Examination of Witnesses (Questions 360-379)
Mr Jim Murphy and Ms Jennifer Cole
3 JULY 2008
Q360 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Can
we take it, given what you have already said, that you will be
pressing for Justice and Home Affairs and the more narrowly external
to be more integrated?
Mr Murphy: We certainly will. This of
course will not be a conversation about the Lisbon Treaty but
one of the difficulties in a post Lisbon or non-Lisbon environment
is that the pillar on Justice and Home Affairs was envisaged to
be an important part of the internal facing security work, moving
pillar 3, JHA, into the Community method, but that is not currently
expected.
The Committee suspended from 3.42 pm to
3.54 pm for a division in the House of Commons
Q361 Chairman: Just on the question which
Lord Anderson was raising with you, which is the relations between
the external and the internal dimensions of security, I wonder,
given that the French White Book which has come out has very much
pulled together the internal and the external dimensions of security,
whether there is any chance that one of the things the French
presidency will wish to see given a higher precedence within the
European Security Strategy is this internal dimension of security
and the inter-linkage between both of them.
Mr Murphy: I think there is a genuine
desire in Paris to see a much better inter-linkage. I do not think
it is conceivable or practical for the French presidency or even
in the context of this refreshed Strategy to expect an absolutely
common architecture in the governance of these issues but certainly
a much better cohesion between internal and external, perhaps
a more proportionate spend. It is certainly my understanding that
there is a 10 to one balance internal versus external spend in
the EU budget on migration. I am not certain whether the right
balance is seven to one or eight to one, but is the 10 to one
legacy or a reflection of today and tomorrow? That is another
conversation I think we do need to have.
Q362 Lord Crickhowell: I would like
to come to energy security, which is rather another aspect of
the internal/external. It is a subject we have been pursuing with
a number of witnesses. Clearly, Europe is faced with an energy
supply problem, notably with gas from Russia on and so on, which
is what people tend to think about energy in Europe. That is really
an economic infrastructure subject. One of the things that has
come out of the evidence is that what many people are thinking
in terms of the energy strategy, or vision, as one rather wisely
thought of it rather than a strategy, was the fact that states
around the world, including Russia, are over-dependent on energy
and that when it runs out, they may be faced with severe internal
crises and become weak and fragile states, and that again, if
energy shortages around the world develop, there may be tensions
between states and even outbreaks of conflict over energy. There
are two quite different issues here, I think, and they are dealt
with probably by different functionaries in the economic community,
one dealing with the energy to Europe supplies and the other with
the creation of the threats to security with which the Strategy
deals. I would be very interested to hear what the Government's
approach is to this and whether you agree that what we are talking
about here is the fragile state, the threats outside, rather than
simply the supply of gas, primarily, to Europe from Russia or
central Asia.
Mr Murphy: I do hope your Lordship does
not mind when I say I think it is all of the above, in that a
genuinely coherent strategy, partially in the Security Strategy
but also in the review of the European Energy Strategy, I think,
has to deal with the pressing problem we have about diversity
of source and diversity of routes to market. In terms of our own
economy, the case is pretty clear; the geopolitics of energy as
well. There is also an additional issue. I think Gareth Thomas
in his letter to your Lordships' Committee talked about the relationship
between climate change and energy as, I think he said, a multiplier
of instability. I think that was the phrase he used. A coherent
strategy should capture all of that. This point about energy source
and route to market: I recently, a month or so ago, travelled
to Baku to meet the President and other members of the government
and those considering investing further in the diversification
of routes to European markets. I think that is the importance
of the Nabucco pipeline. There are at least two important criteria
here: diversity of source and diversity of route to European market
and Nabucco gets you both of those. It is an alternative source
of energy and it is an alternative route of supply to the European
Union's economies that does not travel through Russia, and that
is very important. Other pipelines are important as well but that
is the strategic importance of Nabucco. But it is all of the above,
certainly in terms of the Security Strategy, when you look at
the climate change and energy impacts of the Security Strategy.
Q363 Lord Crickhowell: I do not doubt
the importance of that. Indeed, we address it very firmly in our
report on Russia and Europe. We agree it has a high priority but
when we come to this vision, this European Security Strategy,
it seems to me, and a number of our witnesses have emphasised
this point very strongly, that we must not overlook that, as far
as security and the external threat is concerned, it may not be
the supply to Europe. It may be the tensions created elsewhere
in the world because of energy supply problems in states which
then become vulnerable states and states open to attack. The question
that worries one is that the things may get confused and one needs
to make sure that they are both addressed in the right way.
Mr Murphy: That is right; it is important
to avoid a confusion but the temptation in some of the conversations—I
reflected on this either in evidence to a Commons Select Committee
or in the chamber of the House itself—the conversation and
debate about European energy I think is entirely out of kilter
with the importance of it. The European debate over the past year
has been energetic for all sorts of reasons but, as we perhaps
move away in time from the debate on the Lisbon Treaty and accept
perhaps that is to be parked for a little while and wait to see
the outcome and what happens with Ireland, the energy of the European
debate on these issues I think will gain a much sharper focus.
The danger is we see it through the prism of our relationship
with Russia or the world's relationship with Iran, both of those
things and an awful lot more besides, but, regardless of the failed
state security threat in oil or gas-producing nations, it is an
over-arching strategic priority for us to do what we can in terms
of these pipelines, which is why I went to Baku.
Q364 Lord Hannay: Minister, I wonder
if we could talk about weapons of mass destruction. First really
an analytical question to you: to what extent has proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear, become a
greater security concern since the 2003 Strategy was agreed? Is
it to an extent that needs to be reflected in the review of implementation
that is under way? What is your assessment also of the risks posed
by the very big increase in civil nuclear power that is likely
to occur as a result of climate change negotiations and also demand
for electricity? Then if I could step somewhat wider than that
and ask you whether you believe that the Security Strategy needs
to take account of the very important developments in the last
few months on both sides of the Atlantic with regard to the need
to revive the multilateral nuclear disarmament agenda, efforts
led by Schultz, Perry, Nunn and Kissinger on the far side of the
Atlantic but taken up in the pages of The Times this week
by three former Foreign Secretaries and a former Secretary General
of NATO, contributed to also by the Foreign Secretary, whether
you think that with that issue rising up the agenda and becoming
very actual next year it needs to be reflected in this review
of the security agenda.
Mr Murphy: In response to those three
specific questions on the nuclear threat, has it become more acute
since the 2003 Strategy, the direct answer is yes, with North
Korea, Iran and potentially Syria, but certainly the first two,
and further work has to go on in terms of the detail of Syria's
intentions or ambitions, which are entirely unlawful if indeed
it is for military capabilities. In terms of the growth of the
civil nuclear industry, or renaissance, as I think it has been
described elsewhere, as your Lordships will be aware, we do support
continued growth of civil nuclear programmes, as long as there
is inspection and oversight and as long as there is an acute sensitivity
to the nuclear cycle and nuclear material not falling into the
wrong hands. In principle we think it is right. In fact, we actively
support other nations in their ambitions for civil nuclear capacity.
Indeed, that is the message we are giving to Iran, amongst others,
as your Lordships will be aware. In terms of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty in advance of the Review Conference in 2010, we would like
to see the European Union playing a bigger role—Member States
but also the European Union—to give greater energy to the
multilateral disarmament commitments that nuclear nations have
signed up to. I think it has been reflected in the Government's
response to this. We would very much welcome a higher profile
conversation in advance of the Review Conference. I know, Lord
Hannay, this will not happen with the members of this Committee
but as long as it does not confuse the issue about and the right
of Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, which is, of course, one of the
basic pillars of the NPT, as your Lordships will be aware.
Q365 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
Minister, can you just expand a bit on the civil nuclear renaissance?
The fact is that it is actually many countries in the region who
are finding that they have uranium. Some of them are relatively
poor countries with few natural resources who want to exploit
their uranium to the utmost. Others are pretty rich countries
who already have supplies of oil and gas but who have also seen
that they want to have that sort of capacity into the future.
What sort of effort is the EU making in terms of the sorts of
things that you were talking about, that is to say, the regular
inspection, the nuclear cycle? These are exhortations that you
have made, "This is OK provided that ... " but in what
active way do you think that the EU through the Strategy ought
to be really getting round these issues? Frankly, I have been
involved in some of this bilaterally and I do not see a great
deal of EU activity. I see quite a lot of UK activity and quite
a lot of American activity and I see the International Atomic
Energy Authority being very interested, but not actually the EU.
Mr Murphy: In response to Lord Hannay's
point I said that we would like to see a greater role for the
EU and greater involvement of the EU.
Q366 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
How?
Mr Murphy: It is about getting involved
in the funding of technological advancement. It is about offering
technological advice and on some occasions investment, certainly
in the poorer nations, or where investment would help pinpoint
the type of behaviour we would like to see. The European Union,
the Commission and others being involved at that early stage.
The fact is—and I know you are very acutely aware of this—we
have said to these other countries that we strongly support the
principle of doing so, whether it is for economic purposes, whether
it is, as some try and couch it, for climate change purposes,
and for others sometimes it is status, to be frank. Therefore,
a greater role for the EU at that early point, sending the dual
message of welcoming, in fact celebrating their ambitions, but
within the proper context. There is a greater role for the EU.
I am not in a position this afternoon to comment on the detail
of the EU's failings or deficiencies in this, but I am happy to
reflect on it and return to it, if you wish.
Q367 Lord Hannay: If we could change
now to a subject which has also come on to the international agenda
since the 2003 European Security Strategy was agreed, which was
the acceptance by all Member States in UN of the responsibility
to protect. Up to now that has not been very easy to implement,
to put it mildly, and there has been much talk about it but not
much action, and it has proved in a number of specific cases,
of which I imagine Zimbabwe is the most recent but Darfur of course
is the most prominent over a longer period and there was a brief
reference to it in the case of Burma, but it has been very difficult
to articulate this new principle which the European Union's 27
members were very prominent in promulgating in 2005. I just wondered
whether you felt that the Security Strategy should point the way
forward to a renewed effort to make this a practical working reality
rather than just a few words on paper which, frankly, are losing
credibility as, when circumstances arise where people are not
protected, the international community finds itself unable to
do much about it, and whether this should not be one of the directions
in which a European Security Strategy which is committed to effective
multilateralism should be looking in the future.
Mr Murphy: The UK's National Security
Strategy, of course, acknowledges the importance of the responsibility
to protect, and so should the European Security Strategy. One
of the things that surprised me in my reading over the past few
weeks in advance of conversations about the European Security
Strategy, and I perhaps should have known this, is that all 191
Member States, countries who have membership of the UN, signed
up to this responsibility to protect. We can perhaps with a spirit
of realism come to a sense of how firm and how specific and how
strong a commitment it was when all the Member States of the UN
signed up to it. I say that only as a way of reflecting. It has
not been precise enough. The UK raised the responsibility to protect
in the context of Burma. The UN Secretary-General said that Kenya
was a most pressing recent example of responsibility to protect.
The important development is that the Secretary-General is due
to return to the UN with a report about institutionalising the
responsibility to protect, and I think that is when we get to
a sharper conversation about what all 191 countries actually believed
that they signed up to and the consequences of them signing up
to it. I think that is the pressure point on responsibility to
protect. In the mean time, we will continue to cite it on the
basis that all countries in the UN signed up to it. The short
answer to your question about the European Security Strategy is
yes, it should find an important place in the Security Strategy.
Q368 Lord Chidgey: Minister, I would
like to move on to questions regarding climate change. I will
start, if I may, with the formal question which you are aware
of concerning the High Representative and his counterpart, who
presented a joint report in the March 2008 European Council in
which they drew attention to the impact of climate change on international
security. Then, of course, there is your letter to us on 26 May,
which joined together with this question. It would appear that
the Government is concerned that these recommendations from the
High Representative were not really ambitious enough given the
size of the challenge, which therefore brings us to the main body
of this discussion as to what the European Security Strategy should
be undertaking. Perhaps you could now spend a little time giving
us the Government's view on that in relation to your letter to
us in late May.
Mr Murphy: Of course I will happily do
so. I was struck by a comment that Lord Crickhowell made in the
context of energy, about how a wise sage had reflected that perhaps
this was more of a vision than a strategy, and I think in response
to this question the report by the Commission is more of a vision
than a strategy.
Q369 Lord Chidgey: It was a pragmatic
Anglo-Saxon that influenced it.
Mr Murphy: A pragmatic and principled
Anglo-Saxon. I had the opportunity to be in Berlin earlier in
the week and made a speech trying to persuade our colleagues in
Berlin that actually our view of Europe was both pragmatic and
principled. They accepted the former resolutely but needed some
convincing of the latter. Nevertheless, it is a vision rather
than a strategy as it currently exists. This point about regional
instability—I was struck when reading in preparing for today
by the regional aspect of this. Your Lordships, again, I have
only brought one copy of this but I will happily provide it to
your Lordships. Earlier in the summer myself, the Foreign Secretary
and the whole ministerial team in the Foreign Office Board looked
at this issue of climate change and the regional impact in the
context of the Security Strategy on water scarcity, demography,
crop decline, hunger, coastal risks and finally recent conflicts,
and it is a global matter of where the interaction between all
six is. I think it may be helpful for your Lordships' Committee
to see where the Foreign & Commonwealth Office Board and Ministers
consider the interplay between all six of these factors to be,
at least five of which are directly relating to climate change,
one of which indirectly but I think in time increasingly directly
related to climate change, which is conflict. It may be helpful.
This is the multiplier of instability template across the globe;
it certainly is the guide to the Foreign Office in the work we
are doing in this matter, as it is for the rest of the Government
and, perhaps not surprisingly, north and central Africa and parts
of the Middle East having perhaps four or five of these factors
laid on top of one another, with the UK only having one, which
is the coastal risk. I will happily provide a copy of this for
your Lordships' Committee. On what more the Security Strategy
should do, in addition to providing resource, which is important,
in addition to providing support by scientific development on
climate-sensitive technologies and energy generation and transport
and everything else that goes with it, it is also about a greater
investment in things like mitigation of disasters, preparation
for and mitigation of the tragically inevitable increase over
the short to medium term of man-made natural disasters. Substantial
work is going in there as well. Ourselves and the Dutch in particular
are working on that matter.
Q370 Lord Chidgey: Thank you for
that. In your earlier remark you touched on the issue that these
matters have started to spill over into conflict issues, which
have far greater significance perhaps in the medium term, if I
can put it that way, to the security issues we are talking about.
Can you tell us what sort of input the UK has been able to have
in addressing that with our colleagues in terms of this European
Security Strategy? It seems to spill over much wider issues—I
do not want to get into them because they could get out of hand—talking
with our EU counterparts in terms of providing physical security
against conflict within states we are bounded by in terms of the
energy resources that you mentioned, for example.
Mr Murphy: Our aim in the work we are
doing is to ensure that, while this map is informative I think—I
know it is certainly informative and illustrative—it is
worth reflecting on, without EU and international action, what
this map will look like in the future in terms of the very clear
prediction on the link between hunger, crop decline and conflict.
It is worrying—that is a glib way of putting it; it is much
more than worrying about the trends behind crop decline and hunger
and the relationship conflict which is why the UK, the Dutch but
also the World Bank are working on climate change prevention technologies
and the relationship between that and conflict. I will happily,
in conjunction with colleagues in DfID, provide more detail to
your Lordships on this work we are doing, particularly with the
Dutch and the World Bank. A final point perhaps on this, and I
hope your Lordships accept I am not one of those who says, "We
have managed to persuade Europe to do more of what we would like"
because, as I have said before, that is a recipe for fuelling
Euro-scepticism, not overcoming it, but this is one of the issues
where it is genuinely the case that the UK has been in the lead
in the relationship between climate change, conflict and security.
Q371 Lord Crickhowell: I welcome
what you have just said on climate change and really in many respects
it was the same point I was making about energy. There are two
aspects to this. In the case of climate change, Europe happens
to have a very strong climate change policy which it is trying
to implement and have an impact on other countries as well. What
we are really talking about here—and we have talked about
mitigation of disasters and hunger and crops and so on—is
also adaptation in the widest sense. What I was trying to seek
in the energy question is that, in developing this Security Strategy
or vision, one has really got to concentrate on those aspects
which really are security-related rather than the home economic
aspects, because otherwise we will get into a confusion. It seemed
to me that you rather clearly were stating it in the case of climate
change, and what I am hoping is that if we are adapting the policy
as a security policy, we are emphasising those aspects which are
security-related clearly, because otherwise I think we get into
a muddle. It seemed to me you were doing that rather clearly in
the case of climate change and addressing what are really security
aspects.
Mr Murphy: I apologise to your Lordships
if I gave the impression that on both energy and on climate change
there is a domestic EU economic imperative but also very clear
international peace/conflict prevention dimension as well. I was
hoping to emphasise that on both aspects. I apologise to your
Lordships if I gave the impression but it certainly was not my
intention. It is important on both climate change and energy.
Chairman: We have been very interested
that you have put it like this today because we had an earlier
witness talking a bit about the French White Book and suggesting
that there again in looking at security were these inter-linkages
across. Again, it is one of the points which it is rather important
we should see made more clearly in the review of the Security
Strategy.
Q372 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Minister,
in an earlier reply you appeared to adopt the view that this 2003
document is a vision and is not a strategy, and suggested that
the revision should be more action-orientated. In respect of climate
change, in your letter of May 26 you write "We are working
to ensure that the report leads to concrete EU action, including
regional studies and deeper analysis of climate and security issues."
How are you going to do this? How will you seek to ensure that
it will be more action-orientated, will concentrate more on implementation?
Do you envisage, for example, a series of appendices which relate
specifically to proposed action, including timetables?
Mr Murphy: Lord Anderson, what I was
saying was that specifically the report on climate change is more
of a vision than a strategy. This specific train of work. The
work is to be concluded by December. We have plans to conclude
this specific work that Solana and the Commission are doing on
climate change by December. I think there is a general acceptance
that there have to be many more specifics added to this general
vision and that is the process that we are in just now.
Q373 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Within
the body of the document?
Mr Murphy: Yes. It is within Member States
proposing specific courses of action which are specific enough
to be tracked and monitored but are realistic enough to be achieved.
Q374 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: If Member
States are going to make those sorts of suggestions, should they
not couple them with the increased capabilities they are prepared
to contribute towards what they want to see happen? It does not
really matter what you put in this document, either as it is now
or as it might be revised; if the capabilities to do things are
not there, nothing will happen.
Mr Murphy: That is fair. It is the capabilities
to do these things but also—I will probably put this rather
inelegantly—the capability within the receiving country,
the capacity of the receiving country to absorb the support that
is being offered. The Security Strategy is not an aspirational
document; it is a very strong statement of the collective view
of the European Union countries about the threats that we face
and what we should do to resolve them. So it cannot be aspirational;
there have to be specifics but, as I say, also the specifics at
the other end. I think it is a fair point but it is only part
of the story about deliverability. It has to be deliverable but
also receivable. That is rather an inelegant way of putting it.
Q375 Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Would
you not also agree that actually what has happened under the existing
document is that Europe has massively extended its foreign interventions
in a number of different areas since 2003 and the restraint, as
much as anything, has been capabilities? You need a lead nation,
say France, to say that they think a European mission should be
sent to Chad, and then they try and gather anybody else they can
to join in on the exercise, but if France does not have the political
will and the capability to lead the mission to Chad, nothing happens.
Mr Murphy: Of course, the Security Strategy
is a political declaration. In that context, it is agreed unanimously
by Member States at the European Council and it is a political
declaration of intent about what Member States are willing to
collectively enter into to support and protect their own and other
populations. As your Lordships know, it is not a legal document
so it will always rely on political will, but the important point
I was referring to in Lord Hannay's question about responsibility
to protect is that it was political will that got 191 countries
to sign up to a document that we would wish to see play a greater
role in conflict prevention and conflict intervention on occasion.
On the political will, of course it requires ourselves, the French,
the Germans, the Dutch and others to have the political will to
put technology, equipment and people on the ground, both military
and civilian. Some people bemoan this but I actually think it
is a very important part of making a positive case for Europe
that we can achieve much more by co-operation, for example, in
Kosovo. We can achieve an awful lot more by co-operating with
other European nations than we could ever do by ourselves. That
is the important part of the Strategy that in the past I do not
think we have made enough of and, hopefully, if we can agree a
comprehensive Strategy, it is a very strong case for Europe in
and of itself to be a world player.
Q376 Lord Hannay: Yes, but surely
Lord Hamilton's point is a perfectly valid one, that if you are
going to have a review of this Strategy and you are going to both
confirm existing priorities and perhaps refer to one or two new
ones, like climate change, responsibility to protect and so on,
you are going to need to accept that these broad lines of policy
will only work if the capabilities are there to make them work,
and that it is no good proclaiming them if you do not follow that
through and then produce capabilities, which of course could be
completely different. Climate change means Europe doing its bit
primarily and giving a lead and being prepared credibly to reduce
its carbon emissions and so on. In the responsibility to protect
it is quite different. The point about the capabilities is surely
a very valid one. There has been some shortfall in the period
between 2003 and now in turning what was a pretty good document,
as everybody feels it was, into a living political policy reality.
Mr Murphy: Certainly we have looked at
the 2003 document and reflected on it, and one of the lessons
is that we should all only enter into a set of political commitments
that we can reasonably be expected to have the political will
to fulfil. So despite the progress in Afghanistan, for example—and
we may have time to talk about that—there are problems about
commitments in Afghanistan. This is an important point about climate
change. There is so much to this, but climate change is, of course,
the major emergence since 2003, and we have to get our own house
in order. Renewables: the UK was the first EU Member State last
week to publish its consultation on renewables. What do we do
in terms of Poland? I am not a specialist on the Polish economy
or industry but I think 96 or 97 per cent of Polish energy is
generated by coal-fired power stations. As we encourage other
countries outside the EU to be doing the right thing on climate
change, we also have to do the right thing within European Union
boundaries and borders. My short answer to Lord Hamilton's question
is that we should enter into this political agreement at the end
of the year with our eyes fully open, with a full understanding
about what it means for the UK and for the other 26 countries
of the European Union, and get a collective understanding and
a willingness to do what we sign up to.
Q377 Chairman: I wonder if we could
go on to another issue. I think it was during the Portuguese presidency
that the EU began to see the links between security and development
and governance in approaching the problems of fragile states.
I wonder whether you feel, although there is obviously some reference
to development in the 2003 document, this question of stabilising
fragile states is not something that has become more important
over this five-year period and the problems arising from what
one might call the implosion of fragile states are one of the
real sources of insecurity in the modern world. How far do you
feel that ought to be taken into account in the revision?
Mr Murphy: There is certainly a greater
international sensitivity to the impact of failed states, the
regional impact and in some instances the global impact of failed
states, which I am certain will be reflected in the refreshed
Security Strategy. It is important that that work is done. I think
there has been some progress. Your Lordships' Committee know very
well the work that is going on in Afghanistan, in Kosovo in particular,
and in parts of the Palestinian Authority which are directly linked
to the worries about failed statehood, the regional impact and
the wider impact of failed statehood. The realisation, the political,
military and economic realisation of the impact of failed states,
the good work that has happened in some instances but also where
we have not got it exactly right on failed states, I think that
should also be reflected, the ability of military and civilian
co-operation on the ground, for example.
Q378 Lord Anderson of Swansea: There
will presumably be a section on Russia but I assume that would
have been overtaken to some extent by the agreed view of the Union,
the new mandate in relation to Russia. Although there has been
difficulty in reaching a consensus you would presumably say there
will at least be something, possibly aspirational, but rather
alongside, paralleled, by the actual discussions which are under
way with Russia.
Mr Murphy: This certainly has to be much
more than aspirational. It has to be firm and specific and wide-ranging.
That is the mandate the EU has agreed. I omitted to mention this
earlier so thank you, Lord Anderson, for giving me a chance to
mention it now, because, in the context of energy, an important
part of our conversation with Russia is that again, looking at
these facts before coming here today, the difficulty—and
I am not shy of acknowledging this difficulty—on energy
policy in relation to Russia is that, looking at the table—and
again, if your Lordships do not have this table, I am happy to
provide it—about energy import/export dependence, my reading
of is that seven Member States are 100 per cent reliant—
Q379 Chairman: We published a table
of this sort in our own report.
Mr Murphy: Seven states are 100 per cent
reliant; of their imports, 100 per cent are Russian. If I am sitting
in a European capital as a politician in one of those countries
where, of our imports, 100 per cent is Russian, I think the tone
of the debate about our relationship with Russia is slightly different.
Notwithstanding that, there is an EU mandate which is broad-ranging,
which even goes so far as to say it should be a legally binding
agreement between ourselves and Russia. So it cannot be aspirational.
I think it is a step backwards.
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