Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Question Number 100-119)

Mr Niall Mackenzie, Mr David Capper and Mr Martin Bond

2 JULY 2008

  Q100  Viscount Brookeborough: Yes.

  Mr Capper: In addition to what Niall said, the way that new entrants after 2013 or after 2012 will be treated is that the European Commission has proposed that there will be a pot of five per cent of the total number of allowances, which will be reserved for new entrants—so these are new installations. So, for example, in a particular sector like, say, cement, if there is a new installation after 2012 then, assuming that the cement sector as a whole is still receiving free allowances in phase 3 after 2012, the new installation in that sector will receive free allowances under the same rules that existing installations receive free allowances. So there should not be any distortion between those existing installations and new installations.

  Q101  Viscount Brookeborough: Thank you. And you believe that Member States should not be constrained by fixed levels of auctioning and would a minimum level of auctioning be acceptable to you all?

  Mr Mackenzie: Yes, we think there should be a harmonised minimum level, so if the European agreement was to have 80 per cent for sector X, 80 per cent of auctioning that individual Member States in pursuit of their own environmental ambitions or indeed the market conditions in different countries you could have a higher figure. You cannot allow a complete free for all because then there is an issue of subsidy to some sectors and some countries. So you have to have a harmonised minimum but if one Member State wants to effectively increase the costs for its sectors then ministers in that country should be allowed to do that.

  Q102  Viscount Brookeborough: We would often hear that the United Kingdom is very good at gold plating; is this an option that you really want to leave open, that we can go further than anybody else to lead?

  Mr Mackenzie: One person's gold plating is another's leading environmental ambition from the front. So I think we would see that as increasing environmental ambition and not one to effectively subsidise some sectors. We would take the view that some industries in the UK may not have the same competitive pressures that others do and reserve the right to be able to increase their rate of auctioning.

  Q103  Viscount Brookeborough: What about redistributing auctioning allowances away from the UK?

  Mr Mackenzie: Again we are opposed to that because we do not think that the Emissions Trading System should be the mean for distributing money around the EU—there are structural funds and other measures for doing that. It has to be said that this will be a challenging part of the negotiations, given that it would appear that the Commission have created a qualified majority who benefit financially from this proposal, so seeking to change that in negotiations will be tough, but we are committed to doing that and we have the support from quite a number of Member States.

  Q104  Viscount Brookeborough: I am not suggesting that businesses would necessarily be for it, but to a previous question you said that the funds received from auctioning would not necessarily be committed to other environmental projects. You seem to be rather ignoring the PR side of this of the environmentalists who would like, probably, to see the funds being reallocated not only to poor areas in the EU but also elsewhere.

  Mr Mackenzie: I think the issue is do you announce upfront that you are going to spend the money on the environment or do you have a series of programmes and measures decided at national level for which you then use the money. We have not done the sums but certainly the amount of auctioning we have in phase 2 of the Emissions Trading Scheme between 2008 and 2012 the proceeds from that are not as much as we spend on the environment already in the UK. So there is an issue going forward at what point will auction receipts exceed what we already spend on environmental measures, given that they cover a whole range of energy efficiency technological innovation and so on. But obviously this is a decision for ministers.

  Q105  Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe: What role, if any, does the ETS have in supporting developing countries to address their greenhouse gas emissions?

  Mr Mackenzie: A major role. In fact one of the main successes of the Emissions Trading System is that the demand for market mechanism projects created under Kyoto comes almost totally from the EU ETS because under Kyoto individual countries can buy these allowances, these credits to meet their own targets, but in Europe we have created a private sector demand for these because they can surrender these allowances to meet the regulatory requirements of the Emissions Trading System, and because of that it has been a main driver in creating the market. That then creates revenue streams in the developing countries to help them invest and install low carbon technology.

  Q106  Lord Cameron of Dillington: Hypothecation in other words!

  Mr Mackenzie: Market mechanism is better!

  Q107  Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe: You did cover carbon leakage to some extent earlier on. Could you just run through the areas in which you think there may be problems?

  Mr Mackenzie: We are very clear at this stage that we cannot name sectors at this stage because we have not finished the analysis in the UK as to which sectors are at risk of leakage. We think in terms of the negotiations of the package as well we have a very limited time frame and if we try to inject decisions on individual sectors into that political negotiation process it would risk derailing the process, and it is important that we across Europe have a shared understanding of which sectors really are at risk, based on the analysis of the data. The Commission has started a data collection exercise but it has to be said that the work which we commissioned, which I referred to earlier, by Climate Strategies, Oxford Economics and others shows that this is very complex and it is important to get it right. We think that the Commission time table and their proposal is too long because industry would not know until 2011 under their timescale. We think it can be brought forward a whole year so that every industry would know where they stood and what measures were in place to protect them if they were at risk of leakage by the middle of 2010.

  Q108  Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe: We had Greenpeace here last week in front of us and they were somewhat more sceptical about the extent to which there is carbon leakage.

  Mr Mackenzie: There is a risk. I think they are right to be sceptical; every industry I have been speaking to in the UK, apart from one, which I will not name because it would not be fair, have said that they are at risk of leakage. And so they should; they need to protect their industries' interests. I think that all that we are saying and advising ministers is let us look at the data and make sure that we have a solid basis to make the decision rather than just trying to make an assumption based, possibly, on lobbying power and possibly on other factors as to which sectors are at risk; let us make sure it is based on the evidence, and ministers do this in a transparent process across the board of the EU.

  Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe: As you pinched one of my questions virtually, my Lord Chairman, maybe I can pinch one of yours! I go back to an earlier issue and back to agriculture and to New Zealand as well. You did mention that in New Zealand agriculture is a very substantial part of their economy, yet they are intending to go ahead and cover it by carbon trading in the whole system. You said it is different there; could you say a little bit more about how different it is and whether in fact there is any possibility of using the model that they have developed there to transpose it across here? Could you also say whether you are working in collaboration with the New Zealand in a sense you seeing them as a test bed?

  Q109  Chairman: Before you answer that I will come in as well! Within the UK agriculture in Scotland constitutes a much greater percentage of carbon than the UK generally. Are you taking account of differences with the devolved administrations from sector to sector?

  Mr Mackenzie: Yes, is the answer. The issue with agriculture, I hope I was not suggesting that we are different from New Zealand in agriculture—it is the same basic problem. I think the proportion of their emissions that come from agriculture is significantly different and that is why they are looking at it perhaps sooner than we have. I think the issues are still the same. It is the balance between the burden of regulation and the incentives that you are trying to create on farmers. The department commissioned work by NERA last year, which looked at this issue, and concluded that the Emissions Trading System was probably too burdensome for the vast number of small farms to be practicable, and that project-based mechanisms might be more appropriate. Since that work has been done we have learnt more details about what New Zealand is doing and we are planning to do some further analysis and review whether a lighter touch and a different way of doing emissions trading might work because New Zealanders obviously think it can. So we are going to look very seriously at what they are doing. But picking the right mechanism is the crucial thing, and again just as there are issues of carbon leakage for industry there is exponentially more for agriculture because you have to avoid creating an incentive whereby you reduce the number of cows and sheep in our fields but we import more meat and lamb. There is a whole range of issues to be looked at and that is how we build mechanisms requires careful consideration. We are looking at it and we continue to look at it and obviously we can keep you informed as to our progress. I do not think any of that will be in the timescale that we are looking at these negotiations because the level of complexity is so great. But one of the features that we are looking at in the Commission proposal is the ability for individual countries to opt in other sectors subject to criteria. I am not sure whether it is currently big enough or flexible enough to opt in such a large sector as agriculture. I referred earlier to the concerns about destabilising the Emissions Trading System by bringing in too big a sector too quickly under the wrong mechanism. So we have to decide what the right mechanism for agriculture is, then if there is a market-based mechanism is the Emissions Trading System the correct approach. I have to say that we are undertaking further consultancy work and internal review within the department.

  Q110  Chairman: When you were talking about leakage you quite rightly referred to the need to look at the data and give advice based on the evidence. At some stage a judgment has to be reached and what are the criteria, what sort of data is it that you will use to make that judgment?

  Mr Mackenzie: That is one of the key issues we have asked industry in our consultation paper; we have laid out the criteria, which I will get David to summarise in a minute, and asked is this the right criteria? There is a big debate we are starting with industry about whether impact on profits is a good measure, given that profits vary year on year. So we are very keen to have the debate and the Committee's thoughts on the criteria we have suggested and whether they are the right ones would be very valuable, because if we can get faith in the system that we have picked the right criteria, the process for judging industry against those criteria is transparent and open and industry can see where they are heading, they can make investment decisions fairly confident that they will come through this process and things will be much clearer. Perhaps I can ask David to explain where we are on the criteria.

  Mr Capper: What has happened with the criteria is that the European Commission has proposed some high level criteria on the face of the directive. The key test that they put down is the ability of sectors or sub-sectors to pass on the cost of the allowances without a significant loss of market share. Under that they have four sub-criteria which allow them to make an assessment on that headline measure. This obviously helps industry to some extent in that they have some sense of how the Commission will be undertaking this assessment. What we have done in terms of our consultation document and our impact assessment is to attempt to flesh out these criteria in more detail. This is primarily to give industry more certainty about how the assessment might be done and therefore to inform the UK's negotiating position on exactly what these criteria should be as we sign up, hopefully, to the deal in December.

  Q111  Chairman: Anything more specific?

  Mr Mackenzie: We can send you the criteria I have drawn to your attention, and the impact assessment, if that would be helpful, which sets out what we are currently thinking and what we actually ask industry[2].

  Q112Chairman: Are you getting a feeling that other Member States are thinking in the same terms when it comes to criteria, or are people jumping up with all different sorts of criteria.

  Mr Mackenzie: Very much a consensus and I have to pay tribute to the work that David has done in terms of negotiating with other Member States. We have a common position with four or five other key Member States where we are getting quite a lot of consensus and there is a lot of support amongst officials around Europe that this is a good way to deal with it; growing support amongst politicians who see that having a clear and open process for doing it. It is in everyone's interests in terms of being transparent and fair. Obviously the devil is in the detail but we want to try and make sure—and that is one of the main things we certainly want out of our consultations—that the UK industry understands what the criteria are and feed back to us their concerns with it or how it can be improved. We are not saying that we know everything, and we are very keen to get the feedback from industry, particularly given the analysis that we commissioned earlier last year, which showed the relationship with quality of data, and if you are going to make judgments you want to make sure that the data is fair and accurate and not open to abuse to get someone to get the right answer for that industry or for that environmental outcome. We want this to be a genuinely open and transparent process.

  Q113  Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lord Chairman, I preface my question by saying I register an interest in relation to renewable energy, but maybe not directly to linkage but I put that on the record. You have referred to, in reply to Lord Brooke, about the importance of ETS and supporting developing countries and you have also touched on New Zealand. Clearly there are other parts of the world which are developing similar systems and it was one of the issues in the current US Presidential campaign as well. In terms of devising this particular scheme what steps are taken to try and facilitate linkages between the different schemes that either are already there or may emerge?

  Mr Mackenzie: The basic first step in the Commission's proposal is to actually amend the directive to allow it to allow a new mechanism to link and to give a process which is very welcome, and we have pushed the Commission hard on before they published the proposal and we are glad to see it is in there. Then there is a lively debate to be had through the whole of this review of the Emissions Trading System. If we take certain decisions either on carbon linkage or anything there is a risk that we make it harder to link with other schemes, and things like a small emitter threshold. If we decide a smaller emitter threshold at one level if we linked to another scheme would it have to have the same level or a different one? We think that most of these things are negotiable and they can be changed to have sufficient flexibility. We have again of course in our consultation and indeed in the impact assessment, criteria for linking that should inform the decision whether we link with an American or Australian scheme, and things like environmental integrity impact on the allowance price; and just how robust their monitoring and reporting is. So I think we want to try and agree—I do not want this to sound like officials always resort to criteria—that having a criteria and evidence base on which the political decision to link can be made is a sensible way forward. So we are confident that we will have the ability to link.

  Q114  Lord Wallace of Tankerness: Is there an actual experience of that or do you have particular schemes in mind?

  Mr Mackenzie: At the moment we are effectively the only scheme, national scheme—or international scheme. There is the CDM, obviously, which is project based in the developing world. There are individual states in America setting up schemes but not a federal system. The Australians hope to introduce one this year; and we have already referred to New Zealand. Those are the ones that are in existence, or who are about to come into existence. They hope to learn from the mistakes we made—phase 1 was very much learning by doing—and we hope to learn from some of the mistakes they make in further improving the Emissions Trading Scheme. As long as we are based on the same basic principles of environmental integrity and a tonne of CO2 is a tonne of CO2 come what may, then most schemes should be able to link. The technical difficulty will be the detail of linking, but I think we have to see other schemes up and running before we can make the decision to link, because just as we are wary about expanding the Emissions Trading System to new sectors in the European economy linking it to another economy has the same risks, so we have to understand the risks. We may take the decision that it is worth impact X on the European markets to get the deal, we may not; but, again, that is what ministers would have to decide, as to widening the market. It is very hard at this stage to judge what the correct judgment would be because we will be linking with something that does not yet exist.

  Q115  Lord Wallace of Tankerness: That follows to another question you answered when you pointed out the different proportion of agriculture in Scotland to the rest of the UK. Climate change, as I understand it, is actually a devolved issue because it is not expressly reserved, but there are many aspects of climate change that clearly are reserved matters. What is your relationship, dialogue with the devolved administrations to the extent that it is relevant for the position of the UK in negotiations?

  Mr Mackenzie: Apologies, I should not have just said "yes" to the Chairman's question. We are in very frequent contact with all the devolved administrations because although environment is obviously devolved EU negotiations are not. The beauty of the Emissions Trading System is that there are economies of scale, so we want to make sure that we have reflected the needs of the whole of or the relevance of the UK economy, so we are in very frequent contact with them. None of the negotiating positions that we are discussing within government go anywhere until the devolved administrations have had a chance to discuss them. Ministers meet periodically as well to discuss this and other issues, but I think it is fair to say, certainly at working level, if not weekly contact then almost weekly contact, particularly with my colleagues in Scotland who obviously have a larger number of installations in the Emissions Trading System than Wales and Northern Ireland. But we are in very close contact and we draw on their knowledge and understanding of the sectors and their economy.

  Q116  Chairman: Could I ask the ultimate sceptical question, which is something along the lines of why a global Emissions Trading System makes considerable sense the effect of regional schemes result in carbon leakage on the one hand or they result in your own producers being landed with additional costs which make them internationally less competitive.

  Mr Mackenzie: I do not think that is the case. The analysis we have done on phase 1 of the Emissions Trading System, learning by doing, there was very much towards the end the price of the allowances reduced to virtually nothing because of the over supply in the market. Despite that there is clear evidence that the people were pricing carbon into their investment decisions. There has been some analysis by academics suggesting that before the price fell there was evidence of people focusing more on energy efficiency. One of the industry consultancies—Point Carbon—did a survey last year which said that something like 65 per cent of Emissions Trading Scheme participants had secured some abatement because they were aware that this was now costing them. If just having a price affects people's behaviour and makes people in industry actually count their emissions, which they did not do before, again that is the same answer to those who say rising fuel prices mean we do not need a carbon price as well. But, yes, you do because that only takes you so far. The issue then about leakage is that leakage does affect some sectors but only a few sectors. There are then two issues with that: an international global deal is the best solution to leakage because then all industry is caught by the same carbon price or a similar carbon price; but if in the absence of a global scheme you have regional schemes you can trade mechanisms to protect the few sectors that are likely to be at risk, probably by means of extra free allocation of allowances rather than building a wall around Europe to protect your industry, which does not sit well with World Trade Organisation systems. But it is doable and again I think that the UK view is very much that this is all a time limited problem; that we will reach the global agreement at some point; and the issue is how long is the gap in which these sectors are at real risk of leakage?

  Q117  Lord Cameron of Dillington: Could you explain how you arrived at the figure of £6.49 billion being the benefit to the UK of your proposals over the current Commission's proposals?

  Mr Mackenzie: It is based on two things. To start with, this is a partial impact assessment on which we are effectively asking people's opinion, so we are not saying that is the price; and, as you know, there are a range of scenarios in the partial impact assessment. Our figures are based on internal modelling jointly done between Defra and BERR, which contain a range of assumptions. I am not an economist but economists tell me that all modelling has assumptions which are challengeable; they could be right, they could be wrong. So that figure is our best estimate with the current information that we have. We gain some confidence in that figure in that the efforts of our modelling is very similar to the work that the Commission has done. They have, I think, used three different models and have come up with broadly similar figures. So we think they are in the right region of analysis. The other point I should make, obviously, is that these figures are contrasting the proposals before us now, which we are considering, to change the system with the old directive. They are not against not having a scheme, these are the cost benefits of moving from the current directive to the new one.

  Q118  Lord Cameron of Dillington: You have not really answered my question, you have just given me a lot of caveats.

  Mr Mackenzie: In terms of how it is broken down and different costs and so on?

  Q119  Lord Cameron of Dillington: Yes. Could you give me the main headline figures?

  Mr Mackenzie: The headline figure in terms of cost—and these figures are all net present value—£0.94 billion is the total cost to the UK, which we estimate, which is the cost of industry, installing and buying the technology to reduce emissions, or buying the allowances. We cannot split between the two because different industries and different companies may—



2   http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/consult.euets-2013amendments/partial-ia.pdf Section 4.2.3 Back


 
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