European Union -Developments in EU Trade Policy


CHAPTER 3: THE DOHA ROUND

22.  The Doha Development Round commenced at the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. Further details of the Round and the principles to which the discussions must adhere can be found in Box 2. Currently average applied tariffs for all products, all countries stand at 3.7% and bound rates at 9.9%. The application of the tariff cutting formulae on the table at July 2008 has been estimated to cut applied rates to 2.5% and bound rates to 5.7%.[16] Lord Mandelson, Secretary of State for Business, noted that the level of agricultural support was higher, describing it as the "most distortive, least reformed part" of the global trading system (Q 604).

BOX 2

The origins of the Doha Development Round
The Doha Round of WTO trade talks started at the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. As with previous WTO trade rounds, the negotiations are designed to produce a "single undertaking", i.e. one document that is agreed unanimously, which sets out all of the reductions in tariff levels and non-tariff barriers that have been agreed between members.[17] The Doha Declaration set out six principles to which the discussions must adhere. As well as the requirement to produce a single undertaking, these are:

Participation: The negotiations are open to all WTO members.

Transparency: The negotiations have to be transparent.

Special and differential treatment: The negotiations have to take fully into account the principle of special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed countries. This means the inclusion of provisions to allow developing countries more time to adjust to the impact of liberalisation.

Sustainable development: The principles of sustainable development should be reflected in the negotiations.

Subjects not negotiated: Some elements of the WTO work programme set out in the Declaration do not require negotiations, and these must be accorded as high a priority as those that do.

Under the Doha Declaration, the work is organised by a Trade Negotiations Committee, chaired by the WTO Director-General. Work is split into nine streams, each with a separate discussion group. These cover market access, WTO rules, agriculture, services, geographical indications[18], dispute settlement understanding, environment, review of special and differential treatment provisions, and negotiations on existing implementation issues.

There had previously been hope that a round of negotiations could start following the 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle but delegates at that meeting were unable to reach agreement on the scope of the negotiations. Witnesses told us that the events of 11 September 2001 and the consequent uncertainty in global markets had been a driving force behind the creation of the Round (QQ 3, 28). Ms Sheila Page, Senior Research Associate, Overseas Development Institute, described the round as starting "in a sense by accident, from a trade point of view" (Q 6). Witnesses agreed that this expedited start to the Round had made it weak from the outset. Ms Page added that there had not been a build-up of pressure by industry groups to start the Round, and so many countries were not coming under domestic pressure to liberalise (Q 6).

The Doha Round and services

23.  Services make up 77% of EU GDP and employment but represent only 28% of EU external trade (p 221). Liberalisation of trade in services can bring similar benefits as liberalisation of trade in other goods. Yet this area has been curiously neglected: left until last in the negotiations and of less interest to most witnesses.

24.  We asked witnesses whether the removal of the Singapore issues[19] from the Doha Round had, with the benefit of hindsight, damaged the Round as it had left developed countries with fewer areas in which they could gain a tangible benefit. Mr Adrian van den Hoven, Director of International Relations, BusinessEurope, said that the decision to remove them had been a reluctant one but the business community had recognised the broader deal was more important than these issues; there were still sufficient market access issues (particularly regarding access to fast-growing developing countries) in the Round to maintain the interest of the business community (Q 263). Ambassador Gosper, Chair of the WTO General Council, noted that the presence of services in the Doha Agenda meant that there was still an area of significant benefit available to developed countries (Q 370).

25.  Commission officials told us that they had not been trying to achieve liberalisation in the Singapore issues as a quid pro quo for their own tariff reductions and that they had instead withdrawn on these issues because negotiating partners found the issues "too difficult [and] too demanding" to consider as part of the Round (QQ 142-144). Discussions on trade facilitation had continued and had proved fruitful (Q 144). They hoped that developing countries might take up these issues again as they developed more industrial capacity (Q 167).

26.  Services firms normally find regulatory barriers or overt discrimination, rather than tariffs, acting as a barrier to trade (Q 308). So, instead of countries reducing tariffs and calculating the resultant increase in trade, services liberalisation occurs through what are in effect simultaneous bilateral negotiations on regulatory barriers to trade (QQ 297, 369). When these negotiations occur at the WTO, countries have to make the same offer to all countries. It is hard to calculate the precise benefit as trade in services often involves overseas subsidiaries rather than cross-border trade (Q 300). IFSL noted that liberalisation does not always ensure immediate progress; the removal of one regulatory barrier may reveal another which had not previously been taken into account (Q 302).

27.  Progress towards a deal on services during the Doha Round has been even slower than the pace of the Round itself (Q 297). IFSL told us the lack of focus on services was regrettable but was partly because services have been "held hostage" to progress in agriculture and industry. It is also a reflection of the means by which services are negotiated (QQ 301, 310). Ambassador Bruce Gosper, Chair of the WTO General Council, and Ambassador Crawford Falconer, Chair of the WTO Negotiating Group on Agriculture, explained that services cut across several domestic agencies and political portfolios (for example tourism, telecommunications, professional services and postal services) which made it difficult for countries to coordinate their domestic stance before discussing it at the WTO (QQ 371-372, 515-516).

28.  Ms Patricia Francis, Executive Secretary, International Trade Centre, highlighted the positive impact financial services liberalisation could have; the lack of factoring companies in LDCs was preventing small agricultural producers from investing in fertilizer and expanding production (Q 364). IFSL quoted World Bank research which indicated that 15 out of 23 studies had found a positive relationship linking financial liberalisation with growth; four found a neutral relationship and four a negative relationship (p 5). We were cautioned by IFSL and Ms Francis that financial liberalisation needed to be preceded by the creation of efficient contract and property law systems, and regulatory structures, to ensure that the developing country's economy could benefit from the change and to protect consumers (QQ 319-322, 360).

29.  Mr Kamall MEP was pessimistic about the prospects for substantial progress in liberalisation of trade in services via the Doha Round. He gave three reasons: primarily because negotiators had directed their attention to the more difficult agricultural and industrial sectors (Q 208); partly because the single undertaking approach led to countries considering services liberalisation as one of their "negotiating chips" to be bought rather than as a good thing in itself (Q 214); and finally because services liberalisation was "still seen as big European companies being aggressive and taking over ... markets, and we have not addressed that concern" (Q 214). IFSL and Mr Roger Brown, British Bankers' Association, were more optimistic and hoped for at least equivalence to deals in other sectors, a binding of existing openings and new market access opportunities (Q 309).

LABOUR LIBERALISATION

30.  Linda Kaucher, Researcher, London School of Economics, expressed concern about the offers of labour liberalisation made by the EU during the negotiations, and in particular their compatibility with the UK's immigration policy.[20]

The July 2008 Geneva Ministerial

31.  Mr Lamy explained that the Ministerial meeting he called for July 2008 would centre on "twenty topics" which were put up for negotiation at the start of the Round (QQ 411-414, p 155). Ambassador Gosper, Chair of the WTO General Council, outlined a similar set of issues (QQ 390-391), the complexity of which highlighted the difficulties inherent in the negotiations. Despite Mr Lamy's hopefulness that a deal would be reached (Q 414), and press reports[21] of convergence on eighteen of the topics, the Ministerial eventually broke down over the relatively innocuous issue of the design of a formula (the "special safeguard mechanism") which would have allowed developing countries to impose new and substantially higher tariffs in the event of rapid rises in farm commodity imports that might harm small farmers. Discussions on trade in cotton were not concluded.[22]

32.  We took evidence from the Chairs of the negotiating groups on agriculture and non-agricultural market access in the week before the Ministerial, and they explained the positions that had been reached in their groups (QQ 502-505, 484-489).

A LACK OF DRIVERS FOR A DEAL?

33.  Several witnesses told us that WTO members did not feel under pressure to secure a deal. Mr de Jonquières and Dr Mohammad Razzaque, Commonwealth Secretariat, noted research which suggested that the most likely deal, as predicted before the Ministerial, would have only added three days' worth of growth to China and a matter of weeks' worth to the Indian and Brazilian economies (QQ 12, 93). Dr Peter Holmes, Reader in Economics, University of Sussex, reported a conversation with Indian officials who had said that they were able to get a lot of the liberalisation they wanted from legal challenges through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism instead (Q 33) (the Dispute Settlement Mechanism is considered in detail in chapter four). Mr de Jonquières noted that China had made major domestic reforms when it had joined the WTO in 2001 and that the momentum for change in the country had decelerated (Q 12). This viewpoint was supported by Dr Péter Balas, Deputy Director-General, DG Trade, European Commission (Q 128).

34.  Mr Lamy disagreed with this assessment of the Brazilian, Indian and Chinese positions. He told us that the three countries had promoted agriculture to the centre of the negotiations because they knew they could produce agricultural products relatively cheaply but could not match the agricultural support given by the EU and the USA, making agricultural tariff reductions a vital counterweight for industrial liberalisation on their part (Q 415). Dr Razzaque noted that the promises to Least Developed Countries that had underpinned the creation of the Round had not been met and those countries might use their veto to hold out for more progress (Q 97).

35.  Professor Winters emphasised that all of the "low hanging fruit" had already been picked in previous rounds, and the sensitivity of remaining tariffs made a deal less likely (Q 28). However, Mr van den Hoven noted that the volume of European trade meant that even a very small tariff cut could produce significant benefits (Q 264). The Government told us that the overall impact on global economic output could have been in the order of €120 billion per year, of which €30 billion would accrue to the EU and €15 billion to the developing countries (QQ 569, 604). Lord Mandelson, Secretary of State for Business, gave similar figures and added that the opportunity cost of a missed round would be €300 billion per year because of the trade facilitation measures in the Round (Q 604).

BUSINESS COMMUNITY PRESSURE

36.  Pressure from the business lobby for a deal has declined in comparison with previous rounds: Professor Winters suggested that this was in part because liberalisation was no longer a pre-requisite to achieving their goals, as applied tariffs are already historically low, and key trading issues are being resolved through bilateral deals (QQ 28, 33). Professor Lehmann went further and suggested that a prolonged period of global economic growth, combined with the "short-termism" attitude of most business leaders, meant that trade was no longer a subject in which the business community was interested (Q 463).

37.  Other witnesses disagreed. Mr van den Hoven explained that the time taken over the Round had made the business community more sceptical and the removal of the Singapore issues had made his organisation's members concerned about the low ambitions for the Round. He emphasised, however, that the business community was still strongly in favour of trade liberalisation and feared a protectionist backlash in export markets in the absence of a deal (Q 261). He also complained of a lack of media interest: statements in favour of liberalisation from his members' CEOs had been largely ignored (Q 262). Ambassador Stephenson, Chair of the WTO Negotiating Group on Market Access, and Mr Lamy were confident that the business community would lobby in favour of a deal once one was on the table (QQ 422, 499).

BINDING EXISTING TARIFFS

BOX 3

Bound and applied tariffs explained
WTO negotiations and agreements cover members' "bound tariffs"—in effect the maximum tariff that a country has agreed it could levy on an import. The WTO Uruguay Round led to the binding of 100% of agricultural tariffs; for NAMA, bound rates apply to 99% of developed countries' tariffs and 73% of developing countries' tariffs.

In practice, many countries are not levying tariffs at these levels but instead have voluntarily chosen to levy "applied tariffs" which are considerably lower. The size of the gap can be significant: India, Mexico and Brazil operate applied tariffs on many products at less than a third of their bound rates, leaving scope for significant increases in applied rates which would be "WTO-legal" should their governments become more protectionist.

Conflict arose at the WTO negotiations because some parties requested tariff cuts that were very significant in order to bite into the applied tariffs of these countries. However, cuts on such a scale would have a major impact on some countries, such as South Africa, which at present have little or no gap between their applied and bound tariffs. Lord Mandelson, speaking as European Commissioner for Trade, explained that the EU was happy to give these countries more time to cut their tariffs—but this created an issue of where to draw the line for countries that are considered not to need special treatment (QQ 250-251).

38.  We asked witnesses whether it would be acceptable for a deal simply to reduce bound tariffs to current applied levels and to bind unbound tariffs: this would not produce any immediate economic benefit but would prevent future moves towards protectionism. Ambassador Stephenson, Chair of the WTO Negotiating Group on Market Access, told us that such a move was often discounted as valueless in WTO members' rhetoric, a view to which he did not subscribe (Q 494). Professor Lehmann was in favour of such a move, as it would clear the slate and allow a new Round to begin (QQ 460-462). Dr Gasiorek and Ambassador Stephenson both noted that such a move would not necessarily be easy to agree: developing countries had opposed these large reductions in bound tariffs (Q 33) and the inter-linkages of issues in the single undertaking made such a deal unlikely (Q 497).

39.  The CBI told us that they wanted to see a cut in applied tariffs on industrial goods (p 3). Their view is shared across the EU: Dr Balas told us an agreement that did not cut applied tariffs would not meet the ambitions of European industry (Q 116) and Lord Mandelson, giving evidence as European Commissioner for Trade, suggested that the Member State governments would expect more in return for the reductions in agricultural tariffs that the Union had offered (Q 243). He added that viewing the continuance of the WTO and the consolidation of current tariff cuts as a success was a "rather British view"; he and his staff subscribed to an approach which also required additional market access and tangible business opportunities (QQ 248-249). Mr Thomas MP, Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Consumer Affairs, agreed that any deal would be progress but stressed that the Government's ambitions went much further: he highlighted reductions in cotton subsidies and increased market access for both industry and services as fundamental to a deal (QQ 552, 557).

The EU's position and role

40.  For non-agricultural issues the EU's key objectives for the Doha round are:

·  On market access for industrial goods, the EU wants to do away with high tariffs, tariff peaks and tariff escalation, so as to increase significantly trading opportunities. This objective would be achieved through reduction according to a mathematical formula applied to all tariff lines, ensuring a similar level of tariff reduction across the board.

·  Further market access negotiations on services should bring considerable and real market opportunities for business as well as benefits to consumers world-wide. However, the EU does not seek general deregulation or privatisation of sectors where principles of public interest are at stake, and the EU is also committed to defending the right of WTO members to promote cultural diversity.

On agriculture the EU has offered:

·  to cut its agricultural tariffs by an average of 54%;

·  to use a 'banded' system for tariff cuts that will cut the highest tariffs the most—by at least 66%;

·  to reduce trade distorting subsidies by at least 75%;

·  to eliminate export subsidies completely by the end of 2013 so long as partners who operate their own export support programmes do the same.[23]

41.  Eoin O'Malley, Senior Advisor International Relations, BusinessEurope, and Dr Chris Stevens, Director of Programmes, Overseas Development Institute, recommended that the EU should pursue bilateral deals as a vehicle for liberalisation in services (QQ 6, 274). However, Mr O'Malley noted that the biggest steps towards services liberalisation had been taken by countries as they joined the WTO: he cited Ukraine and Vietnam as countries that had made commitments on accession that were more significant than those of other WTO members (Q 274). Ms Francis explained that this was in part because the private sector took the opportunity to push for additional reforms in the knowledge that their governments could not delay (Q 364). The British Bankers' Association praised the Commission for its work on services liberalisation, and told us that different DGs work together to discuss regulatory barriers (Q 301). Industry bodies had compiled a country-by-country list of the most significant barriers to trade in services (Q 307).

42.  When we met Lord Mandelson in his role as European Commissioner for Trade and Commission officials a month before the July Ministerial, the focus was on the agricultural negotiations and the difference between bound and applied tariffs in the NAMA negotiations. Dr Balas emphasised that the average industrial bound tariff in the EU of between 4 and 5% was significantly lower than the average bound tariffs in Brazil, India and ASEAN countries of around 30% (Q 116). The Commission believed that the reductions in agricultural subsidies that are scheduled under the 2003 CAP reforms would create sufficient trade opportunities to be attractive to partners (QQ 117-118, 120) and noted that it was offering a cut in average industrial tariffs to around 2% (Q 136).

43.  Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, Secretary-General, UN Conference on Trade and Development, praised the EU for the work it had undertaken to reduce its support for agriculture (Q 403). Ambassador Falconer, Chair of the WTO Negotiating Group on Agriculture, highlighted the fact that current consumption trends meant that the EU would become a net importer of some foods, such as beef, and that the Union had recognised it was in their own interest to liberalise agriculture (Q 507).

44.  Several witnesses were critical of the EU's position. EEF/UK Steel hoped for real market opening for UK exporters, particularly to those countries whose producers were in competition with UK industry (p 1). Anja Osterhaus, Co-ordinator, Fair Trade Advocacy Office, Fairtrade, would have preferred the EU to concede more to developing countries (Q 188). Mr Kamall MEP, Dr Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Senior Fellow, ICTSD and Mr van den Hoven suggested that the EU could have reduced agricultural subsidies further to unlock a deal (QQ 213, 265-268, 430)—although Mr van den Hoven would have also liked the EU to put more pressure on richer developing countries to reduce their industrial tariffs (Q 269). Mr Erixon explained that the EU's hands were tied by Member States' repeated failures to reform the CAP (Q 285). Lord Mandelson, in his role as European Commissioner for Trade, disagreed and told us that the EU was already "paying through the nose on agriculture" and that he was "not ashamed" of the offers that the Union was making (QQ 243, 247).

45.  However, none of the witnesses that we met in Geneva in the fortnight prior to the Ministerial raised the EU's position on agriculture as a significant stumbling block in the negotiations: Ambassador Falconer, Chair of the WTO Negotiating Group on Agriculture, believed that reform of CAP would continue in the long term (Q 506) and Mr Lamy said that the Union was "on the right side" of the liberalisation debate (Q 414). This appeared to continue to be the case throughout the Ministerial: writing in a notably candid online diary during the talks, Lord Mandelson noted at one point that the EU was "in the unusual position of being on the edge of a Doha argument rather than in the middle."[24]

THE FUTURE OF THE ROUND

46.  We asked Lord Mandelson, Secretary of State for Business, why the negotiations in which he had participated had not reached agreement. He told us that while the talks did not meet their objective of agreeing the modalities, "substantial progress" had been made on reducing agricultural tariffs: "we agreed … in respect of agriculture that the proposed reductions in agricultural trade barriers … would be set at an average of at least 54% with the highest tariffs enjoying the greatest cuts, in the case of the European Union something in the region of 70%." "Significant indications" had been offered in services negotiations (Q 594).

47.  The breakdown of the Geneva Ministerial was not accompanied by rancour, and the leaders of the G20 countries have called for further talks and an agreement by the end of this year. However the appointment of a new Commissioner in Europe and the change in administration in the United States may create uncertainty among trade participants. Some witnesses did not see political uncertainty as a great concern, noting that the 1992 US Presidential election had not prevented progress towards completion of the Uruguay Round in 1993. Lord Mandelson, Secretary of State for Business, did not expect the 2009 Indian elections to impact upon their stance (Q 614).

48.  Speaking after the end of the Ministerial, Celso Amorim, Brazilian Foreign Minister, said "people say we should preserve what we have, but it is not in our power. Life goes on. Protectionist interests will again present themselves. It will be very difficult to keep this intact."[25] Mr Thomas MP, Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Consumer Affairs, agreed: he predicted that the failure to agree a deal would be a "major boost to the protectionist mood music" (Q 555).

49.  In evidence given as European Commissioner for Trade, before the Ministerial, Lord Mandelson was blunt about the implications of a complete failure of the Round. He noted it would be the first trade Round not to conclude in a positive way and more significantly, it would send a signal to the developing world that the developed countries were greedy, selfish and unable to recognise the implications of globalisation and the "shift of economic power from West to East" (Q 245). Globalisation had created a "multi-polar" economic world which required new relationships, a new sort of political management and new definitions of reciprocity; the world had not yet adjusted to these (Q 259). Ambassador Stephenson, Chair of the WTO Negotiating Group on Market Access, was concerned that the mandate for the Round was becoming increasingly disconnected from current issues, making an agreement even more difficult (Q 498).

50.  We detected a sense of weariness among participants and observers of the negotiations. Those we met in Geneva prior to the Ministerial were understandably reluctant to discuss the implications of the Ministerial concluding without agreements or admit to a sense of frustration, but Dr Mendoza described the phenomenon of "negotiating fatigue", in which participants believe they are wasting their time through lack of progress and stop tabling their own offers. He was confident that the Doha Round had got through a bout of fatigue and participants were engaged in the negotiations (Q 442). Professor Lehmann had observed a similar cynicism at meetings such as the World Economic Forum annual meeting (Q 472), and Ambassador Falconer, Chair of the WTO Negotiating Group on Agriculture, said the length of the Round had been "frustrating" as it was now crowding out discussions on more pressing questions (Q 509).

51.  In early November, after President-elect Obama's victory in the USA, and the sharp decline in the global economy, we asked Lord Mandelson, in his role as Secretary of State for Business, what he believed the prospects for the Round were. He told us that "the Doha deal is more urgent than ever given the financial crisis. We need to demonstrate to the world our commitment to open markets and our rejection of protectionism; otherwise we would make the present turmoil and dramas even more serious and long-term in their impact" (Q 600). He said that the meeting of G20 leaders on 15 November should "send a very strong signal" that a further WTO Ministerial meeting should be held and agreement reached before President Bush's term expires in January 2009 (Q 601). Participants at the meeting did agree to strive for a conclusion to the round this year.

52.  We also asked Lord Mandelson about the likely policies of the new Democratic administration in the United States and to contrast the present economic situation with that which led to the 1930 Smoots-Hawley Act which raised US tariffs on 20,000 items. Lord Mandelson noted that there were protectionist tendencies within the Democratic party, but that the Party had "different policy emphases … Mr Obama has a pro-market approach, including government action to shape markets and distribute their fruits more fairly … Inevitably, however, he and others in the Democratic party are concerned by the impact of globalisation on American workers and American industry. This could lead to Democrats becoming more sceptical about the virtues of free trade." He said that the Government would encourage the new administration to adopt a non-protectionist policy (Q 602).

53.  We were relieved to hear that the economic downturn had not led to protectionist measures in the UK's major trading partners (Q 602).

54.  We are disappointed that the Doha Round is yet to reach a successful conclusion and are concerned that a global recession will increase pressure for protectionist measures. We therefore welcome the decision of the leaders of the G20 countries to use their November summit as a springboard towards further Ministerial meetings on the Doha Round. We commend the UK Government, Lord Mandelson (in his former role as Commissioner for Trade) and the Commission for their work to date. We welcome Commissioner Ashton's announced commitment to work to revitalise the multilateral talks at the start of her tenure as Commissioner for Trade.

55.  We call on the Government and the Commission to make every effort to ensure that the positive rhetoric arising from the G20 summit is translated into action and a successful conclusion to the Round. The Government should also work with the incoming administration in the United States to emphasise the importance of trade liberalisation.

56.  We agree with the British Bankers' Association's assessment that the services sector as the "engine" of economic growth in the EU (p 107). We are concerned about the pace of services negotiations, especially as this is the area in which the UK has the most to gain from the Doha Round. Services negotiations require more attention because of the range of issues involved. We would encourage the business community to be more vigorous in advocating the completion of the Round.

57.  The Singapore issues should be revisited outside of the Doha Round.

58.  A Round in which WTO members bound tariffs at existing applied tariff rates would not be a failure: we do not take the current, historically low, levels of tariffs for granted. The embedding of current low levels of protection at a time when the global economy is facing a turbulent period featuring volatile raw material prices and a likely economic contraction would be a very real gain.

59.  We would prefer to see continued reform of the Common Agricultural Policy for its own sake, although further reductions in agricultural support would also allow the EU to offer still larger cuts in agricultural tariffs. Although it was at the periphery of the area of dispute in this summer's talks, the EU retains a central position in international trade negotiations and will need to maintain and strengthen its role as a promoter of liberalisation.


16   Will Martin and Aaditya Mattoo, The Doha Development Agenda: What's on the Table, World Bank Policy Discussion 4672 Back

17   WTO website. Back

18   This term refers to place names associated with either the quality, reputation or other characteristics of products (e.g. "Champagne", "Melton Mowbray".) Back

19   Ministers from WTO member countries decided at the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference to set up three new working groups: on trade and investment, on competition policy, and on transparency in government procurement. They also instructed the WTO Goods Council to look at possible ways of simplifying trade procedures, an issue known as "trade facilitation". These four subjects are collectively known as the "Singapore issues". In August 2004, all of these except trade facilitation were removed from the Doha Round as there was no consensus on how they should be negotiated. Back

20   Agreements on Trade in Services include provisions on the international movement of labour to supply services.  Back

21   The Economist 2 August 2008 Back

22   We asked Lord Mandelson, giving evidence as Secretary of State for Business, whether the disagreement on the Special Safeguard Mechanism had been a deliberate attempt by some participants not to discuss the issue of cotton tariffs. He told us that it was "not something on which I could possibly comment" although he noted that cotton was an issue of political sensitivity in a number of American swing states, and India needed the SSM to protect its non-commercial agricultural sector and make the Doha Round "a good win" rather than "a huge threat" (QQ 595, 614). Back

23   European Commission website. Back

24   http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/newround/doha_da/geneva08/update_en.htm Back

25   Financial Times 30 July 2008 Back


 
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