Select Committee on European Union Written Evidence



Memorandum by Kenneth J Thomson and Sophia M Davidova, respectively Professor Emeritus, University of Aberdeen and Reader, Kent Business School, University of Kent at Wye College

1.  What should be the long-term objectives of the CAP? Does the title "Common Agricultural Policy" aptly fit your perceived objectives of the policy? What do you consider to be the main pressures on the CAP as it currently is?

  1.1  There is a continued need for the EU to have a Common Agricultural Policy—though with new objectives (see 1.2 below), given:

    (a)  the long-established tendency for all governments to intervene in agriculture;

    (b)  the need to maintain the Single Market without unnecessary barriers to internal (or external) trade;

    (c)  the extensive positive and negative externalities of agriculture; and

    (d)  the difficulty of extending mainstream policies for industry and business (eg taxation, pollution control) to the often small-scale and family-oriented aspects of farming.

  1.2  The objectives of such a CAP should be to ensure that:

    (i)  the provisions of EU competition policy apply fully to agriculture, particularly in terms of the control of state aids and the maintenance of the Single Market;

    (ii)  there is an adequate supply of safe food to citizens of the EU;

    (iii)  environmentally friendly farming practices provide an adequate supply of public goods, ie agricultural "multifunctionality";

    (iv)  farming is subject to the polluter pays principle;

    (v)  farming suffering from structural disadvantages is offered assistance towards commercial and environmental sustainability; and

    (vi)  farming exposed to unfavourable weather conditions, pest and diseases is offered assistance serving as a safety net (only).

  1.3  Such a policy would still be suitably entitled the "Common Agricultural Policy" rather than eg the "Common Rural Policy", but it would lose most of the current CAP objectives, some of which date back to the 1950s and are defined with a productivist mind-set. Instead, it focuses on the provision of public goods (and avoidance of "public bads").

2.  What has been your experience so far with the reformed CAP? What has worked well and less well? And where can lessons be learned?

  2.1  The reformed CAP has involved (a) conversion of most but not all commodity-linked direct payments to "decoupled" Single Farm Payments (SFPs) based on historical and/or area "entitlements" in the 15 "old" Member States and in Slovenia and Malta, and (b) the introduction of Single Area Payments (SAPs) based on registered farm areas in the 10 other New Member States (NMSs).

  2.2  In the UK, the flexibility allowed to different regions has been exploited via the four different SFP systems applied in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This has allowed a welcome but limited degree of subsidiarity in agricultural policy decision-making. In England, the well-known problems of the Rural Payments Agency in calculating and making SFPs have damaged expected farm income flows.

  2.3  In the NMSs, the changes in payment systems were more profound. Pre-accession national support programmes provided farmers with advance payments, mainly used for working capital. Many NMS farmers have apparently treated the new Single Area Payments (SAPs) in the same way, planning to use them to cover their operating expenses. The new time schedule of payment disbursement (called ex post by some commentators, Bozik and Blaas, 2005) has created cash-flow problems. These early experiences suggest that, irrespective of the policy-makers' intentions, as long as such payments exist, farmers will include them in their farm management decisions and that simply enable farmers to continue farming as in the past possibly with less intensive systems, since SAPs do not depend on yields.

3.  Do you consider the Single Payment Scheme to be a good basis for the future of EU agricultural policy? What changes might be made at the EU level to the Single Payment Scheme, including to the rules governing entitlements, in the short and/or the longer-term?

  3.1  The Single Payment Schemes should be used as a basis for the future of EU agricultural policy only if they are subject to further and deeper cuts due to compulsory modulation or capping at the EU level, since:

    (i)  they have no clear and defensible foundation except the continuation (sometimes in modified form) of past support to agriculture;

    (ii)  they have established, and are consolidating, a powerful interest group in favour of their continuation, regardless of their merits or deficiencies; and

    (iii)  the cross-compliance conditions are weak, and their monitoring and observance are uncertain particularly in view of the different administrative capacities across the EU.

  3.2  In their present form and level, the SFPs do not stimulate structural change. A study (EU- FP6 project "Impact of Decoupling and Modulation in the Enlarged Union", IDEMA) of farmers' intentions indicates that: (a) the introduction of decoupled payments in England is affecting farmers' management plans only marginally; few farmers plan to modify their exit or growth decisions; and (b) some more farmers intend to adjust the output mix and to expand (slightly) their diversification into off-farm activities.

  3.3  In the NMSs, SAPs mean higher and more predictable payments. As a result, farmers plan to stay longer in agriculture, would like to increase their land area and do not intend to diversify to non-agricultural acytivities. The majority of farmers are pessimistic about their ability to make sufficient profits without policy support. This reliance on support and the focus on farming activities may strengthen further the anti-liberalisation lobby in the EU.

  3.4  In view of the above, in the short term, efforts should continue to extend the compulsory modulation of SFPs from Pillar I income support into Pillar II "rural development" support. In the longer term, the level of SFPs should be reduced and a time limit should be imposed on their continuation, and/or they should be converted to a "bond" in line with proposals made by LUFPIG, Swinbank and Tangermann, and others.

4.  What short and longer-term changes are required to the CAP's market mechanisms? Suggestions made by the Commission have included re-examination of certain quotas, intervention, set-aside, export refunds and private storage payments

  4.1  No comments, due to length constraints.

5.  What is your view on the introduction of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)? Do you consider that it is meeting its objectives thus far? Is it suitably "strategic" in nature, meeting the needs of rural society as a whole rather than being restricted to aiding the agricultural industry? How well is it being co-ordinated with other EU and national policies on regional and rural development?

  5.1  The EAFRD is largely restricted to aiding the agricultural industry and population, and does little for the rest of rural society. Its establishment marked a de-coordination of agricultural and regional/rural development, in that DG Agriculture and Rural Development has become responsible, via the EAFRD, for most smaller-scale regional/rural development. Also, due to the "80% rule", there is also little coordination of Pillar II spending with the objectives of the EU's Cohesion policy, under which attempts should be made to bring poorer regions more up to the standards of the EU as a whole.

6.  Is there a case for a higher level of EU financing of rural development? Do you have a view on the extension of compulsory modulation from Pillar 1 (Direct Payments) to Pillar 2 (Rural Development)?

  6.1  Non-agricultural (or even agricultural) rural development, ie investment, restructuring, modernisation, which can be promoted banks and other private agents, seems in little need of substantial assistance in the more advanced EU Member States, especially assistance over and above that offered by mainstream state support for public infrastructure, business development advice etc. However, there is a need to fund agricultural and non-agricultural rural development in the NMSs.

  6.2  Irrespective of the need for EU financing of rural development, looking more broadly at the future of CAP, compulsory modulation is a practical and politically feasible way to put pressure for the decrease of SFP (SAP). The current rate of modulation does not exert any pressure to decrease farmers' reliance of support. Iraizoz et al (2004) studied 369 commercial farms in Navarra, Spain, and found that after the application of the franchise, only 201 farms would be subject to modulation, with a mean reduction in payments of only about €600 per annum. The franchise of course excludes the many smaller farms from modulation completely.

  6.3  Another option is to leave SFPs "exposed" with no clear justification and to hope that budget pressures and/or reasoned argument will force down the rates in a straightforward way. Unfortunately, current high world prices make financial discipline rather irrelevant—though of course it should be easier to undertake CAP reform during an "easy" period (such as the present time) than in the midst of a crisis.

7.  What benefits can the EU's World Trade Organisation obligations create for EU agriculture and, consequently, for the EU economy as a whole?

  7.1  Given the flexibility (eg on "tariffication", the "green box") and weaknesses (eg the Peace Clause) of the current WTO obligations on EU export subsidies, market access and domestic support for agriculture, and the present climate of high world market prices for agricultural products, these obligations have only patchy effects, eg for sugar and banana regime reform, via the Dispute Settlement Mechanism.

  7.2  With its border protection substantially unaltered, EU agriculture is still supported by the CAP, albeit in a substantially different way, with single payments. Implementation of current or future WTO proposals would further push EU agriculture towards a more dynamic competitive situation where it must focus more on local (including EU) and differentiated products.

8.  To what extent has the system of cross-compliance contributed to an improved level of environmental protection? How is it linking with other EU policy requirements such as the Water Framework Directive?

  8.1  No comments, due to length constraints.

9.  How can the CAP contribute to mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change? What do you consider the role of biofuels to be in this regard?

  9.1  We consider that the CAP has only a small role to play in mitigating and adapting to climate change, especially if other environmental concerns such as those for landscape and biodiversity inhibit the large-scale adoption of biomass cropping in Europe. The economic and technical efficiency of agriculture in replacing fossil fuels is as yet unproven: at a recent conference of the UK Agricultural Economics Society, it was concluded that "biofuel production in the EU might only be profitable in the EU with oil prices over $90 per barrel, and a 10% share of biofuel in overall fuel consumed in the EU-15 [ie the Commission's proposals of January 2007] would require an area equivalent to 50% of the current arable land area" (AES Newsletter, May 2007). A recent Commission estimate (Summa, 2007) is that a 14% bio-fuel share by 2020 would require about 18 million ha of land in the EU-25, out of a total of just over 100 million ha. Most of this land would be used for growing cereals for biofuel (about double the present area of 4 million ha) or woody material (7 million ha). There would be a significant but not huge effect on cereal and vegetable oil prices, but meal prices would decline.

  9.2  Recently there are some—probably overoptimistic—expectations about the potential for biocrops in the NMSs ("Biofuels in Central and Eastern Europe", conference organised by Agra Informa, Prague 17-18 April). One factors is that oilseed yields in the NMSs are still low, at 50 to 60% of the EU-15 average (AgraFood East Europe, May 2007). The potential for oilseeds in the last two entrants, Romania and Bulgaria, is assessed to be high.

  9.3  Unless it is considered that biofuels are likely to have a major role in reducing the EU's dependence on external sources of energy, so far there is no clear argument as to why agriculture needs special assistance from the taxpayer in coping with the gradual shifts in temperature/rainfall involved with climate change.

10.  The Commissioner has expressed her dissatisfaction at the financing agreement reached by the Member States at the December 2005 Council. Do you consider the current budget to be sufficient? Do you consider co-financing to be a possible way forward in financing the Common Agricultural Policy?

  10.1  The current budget for Pillar I of the CAP was determined (before modulation) by the October 2002 European Council, and is certainly more than "sufficient", especially as the purpose of and "need" for single payments are undefined.

  10.2  The budget for Pillar II was reduced by about 20% during the 2005-06 negotiations. We see no great justification for seeking an increase even in this part of the overall EAFRD budget, and would prefer to see development assistance channelled through the Regional and Social Funds, primarily to New Member States.

  10.3  Co-financing has been an integral part of EU budgeting for development assistance. The "opt-out" ("Sums transferred to support rural development measures pursuant to such arrangements [for voluntary modulation up to 20%] shall not be subject to the national co-financing and minimum spending per axes rules set out in the Rural Development Regulation" (European Council, December 2005) came as something of a surprise, and does not appear to be taken up in the recent UK proposals for Rural Development Plans.

11.  What has been the impact on the CAP of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and what is the likely impact of future enlargements of the EU on the post-2013 CAP?

  11.1  The 2004 and 2007 enlargements have not yet had a major impact on the CAP, largely because the current framework of the policy was determined by the October 2002 CAP budget agreement and the 2003 Luxembourg agreement on CAP reform. The first ten New Member States did not play a large part in the 2006 negotiations over the budget for 2007-13, except to insist on retaining the commitments made to them in the accession agreements, eg transition from 25% to 100% of the EU-15 single payment rates. The entry of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 was expected by some (but not all—see Davidova and Thomson 2005 to lead to a reduction in these rates in order not to violate the budget ceiling for the CAP, but with high world prices (and hence lower export subsidy payments) this now seems unlikely.

  11.2  However, the enlargements (2004 and 2007) changed the political economy of the decision-making, strengthening the group opposing policy liberalisation. The previously mentioned IDEMA study indicated that the strongest opposition to policy liberalisation comes from farmers in the NMSs. Newcomers to farming in NMSs tend to reject policy liberalisation and endorse notions that farmers should concentrate on agriculture. These views are likely to have important implications for the decision-making processes surrounding agricultural policy reform in the EU. The new entrants to the Union do strengthen the political opposition to further agricultural policy reform, and most probably to co-financing. The difficulties to liberalise the policy are likely to increase with future enlargements.

12.  How could the CAP be further simplified and in what other ways would you like to see the Common Agricultural Policy changed in the short and/or the long term?

  12.1  The Commissioner, Ms Marianne Fischer Boel, has distinguished between "technical" and "political" (or "policy") simplification (speech in Brussels, 3 October 2006). The first "is about the detailed implementation of policy, and sometimes about form", for example "revising a legal document to make it clearer, or streamlining administrative procedures". "Political simplification is about changing underlying policies in ways which make them simpler. For example, some say we should abolish production quota systems". She intends to pursue both types of simplification and has proposed a single Common Market Organisation for all or most agricultural products, replacing 21 individual CMOs. She also proposes an Action Plan, with "20 proposals for practical changes which can make life easier for farmers, businesses and national administrations without changing fundamental policy".

  12.2  On the policy side, she has proposed reforms for commodity regimes, such as those for sugar, wine, bananas, and fruit and vegetables, and relaxing the conditions for receiving certain commodity subsidies. The "health check" may suggest certain adjustments in the new single payment system, eg ending "the many exceptions to the principle of full decoupling", a single type of entitlement, and an end to set-aside. Finally, the budget review may question the very existence of certain market instruments in the long term, ie a new role for direct payments, and a "single model for decoupling", after 2013. In her speech, the Commissioner was firm on the principle of cross-compliance, ie payments for "the delivery of public goods and services", as a means of winning "broader support for our policy in the future".

  12.3  We support all these proposals for simplification, with caution over fraud from reduced paperwork. However, with the possible exception of the vague hope of "a new role for direct payments", they will not change the nature of the current CAP, ie still significant market protection via border taxes, and generous payments to farmers for little obvious social or economic (or environmental) purpose or efficiency.

June 2007



 
previous page contents next page

House of Lords home page Parliament home page House of Commons home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008