Select Committee on European Union Ninth Report

CHAPTER 9: Summary of Conclusions and recommendations

Borders

189.  The migratory pressure on Europe's borders will grow because there are a growing number of failed states where a combination of economic incompetence, uncertainty of property rights, corruption, internal conflicts, political anarchy and repressive regimes has created intolerable conditions for the local population. Conditions may also be intolerable in states where poverty is endemic, or in those which, though once prosperous, are now ravaged by war. It is therefore inevitable and predictable that people will attempt to escape to countries which they see as offering a chance of a better life. (paragraph 11)

THE POSITION ON SCHENGEN

190.  Given the views of successive Governments on the comparative strengths of the United Kingdom and Schengen borders, it seems to us that "Possibly, but not yet" will for many years to come be the reply to the question of the United Kingdom becoming a full Schengen State. (paragraph 45)

THE UNITED KINGDOM'S BORDERS

191.  We recommend that more effective fencing should be put in place near the ferry berths at Calais as a matter of urgency. (paragraph 33)

192.  We believe the work on e-Borders should be brought forward as a matter of urgency to protect Britain's territorial integrity. (paragraph 48)

Frontex

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

193.  For the present the United Kingdom has to accept that, not being a full Schengen State, it cannot play a full role in Frontex. Subject to that legal limitation, the Government should ensure that the United Kingdom participates effectively in the development and operation of Frontex. (paragraph 60)

JOINT RETURN OPERATIONS

194.  For the present we would not encourage Frontex to put any more assets into organising compulsory return operations. (paragraph 65)

RESOURCES

195.  We believe that before the European Parliament considers withholding part of the budget of Frontex, it should bear in mind the importance of Frontex being seen as a secure and responsible employer. Nothing should be done to undermine its operational effectiveness or put at risk the accumulated expertise of its permanent staff. (paragraph 79)

196.  We believe the increased resources may usefully lead to a modest increase in the number of operations in 2008, but should be concentrated on further increasing the quality of those operations, and of the intelligence-gathering and sharing leading up to them. (paragraph 81)

ACCOUNTABILITY

197.  We believe that the current arrangements for financial accountability are adequate. (paragraph 89)

198.  Frontex should raise its public profile by ensuring that information which is or should be in the public domain is easily accessible to the public, in particular on its website. (paragraph 90)

199.  Frontex should be more formally accountable to the European Parliament. The Chairman of the Management Board and the Executive Director should, if so requested, appear before the Parliament or its Committees to discuss the activities of Frontex. (paragraph 91)

Joint operations organised by Frontex

REPORTS OF OPERATIONS

200.  We believe that the host country, and other countries taking part if they wish, should be involved in drawing up a report after each operation from which lessons can be learned. Frontex should be responsible for coordinating such reports. (paragraph 96)

201.  Frontex should formulate rules for data collection which will allow a better evaluation of the results and impact of operations. This evaluation should show in particular the kinds of people intercepted or turned back, and the extent to which the operations are effective in reducing, and not just displacing, illegal immigration. The United Kingdom should participate fully in any such evaluation. (paragraph 159)

COMMITMENT OF OPERATIONAL ASSETS

202.  We recommend that Member States should be asked to pledge to make available for Frontex operations only as many vessels and other equipment as they are actually able to make available when requested. (paragraph 106)

203.  In the longer term, consideration should be given to introducing into the Frontex Regulation a provision requiring, subject to strictly limited exceptions, compulsory deployment of vessels and equipment in joint operations and other Frontex activities. (paragraph 163)

DISEMBARKATION

204.  It should not be the responsibility of those planning individual Frontex operations to decide the rules on disembarkation for those operations. Rules must be formulated which will apply to all Frontex maritime operations. This question must be addressed by the working group developing general guidelines about the law of the sea as it relates to EU States and illegal migration. (paragraph 112)

205.  We believe that a fairer method must be found of calculating and granting financial assistance to those states which bear a disproportionate share of the burden of illegal immigration. (paragraph 113)

206.  We believe that the fairness and effectiveness of the Dublin II system is something which must be addressed in the second stage of the work on a Common European Asylum System. (paragraph 119)

OPERATIONAL COOPERATION BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

207.  The United Kingdom has great experience of controlling sea and air borders, and recent experience of controlling the land border with the Irish Republic. This country has much to offer Frontex and the Schengen States. We hope that the Government will share their experience with them, and that they will make full use of it. (paragraph 125)

208.  Improved coordination of border management of the Schengen States will be of direct benefit to the United Kingdom. The Government should make clear to the other Member States that they wish to play as full a part as possible in operations, and should commit resources to them for this purpose. The Management Board should not just allow, but should encourage, United Kingdom participation. (paragraph 126)

THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS

209.  The liabilities of guest border guards, particularly those which arise from the use of weapons, need to be clarified in amending legislation. The particular position of participating United Kingdom border guards should also be addressed. (paragraph 135)

Other issues

THE APPLICABLE LAW

210.  Given the complexity of the law governing operations on the high seas involving illegal immigration, we think it essential that the Member States taking part in operations coordinated by Frontex should follow clear guidelines clarifying their powers and obligations in the different sea areas. (paragraph 145)

AGREEMENTS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES

211.  We believe that working arrangements between Frontex and the authorities of third countries in the Mediterranean could play a valuable part in controlling illegal immigration to the EU. We hope that Frontex will carry forward the negotiation of such arrangements. (paragraph 152)

212.  Member States, including the United Kingdom, should however be concerned to ensure that any such arrangements with a third country include meaningful guarantees for the treatment of would-be immigrants repatriated to that country. (paragraph 153)

LINKS WITH UNHCR AND OTHER BODIES

213.  We welcome the cooperation between Frontex and UNHCR, and would like to see this extended to other bodies with responsibilities for immigration, asylum and refugees. (paragraph 155)

Looking to the future

WIDENING THE MANDATE OF FRONTEX

214.  We agree with the majority of our witnesses that, for the present at least, it would be an unacceptable enlargement of the mandate of Frontex for it to concern itself specifically with counter-terrorism or serious cross-border crime which is not directly linked to illegal immigration. (paragraph 170)

215.  Nevertheless Frontex must be involved in combating any organised crime whose aim is to facilitate and profit from illegal immigration. It is right that this should already be an objective of Frontex. Technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of this. (paragraph 171)

COOPERATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME

216.  It is essential that there should be a mechanism enabling Frontex to transfer key intelligence to those who can best make use of it. (paragraph 173)

217.  We welcome the cooperation between Frontex and Europol, which in our view will benefit from being formalised in an agreement between the parties. (paragraph 176)

218.  Intelligence and information coming to the knowledge of Frontex in the course of its work should be passed not only to Europol but also to other agencies which are well placed to make good use of it, and with which similar agreements can be concluded. (paragraph 177)

AN OPERATIONAL ORGANISATION?

219.  We believe that it would be wiser for Frontex not to acquire its own operational assets until the implications of this have been considered more fully by Frontex itself and by the Member States. (paragraph 181)

220.  Suggestions that Frontex should become, in effect, a European Border Guard are in our view ill-conceived, and should not even be considered for the present. (paragraph 183)

Our own assessment

221.  We believe that, in the short time it has been operational, Frontex has made an excellent start in its important role of coordinating action on the external borders of the EU. We congratulate those involved. (paragraph 185)

222.  We nevertheless caution against too much being demanded of it. A new agency cannot be expected to double its size, its work and its budget every year. The time has come for a period of consolidation: somewhat slower growth, and concentration on improvement in the quality of operations rather than in their number. (paragraph 186)

223.  It is not in the interests of the European Union as a whole or of the Member States individually that the United Kingdom should be excluded from full participation in the development and operation of Frontex. We recommend that the Government should persevere in negotiations in the Council of Ministers to end this exclusion. (paragraph 187)

224.  The States which are full members of Schengen took the view that freedom of movement should take priority over border security. The United Kingdom takes the opposite view, and its geographical situation puts it in a better position to safeguard its borders outside Schengen. However this argument is undermined by the inadequate and unacceptable way in which the United Kingdom's borders are at present safeguarded. We therefore believe that the highest priority should be given to remedying this. (paragraph 188)

225.  We recommend this report to the House for debate. (paragraph 8)

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