House of Lords - European Union

10.15. The Lisbon Treaty introduces two other changes which are of symbolic rather than practical importance. First, it states that agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources, shall be areas of shared competence between the Union and the Member States (Article 4(2)(d) TFEU). This reflects current practice.

10.16. Second, under the existing Treaties references to "agriculture" include fisheries. The Treaty gives greater prominence to fisheries by making explicit references to it throughout the revised "Agriculture and Fisheries" Title of the TFEU (Articles 38-44 TFEU).

The application of the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision) to agriculture and fisheries.

DETAILS OF THE CHANGE INTRODUCED BY THE LISBON TREATY

10.17. Under Article 43(2) TFEU the default decision-making procedure applying to agriculture and fisheries will be the ordinary legislative procedure, rather than the consultation procedure. This has the practical effect of making the European Parliament and the Council equal partners in the decision-making process.

10.18. Exceptions to the application of the ordinary legislative procedure to agriculture and fisheries are measures on fixing prices, levies, aid and quantitative limitations and on the allocation and fixing of fishing opportunities (Article 43(3) TFEU). An example of agricultural legislation where the exceptions would apply is the Council Regulation governing the milk market[243], which provides for: the setting of intervention prices for butter and skimmed milk powder; the application of levies on producers who over-produce; aid for private storage; and tariff quotas for imports.

10.19. An example of legislation in the agricultural sector where the default procedure (co-decision) would apply is the 2003 Regulation[244] reforming the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which provides a framework for policy and does not fix specific prices, aids, levies or quotas.

10.20. Measures on the allocation and fixing of fishing opportunities are also exempted from the application of the co-decision procedure and will therefore be decided on solely by the Council. This will continue current practice under Article 20(1) of Council Regulation 2371/2002[245], which does not provide for consultation of the European Parliament on such decisions. However, co-decision will in future apply to framework legislation (e.g. long- term cod recovery plan[246]), which sets the boundaries within which decisions on the allocation and fixing of fishing opportunities are taken[247].

EVIDENCE

10.21. The RSPCA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty of Animals) welcomed the move to co-decision. In their view, it "will bring more openness and accountability to these decisions, and will enable organisations like the RSPCA to be able to discuss concerns about proposed legislation in a more considered and constructive way" (p D16).

10.22. Professor Wallace agreed that the move would increase the transparency of decisions. She believed that, in the past, ministers of agriculture "have been able to operate as a collusive club with rather little external scrutiny and in a way which was not very easy for national parliaments to get any handles on either" (Q S182). Lord Rooker agreed that the process had been opaque (Q D15).

10.23. Lord Rooker also emphasised that it would be easier to assess the possible impact of the move to co-decision once the composition of the agriculture and fisheries committees after the 2009 European Parliament election was known. The policy direction of the European Parliament might be influenced in one particular direction if producer interests were strongly represented in the committees (Q D1).

10.24. Lord Rooker explained that DEFRA was not concerned about the move to co-decision for two reasons. First, the Department had had positive experiences in working with the European Parliament on environmental dossiers under the co-decision procedure. He cited the chemicals regulation, REACH[248], as an example of a dossier on which the negotiated outcome was closer to the UK position due to the involvement of the European Parliament. Second, he felt that there would be more discussion and therefore more opportunities for the UK Government to explain their reform agenda (Q D9).

10.25. The Scottish Fishermen's Federation (SFF) considered that it was not clear whether the procedural change "will be an advantage or a hindrance". On the one hand, there was likely to be more thorough consideration with an extended chance to challenge, modify or support proposed measures. On the other hand, the timescale for the introduction of measures might be extended beyond that which was desirable for the timely management of fisheries (p D16).

10.26. The National Farmers' Union (NFU) agreed that the procedural change might "result in a longer decision-making process". They considered that the policy impact was more difficult to ascertain, noting simply that outcomes might "suit more closely the needs of farmers" but, on the other hand, it might "water down action and increase political compromises" (p D15).

10.27. The Chair of the European Parliament's Agriculture Committee, Neil Parish MEP, suggested that in his personal view there would be "some flexing of muscles" from the European Parliament[249]. He emphasised that the Parliament would need to be more cooperative in its dealings with the other institutions than it had been in the past. He was sceptical as to whether the change would assist the process of agricultural policy reform[250].

10.28. In a similar vein, Neil O'Brien argued that, over the last few years, "the Parliament has tended to be a brake on reform of the agricultural policy and the fisheries policy" (Q S81) and therefore that co-decision "will effectively give protectionist interests a second line of defence in the negotiations" (Q S85).

10.29. On the other hand, Professor Hix suggested that surveys of MEPs had shown that there was in fact an overwhelming majority in the European Parliament in favour of reforming the CAP and that the move to co-decision may therefore enable the CAP to be further reformed via the EP (p S145).

10.30. Professor Chalmers agreed that the change could lead to further reform. He felt that it "will shift power away from the farmers towards food safety policy and consumers in the sense that at the moment it is agricultural ministries and the European Commission Agriculture Directorate-General who run agriculture". He thought that "there will be MEPs with urban constituencies who will be much more interested in having a say, so it might lead to an ideological shift" (Q S22).

10.31. Lord Rooker warned, however, against assuming that urban-based MEPs would be supportive of further reform. He took the view that there might be urban MEPs who "are very much with the psyche of the culture of farming and agriculture" (Q D9).

10.32. In suggesting that the application of the ordinary legislative procedure would assist the process of CAP reform, Sir Stephen Wall alluded both to the new budgetary arrangements and to the diminishing economic significance of the agricultural sector: "it is hard to see over time that a policy where the European Parliament has to take responsibility for expenditure will lead to that Parliament trying to take decisions which kind of fly in the face of what is going on in the countries from which the MEPs come" (Q S221). Lord Rooker agreed that the approach of the European Parliament was likely to change once it had been given "a degree of ownership and accountability" for decisions (Q D10).

10.33. European Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget, Dalia Grybauskaite, anticipated that the extension of co-decision elements "will make the Council's life more difficult"[251].

10.34. The SFF noted that the exception for fixing and allocating fishing opportunities "will be necessary to achieve the required timescale for decision-making" (p D16). The SFF referred to the time pressure on the decisions taken by fisheries ministers each December on the fishing opportunities for the following year. Scientific advice on which Commission proposals are based is normally only available in October, and the Commission proposals follow in November, thus rendering very difficult the application of the ordinary legislative procedure if a decision is to be taken in December.

10.35. Lord Rooker confirmed that the need for all of the exceptions was purely a timing issue. He explained that co-decision would not necessarily slow things down but "it can be weeks and months" rather than "hours and days", which was the timescale required for decisions under these exceptions (Q D18).

CONCLUSIONS

10.36. The move to co-decision in agriculture and fisheries is significant. It will bring more transparency and accountability to the policy-making process, allowing third parties to raise concerns more easily with policy makers and facilitating national parliamentary scrutiny of agricultural and fisheries decision-making.

10.37. We urge the European institutions to ensure that the application of the ordinary legislative procedure does not unduly extend the length of the decision-making process. As regards fisheries, particular efforts may need to be made to ensure that the more complex procedure does not hinder the timely management of fisheries.

10.38. There is a range of views on the likely policy impact of the move to co-decision in agriculture and fisheries. Some witnesses took an historical approach, arguing that the European Parliament had not been reform-minded in the past and that this was unlikely to change in the future. Other witnesses analysed the underlying political trends in the Parliament and argued on that basis that the Parliament was likely to be increasingly reform-minded once the power of co-decision had been granted.

10.39. The future policy impact of the move to co-decision is not clear. Much depends on the European Parliament itself, but the weight of the evidence suggests that the agriculture and fisheries committees of the European Parliament will in future represent, and be closely overseen by, a wider range of interests than the narrow producer interests that have historically dominated those committees. For these reasons, we expect that the change is likely to assist rather than impede further reform of both the common agricultural and fisheries policies.

10.40. Maintaining the various exceptions to co-decision, while justified in the light of the required timescales, may be significant as important decisions will continue to rest solely with the Council. We would urge the Commission to publish its annual proposals on the fixing and allocating of fishing opportunities as early as possible each year in order that the European Parliament can be informally consulted and allowing time for national parliaments to scrutinise the proposals more effectively.

The amended budgetary provisions

DETAILS OF THE CHANGE INTRODUCED BY THE LISBON TREATY

10.41. New budgetary provisions will increase the role of the European Parliament with respect to agricultural spending as the current distinction between "compulsory" (predominantly agricultural) and "non-compulsory" expenditure will be abolished. At present, the European Parliament has an advisory role in respect of compulsory expenditure. Under the Treaty, the European Parliament and Council will have to come to a final agreement on the whole budget, including agricultural spending (Article 314, TFEU).

EVIDENCE

10.42. Sir Stephen Wall welcomed the abolition of the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. In his view, the European Parliament had in the past been able to use its power over non-compulsory expenditure as "leverage to ratchet up agricultural expenditure anyway", without having to take responsibility (Q S196). The change would therefore "make the European Parliament make a responsible choice" (Q S198).

10.43. The Chairman of the European Parliament's Budget Committee, Reimer Boege MEP, agreed that the change would force the European Parliament to act more responsibly[252]. He explained that there would be a range of pressures applied to MEPs as a result of their increased role and therefore "to find a balance for the agricultural sector, including the budget, including these elements of sustainability and food production at a level of high quality and acceptable prices, is a new challenge and a real challenge for the institutions"[253].

10.44. David Heathcoat-Amory MP expressed concern that giving the European Parliament "any further powers over the budget will probably be treated with considerable alarm in the treasuries of all Member States" (Q S87). On the other hand, the European Parliamentary Labour Party opined that the change would make the way that the EU spent its money "more open and balanced" (p S139).

CONCLUSIONS

10.45. The abolition of the distinction between compulsory (agricultural) and non-compulsory expenditure is a significant step alongside the application of the ordinary legislative procedure to agriculture policy. The change will make the agricultural budget-setting process more transparent, open and balanced.

Exclusive competence for the conservation of marine biological resources under the Common Fisheries Policy

DETAILS OF THE CHANGE INTRODUCED BY THE LISBON TREATY

10.46. Article 3(1)(d) TFEU provides that the conservation of marine biological resources under the Common Fisheries Policy will be an exclusive competence of the European Union. The principle of exclusive competence in this area was first established by the European Court of Justice over 30 years ago[254] and reiterated subsequently[255]. The Treaty therefore reflects current practice. In the 1976 joint ruling, the Court concluded that "the Community has at its disposal, on the internal level, the power to take any measures for the conservation of the biological resources of the sea, measures which include the fixing of catch quotas and their allocation between the different member states."

EVIDENCE

10.47. DEFRA considered that "the Treaty provisions are intended to codify previous case-law relating to competence" (p D2). Lord Rooker added that the codification "should not make any difference to the existing position on future domestic marine legislation or to regional fisheries management" (Q D23). The SFF believed that the practical implications of this were not clear but the development sounded "worrying" (p D16).

CONCLUSION

10.48. The clause on exclusive competence for the conservation of marine biological resources under the Common Fisheries Policy represents a codification of ECJ case-law.

Animal Welfare

DETAILS OF THE CHANGE INTRODUCED BY THE LISBON TREATY

10.49. Article 13 TFEU brings into the Treaty the wording of the existing Protocol (No. 33) on Protection and Welfare of Animals annexed to the TEC. The wording is amended to add a reference to fisheries, technological development and space policies. A reference to animals as sentient beings is also incorporated into the body of the article. The wording of the Protocol already balanced the need to pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals in the prescribed areas against the need to respect the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage. This wording is maintained.

EVIDENCE

10.50. CIWF (Compassion in World Farming) believed that the incorporation of the animal welfare Protocol into the body of the Treaty would give greater weight to the recognition of these issues (p D12). The RSPCA was pleased to see that the recognition of animals as sentient beings had been supported in this Treaty, having previously been included in the Protocol. The RSPCA felt it important that animal welfare issues were considered fully when formulating and implementing any policy in the EU and in individual Member States. It cited recent Eurobarometer surveys indicating public support for such a position (p D16).

10.51. Lord Rooker stated that there would probably be more debate of animal welfare issues in the European Parliament as a result of the application of co-decision to agricultural policy. He hoped that this would assist the UK in getting the rest of the EU to catch up with what the UK had done in terms of imposing welfare conditions on food producers, thus ensuring a level playing field across the European Union (Q D30). CIWF also referred to the increased powers that the European Parliament would have as regards agriculture, commenting that "the Parliament has traditionally been more helpful on animal welfare than the Council" (p D12).

10.52. DEFRA stated that there was wide consensus on the sentience of vertebrates, although less so as regards invertebrates. In this light, DEFRA explained that the Animal Welfare Act 2006 covered vertebrates kept by man but that the Treaty wording would extend to some invertebrates used for fisheries (i.e. shellfish) and also the catching of vertebrate fish (p D2).

10.53. The SFF considered that the inclusion of fisheries in the new Article 13 TFEU was unfortunate and that "the potential for advanced silliness in policy making is clearly apparent" (p D16).

10.54. DEFRA took the view that the implications of the scope of the Treaty would need to be considered in relation to the exemptions provided for matters such as religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage (p D2). Lord Rooker explained that this related, for example, to exemptions allowing for the production of religiously slaughtered meat (Q D39).

CONCLUSIONS

10.55. The new Article 13 TFEU re-affirms the European Union's commitment to animal welfare. It will help to ensure greater consistency across the EU as regards animal welfare.

10.56. We acknowledge the concerns of the fishing industry and draw attention to the potential consequences of applying the provisions on animal welfare to commercial fisheries given the nature of death to which netting and landing can lead.