Memorandum by Sir Brian Crowe, Deputy
Chairman of Chatham House, formerly Director General for External
and Politico-Military Affairs, EU Council of Minister
THE FOREIGN
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF THE
REFORM TREATY
1. The founding fathers deliberately excluded
foreign policy (although not foreign trade/commercial) policy
from the Treaty of Rome. Foreign policy was to remain strictly
a matter for the member states. Consequently the institutional
framework created by the Treaty for Rome made no provision for
it.
2. In subsequent years starting in 1969-70,
stretching into decades, the member states took the view that
foreign policy cooperation (EPC or European Political Cooperation,
as it was called, until it was renamed CFSP or Common Foreign
and Security Policy in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992) was a good
thing. The member states would wield more influence if they spoke
and acted in common than if they continued to act on their own.
British governments from the UK's accession in 1973 have consistently
taken the same view, at least when not running scared of the Murdoch
press and the Daily Mail.
3. But the arrangements for EPC which the member
states worked out informally as they went along outside the Treaty
framework, little changed in their fundamentals when brought into
that framework at Maastricht, have increasingly shown themselves
to be inefficient verging on dysfunctional. The management of
the CFSP by successive six-monthly rotating Presidencies among
countries of differing size, international standing, competence
and even interests, with very little provision in the EU budget
and patchy representation by Presidency embassies in third countries
was confused. That most of the incentives and levers (eg aid and
trade) available to the EU were controlled by an institution,
the Commission, not answerable to the Presidency only added to
the confusion.
4. Palliatives, notably the creation of the
post of High Representative for the CFSP and the appointment to
it of a high-calibre international statesman (Javier Solana) in
1999, mitigated the worst, but introduced its own dysfunctionalities
(two actors, Presidency and Commission, became three with the
HR/CFSP). That business got done at all was an achievement.
5. It has been argued that there is no need
for reform since the EU has managed perfectly well without it,
eg over Iran's nuclear ambitions. This oft-cited example actually
demonstrates rather that, while the existing system can sometimes
work, it is too fraught and unreliable a process to be a desirable
norm. The original EU3 (France, Germany, UK) launched the Iran
initiative themselves because launching it within the existing
CFSP framework would have meant entrusting the lead to an Italian
Presidency they did not trust. Excluding the Presidency meant
that they had to exclude Javier Solana. But they found themselves
negotiating with Iran relying on incentives which only the EU
could provide (aid and trade). There was also much resentment
in the rest of the EU. Fortunately the circle was squared, no
doubt because all concerned showed good sense, because the stakes
were so high and because there was no real policy disagreement.
The EU3 with the participation of Solana (but still not the Presidency)
were given an EU mandate at the Rome European Council in December
2004) and now Javier Solana leads not only for the EU but also
for the three plus three ( EU3 plus US, Russia and China).
6. So that is, so far, a success story, but
arrived at haphazardly relying on dysfunctional procedures. The
changes in the Reform Treaty are an attempt to change this and
to make the institutional arrangements for operating the EU's
external relations fit for purpose, finally shedding the legacy
of the founding fathers' deliberate omission fifty years ago.
7. It does this, and this is a key point, not
by bringing any new powers to Brussels from national capitals
or by creating new powers. Rather it takes the existing powers
and functions and re-allocates them among the foreign policy actors
in Brussels (essentially, the Presidency, the HR/CFSP and the
Commissioner for External Relations). It replaces the rotating
Presidency (which largely disappears from external relations),
gives its functions of chairing the Foreign Affairs Council and
managing the CFSP to the HR/CFSP, and makes him (renamed EU High
Representative, or EUHR) also a Vice President (VP) responsible
in the Commission for external relations.
8. It also gives him a so-called External Action
Service to assist him in his functions, with the Commission's
existing nearly 130 overseas delegations placed under his authority.
This is to be his eyes and ears abroad in the same way that national
foreign ministers have their embassies. It has been one of Javier
Solana's great handicaps that as HR/CFSP he did not have anybody
to do this for him (other than the occasional ad hoc special representative
he was able to appoint); relying on Presidency embassies was very
hit or miss and Commission delegations were generally unavailable
because of Brussels institutional rivalries.
9. The EAS is not however a new creation. The
nearly 130 Commission delegations (and two Council liaison offices
in New York and Geneva), already exist. Re-branding them into
the EAS is no more than a common sense adaptation to the new allocation
of tasks at the centre, making them too fit for purpose for an
integrated EU foreign policy across the board.
10. For this is what the foreign policy provisions
of the Treaty are about: the integration of the EU's foreign policy
across the board, bringing together, under the coherent leadership
of one person, the EUHR, the political objectives established
by unanimity under the rules of the CFSP (which remain substantially
unchanged by the Treaty) and the economic objectives and instruments
established very largely by QMV in the Commission's areas of responsibility
(where, unlike in CFSP, the European Parliament has a very substantial
role and the ECJ has jurisdiction).
11. The reforms are not perfect. The removal
of some fault lines has led to others. The functions of chairing
the Council, running the CFSP and managing and coordinating the
Commission's actions in external relations have led to tensions
in the past which will not go away just because they are now combined
in one person. The EUHR's answerability to the Council in some
areas (CFSP), the college of Commissioners as VP in others, and
both where the two areas of policy come together (which is after
all the intention) could give rise to resentments and tensions
which will require skill to handle.
12. And the role in foreign policy of the new
standing President of the European Council, whose main function
is to provide continuity and coherence mostly on the internal
side over several Presidencies, is not clear. He is to represent
the EU "at his level", which is one thing for attendance
at EU summits with third countries, quite another if (as will
always be the temptation for former heads of government who are
likely to get the job) he seeks to cut a figure on the world stage
competitively with the EUHR. It has to be hoped that this will
not be allowed to happen when the detailed arrangements are worked
out in Brussels.
13. Nor are these reforms anywhere near enough
to turn the old EU-foreign-policy banger with many not very careful
drivers into a chauffeur-driven Rolls Royce. They are an important
contribution. But more important will be the willingness, indeed
the will, of the member states to agree to common foreign polices,
to support the EUHR in fronting them, to accept (on the part of
the smaller member states) that in the real world weight counts
and that therefore some larger EU member states must have a stronger
role in CFSP than others, and that (on the part of the larger
member states) the interests of all must be recognised. And of
course the quality of the EUHR and his staff in the EEAS and his
ability to work with the important member states (including beyond
any question the UK) will be crucial.
14. The UK has always supported foreign policy
cooperation with our EU partners. Such cooperation will take place
other than on an entirely ad hoc and occasional basis only within
a sensible framework so that the necessary discussion, coordination,
decisions and implementation can happen. If we want meaningful
foreign policy cooperation amounting to common polices and actions
among 27 countries, recognizing that alone we carry little weight
and dispose of the most limited resources, then it is in the UK's
interest to support the arrangements needed to make this possible.
15. The UK has the ultimate safeguard in CFSP
that no decision can be taken without its consent, or at least
acquiescence (see note below). But there is no need for the UK
to think in such defensive terms, rather the contrary. The UK
is indispensable to an effective CFSP for all sorts of reasons
(just as are also eg France and Germany), and at the core of the
EU's Defence and Security Policy. No EUHR could afford to ignore
this. So there is a strong mutual interest among all the main
players, whether in Brussels or national capitals, in making it
work effectively. If it fails for one, it will fail for all. We
shall have lost nothing by trying, but a lot by failing
NOTE:
The important decisions will continue under
the Reform Treaty to be taken by unanimity. There is provision
for implementing decisions to be taken by QMV (actually a provision
in the existing treaties but never really used). But there is
also the so-called emergency brake, or safety net: if a likely
QMV decision would affect a member state's vital interests, no
vote can be taken. If no agreement can be reached the issue can
be referred to the European Council by QMV, but the European Council
decides on the issue itself by unanimity
Another important point relates to the EU's
new legal personality. Some people have seen this as giving the
EU a new right to reach and sign international agreements committing
the UK against its will. It does no such thing. Not only does
the EU already have that right (typically now exercised through
the Presidency, in future no doubt through the EUHR or, at summit
level, the President of the European Council), but more to the
point, it can only be exercised (in either case ie with or without
formal legal personality) under the authority of a unanimous decision
of the Council. So in practical terms it is a distinction without
a difference.
3 December 2007
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