Memorandum by the European Parliamentary
Labour Party
1. The development of the European Union
has been fundamental in establishing an area of peace and stability
in a continent previously ravaged by war, in enhancing prosperity
and welfare through the creation of the world's largest single
market with common rules for social standards, consumer protection
and fair competition in enabling Member States to work together
to address issues that transcend national borders, not least the
environment, and in giving Europe a stronger voice in world affairs.
2. There has, for some time, been consensus
amongst the EU governments on the need to reform and strengthen
the structures of the EU in order to consolidate its existing
achievements and to improve the capacity of a Union of 27, and
potentially more, Member States to function effectively and to
be subject to greater democratic accountability.
3. A first attempt to reform, consisting
of repealing the previous treaties and replacing them with a Constitution,
was ratified by two-thirds of the Member States but stalled when
it was rejected by France and the Netherlands.
4. This new attempt, the Treaty of Lisbon
or "Reform Treaty" explicitly abandons the idea of a
Constitution in favour of a traditional treaty, comprising a set
of amendments to the two existing treaties, while preserving the
bulk of the institutional adjustments that it contained. This
change is very important. The term "Constitution" was
probably the factor that caused its defeat in the Netherlands
and was an issue in France. In Britain it was used to justify
calls for a referendum on the grounds that this was no ordinary
treaty but, as a Constitution, was something different and more
significant. Whether this would really have justified a referendum
is debatable, but now that this has been abandoned it would be
extraordinary to hold a referendum on a conventional amending
treaty. Besides, Britain, as a parliamentary democracy, has never
ratified an international treaty by means of a referendum.
5. Other "constitutional" features
have also been abandoned in the Reform Treaty: the upgrading of
the High Representative to the status of "Minister";
giving treaty status to the symbols (flag and anthem); the change
of the terminology for EU legal instruments, (with EU regulations
becoming "EU laws" and EU directives becoming "EU
framework laws"). In addition, the Charter of Fundamental
Rights will not be a full part of the treaty but will be binding
on the EU institutions and will apply to the field of European
law with a protocol added to clarify that it does not affect or
override UK domestic law; the changes to the voting weights in
the Council of Ministers will not start to come into effect until
2014; a right to opt-out is given to Britain on criminal law and
co-operation on legal matters.
6. All of the above make the Reform Treaty
significantly different from the Constitution, especially for
Britain. But the Reform Treaty does retain many of the practical
institutional reforms and adjustments that had been in the Constitution
and which seek to make the EU function more effectively and to
enhance its democratic accountability. Let us begin by focusing
on the latter.
MORE DEMOCRATIC
ACCOUNTABILITY AND
TRANSPARENCY
7. The Reform Treaty contains a number of
innovations that will improve the democratic accountability of
the European Union.
8. Under the treaty, the approval of virtually
all EU legislation will require the dual approval of elected governments
in the Council of Ministers and directly elected MEPs in the European
Parliament—the full time representatives that voters choose
to represent them specifically at European level. This dual scrutiny
provides a double quality control for all European legislation.
Similarly, the treaty provides that all budgetary spending must
be subject to double approval by the Council and the European
Parliament. This is particularly relevant to CAP spending which
is currently decided exclusively by the Council of Ministers.
Opening these policy areas up to the European Parliament will
inevitably make policy delivery more transparent and make the
way that the EU spends its budget more open and balanced.
9. The treaty will also provide for the
Council of Ministers to meet in public when discussing legislation—a
long overdue reform that was driven by the 2005 UK Presidency.
10. One of the key innovations of the treaty
provides that all EU legislative proposals must first be sent
to national parliaments. This should enhance the ability of national
parliaments to shape the position taken by their own government
representatives and to scrutinise their actions in Brussels.
11. National parliaments will also have
the power to send proposals back to the Commission, if a minority
(one third) believe that the proposal breaches the principle of
subsidiarity and that the issue should be for national—not
European—law. If a majority oppose a proposal, this will
trigger a vote in the Council that will kill off the proposal
in all but the most unusual of circumstances.
12. The Commons European Scrutiny Committee
has voiced concerns about the passage in the text that reads "national
parliaments contribute to the effective functioning of the Union".
This was amended during the IGC from "national parliaments
shall contribute to the effective functioning of the Union",
a phrase which some felt inferred a legal obligation on national
parliaments. We do not share these concerns. On the contrary,
the passage formalises the fact that national parliaments are
involved in formulating European legislation not just the EU institutions
and national governments and, consequently, has been welcomed
by the vast majority of national parliaments across the EU.
13. The treaty provides for the President
of the Commission to be elected by the European Parliament. The
nomination of a candidate by the European Council must take account
of the European election results and the majorities that are possible
in the European Parliament. This, coupled with the need for a
vote of confidence by Parliament for the entire Commission, will
make it clear that the Commission is not a bunch of unelected
bureaucrats, but is a politically accountable executive dependant
on the confidence of the elected Parliament.
14. The democratic control of the exercise
of delegated powers by the Commission will be reinforced through
a new system of supervision by the European Parliament and the
Council that will enable each of them to call back Commission
decisions on delegated legislation to which they object and give
each of them the right to revoke the delegation of powers.
15. The procedure for revising the Treaties
will be, in future, more open and transparent. The European Parliament
will gain the power to submit proposals to that end, and the scrutiny
of any proposed revision must be carried out by a Convention which
will include representatives of national parliaments and of the
European Parliament, unless Parliament agrees that this is not
necessary; This will ensure that any future amendments to the
treaties are subject to wider scrutiny and more public debate.
16. All in all, these measures are modest
adjustments, but, nonetheless, they will create a system with
multi-layered and multi-faceted democratic scrutiny, this will
give the EU a level of parliamentary scrutiny that exists in no
other international structure.
MORE EFFICIENT
INSTITUTIONS
17. The six-months rotating presidency of
the European Council will be replaced by a President elected by
its members for a 30 month term, thus allowing for more coherence
in the preparation and follow up of its meetings (thereby arguably
strengthening the main intergovernmental body of the Union at
the expense of the Commission).
18. The Treaty merges the two existing posts
of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and External Relations
Commissioner to create a "double hatted" High Representative
who will be a Vice-President of the Commission and will chair
the Foreign Affairs Council. This should avoid duplication and
give the EU a single voice on foreign policy issues where the
Member States have agreed to act collectively. This High Representative
will be both accountable to the Council and, as a member of the
Commission, to the European Parliament.
19. The single external action service,
composed of civil servants of the institutions and of the national
diplomacies, under the responsibility of the Vice-President/High
Representative, will ensure coherence of the execution of the
Union's external action. Previously, the external representations
of the Union around the world came under exclusive responsibility
of the Commission.
20. The Treaty will cap the European Parliament,
which has grown from 518 members in 1994 to 785 members, at 751
members (roughly the same size as the current House of Lords).
Under the Reform Treaty, these will be allocated using a system
of "degressive proportionality", with a country's seats
decided by its population. This is a fairer method than the current
method of allocating seats according to blocks of countries and
negotiating skill or trade-offs by EU leaders. However, it is
a matter of regret that, at the October summit, an extra parliamentary
seat was attributed to Italy in derogation of the principle of
"degressive proportionality".
21. Similarly, the new voting arrangements
in the Council of Ministers will deliver fairer and more efficient
decision making, with a 55% majority of countries representing
65% of the entire EU population required to approve European legislation.
Incidentally, basing votes in Council on population will increase
Britain's share of the votes from 8.5% to 12%.
22. The number of members of the Commission
will be reduced, to avoid it changing, through successive enlargements,
from a compact executive into a miniature assembly. As of 2014
it will be confined to a size equal to two-thirds of the number
of Member States, thus conferring more cohesion to the college,
while a rotation system will ensure equal participation of all
Member States. Being without a commissioner for one term in three
is better than always having a member of an oversized and unwieldy
Commission.
REFORM RATHER
THAN NEW
POWERS
23. The Reform Treaty is an evolutionary
rather than a revolutionary treaty, focusing not on giving the
EU more responsibilities but on enabling it to use its existing
responsibilities more effectively.
24. The treaty defines more clearly the
areas where the EU can and cannot act, under the principle that
all competencies that are not conferred upon the Union by the
Treaties remain with the Member States. The Union's objectives
and competencies in the fields of climate change, energy, space,
children's rights, tourism, sport, public health and civil protection
are defined in a clearer way, but are not new competences. Indeed,
no new subject matters are given to the EU institutions—just
changes to how the EU can handle them.
25. The treaty also specifies that powers
can be returned to the member states. Whether this is necessary
or not depends on the member states themselves, because they are
the gatekeepers of what goes into the European domain and what
does not. And it is worth recalling that the EU cannot deal with
any subject unless all member states have agreed to put it into
the treaty. Even then, the intensity of EU action is determined
by the Council, a body composed of national ministers from national
governments accountable to national parliaments. The EU does not
determine its own remit—member states do—and the Reform
Treaty will not change this.
26. Indeed, the treaty contains, for the
avoidance of any doubts, sufficient guarantees that the Union
will not become a centralised all-powerful "superstate":
— the obligation to respect the "national
identities of Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures,
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local
self-government", as well as "their essential state
functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the
State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.
In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility
of each Member State";
— the principles of conferred powers
(whereby the Union's only competences are those conferred on it
by the Member States), subsidiarity and proportionality;
— the participation of the Member States
themselves in the Union's decision-making system and in agreeing
any changes to it; and
— recognition of the right of Member
States that wish to do so to leave the Union.
COMMON FEARS
27. The fears of eurosceptics about the
provisions that would give the EU "legal personality"
are misguided. The EC has always had legal personality (the right
to sign binding agreements and to be sued), as most international
organisations do. International agreements signed by the EU will
require the approval of the Council. The confusion between the
"European Community" and "European Union"
will end as treaty establishes that the European Union becomes
one single legal entity and structure.
28. Others have queried the extension of
majority voting. It should be remembered that the veto is a double
edged sword: if you have one, so does everybody else. Things that
Britain wants can be blocked by the veto of just one of 26 other
countries. Of course, unanimity is retained for the sensitive
areas of tax, social security, foreign policy, defence and decisions
on the method of financing the EU, (including the British budget
contribution). In fact, of the 50 extensions of majority voting,
most are in areas that are either technical or where Britain has
an opt-in/out. The handful that are politically important such
as urgent humanitarian aid operations, aspects of energy policy
and co-operation in the event of natural disasters are all where
it is in Britain's interests not to be blocked by the vetoes of
others. In any case, the new system of voting, linked to the size
of each country, will actually increase Britain's share of the
votes.
29. With regard to claims that the Reform
Treaty is "self-amending" and so "the powers of
the EU could be increased without the need for any new treaty",
it is worth pointing out that no change to the EU treaties can
be made without the approval of each and every Member State. Whether
or not we want to make further changes to the EU treaty therefore
lies entirely in our hands. Even minor changes, according to the
treaty, must be "notified to the national parliaments",
and if even a single one objects, the changes "shall not
be adopted".
CONCLUSIONS
30. Discussion on the treaty boils down
to the following: "reform versus more of the same".
Taken as a whole, the Reform Treaty is a substantial improvement
on the existing treaties as amended by the Treaty of Nice, which
will bring more democratic accountability to the Union (through
a strengthening of the roles of the European Parliament and national
parliaments), enhance the rights of European citizens vis-a"-vis
the Union and improve the functioning of the Union's institutions.
31. Blocking the reform treaty will mean
more of the same—the EU as it is now, with less democratic
scrutiny, accountability or transparency than it should have,
and constrained by a structure that was designed for a union of
15 rather than 27 nations.
32. The Reform Treaty is a set of useful
reforms that will make the EU institutions more responsive to
Member States, their parliaments and their people. In other words,
it will deliver a more focused EU, better capable of delivering
in those policy areas where we benefit from common European action,
but subject also to stronger safeguards and more scrutiny. This
Treaty will provide a stable and lasting framework for the future
development of the EU and deserves our support.
Richard Corbett MEP
On behalf of the European Parliamentary Labour Party
13 December 2007
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