Memorandum by Frank Vibert, Director,
European Policy Forum (evidence submitted in a personal capacity)
INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP
UNDER THE
REFORM TREATY
1. THE TREATY
PROVISIONS
Terms of Office
(i) In addition to the office of the President
of the Commission, the Reform Treaty provides for a new President
of the Council and a High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy. The President of the Council is elected
for a 2½ year term renewable once (Art 9b para 5) and the
other two positions for 5 years (Art 9d para 3). Essentially therefore
the positions run concurrently with the five year term of the
European Parliament. (Art 9a para 3).
Manner of Selection
(ii) The President of the European Council
is elected by the Council itself by qualified majority ((Art.9b
para.5).
(iii) The President of the Commission is
proposed by a qualified majority of the European Council, taking
into account the elections to the European Parliament, and elected
by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members
((Art 9d para 7).
(iv) The High Representative is appointed
by the European Council (by qualified majority vote) with the
agreement of the President of the Commission (Art 9e para 1) and
subject along with the President of the Commission and other members
of the Commission to a vote of consent by the European Parliament.
(Art 9d para 7 clause 3).
2. GRADUATED
INVOLVEMENT OF
EP OR A
"PACKAGE?"
(i) These provisions can be viewed as allowing
for a graduated role for the European Parliament as shown in the
table below. On the face of it the Parliament has no role in the
appointment of the President of the Council, gives its consent
to the proposed High Representative and elects the President of
the Commission.
Table
ROLE OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN APPOINTMENT
PROCESS
Declaration A Para 2.
(ii) There is a highly important qualification
to this picture contained in Declaration A para 2. This Declaration
applies to each of the articles referring to the method of appointment
for each of the offices and reads as follows: "In choosing
the persons called upon to hold the offices of the President of
the European Council, President of the Commission and High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, due account
is to be taken of the need to respect the geographical and demographic
diversity of the Union and its Member States".
(iii) The effect of this provision is that
the three appointments are to be chosen as a package. Under Declaration
A Section 3 para 6, the European Parliament and Council are "jointly
responsible for the smooth running of the process leading to the
election of the President of the Commission". Appointments
to each position, and the package as a whole, will thus become
a matter of inter-institutional bargaining between Parliament
and Council.
3. THREE QUESTIONS
Three questions arise from the packaging of
these positions:
1. The Best Person for the Job?
The first question is whether packaging will
produce the person most suited for the job. The positions themselves
call for very different qualities. The President of the Council
is to "drive forward" (Art 9b para 6) the work of the
Council in giving general political direction and priorities to
the Union (Art 9b para 1). The President of the Commission is
meant to be independent of any government or institution, (Art
9d para 3) and essentially must oversee the Commission's role
as network manager for the Union. The High Representative has
to help forge common positions in the Council on foreign and security
policy and to help present those common positions to the external
world.
2. A Plus for Parliamentary Democracy?
The second question is whether the arrangements
will be seen by European electorates as a step forward for parliamentary
democracy (because of the heightened involvement of the European
Parliament). What is clear from the packaging and Declaration
A is that the negotiations will take into account not only left/right
divides within the Parliament and Council (and coalition formation)
but also divides between large and small member states, north
and south, and new member state claims against old member state
claims. The criteria will thus be blurred.
3. A Balanced Ticket for Representative Democracy?
The third question is whether the procedures
involved in putting together the package of appointments will
be viewed by the electorates as providing for a balanced ticket
that will be seen to be more broadly representative than a differentiated
process.
In practice, whatever the Parliament and Council
agree for the selection procedure will be preceded and accompanied
by caucusing by party groupings within the Parliament (as well
as by party groupings that may include some members of the Council).
Such background caucusing might risk the appearance of a division
of the spoils of office between Council and Parliament.
5 December 2006
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