Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 260 - 279)

WEDNESDAY 19 DECEMBER 2007

Mr Jim Murphy, Ms Shan Morgan, Mr Paul Berman and Mr Martin Shearman

  Q260  Lord Jopling: Minister, under the new rules that we are faced with, if a country wishes to join with others in getting a blocking minority in order to block something, under the new rules on qualified majority voting, is that not going to be a good deal more difficult and is the Government unhappy about the effect of these changed rules on the ability of the UK to block things it does not like?

  Mr Murphy: No, that is not the case at all. We are really pretty content with the new system of moving away from qualified majority voting to double majority voting. I have been asked about this before in various gatherings which has led to me having to wade through all the analysis and it is another one of those points where, not your good self, my Lord, of course, but others, they substitute fact for assertion and I have had debates in the Commons about this where it has been suggested that this would be much more difficult and it weakens the UK position. The fact is that, in terms of the UK's share of a blocking minority, it has gone up from the current situation of 32%, so in any blocking minority it wished to be involved in, whereas the UK is currently 32% of that, that would go up to 35% under the new system. It may be helpful for your Lordships if I just reflect on what these changes are about. With the system currently of qualified majority voting, in order for a proposal to gain assent, it requires the agreement of a majority of the Member States, as you know, plus, I think it is, 255 of the 345 votes for a proposal to be agreed to. Under the new system, instead of a majority of Member States, it is 55% of Member States and, instead of 255 of 345, we are moving to a system based on populations where the UK will be one of the main beneficiaries because we are moving towards a system of votes based on population, so I think at the moment we have 29 of the 345 and we are going to a situation where our population of 60.6 million means that, instead of having an 8% share of the vote in the Council, we go to a 12% share. The new system of double majority voting is based on 55% of Member States, instead of a simple majority, and, instead of the figure of 255, it is based on the agreement of the Member States representing 65% of the EU population, so you would have to have both, 55% of the States plus 65% of the population of the EU, being within that 55% of Member States. Therefore, in fact it enhances our share of the vote and it increases our proportion of a blocking minority, so based on all the science, all the facts, all the figures and all the analysis, we are really pretty content with the deal that we have here.

  Q261  Lord Jopling: Can I turn to another side of this and ask you what you think will be the position in the future of a country which very, very strongly objects to what is proposed and what, in the old days, used to be described as a "vital national interest", and that brings me to what used to be called the "Luxembourg compromise". I think that you perhaps agree that there was a lot of misunderstanding about what was meant by the Luxembourg compromise and a lot of people, particularly in this building, thought that a country just had to say, "Veto" and that was that. Of course, it was not like that at all. If you had a vital national interest and you declared it, in order to apply that "veto", one had to get a blocking minority to support you and, forgive me, but you are probably too young to remember that in 1984 Peter Walker used the Luxembourg compromise and was rolled over because he could not get a blocking minority to support him, so the veto in fact never used to work, unless you could get other people to join in with you and sympathise with you. In fact, in my time, a number of delegations were under a standing instruction that, if any delegation declared a vital national interest, they were, regardless of the facts, to support that delegation to encourage the so-called Luxembourg compromise to work. Now, my question is this: how will it still be possible for a country with a vital national interest which says it is so and it needs to get a blocking minority to support it, which I imagine would still delay agreement if you got the blocking minority? Surely that, as I understand it, will still operate and the so-called veto, which we used to call the "Luxembourg compromise", would still operate if a country declared a vital national interest and could get enough countries to support it. For instance, is the British delegation, at the various facets of the Council, still under a standing instruction, as they were in my time, that, if anybody did declare a vital national interest, they were willy-nilly to support it, and do you know of other delegations which are also under an equal instruction, which I could name, but I will not, which, in my time, were always in that position?

  Mr Murphy: You are right, my Lord, that I cannot recall 1984 and the case of Peter Walker. I think at the time I was living in South Africa which is my excuse for not reading the detail at the time. First of all, there are two ways to respond to this. Firstly, on the system of double majority voting, which I accept is not the general point you have made, it is our view that this new system will give us a greater opportunity, where we so wish, to gather a blocking minority, not only because our own share of the vote on a blocking minority is up, but also, in our assessment of the previous occasions on which we have sought to achieve a blocking minority, our retrospective analysis makes us comfortable with this new system in terms of what we wish to achieve. In terms of the Luxembourg compromise, it is my understanding, and your Lordship did not suggest that this was the case, but it has never been a Treaty agreement, it has been a political agreement and that still stands. Now, what we have to do in each instance of course is to ensure that we examine the detail of the suggestion that it is a vital national interest, but, where we are convinced that that is the case, we have still a great deal of sympathy from the United Kingdom and other Member States for the spirit and the logic of the Luxembourg compromise and it is not affected by the Treaty.

  Q262  Lord Jopling: Is the British delegation under an instruction to support a country that declares a vital national interest?

  Mr Murphy: Well, under an arrangement, if someone declares it, we examine it to come to a view as to whether it is a legitimate claim and, when it is a legitimate claim, we would work with others to respect that vital national interest, but I am sure your Lordship would accept that we do not, nor should we ever, take as unconditional, superficial and at face value the claim by another about it being a vital national interest, but, where it is proven to be the case, the United Kingdom Government is sympathetic to that political arrangement that has been in place for many years, yes.

  Chairman: There is a blocking minority at this end of the table that wants to move on to the next question, but I will take two quick ones on this and then we will move on.

  Q263  Lord Sewel: Why is it that this question on the changes to the rules of qualified majority voting is always sort of discussed and couched in a very sort of defensive, negative way? Surely the real benefit to the United Kingdom Government is that the changes in the rules mean that it will be easier for the UK Government to get its proposals adopted and not be blocked by a totally unrepresentative minority.

  Mr Murphy: I think your Lordship is absolutely correct, but unfortunately, and I do not know if I have reflected on this before, the fact is that sometimes the conversation about Europe is trapped in a dialogue about a double negative, that, "Europe is a real threat, but don't worry, we're protecting you from it". Now that we have the Treaty, we have the formal text and we have achieved our red lines, protocols, opt-ins and opt-outs, there is an opportunity now in the new year, as we seek to ratify the Lisbon Treaty through Parliament, to be positive about the impact of the Treaty and, more widely, positive about the importance of Europe in our foreign policy. I think, without drawing your Lordships into a wider debate, for those who say that the Reform Treaty is not necessary, I am not aware of their considered alternative in terms of how a Europe of 27 countries can change its rules to be effective, and those who oppose our membership of the European Union more generally, I cannot conceive of a coherent British national interest foreign policy assessment which it does not have as an active member of the European Union. A world without the European Union, I think, would be a less prosperous and less fair place and the European Union, as the Foreign Secretary has said recently, has the opportunity to be a model power in the world and that is part of the argument we seek to make as we ratify the Reform Treaty. Unfortunately, and perhaps inevitably, my Lord, I have to set out the statistics and the facts for the record and I think the opportunity for rhetoric and high-minded politics, if I ever reach that, is for another time, perhaps at the second reading of the EU Amendment Bill, but we are certainly determined to make the positive case for the Treaty and, more widely, the positive case for the European Union.

  Q264  Lord Kerr of Kinlochard: I admire your self-restraint, Minister. Also, in your answer to Lord Jopling's question, I suppose you could have said that the Luxembourg compromise was always opposed as a matter of theology by some Member States, like the Germans, who were under instructions always to vote against a Member State who was invoking the Luxembourg compromise. It mutated in the 1990s into the Ioannina compromise, which became a Union text which everybody accepted, negotiated by Solana and Lord Hurd. Now, thanks to your diplomacy and maybe a little more to Polish diplomacy, it has mutated into the Treaty and there it is now, in the form, as I understand it, of a version which allows for further time for discussion if a Member State is in serious trouble and concerned about a national interest. Is that correct?

  Mr Murphy: That is correct. The proposal in the Reform Treaty is to move to this new system by transition from 2007 to 2014. In the interim, a Member State has the opportunity to request a vote by the old system, so we try it on the DMV and, if a Member State still requests it, they can say, "Well, let's try it under the old rules, under QMV", and, if we cannot work it out that way in this transitional period under an Ioannina compromise, the idea would be that there would then be responsibility on, I think it is, the Council to find a commonsense way forward that meets everyone's concerns, but that is a protection that is now in there. It is partly driven by the Poles of course, but that is now in there and I think it is a pretty important kind of staging post to move towards this new system in 2014, and thank you for your comment about my self-restraint. Really what I have decided to do is to take a self-denying ordinance and I would enjoy it if all politicians of other Member State did the same over the next six months. I do not see the attraction for our position by defining us against another Member State and that is my general approach.

  Q265  Lord Jopling: Can I just point out that in my presence, although the Germans opposed the Luxembourg Compromise, Mr Keichle actually used it.

  Mr Murphy: Perhaps it would be important also to say, and I am not sure if everyone in the country will be following the detail of this sentence, but the Ioannina arrangements and the Luxembourg Compromise will operate in tandem for this period as well, so that is an important, perhaps double, protection.

  Q266  Lord Maclennan of Rogart: I wonder if we might move on to the authority of the Commission and, in particular, of its President and I wonder if you think that the elevation in, for example, the role of the High Representative and the strengthening of the position of the President of the Council have, together with the provisions for the election of the President of the Commission by the Parliament on the commendation of the Council taking account of the results in an election, affected the role and authority of the President of the Commission.

  Mr Murphy: This phrase about taking account of the results of the European elections was another one of those phrases that a number of people have made enquiries about and made all sorts of suggestions about, that it guarantees that the predominant political grouping that wins the elections has greater powers as a consequence. If one reflects on the current situation, it is that a nominee is put to the Parliament and the European Parliament either assents or disagrees to the proposal and that will still be the case under the Lisbon Treaty. What is different is that phrase, "taking account of the election results of the European Parliament". Now, in truth, it is a statement of the political reality because, even though that phrase does not exist at the moment in the Treaty, the fact is that a candidate proposed to the European Parliament that did not command the support of the majority of the European Parliament would not be elected by the European Parliament, so, in an operational sense, a practical sense and even a political sense, that changed phraseology has no impact; it simply codifies the Treaty, the current arrangements as they stand. In terms of whether the Commission has more power or less, the powers have not increased for the President of the Commission and those are established in the Treaty of Nice, but my sense, and I tangentially referred to this earlier, of the increased influence of the President of the Commission will come about by the Commission itself being more effective and, therefore, gaining greater respect and consent, and I think that is the prize that would lead to greater influence, but in itself the formal powers have not changed.

  Q267  Lord Maclennan of Rogart: You earlier suggested, Minister, that the reduction in size of the Commission might actually enhance its effectiveness and I suppose it follows from that that you think the President may be more effective as a consequence of that, but why, and I am sorry to revert to this phrase, was this phrase inserted if, as you suggest, it had no meaning in an operative sense?

  Mr Murphy: Well, I am happy to seek to find the genesis of the phrase, but the consequence of the phrase simply, in a pretty clear sense, reflects current practice. Your Lordship will be aware that it is about taking account of the results of the European elections. A nominee to the European Parliament that did not in any way command the support of the Members of the European Parliament, as elected at the European elections, would not be successful in any case, but I will, if your Lordships wish me to, happily seek the origin of the exact phrase.

  Q268  Lord Maclennan of Rogart: I have some recollection of it, as a matter of fact, with respect, but now there is another issue. Supposing a political party or a political family which emerged after the election had announced prior to the election that it would propose to nominate a particular individual as President of the Commission if it were successful in the election, would it not be somewhat strengthened by the formulation that is included now?

  Mr Murphy: I am not sure it would, my Lord, on the basis that it is the European Council that considers, and makes, the nomination.

  Q269  Lord Maclennan of Rogart: But, if the European People's Party were the largest party there and had said, "We propose to support so-and-so", would that not be a factor that might be taken into account?

  Mr Murphy: It may be, but, without wandering into the internal disagreements and dynamics of the European People's Party, I think it would be an achievement if they were to agree on one nominee in advance of an election. I do not want to get involved in the party politics of it, but the internal dynamic of that grouping, as of any European political family, as you well know, are multi-dimensional and personally I would be surprised if, one, they were able to, two, they chose to and, three, I think it would seem in many capitals to be extraordinarily presumptuous. Ultimately, the relationship and accountability is from the European Council to the European Parliament and, therefore, even if they were to make a declaration, if they were to arrive at a declaration, they would have no formal influence, but of course informally, you are right, it would send a signal to say, "If you don't nominate one of our family, then we're not interested", but there is no sense that that is what is currently being considered at all.

  Q270  Chairman: This is a question which I think we will probably continue to look at very carefully because the fact remains that nobody is going to be elected President of the Commission who does not have the support of the majority in the European Parliament and it is not very hard to identify what that majority is once the elections have taken place. That is not going to change in effect from what we have had before and I would assume that no nominee for the Commission President who does not have the support of the largest political group is likely to be elected, unless it is such an outstanding candidate that the EPP will be happy to vote for somebody who was clearly the standard-bearer of a different group.

  Mr Murphy: Of course, that is what already happens in terms of a proposal is made to the Parliament and the Parliament votes for or against that nominee. That will be the situation if indeed the Treaty is ratified across Europe as well.

  Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. Let us now move on to the European Parliament.

  Q271  Lord Sewel: This is a question which starts at the general level and then gets particular. Generally, what will be the impact of the Reform Treaty on the European Parliament? How extensive are the Parliament's new legislative and other powers? Then we get more particular and ask you the impact of those powers on the EU and the UK, with particular reference to (a) the move to co-decision making in agriculture and fisheries, and there the lurking question is does it make agricultural reform more or less likely if we move to co-decision making, and (b) the amendment to the budgetary process.

  Mr Murphy: You would not thank me, your Lordship, but we could spend the whole of this afternoon just on that one relatively short question. Our response would be the likely impact first of all would be that we will have slower legislation. Inevitably there will be a delay on occasion in the process as others seek to debate, as entirely entitled to do so as part of the agreement. I think I am right in saying there are 40 moves to co-decision envisaged here. In terms of agriculture and fishing, it will probably be slower but it is important to mention that when there is need for urgent action there is still a route to take urgent action where human or animal wellbeing and health is going to be affected. In terms of the budget, it is a pretty technical response. The European Parliament currently has co-decision over the annual budget, not the seven year Financial Perspective of course. The Parliament has co-decision now over the non-compulsory expenditure; everything except Common Agricultural Policy. Under the proposals on co-decision it gets co-decision over compulsory expenditure, including CAP; it does not get co-decision at all over the seven year Financial Perspective, that is still an issue for Member States to be decided by unanimity. Finally, on the wider point about agriculture and fishing, I believe that Sub-Committee D is looking at this in some detail and Defra are in the process of responding.

  Chairman: Lord Sewel is the Chairman of that Sub-Committee.

  Q272  Lord Sewel: That is why I am asking the question you see.

  Mr Murphy: I need to shoot my researcher! I was not aware of that.

  Q273  Lord Sewel: This is an interesting one, is it not? All UK governments have put a pretty high priority on reform of the CAP, we get co-decision bringing the Parliament in in a much stronger way. Is it your instinctive view that that will help or hinder the process of reform?

  Mr Murphy: There is party political leadership at prime ministerial and presidential level. The Foreign Office reading is that there is an emerging consensus that the reform not only should take place but will take place. We are about to enter into the process of just what exactly that means. President Sarkozy has spoken about the need for radical reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. There are different definitions and analyses of what "radical reform" means in practice. Our view is that amongst the Members of the European Parliament there is a real determination in principle amongst the majority to reform the agricultural policy. Not unanimity but the majority. We think that can be a useful lever in the process of change.

  Q274  Lord Plumb: Minister, I am one of Lord Sewel's boys on his Committee and we are about to come to a conclusion on the CAP reform which may interest you. You did not mention agriculture and fisheries or budgetary procedure under the five formal extensions of power and influence, but it does change the power, not so much as budget is concerned although, as you say, the compulsory expenditure is outwith the responsibility of the Parliament, and agriculture, of course, has never been within it in any case. It is sometimes said that the European Parliament does give way on budgets but I can tell you when I was President of the Parliament I refused to accept it twice, so it has had some responsibility and it did hold up the budget for quite a long period of time, quite rightly at that time. On agriculture and fisheries, what effect do you think this is really going to have? You have said already that it may hold up procedure but I would not be too sure about that because I think there is an attitude there which recognises the need for reform and a lot of people are beginning to believe that the sooner we get on with it the better and that goes throughout the whole of Europe from the evidence we have received already in Sub-Committee D.

  Mr Murphy: On the specific point about slowing up procedures, I was talking about specific legislative proposals rather than agricultural reform whereby the opportunity for Members of the European Parliament to become involved in the debate and deliberate through the relevant committees and perhaps in plenary session as well will inevitably lead, at least initially, to some delay in the process of specific proposals. I cannot recall whether the REACH Directive was delayed. It was certainly improved but I think it was also delayed as a consequence of deliberation. It is that type of thing, the assessment that would delay but potentially improve. In terms of wider agricultural reform, there is not an assessment that says co-decision of that sort would slow that wider process. There is a growing political consensus left, right and centre amongst Member States and political families in the European Parliament that this should now take place. What I did not mention earlier in answer to the first question from my Lord Chairman on the extensions of the competence, and there were five specifics in these articles and I think there are 12 existing competences that were extended, was the other 12 because the first five I mentioned were extensions of new competences extended through the five articles that I mentioned, starting with space policy.

  Q275  Lord Plumb: Do I take it that you would generally agree with the co-decision procedure?

  Mr Murphy: Yes, I think it is an important reform.

  Q276  Lord Kerr of Kinlochard: I am not a member of Lord Sewel's gumboot gang but I was struck by his mention of the changes to the budgetary procedure. As Lord Plumb says, that is quite a big change and perhaps bigger than the co-decision change. As I understand it, up to now the Parliament has been no allowed say on dépenses obligatoires which includes two-thirds, three-quarters of the agriculture budget, none at all. As I understand it, there is a large urban majority in the European Parliament, there are many more urban constituencies than rural constituencies, and agriculture provides about four per cent of European GDP. It seems to me unthinkable that, when the Parliament is allowed an equal say on agriculture as on all other bits of the budget, agriculture will go on getting the paramount share of the budget. It seems to me that the Parliament's influence is bound to be to reduce the amount of agricultural support as a proportion of the European budget. Is that wrong?

  Mr Murphy: First of all, good luck in your aspirations to join the noble Lord's Committee. I do not know if that was a hustings speech or not! The general analysis is an entirely fair one. I do not want to second-guess it but the general assessment is that involving the politics and the energy of the European Parliament can be an additional driver of this momentum. The rural/urban split is a commonsense analysis of where populations lie and where the parliamentary seats are divided, but primarily in the European Parliament's set-up and internal relationships it is not that straightforward, and probably nor should it be, because quite fairly there is a good number of urban Members of the European Parliament who emotionally and practically for all sorts of different reasons have a real affection for agriculture, fishing, farming, and that is entirely right and proper. In general terms the co-decision role of the European Parliament on Common Agricultural Policy is a positive and it can help the process.

  Chairman: Let us move on to the fourth of the institutions we are discussing, the European Court.

  Q277  Lord Harrison: Minister, do you agree that the most significant change to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice is its extension to matters relating to Freedom, Security and Justice? In the light of that, are you confident that the Court will be able to cope with an increased workload following from, first of all, the Commission's power to bring infringement proceedings in relation to criminal law and policing measures and, secondly, the extended preliminary reference jurisdiction in both existing Title IV, referring to visas, asylum and immigration, and Title VI, police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters? Given the importance of the ECJ and the necessity for having it sufficiently staffed but also staffed by those of the highest quality, are you confident that can and should happen?

  Mr Murphy: First of all it should happen. We are certain it should happen because the role of the ECJ is absolutely essential, which partly means that it has to have both the quality and quantity of people necessary for it to perform its role. It is also important to acknowledge that we should not overstate the extension of ECJ competence in terms of Justice and Home Affairs. It is not a year one, day one extension on these transitionary measures in particular, there is a five year transitionary period. There will be a gradual build-up which will give the ECJ the opportunity to build capacity as each of these specific defined areas move from Pillar 3 to Pillar 1 over that five year period. So there is an opportunity to participate and learn from the experience of that transition, but it is important that we do get it right. In terms of the second wider point about the infringement and preliminary references, there is a proposal now to put in place fast-track mechanisms which generally are welcomed across the European Union. The analysis at the moment is that the backlog on ECJ referrals is reducing, so there are some positive signs. Also, the expansion of the European Union has brought a new group of judges and expanded the capacity of the judges in terms of numbers and, despite some reports, it has expanded the quality of the judges. There is a supply of good quality, high calibre judges. What I would say is do not overstate the scale of the change. Of course there will be a change but it will be a gradual change and we think mechanisms are being put in place to deal with those changes.

  Q278  Lord Harrison: I very much accept that answer but, given the nature of Freedom, Security and Justice matters, there is the element of a Pandora's Box that in that five year period when those areas are brought into play things could not spin out of control but there could be more references than otherwise might be expected.

  Mr Murphy: The number of references has stabilised at about 250 per annum at the moment and that is a relatively stable figure. As I say, there is a period of gradual change. If the transition was over a month or three months then those concerns would have added validity, but that transitionary period of five years does give space to anticipate workload and adjust the transition accordingly.

  Q279  Lord Wright of Richmond: Minister, I think possibly you have just answered my next question. We have had conflicting evidence from witnesses as to whether the Court is likely to become flooded with asylum cases. Do you have a view on that?

  Mr Murphy: I do not believe that it will on the basis that, rather than me believing it, the evidence suggests strongly to the contrary, the number of cases having been stabilised. The worry is about delay in processes which comes back to the question posed earlier. We have to continue with the stabilised number of 250 and with the backlog reducing the evidence strongly points to the contrary.


 
previous page contents next page

House of Lords home page Parliament home page House of Commons home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008