Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 120-127)

Mr Simon Tilford

10 JULY 2007

  Q120  Lord Inglewood: It is not what I wanted to talk about at all, but it is quite interesting that there is this clear distinction with this willingness to move between those from old Europe and those from new Europe, for obvious reasons, but it may have some bearing—to get back to what I was talking to you about earlier—about needing a bit more pain. What I really wanted to talk about is not labour mobility so much as flexibility or lack of flexibility of the labour market, particularly in old Europe. It seems that there is a degree of general agreement that we must encourage greater flexibility within the labour market there otherwise we will have problems that can only be dealt with by way of physical transfers, is that not right?

  Mr Tilford: It is not just flexibility in terms of excessively tight employment protection, we also have a big skills deficit. One of the problems we have in Europe and the reason why we are not doing as well in the high tech sectors as we should be is if you go back to the early Nineties and the hopes for the single market, one of the key objectives was obviously to strengthen our comparative advantage in the high tech sectors and close the gap with the US. That has not happened. The EU economy has not become more specialised in the high tech sectors and if anything we have fallen further behind the US. A big reason for that is that we do not have the necessary skills. If you look at the profile of our labour skills, a lot of it is most suited to producing medium tech goods—electrical and mechanical engineering goods—which is good, I am not down-playing the importance of, say, the German engineering sector to the European economy. One of the problems we have is that we are just not investing enough capital, either at the level of schools or at the higher education level, so when I talk about flexibility I am not talking just about labour market regulations, I am actually talking about the ability to do the job. Companies will only invest more in R&D, will only innovate more, if two things are in place—if they are confident that there will be demand for the products, the innovative products, and also if they can actually find people who can develop those products, and companies will only adopt new technologies if they can find people who can operate those new technologies. In many ways not the whole of Europe but if you look at Europe as a whole we are lagging behind; clearly, some countries are in the leadership, the technological frontier if you like on all of these things—the Nordics and the Dutch—and then there is a group of economies—the Germans and the British do rather better—but then there is quite a long tail where there is real under-performance in most of the sectors and where our technological readiness is just very weak. Labour and lack of the relevant skills is a big part of that, so flexibility I would define more broadly.

  Q121  Lord Inglewood: Is that principally the consequence of the domestic education policies or is it something to do with the lack of investment on the part of businesses, or is it a bit of each?

  Mr Tilford: It is a bit of each. I certainly think we are under-investing as a whole in higher education and, given the fiscal constraints, the additional finance will have to come from the private sector. The US invests a similar proportion of its GDP in public spending on higher education, but then obviously the total amount spent is doubled by private spending. Given the fiscal constraints we are going to have to come to terms with a greater role for private money in higher education. At school level there have been big improvements. You alluded to the Lisbon agenda and I do not think it has been such a damp squib; it was not realistic to expect it to transform the European economy. The goals it set were hugely ambitious and obviously there is only so much any government can do to boost expenditure on R&D, it is the product of a complex set of dynamics, but governments now look to see what other governments are doing and there is more awareness of successful qualities elsewhere in the EU than there was and there is more general debate and awareness of what should be done and how similar economies have managed to do it, so it has been very positive in that sense but it was handicapped by the excessive expectations that people placed on it. Obviously, something such as that can only achieve so much and the responsibility for most of the things on the Lisbon agenda lies with national governments; if national governments choose not to take steps to address these issues then there is only so much the EU can do beyond naming and shaming.

  Q122  Chairman: On balance do you think the euro has been a success? It has been a tremendous benefit.

  Mr Tilford: On balance, yes. It is difficult to know because it is counter-factual; where would Europe be without the euro? We would not have seen the integration of financial sectors that we have seen, the euro has emerged as a strong, stable currency and the ECB has established its credentials, but we need to set our expectations rather higher. At the moment there are too many question marks over the adoption of the euro for it to be a catalyst for the kind of integration and the competitiveness gains that everyone hoped adoption of the euro would lead to. We now have the currency, it is established and institutions are working effectively, but we have not seen it exerting the sort of transformation of the European economy that people hoped it would. There is still even now an assumption that just by being in existence things will happen, that reforms will be made, that transformation will take place, and that is just not the case. I agree that if the pain gets fierce enough then governments will be forced into taking steps; the problem is of course that by the time that happens it will be much more painful than it would have been because their competitive position will deteriorate to the point where they are going to feel much more pain than they otherwise would have done. The lack of urgency is very disappointing and of real concern.

  Q123  Lord Blackwell: My Lord Chairman, if I could just put the counter-argument. Based on your paper it is that without the euro those countries that needed to adjust would not have been able to put off making those adjustments and we might have had more adjustments sooner. Similarly, Germany would have not been able to coast along without dealing with its problems.

  Mr Tilford: That is the argument I make and I think it is a strong argument.

  Q124  Lord Blackwell: Therefore, to the extent that actually we postponed the necessary adjustment in Europe, is that not a counter argument on the benefits of the Euro?

  Mr Tilford: It is a counter argument, yes. It is not inevitable that Italy would have taken those steps, it could have just devalued again and postponed the necessary reforms because devaluation would have given it a temporary cushion. It might have made things even worse; Italy might now be living with a debt to GDP ratio of 200% because it had gone through a series of devaluations so it might have been in an even worse position. It is a counter argument and a good one—I have made it myself—but it is not necessarily the case that they would have adjusted, you could have just seen a whole series of currency crises.

  Q125  Lord Inglewood: Would it be true to say that having got thus far for it to collapse now would be as it were the worst of all possible worlds?

  Mr Tilford: Yes, if it was to collapse now it would be the worst possible outcome.

  Q126  Lord Steinberg: Would you also say that it is still not for us here in Britain?

  Mr Tilford: Actually Britain fulfils more of the criteria than most of the current Member States but we have got in a number of areas some pretty big issues: one is the lack of an effective market in land. The supply of residential accommodation in the UK is incredibly unresponsive to changes in demand, so we would definitely need to address that and also some skills deficits and vocational training. Generally, however, we meet more of the criteria than most of the current Member States.

  Q127  Lord Inglewood: Can I ask why the land point is so important?

  Mr Tilford: Had we joined and had we experienced much lower interest rates over the last seven years than we have done, which we would have done—interest rates would have been very considerably lower, they would have been higher in the eurozone than they have been because Britain is a large economy and would have exerted some weight on the overall average, but interest rates would have been much, much lower and we would have had a huge asset price boom. If you see what has happened in Ireland, Ireland has managed because the Irish have built a huge number of houses, a massive number of houses, and that has kept a lid on prices. House prices have risen dramatically but that is despite building large numbers of new houses. Despite the fact that house prices have risen dramatically in recent years and there is clearly a huge pent-up demand, the actual volume of houses that we build has remained largely stagnant so we would have had to address that problem, we would have had to ensure that land was available to actually build houses for which there was so much demand, else we would have had an even more problematic build-up of house prices.

Chairman: On behalf of our Committee may I thank you very much indeed for your contribution.



 
previous page contents next page

House of Lords home page Parliament home page House of Commons home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008