CHAPTER 4: Summary of Conclusions
59. The ECB Governing Council has gained public
acceptance and market credibility. (paragraph 16)
60. There is currently no need or desire to reform
the way the eurozone is governed. (paragraph 17)
61. We agree with those witnesses who argue that
the ECB has run a credible price-stabilising policy in the euro
area and successfully anchored market price expectations. (paragraph
20)
62. The ECB is performing its primary role of
maintaining price stability effectively, and its behaviour since
1999 and the evidence of its monetary policy decisions show that
it looks to factors other than price stability when setting interest
rates. (paragraph 23)
63. Co-ordination of Member State budgets as
they are prepared is theoretically desirable from the perspective
of monetary union but politically unrealistic. We accordingly
oppose calls for supra-national co-ordination of fiscal policies.
(paragraph 28)
64. We welcome the revision of the Stability
and Growth Pact but agree with the Commission that greater attention
must be given to the implementation of structural policies that
enhance growth potential and long-term sustainability of public
finances. (paragraph 30)
65. The fact that no further integration was
suggested for inclusion in the Treaty of Lisbon suggests that
eurozone members see no pressing need for any fiscal integration.
(paragraph 34)
66. We conclude that the introduction of the
euro has been a major influence on increased trade both within
the eurozone and with other countries. (paragraph 43)
67. The introduction of the euro has stimulated
integration in parts of the capital market and the Eurobond market
has become well established. This still needs to be reinforced
by other measures; historically, the protection afforded to national
retail banking markets has resisted a substantial "euro effect".
(paragraph 50)
68. The euro has become an important reserve
currency. (paragraph 51)
69. The euro has established itself with remarkable
speed as a widely accepted transactions currency. (paragraph 52)
70. The euro has resisted external shocks to
date, and does not face any forseeable likelihood of disintegration.
None of the fears, expressed at the time of its launch, about
a divisive or negative impact on European economies has been borne
out. Its existence has contributed to economic development and
low inflation in the eurozone. This is a static analysis of developments
during the first decade of the currency's operation and not a
comparison with what might have occurred without the currency.
The relatively short history of the currency makes firm conclusions
difficult to draw after only one decade of the currency's operation.
(paragraph 58)
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