Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40
- 47)
THURSDAY 19 JULY 2007
Sir Mark Lyall Grant, Mr Michael Davenport and Mr
Jasper Thornton
Q40 Lord Chidgey:
Sir Mark, as my good and noble friend Lord Anderson is suggesting,
we have a problem here understanding how the EU can effectively
promote democracy in Russia, let alone here, and the rule of law.
You have touched on this in general terms as part of our session
today and I think you have been fairly frank about the gap that
does exist between perception in our society, the EU's society
and perhaps in Russia of what we mean by democracy and the rule
of law, the search for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
I do not expect you to give us a treatise on this now, I think
we understand both differences, but it does create a huge challenge
for the EU to be in a position where our Russian counterparts
are willing, in fact, to engage on those issues, let alone the
EU being able to promote our vision of those key principles that
we enshrined in our own agreements. Is advice bland words here,
but the reality of achieving anything I find personally hugely
difficult and hugely challenging for us. I wonder what HMG's position
is on that?
Sir Mark Lyall Grant: My Lord, I can answer
that, I think. It is clearly challenging to get solid outcomes
in this area, but there are mechanisms by which we can try to
achieve that. There are structured human rights consultations
twice a year, which the Russians do engage with, and that is supplemented
by an ongoing dialogue and specific démarches at all political
levels, including head of state level and, indeed, at the recent
EU-Russia Summit in Samara in May, which I referred to, human
rights was a very strong theme of those discussions. On behalf
of the EU, Angela Merkel made that very clear in her engagement
with President Putin at that summit. There are mechanisms for
doing that. The EU also has ongoing direct contact with the NGO
sector in civil society in Russia and, indeed, supports various
projects directly to NGOs in civil society within Russia. Lastly,
I would add that in the new mandate for the new PCA there is a
strengthened element of democracy and human rights which we would
want to negotiate into the new agreement. There are mechanisms
there, do they deliver results? Of course, it is a challenge and
a particular challenge at the moment, there is no question about
that. It is not that the Russians do not engage, it is that they
sometimes question our approach, they question the premise on
which we operate and they do not always see us as avoiding double
standards. I do not think I am divulging any secrets by saying
at the summit in Samara President Putin was trying to draw an
analogy between the way the Germans had treated protesters at
the Heiligendamm G8 Summit—what has now become the traditional
way at G8 Summits, protesters are kept at some remove from where
the heads of state and government meet—and the complaints
that we made about allowing any protesters to make representations
or to turn up at the Samara Summit. One was Mr Kasparov, a human
rights champion in Russia, who was prevented from travelling but
was not the only one travelling down to Samara. President Putin
felt that it was wrong for us to complain about the treatment
he was meting out to these demonstrators and protesters because
the Germans had done the same thing at the Heiligendamm Summit.
Obviously we did not see those two things as comparable.
Q41 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Human rights may be a strong theme, but would you agree that the
picture in comparison with the Yeltsin era is relatively bleak
and deteriorating to the point perhaps where Russia would not
now qualify as a member of the Council of Europe? One thinks of
the removals of checks and balances in the political structures,
the fact that there is a monopoly of these four television channels
in Russia and there have been political assassinations on a larger
scale with apparently no redress. Do they take any notice of these
dialogues? What evidence is there of their altering practice as
a result, or do they go through the motions and say that really
this is interference in their internal affairs?
Sir Mark Lyall Grant: My Lord, you have highlighted
some concerns. I mentioned right at the start that there are increasing
concerns among EU members about Russian policy, both internally
and externally. When I mentioned internally, I meant these issues
of democracy and human rights, and you have highlighted some specific
areas of concern, freedom of the media, checks and balances, independence
of the judiciary, et cetera. It is a challenging time and I think
if one compared now with perhaps the time of President Yeltsin,
there has been some slippage but, as I think I mentioned earlier,
given the extent and speed of the reforms that happened after
1989, or in the late 1980s, early 1990s, perhaps some correction
was inevitable in the strategic sense. We have to recognise that.
We do not have to accept that, but we should look at that with
a clear eye and hope it is a short-term correction rather than
a longer-term trend, because if it was a longer-term trend and
set for some years that would be of very grave concern. My very
last point, my Lord, is there are mechanisms within the European
Union-Russia partnership that do allow us to address those issues.
I would not sit here and claim that we could show some successes
in terms of outcomes, that would be wrong because I do not think
we can in recent years but, nonetheless, there are mechanisms
and we do raise these issues at very regular intervals.
Q42 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Chairman, could I mention one word on the British Council and
it would be wrong not to mention it. Would you say a few words
about the current nature and difficulties in the work of the British
Council?
Sir Mark Lyall Grant: I visited the British
Council at the Moscow office a few weeks ago. They do have a very
extensive network in Russia doing a lot of extremely good work
across the field of English language teaching, cultural exchanges,
education support, governance work, et cetera, so it is a very
effective and important operation for the British Council. They
have been under some recent pressure on the grounds of tax and
their overall status in Russia. We believe that pressure is unjustified
and obviously we are supporting the British Council very strongly
with the Russian authorities on that, but we hope those issues
can be resolved and it is a short-term mechanism of putting pressure
on the British Council rather than a long-term attempt to close
down their activities entirely.
Q43 Chairman:
Sir Mark, we are coming to the end of the time when we asked you
to be with us. We have two more topics we would like to raise
with you, we will try and make sure there are not too many supplementaries.
Would you be able to stay with us a little longer?
Sir Mark Lyall Grant: Certainly, my Lord, yes.
I have a conference call I have to take at 12:15.
Chairman: In that case, we can go on
for another 10 minutes.
Q44 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
I wonder if you could say with regard to political developments
in countries of the former Soviet Union which are now not part
of Russia, to what extent Russian and EU interests coincide and
to what extent they conflict and, secondly, whether Russia and
the EU have any scope for collaboration in dealing with what are
called the "frozen" problems, Transnistria, South Ossetia,
Abkhazia and Nagorny Karabakh?
Sir Mark Lyall Grant: Yes, my Lord. On the first
issue, of course, they vary enormously. Some former members of
the Soviet Union are now members of the European Union, at one
extreme and perhaps at the other extreme countries, like Belarus,
which remain extremely close and umbilically linked to Russia.
Then you have some of the Caucasus countries that have their own
specificity and some big countries in-between, like the Ukraine,
where the EU has its own relationship and wants to develop a closer
relationship. It is difficult to be categoric, they have all developed
in their different ways and the European Union has a different
relationship with all of them. In terms of the frozen conflicts,
I have to be honest and say that I do not think the European Union
per se is really the critical forum for addressing those conflicts.
There are some ad hoc arrangements that have built up on
the different conflicts, for instance there is the Minsk Group
that deals with Nagorny Karabakh, which is the US, France and
Russia, and there is also Friends of the Secretary General that
deals with Georgia which does include the UK and Germany as well
as Russia and the United States. The G8 looks very regularly at
these frozen conflicts, particularly at Georgia, Moldova and Transnistria,
and the EU itself does not really play a very substantial role.
The Moldova-Transnistria dispute probably is more linked to the
CFE Treaty and the recent Russian decision to signal a future
suspension from that Treaty, therefore it is more of a NATO issue
perhaps than a European Union issue. I do not think we can expect
the European Union to play a particularly dynamic role in the
resolution of those conflicts, but we do think resolution of those
conflicts is extremely important.
Q45 Chairman:
Does the EU not provide some border monitoring assistance to either
the Ukrainian or Moldovan border? A "border assistance mission"
I think it is called.
Sir Mark Lyall Grant: There might well be in
Moldova-Transnistria on that point.
Q46 Lord Lea of Crondall:
This is question 11 and perhaps to get to the heart of it, I think,
in scope for co-operation. We have been looking at the Quartet
in a different study we have been doing and in that case Russia
was taking a low profile, but as soon as it gets rather interesting
they go ahead again with their own diplomacy. Do you think that
is a pattern? How do you categorise that? We have other different
examples and obviously with Kosovo we thought that we had nearly
cleared it up and now it is getting very fierce once again. Could
you comment on that? We cannot go right through the world but
could you comment on those.
Sir Mark Lyall Grant: Perhaps I could compare
and contrast three examples. On the Quartet, I think you are right,
my Lord, Russia has not played an enormously active role within
the Quartet but is an important member of the Quartet. It is important
that Russia does use the Quartet as its vehicle for its own diplomatic
activity in the Middle East and certainly we want to encourage
that. Obviously the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has now
been appointed as a special representative of the Quartet. He
will help to give a little bit more energy and thrust to the Quartet's
role in the region and will be acting on behalf of Russia as well
as the other members of the Quartet. I have not sensed that in
its own bilateral activities in the Middle East Russia has caused
any particular difficulties. Russian objectives in the Middle
East are not very dissimilar from ours and I think this is a good
area for co-operation. I do not sense any particular problems
on that score. Likewise, but even more so, is Iran which has the
3+3 mechanism, as I mentioned, where Russia has always been an
extremely co-operative member of the 3+3, and continues to be
so, there has never been any question of a different sense of
priorities or objectives. Russia does not want to see Iran develop
nuclear weapons, nor do we, and that underpins the whole approach
to the Russian nuclear issue, so that is a very close relationship.
The third one, and the one you mentioned which is more difficult,
is the Contact Group on Kosovo. Russia was a very important member
of the Contact Group, but we have now reached such a stage in
discussions on the status of Kosovo that it is becoming extremely
difficult for the Contact Group to stay united because differences
have emerged over pushing through a resolution in the United Nations
which would, in effect, bring into implementation the Ahtisaari
proposals which have been endorsed by the UN Secretary General
and the European Union. That has made Contact Group discussions
on Kosovo, which continue, rather more difficult than they have
been before, but if there will not be a UN Security Council in
the next few weeks, which is a possibility, then I think the Contact
Group will come back front and centre because it will be the Contact
Group which will need to collectively take forward the next stage
of Kosovo status independently and Russia's role will be important
on that. There is no question that Russia's approach on Kosovo
has divided the Contact Group very much.
Q47 Chairman:
Sir Mark, on behalf of us all could I thank you very much indeed
for having given such a very useful start to our inquiry, we are
very grateful to you and Mr Davenport. If we had more time, I
could go on at greater length in saying it, but it is our very
serious and sincere thanks for your contribution to our work this
morning. Thank you.
Sir Mark Lyall Grant: Thank you, my Lord Chairman,
and good luck with your report.
|
