Examination of Witnesses (Questions 100
- 119)
THURSDAY 18 OCTOBER 2007
Miss Katinka Barysch
Q100 Chairman: Good
morning Miss Barysch, you are very welcome again. We have seen
you on a number of occasions before. You are now batting single-handedly
because Charles cannot be with us this morning. You know the rules;
we are taking a transcript of the evidence and we will send you
a copy of the transcript as speedily as we can. We look forward
to you annotating it if you do not think it accurately reflects
what you said, or intended to say, and letting us have it back.
If I can start off on a fairly general range of things, which
will give you the opportunity to make what in effect is an opening
statement: what do you think are and should be the fundamental
objectives of EU policy with regards to Russia? What does the
EU have to offer Russia in the context of a negotiation, and how
can it best influence Russian thinking and policy? Linked with
it, trying to do it for the other side, how do you think that
the EU is perceived from a Russian perspective and what are the
underlying principles of Russian foreign policy towards the EU,
so a fairly general introductory range of points?
Miss Barysch: I believe that the EU is currently
in the process of re-thinking its relationship with Russia. For
many years we thought, and we should be forgiven for thinking,
that Russia, just like most of the other Central and East European
countries, was on a fairly linear path towards democracy and an
open capitalist economy. A more difficult path perhaps with more
setbacks, but we did believe that that was the way Russia was
going, and at one point in time Russia itself believed that that
was where it was going. What the EU thought it should do was it
should offer help and advice and its own best practice, if you
want, to help Russia along that path towards democracy and open
markets. For most of that time that we tried to help, Russia has
gone in the other direction, but it took us an awful long time
to realise that what we were trying to do was not actually working.
It was very difficult for the EU, partly because it is attached
to its own values, of course, and partly because it is a very
complex organisation, to re-think that position. We are now in
that process of re-thinking and you see a mixture of attachment
to the old strategy and the need to come up with something which
is perhaps more realistic. You see that mixture in all the documents
and statements that currently come out of the European Union where
we still talk a lot about values, and we still push what we perceive
are our interests and needs, particularly with regard to energy
and security and stability in our common neighbourhood, to the
forefront.
Q101 Chairman:
Can I just follow on that briefly because you said that it took
us a long time to recognise that that linear path towards democracy
was not going quite as directly as it should be and might even
be going in a different direction in part; was that because we
were looking through rose-tinted spectacles at Russia and only
seeing what we wanted to see? Do you think there were signs there
that should have been recognised earlier?
Miss Barysch: Perhaps. I do believe we saw what
was happening in Russia but perhaps we did not believe it, and
again Russia itself did not say, "We have discarded democracy,
we are now practising a different model." Russia insisted
on calling itself a democracy and to the present day Russia insists
on calling itself a democracy. There is always a prefix nowadays
calling it a "managed" democracy, a "sovereign"
democracy, a "Russian-style" democracy. The striking
thing about Putinism for me is that he always insists on leaving
the full institutions of democracy in place. He hollows them out
but he has not touched Parliament and the formal system of checks
and balances. Just consider his clinging to the Constitution,
he says, "I cannot continue ruling this country as the President
because the Constitution does not allow me." Everybody knows
that he is looking for a way to do that anyway, but because Russia
never said that it did not care about democratic rules and standards
but formally insisted that it was a democratic country, and that
it did respect human rights and the principles of democracy, it
would have been very difficult for us to make a grand statement
about saying, "You now no longer are a member of the club;
we have to change our strategy."
Q102 Chairman:
Just before bringing in Lord Anderson and Lord Hannay, can I ask
you on the other part of the question: how is the EU perceived
by the Russians? From a Russian perspective what do they perceive
the EU to be and what are the underlying principles of Russian
policy towards the EU?
Miss Barysch: I think there is a slight difference
between the Russian political elite and the Russian people. The
Russian people traditionally had a rather positive view of the
European Union. That has now changed. There was a rather worrying
opinion poll that was conducted not too long ago at the behest
of EU Russian Centre in Brussels, where they found that the Russian
people now have a much less positive view of the European Union.
They perceive it not as something they want to join but as a threat
to their economic independence. I think now that only a third
of all Russians think that Russia should build a long-term friendship
with Europe. At the level of the political elite, my impression
for the limited period that I have been working on this issue—which
is about five years now—the Russian political elite has
always been somewhat disdainful of the European project, simply
because I think they have a slightly different attitude towards
what power is and how it should be exercised. I am under the impression
that a lot of the officials in the foreign ministry and in the
Kremlin have a somewhat old-fashioned attitude towards power:
it is about the unity of the state; high politics is about security,
it is about territorial integrity, it is about sovereignty. If
you look at the EU, which is policy-making by committee, it is
post-modern, it is mainly about economics, and the two sets do
not fit very well together. The Russian politicians always like
to say, "Europe is too complicated for us to deal with and
we need to deal with the Member States." To my mind, that
view has changed little over recent years. What has changed is
that Russian politicians now deem it perfectly acceptable to be
very outspoken about their views on Europe.
Q103 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Our focus as a Committee is of course on the European Union, but
do you see any parallels with that of NATO and the NATO-Russia
Council in that one began with rather expansionist views which
are now seen to be illusory, and both are now scaled down, and
that just as in NATO where there has been progress, it has been
in specific, often specialist areas—air-sea rescue, which
Lord Boyce will know about—and perhaps, equally, within
the EU we should abandon the rather grandiose concepts and look
for areas equivalent to air-sea rescue where we and the Russians
have a clear common interest in working together?
Miss Barysch: I think it is very interesting
to explore those parallels. The starting positions were probably
a little different because Russia saw NATO as an adversary, so
you started from the idea of a rapprochement, whereas the EU and
Russia started from the idea that we are already living in a common
European house, and then we started drifting apart, so the whole
thing is somewhat more emotional, at least on the European side
at the moment. It is entirely true that in the EU/Russian relationship
we are moving away from that grand rhetoric. It is partly because
the key ingredients of the EU/Russian relationship are so uncertain.
Firstly, we do not know where Russia is going and Russia itself
does not know that. Secondly, we do not know where our common
foreign and security policy is going. We obviously have internal
divisions in the European Union, and now even more so after the
enlargement of 27 countries, which does not make it any easier
for us to deal with a country that is changing fast and might
be going in a direction that we neither like nor understand.
Q104 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Have you accepted the principle of seeking to isolate specific
areas rather than grand plans where we can work together?
Miss Barysch: Yes, that is very much the basis
of the common relationship, because if you look at what is happening
on the institutional side, the basic legal framework for EU/Russia
relations is still the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement,
which is out-of-date. But we have moved away from the plan of
replacing that with another ambitious and grand bilateral agreement
and what we are working on now is the so-called "four common
spaces," which is basically a list of projects and areas
where if we can work together we will work together. This is a
very flexible framework, a "whatever works" framework
that allows us to make progress wherever progress is possible.
Q105 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
I wonder whether if in this rather general part of the discussion
you could situate the issue of Russia as a conceivable member
of the European Union in these perceptions from the two sides?
To what extent was the earlier European perception, which you
rightly characterise as now being out-of-date, conditioned by
the view that perhaps one day Russia might aspire to membership
and that therefore the path which it was on was not totally dissimilar
to that of other countries who were aspiring to membership? On
the Russian side, perhaps there were similar desires to give reality
to the rhetoric of the common European home and so on. Could you
also comment on the view expressed, I thought very cogently, by
that booklet written by Strobe Talbott and Rod Lyne and a Japanese
whose name I cannot now recall, called Engaging with Russia,
which argued that however unrealistic it is, and indeed how undesirable
it is to think of Russia as a member of the European Union, it
would be a great mistake for the European Union to say flatly
Russia cannot ever be a member of the European Union?
Miss Barysch: As far as I am aware, there has
never been a serious discussion on either the European side or
the Russian side that Russia should join the European Union. I
think to have such a discussion at the present point in time or
in the foreseeable future would be unrealistic first of all because
the European Union itself is still struggling to digest the last
enlargement. We see that in the discussions we are having about
taking in the Western Balkan countries or Turkey, which is a country
which is not as large as Russia but it is a sizable country, and
the mere idea of admitting Turkey strikes panic in the hearts
of those who still believe in Europe as a political project, and
it is also controversial economically, so from the European side
the idea that we could take in a country with 11 time zones and
a country which at the moment is so far away from fulfilling the
Copenhagen accession criteria simply does not warrant the discussion.
Even with a country such as the Ukraine, which has a much better
prospect of one day joining the European Union, we are not making
any promises, for the simple reason that these promises would
not be realistic. If you look at the EU's internal debate further
enlargement beyond those countries that are candidates is a distant
prospect or a possibility, but to talk about it does not serve
any particular purpose because it is just not on the cards. From
the Russian side also, joining the European Union is not a very
attractive prospect. Russia, as I tried to point out, is attached
to old-fashioned notions of foreign policy-making. It likes to
be a member of clubs where the "big guys" meet. It likes
to be a member of the G8 because that is where the world leaders
meet, that is where great powers talk to each other. It likes
to deal with the European Union as a whole because it has woken
up to the fact that the European Union is an entity that at least
has to be taken seriously at some level. If Russia were to join
the European Union it would be one member of the club. The EU,
at least in principle, tries to uphold the idea that all Member
States are equal. For Russia the idea of sitting somewhere between
Portugal and Latvia and having the same say as these countries
is completely inconceivable. It would be a very different Russia
that would perhaps one day want to join the European Union. Another
area where the EU and Russia are very different arises because
the EU is the epitome of a legal community and everything we do
is based on the rule of law. Russia has a very different attitude
towards the rule of law and the implementation and enforcement
of law in Russia are a huge problem. So long as that is the case,
I think even the idea of integrating Russia and the EU more closely
is very difficult. Then, as I explained previously, in order to
just gain candidate status a country has to comply with the political
part of the Copenhagen criteria which say that you have to have
a well-functioning democracy, respect for the rule of law and
minority rights; and none of these things apply in Russia at the
moment.
Q106 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
I am awfully sorry to continue but you have not actually replied
to the question as to whether it would be a mistake for the European
Union to say flatly now—and this is the concept that President
Sarkozy sometimes pursues of drawing a line—that Russia
is on the other side of the line, not because it does not fulfil
the Copenhagen criteria but because we do not believe that it
is conceivable that it could become a member of the European Union,
perhaps with some specious arguments about some of Russia being
in Asia. I am sorry to press you on this but it is quite useful
to know this because the Strobe Talbott "red line" argument
was very powerfully that that would be a mistake, even though
you have explained (and I think I agree with you) that it is quite
unrealistic?
Miss Barysch: That is a very good point. I think
absolutely no purpose is served by drawing red lines around Europe.
I have made that argument in another context with regard to Turkey
because I am in favour of Turkey joining the European Union, and
also for those countries that we are not giving so-called membership
perspective to at the moment, such as the Ukraine and perhaps
Moldova. I think absolutely no purpose is served because on the
one hand if you invited Russia to join the European Union it would
be horrified, but if we made it clear to Russia that it would
never join, it would be equally horrified. I do not think any
purpose is served by drawing borders around the European Union
and you probably do not need to answer the question of the potential
membership of Russia.
Q107 Lord Lea of Crondall:
I suppose you could draw up a list—and maybe you could do
it or somebody in Brussels might do it—of what are the matters
where there is specifically right now an EU/Russia relationship
and illustrate it to show a multiplicity of things that we could
be talking about. We have just done a report on the Middle East
peace process and looked at this strange animal called the Quartet,
and for a long time Russia was a silent party, but now of course
it is developing a slightly independent policy not only on Hamas
but also, not a million miles away, on Iran. Do you think that
if we draw a blank on Lord Hannay's direction of probing, we could
use a long-standing term (not in this context) "special relationship"
and see what would be the content of that special relationship?
Clearly there is the Kyoto emissions trading where because of
the pipelines there will be a huge amount of specifically EU relations,
certainly not bilateral. Would you comment on would there be such
a list that somebody could draw up at the moment? What is the
content and the number of things where the EU actually has a joint
role with Russia and could you categorise the sorts of things?
Miss Barysch: Could I just ask for clarification
purposes, are we looking for areas where the EU has dealings with
Russia as opposed to the EU Member States' dealings with Russia,
or are we looking at the international scene where the European
Union's and Russia's interests coincide as opposed to, let us
say, the United States and China?
Q108 Lord Lea of Crondall:
The first.
Miss Barysch: Then you would have to probably
start by looking at what are specific EU competences and take
it from there. Russia started taking the EU seriously through
trade negotiations because before that, as I said, Russia found
it very difficult to understand the EU as a political animal.
When Russia got a bit more serious about joining the WTO, it suddenly
found out that Brussels matters because Brussels conducts the
negotiations, not the Member States, and Moscow had always tried
to lobby in the individual capitals for special deals in its trade
negotiations and it found that it had to deal with the Trade Commissioner
in Brussels. That is when Russia first woke up and saw that the
EU actually matters. Then the Europeans were starting to construct
a common foreign and security policy. Russia in the beginning
did not know what to make of that. It then started taking it terribly
seriously and now has moved a little bit in the other direction.
What are the specific ingredients? Trade certainly, but we have
now struck a deal for Russia's accession to the WTO and we are
thinking beyond that already, whether we could have a free trade
area with Russia perhaps. That is an area where Russia will have
to deal with the European Union as opposed to the Member States.
We are trying to refocus Russia's attention in the energy sector
where at the moment it engages in tried and tested divide and
rule tactics where it tries to forge special energy relationships
with the individual Member States. At the same time, the European
Union is trying to build a more coherent and integrated energy
policy as such, so there are two forces that do not quite work
in the same direction but, hopefully, if we get our act together
in Europe then we would have an EU/Russia energy dialogue and
not a German/Russian energy dialogue, a British/Russian energy
dialogue and so forth. Another area that springs to mind is the
common neighbourhood. The European Union is still in the process
of constructing what is called a European Neighbourhood Policy
at the moment. It is still at the initial stages, it is not very
well resourced, and the incentives are probably not strong enough
to make a great difference in the neighbourhood, but again that
is an issue where the EU as a whole should act and interact also
with Russia and its neighbours. Lastly, as you pointed out in
the international area, the Europeans are trying to do things
together such as for example in Iran, but obviously Russia deals
with the big three Member States.
Q109 Lord Lea of Crondall:
The Quartet?
Miss Barysch: And the Quartet. You also mentioned
climate change where the EU as a whole takes a position, but on
climate change Russia is not at this present point in time a big
player because although it has signed the Kyoto Protocol it is
not one of the countries that is at the forefront of the climate
change debate. It might one day be—
Q110 Lord Lea of Crondall:
Is not the lengthening and deepening of such a list going to look
quite formidable as the years go by?
Miss Barysch: We have been pointing out to Russia
and Russia has never disputed that we have multiple common interests
that force us to work together. When it comes to a special relationship
I think we do have a special relationship. Russia is our biggest
neighbour and we share this potentially unstable neighbourhood.
Both Europe and Russia have a strong interest in having stable
and prosperous countries along their borders, so that is where
we should work together. Energy obviously. Russia sometimes says
that we do not agree on what energy partnerships should look like
and they say they will sell their energy to the Chinese or the
Americans. At the present point in time they simply cannot do
that because all their major pipelines go westwards to the European
Union, so that special relationship is very much there. What I
was always struck by is, despite these various common interests,
how difficult our day-to-day relationship often is.
Q111 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:
To follow on Lord Hannay's point about membership of the EU, one
of the unhealthy things about Putinism is that he seems to have
developed a paranoid nationalism in Russia, an "everybody
is against us" attitude, which goes down quite well with
the Russians but is extremely unhealthy from the point of view
of the EU and its relationships with Russia. Should we not be
putting on the table that we do see them as members of the EU
ultimately? I do not think there should be any sort of timescale,
we are looking way into the future, but you have talked about
the Ukraine and Moldova, if they start the process of EU membership
it is going to increases the paranoia in Russia that they are
the only people who are not part of this. I just think that makes
the thing worse. Surely we should be pointing out that we would
like one day to see Russia in the EU? Maybe it will never ever
come to anything. It is gesture politics but I think it is terribly
important for the EU to say, "We do not think you are an
alien country who is just so much on our borders that ultimately
you cannot be a member of the club".
Miss Barysch: That is an interesting idea but
I am not sure I would agree with it. I have been a strong advocate
of shifting the EU/Russia relationship away from grand rhetoric
and towards more realism. We have spent many years pretending
that EU/Russia relations are something they are most obviously
not. We are now talking about a strategic partnership. I am not
sure that we share many strategic objectives and the way we deal
with each other on a day-to-day basis does not always look like
a partnership to me. Whilst the relationship is tricky and whilst
Russia is in a transition period, I just do not see how we could
credibly claim that we want Russia in the EU, even in the long
term. Russia has no interest in that prospect at the moment. Even
if the EU said that at the political level, it simply would not
be credible, so although I agree with Lord Hannay that we should
not rule it out, if we now made a statement saying "but one
day we want Russia in the EU", I do not see what purpose
would be served by that.
Q112 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:
Let us turn to the Ukraine. The Ukraine is not a suitable candidate
to be a member of the EU today, but nobody would rule out the
Ukraine ultimately being a member of the EU.
Miss Barysch: The Ukraine has for many years
expressed a strong interest in one day becoming a member.
Q113 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:
Hold on, we are not talking about the interests of the country;
we are talking about whether they are suitable to be members.
The Ukraine is no more suitable today than Russia is.
Miss Barysch: I do believe that the Ukraine
is a lot closer to one day becoming an EU member than Russia is.
Russia sees itself as a great power. Ukrainian politics is messy
but it is a democracy, of sorts. It is a reasonably diversified
economy, although heavily skewed towards heavy industry at the
moment. It does engage with the neighbourhood policy, which means
that, at least in principle, it accepts the idea that it should
take over EU rules and laws and norms. Russia does not accept
that in principle. On the contrary, it is completely allergic
to any idea of taking over EU rules, so I think the two countries
are in a very different position.
Chairman: I am afraid we must move on
from the general discussion. I have been very liberal in allowing
a very wide-ranging discussion, but I am going to be slightly
more rigorous on the more specific questions. We move on to one
that you have already touched on en passant but the question
that Lord Hannay is going to expand on concerns the institutional
framework.
Q114 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
I wonder if you could just say how you think the institutional
framework actually works. Does it produce results or is it just
a lot of wheels spinning around meetings and not much in the way
of results? Secondly, could you comment on whether the delay in
negotiating a successor agreement stands in the way of the necessary
institutional co-operation or whether the roll-over, which is
explicit I think in the PCA, and which will take place now next
month as I understand it, and presumably thereafter every November
so long as there is not another one, whether in fact that is a
perfectly satisfactory short-term state to be in, just from the
institutional point of view, not from the political point of view?
Miss Barysch: The institutional framework that
we have currently in place is a sort of makeshift arrangement.
Some of what was initially envisaged in the Partnership and Co-operation
Agreement as a structure of expert committees and then moving
up the hierarchy until you reached a six-monthly EU/Russia summit
is now defunct and some of that has become an area of contention.
When it comes to ministerial meetings, for example, Russia has
always been in favour of having some kind of EU/Russia Council
there to meet all the Member States at the same time, whereas
of course the European side insists on Russia meeting the Troika.
What we have done is we have been very flexible about this and
under the four commons spaces we have set up a new structure of
expert groups. The common spaces idea leaves us ultimate flexibility
with regards to the institutions. We can have business round tables,
we can have expert groups, we can have ministerial meetings, we
can have standing committees, we can have ad hoc meetings, and
I think in order to take the institutional question out as a contentious
issue and just say "we will work with you, let us just talk,
what are the objectives, which kind of institutions do we need
to achieve that objective" that works fairly well. With regard
to the post-PCA agreement, I personally do not think it is too
dramatic that these negotiations are being held up at the moment
because we have only just got going on the four spaces idea. It
took us two years after having agreed on the four spaces idea
to work out the so-called road maps, which list all the possible
projects that could fill these spaces. We then started talking
about the implementation mechanisms for these road maps. We are
still in the process of doing that. I think we should give that
idea of pragmatic co-operation a little more time to work. As
I said, we are in a period of uncertainty in EU/Russia relations.
We are in a period where, yes, Russia does exhibit a certain amount
of nationalist paranoia, so at the present point in time to sit
down and start yet another grand debate about common values and
where this relationship should ultimately end up might be bad
timing. I think we should let things settle down a bit. We should
build mutual trust and everyday co-operation wherever we can achieve
it and then maybe at a later point in time come back to negotiating
a big comprehensive agreement with joint objectives and more fixed
institution mechanisms. I think at the present point in time it
is not a big disaster to roll over the PCA. The PCA is out-of-date,
there is no doubt about it, but it has not held us back. When
the PCA was concluded there was no common foreign and security
policy, for example, yet we do have a political dialogue with
Russia. We have co-operation in justice and home affairs. We have
moved into all sorts of areas that were not foreseen by the PCA,
so it has not held us back, we can roll it over, and we can continue
that more pragmatic co-operation in the meantime.
Q115 Lord Crickhowell:
Can we move on to the question of EU solidarity or lack of it.
You have painted a clear picture of rather changing Russian attitudes,
starting out as disdainful and finding it complicated to deal
with, then for example on trade negotiations recognising they
had to take it seriously. You have said that they now rather like
to deal with the EU as a whole. The truth is they also like to
take advantage of the lack of solidarity and deal with the individual
states when it suits them. Is there a need for greater unity and
coherence of approach amongst the Member States towards Russia?
You have painted the Russian change of attitude; what would your
comments be about how Europe sets out to deal with it?
Miss Barysch: There is clearly a need for greater
solidarity for our own sake because the EU is obviously based
on the idea that we have common objectives and common interests
in foreign policy and in energy policy and in the other areas
that affect our relationship with Russia. Disagreements over Russia
have in recent years sometimes poisoned the atmosphere. That is
not very healthy for the European Union because it could spill
over into other areas of co-operation. It is also very important
that we stand more united in Russian eyes because the way we are
divided at the moment, the Russians can almost claim, "We
cannot deal with the European Union; there is no EU position,
you are divided, you are complicated; we have to deal with the
Member States." When Russia says "Member States"
of course it means the big Member States, not the small Member
States. That then reinforces the EU internal divisions because
the smaller, newer Member States think that their interests are
not being taken into account when the EU deals with Russia, so
there is an urgent need for more of an internal debate about what
the individual Member States want and need from Russia. We have
done surprisingly little in this respect. We have various forums
where the Member States can meet and talk about their attitudes
towards Russia and what should be done, but somehow this has not
worked so we probably need more of that.
Q116 Lord Crickhowell:
Can I pick up one point that arises from that. You spoke about
the desirability of it and you referred to some of the smaller
and newer states, but of course the very fact that they have strong
views and are near neighbours very often makes it even more difficult
for Europe to take up a common position because they resist what
the marginal and further away states think should be their position.
Miss Barysch: Yes, and they had a point initially
because there was a group of leaders in the big existing Member
States that was not really inclined to take the smaller, newer
Member States terribly seriously. Instead they took every opportunity
to build special relationships with Putin and get photo opportunities
and they never liked to criticise him in public. Now all of these
leaders—Schroeder, Chirac and Berlusconi—are gone
so there is a better chance for EU unity just because at the level
of leadership we have had a change-over. Angela Merkel has been
both more outspoken about Russia's democratic shortfalls and she
has made efforts to consult the new Member States and take their
views into account. When Europe formulates its Russia policy you
see Nicholas Sarkozy also being more willing to criticise Vladimir
Putin than Chirac was. You see obviously the UK/Russia relationship
being somewhat frosty at the moment. I think if there was a common
relationship the distinctly pro-European Italians would not throw
a spanner in the works so from that perspective you can see a
greater chance for EU unity. When the new Member States came in,
some of them probably thought that the European Union was a good
way of amplifying their own individual criticisms and grievances
that they might have had with Russia. That was not a good idea
because it allowed the Russians to claim that EU foreign policy
is now run from Latvia. That is so obviously not the case, but
the Russians particularly like to emphasise that: "Now we
cannot deal with Europe any more because it has all become completely
ridiculous." I think we have overcome that phase. You do
not see the new Member States taking one position that is distinct
from the old Member States. On the contrary, you see some countries
having big problems with Russia at the moment—Estonia, Lithuania
and Poland—and you see Latvia, for example, having a remarkably
good relationship with Moscow at the moment. You see some countries
such as Slovakia and Hungary mimicking a bit what the old Member
States have been doing in building special relationships and doing
bilateral energy deals. It is not that you have old Europe versus
new Europe in dealing with Russia, and I think now at the level
of political leadership the constellation is better than it was
before. We are also having Polish elections which might help,
and from that perspective I think we will see a convergence of
views, and I am quite optimistic that we are moving towards a
more coherent policy on Russia.
Q117 Lord Chidgey:
Can I just turn back now to Russia's view of the EU. You talked
earlier about how Russian foreign policy still seems to be set
in the old-fashioned view, particularly amongst the senior political
establishment in Russia, and almost set in stone if you like in
the traditional, centralised way—this is where the great
powers stand; this is where Russia stands—and I am interested
to know how Russia is able to adapt, or not adapt at all perhaps,
to the very fluid and changing perspectives in the Western world.
We are having our own issues about how we deal with the expansion
of the EU and all the opportunities and challenges that provides.
Is this a more, if you like, frightening perspective for the Russian
political establishment in the sense that they are not part of
it, whereas we are very much trying to ride the tiger, so to speak?
Do they see the situation of relations with the United States,
with China, and with India and so forth, as a more comforting
scenario than the dynamics in the EU, which are perhaps far less
predictable in Russian eyes? Do they see the EU as an irritant
rather than an opportunity in comparison to the other global powers?
Miss Barysch: If you listen to Russian rhetoric,
you would sometimes think that they see the EU as an irritant,
but I think they are fully aware that if they look around their
borders and to the wider world, Europe is their most reliable
partner, their biggest market, and probably the entity or the
bloc of countries that is easiest to deal with.
Q118 Lord Chidgey:
By that do you mean the easiest to influence?
Miss Barysch: Certainly easier to influence
than, say, the United States or China. I think Russia is fully
aware that the potential for partnership with Europe is bigger
than with any other country or group of countries. No, they do
not quite know what to make of the European Union. I am under
the impression they have rethought their attitude towards the
EU. Europe at one point in time for Russia was the only game in
town, it was the parameter against which everything else was measured.
There was a time in the early 1990s when they talked about a "common
European house". Now Russia sees itself as a great power,
it has a global perspective, and it no longer thinks that Europe
is the only parameter against which it should measure its progress.
There is something called BRIC out there and it is a club of rising,
emerging powers that has an "R" in it standing for "Russia"
and that is a much cooler club at the moment to belong to than
the somewhat sclerotic and squabbling European Union. Russian
obviously thinks that its relationship with the United States
is tremendously important and is also trying to make sense of
where China is going. There is not much trust perhaps in Russian/Chinese
relations but they are certainly trying to strengthen their ties.
I think Russia is struggling to position itself globally and the
EU relationship might be the easy bit because it is a very close
relationship, it is a relationship that is living day-to-day through
trade and through the multiple links that we have with them. Despite
the somewhat disdainful rhetoric that is sometimes coming out
of Moscow, I think that most Russians are fully aware that the
potential for partnership here is greater than with most other
countries.
Q119 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Surely the test for EU foreign policy is not whether we can agree
on Burma and Darfur but whether we can agree on matters directly
affecting our own interests in our own neighbourhood such as Kosovo
and Russia. Despite what you say about the change of Chancellor
Merkel as opposed to Chancellor Schroeder, President Sarkozy as
opposed to President Chirac, and Prime Minister Prodi as opposed
to Prime Minister Berlusconi, who stand up more to Russia, they
still favour pursuing their own policies on the economic side,
particularly on the energy side. Prime Minister Prodi is no different
from Prime Minister Berlusconi in respect of Italian oil interests.
Do you agree?
Miss Barysch: I agree that on the energy side
we run the risk of having a kind of beggar-thy-neighbour policy
in energy at the moment where each country scrambles to secure
its own energy needs, not really thinking about what its neighbour's
needs might be. I am nevertheless hopeful that if we make some
progress in building a more integrated Europe energy market, our
interests and needs in the energy sector would coincide and converge
and then perhaps we will have a more unified position towards
Russia. At the moment I admit that is not happening because you
see German companies doing deals with Gazprom, Italian companies
doing deals with Gazprom, French companies doing deals with Gazprom
and these contracts that they are signing will last for 30 years.
How we unscramble these bilateral deals I am not entirely sure.
However, I do believe if we make progress with building a more
European energy policy then that would really help tremendously.
Gazprom making threatening noises and Gazprom trying to buy downstream
assets in Europe might focus our minds on the need for unity.
Chairman: I am going to move on to a
whole raft of questions on the Russian economy. In order to protect
the interests of people who have got interests in later questions,
I am going to appeal for fairly short, succinct questions, and
the economic ones are capable of shorter, more succinct answers
as well, so Lord Hamilton?
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