Memorandum by Sir Roderic Lyne
The political relationship between Russia
and the West is at its lowest point for two decades.
This could become a "confrontation", but
is not one yet. Neither side is deliberately seeking to confront
the other. Relations in areas outside high politics remain generally
constructive and friendly. The growing economic interdependence
of Russia and the EU is a powerful constraint, including in
the energy sector.
The current animosity stems partly from events,
partly from reasons internal to Russia, and partly from the inability
of Russia and the West to understand each other.
Russian reformers in the early 1990s had wildly
unrealistic expectations of the speed with which Russia might
be integrated into the West. They now feel let down and rather
bitter. The current Russian leadership for the most part does
not understand, and does not wish to understand, Western processes.
It has no experience of living under the rule of law or the separation
of powers; and, sometimes wilfully, it misinterprets Western actions.
We in the West had equally unrealistic expectations
about the speed of change in Russia. We tried to assist the transition,
but failed to appreciate how deeply humilitating, painful and
destabilising the 1990s were for the Russian people.
There are disappointed expectations on both
sides—what Solzhenitsyn has called "the clash of illusory
hopes against reality".
Russia is going through a negative or revisionist
cycle in a long process of transition. It is not the end of the
transition; but we must wait for 10 to 15 years before the first
generation of post-Soviet leaders comes to power in Russia.
The economy is now a market-based system.
Thanks to high oil prices, but also to sound macroeconomic management
and rising domestic demand, it has been through a seven-year boom.
The expansion of Kremlin-controlled conglomerates is regressive.
More difficult times lie ahead—but a few years hence this
may bring the economic liberals out of hibernation and lead to
a new drive to modernise the economy. A new generation of Russians
engaged in business and a growing middle class look like the most
likely agents of change in the country.
Politically, Russia has yet to develop
a new model. Gorbachev and Yeltsin gave Russians freedom—and
Russians still enjoy wide personal freedom, although some constraints
have recently returned. But democracy barely started in Russia.
For the past few years the Kremlin has been focusing on control.
There is at the moment no political development. But there
will need to be: a huge country dependent on a single institutional
and a single personality is not stable. As President Putin recently
said: "We cannot build Russia's future by tying its many
millions of citizens to just one person or group of people. We
will not be able to build anything lasting unless we put in place
a real and effectively functioning multi-party system and develop
a civil society that will protect society and the state from mistakes
and wrong actions on the part of those in power".
The third, and most difficult, facet of the
transition has been Russia's adjustment to its new status as
a smaller and less powerful country than the Soviet Union. Other
former Great Powers and Empires, including the United Kingdom,
have found this a long and painful process. It has been much more
difficult for Russia because the collapse happened without warning;
the empire was contiguous; and territories which were regarded
as part of the Russian heartland—most of Ukraine and Belarus
and Northern Kazakhstan—suddenly became independent. It
takes much more than half a generation to come to terms with this—on
both sides of the divorce.
In its Common Strategy of 1999, the EU said
that it was seeking to build with Russia "a genuine strategic
partnership, founded on common interests and shared values".
Similar language is to found in the 1997 Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement and the 2004 Road Map for the Common Pace of Freedom,
Security and Justice".
These aspirations have not become reality. We
have a conflict of values, for example over the rule of
law, which inhibits strategic partnership. Our interests converge
in some areas—such as counter-terrorism, WMD proliferation,
the environment, trade and investment—and diverge in others.
They diverge most strongly in the arc of states from the Baltic
through Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova to the Caucasus. These are
substantive differences between Russia and the West.
The anti-Western mood in Russia is also being
played up for reasons of internal politics. The idea that Russia
is besieged and encircled by malign forces is a useful device
for binding the nation, deflecting blame, justifying central control
and the reinvigoration of the organs of internal security, and
discrediting external criticism.
How should the EU and the West respond to this?
— We need to recognise that this a
phase which will last for several years, but not for ever. Events
within Russia will determine the country's future course. Our
influence is not zero, but it is marginal.
— We need to develop a shared analysis
and better understanding within the EU. The process of debate
and analysis within Europe is weak and fragmented.
— Founded on that shared analysis,
the EU urgently needs stronger policy coordination and a common
approach towards Russia.
— The common approach should be based
on clear principles, including that the EU:
— opposes a new division of Europe
and seeks to dismantle barriers;
— wants to see Russia strong, stable,
prosperous and modern;
— acknowledges Russia's right to defend
its own interests and pursue its own independent policies within
the parameters of international law and of the sovereign rights
of other states;
— seeks to promote harmonious and stable
relations between Russia and all of her neighbours and the peaceful
settlement of disputes;
— is not seeking to expand its influence
at the expense of Russia, but will oppose any encroachment on
the sovereign rights of any European state; and
— will defend its own interests and
values robustly where they are challenged.
In practical terms, the EU should for the time
being shelve the concept of "strategic partnership".
It is premature. It is not what the Russians want. A grandiose
new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement would be inappropriate.
But, if and when Russia joins the WTO, a Free Trade Agreement
would be a practical step forward.
We should also reject the concept of "neo-containment"
favoured by some in the United States. It is based on the wrong
analysis. Isolating Russia is entirely the wrong approach.
We shuld instead aim for "neo-engagement",
ie:
— Partnership and cooperation on specific
strategic issues—where this is possible. There are many
such issues.
— Support for the further development
of trade and investment.
— To the greatest extent possible,
we should sustain the flow of information, educational and cultural
exchanges, and every form of human contact.
— We should seek to invest in the next
generation.
In the energy sector, Russia and the EU have
a clear mutual interest in sustaining cooperation. The EU is almost
the only profitable market for Russian gas exports. However, given
doubts about Russia's ability to raise production and her use
of energy as a political instrument, the EU clearly needs to diversify
its sources of supply, to avoid deeper dependence on Russia, and
to develop an efficient internal market.
Finally, during this difficult period, the EU
and NATO need to manage areas of disagreement with Russia in a
way which protects Europe's legitimate interests but does not
tip us into real confrontation. These issues include Kosovo, Georgia,
Ukraine, Iran missile defence, and the future of the INF and CFE
agreements. Handling that agenda will be no easy task.
25 October 2007
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