Examination of Witnesses (Questions 171
- 179)
THURSDAY 15 NOVEMBER 2007
Professor Anatol Lieven
Q171 Chairman:
Professor Lieven, we are very pleased to see you. We are very
pleased that you are back eaching in London at King's. As I was
saying to you earlier, I think you are a good example of a reverse
brain drain and London has certainly gained by your return. We
have all read you with interest over many years. What I would
like to do is to ask you if you would like to say one or two things
before we begin and then we will go into questions. As you will
see, we are taking a note of the questions, you will get a copy
of the transcript, and you will be able to make any corrections
to it.
Professor Lieven: Thank you for inviting me.
It is a great honour to be here. It is slightly intimidating in
the presence of Rodric Braithwaite, who knows a great deal more
about this subject than I do. Very briefly, I would say that the
key problem in the attitudes of Europe towards relations with
Russia has been a repeated veering between what I would call some
kind of euphoria and catastrophism, a belief, in other words,
that either we have to have a full-scale partnership, a truly
close partnership of values as well as policies, or that we risk
plunging into a new cold war. I would say that full partnership
is in fact impossible given the differences between our systems
and also given real differences of interest. On the other hand,
while a return to a form of Cold War is possible under certain
circumstances, it is not likely and it is certainly not necessary.
What I would say we can hope to work for is something like the
relations which exist between member states in Asia, which is
to say that they are not enemies, they are not always friends,
they mix a relationship in which real and deep co-operation on
key matters co-exists with friction on others but the level of
friction is kept within bounds that do not threaten the relationship
as a whole and, above all, of course, do not threaten actual conflict.
To achieve this, I think the first thing we need to recognize
is that Russia's basic foreign policy course is most probably
now set for a very considerable time to come, and that is because
it is supported by a consensus not just of the Russian establishment
but of a very large majority of the Russian population. For this
considerable time to come, if change in policy does occur, it
is unfortunately on balance more likely to be in a direction disadvantageous
to us and to our interests, that is to say, in a more nationalist
direction. In the long term I am actually quite confident about
an eventual Russian move to greater democracy. One factor in this
will be that it will depend on pretty open relations continuing
with the West and strong Western inputs into Russia, both economic
and cultural—not only into Russia itself but also via the
huge numbers of Russians who now live in the West. Even in those
circumstances though we have to remember that any Russian party,
even under a full democracy, which will hope to be elected will
always have to be seen by the Russian people as tough defenders
of Russian national interests, just as any American party which
hopes to be elected by the American electorate has to be seen
as tough defenders of American interests. As far as the EU is
concerned, there are two obvious issues, I would say. One is actual;
the other may now be receding. The first is obviously energy,
of which you must have heard an enormous amount in the course
of your deliberations. I am more sanguine about this than many
people because today and for a considerable time to come the dependence
is of course mutual; the Russians are just as dependent on energy
markets in Western Europe as we are dependent on them—even
more so in a way. Russia cannot direct most of its gas away from
Europe without huge and completely unprofitable investments in
restructuring its existing production towards pipelines towards
the Far East and new liquid natural gas infrastructure. The people
in charge of Russia's energy sector, are state-ists but they are,
after all, businessmen and they are certainly very interested
in profits. I do not think they are going to do this. When it
comes to new fields, like Shtokman, it could be very different.
On the other hand, the Russians certainly will try to capitalise,
within certain bounds, on any advantages they see and therefore
we do need to think coherently about how to advance bargaining
chips and counter-pressure of our own. I should say that the latest
news on this does appear to be rather positive: in their latest
negotiations with the EU the Russians have indicated a willingness
to make certain changes to their laws. They have also given Statoil
24% of Shtokman on top of Total getting 25%, which is perfectly
reasonable, a common international deal. The second question,
and for me potentially a very acute one, is the question of where
the eastern borders of the European Union and NATO should lie.
The enlargement of the EU, the subject of this Committee, is not
of course actual and will not be for a very long time to come.
EU enlargement to Ukraine and the Caucasus may never happen but,
even more importantly, if it does, it will be as a result of an
internal transformation in these societies which has already in
effect made them part of the West, just as had happened in central
Europe before those countries joined the European Union. NATO,
in my view, is much more dangerous because that can happen much
more quickly and without a fundamental transformation of the societies.
It is worth remembering that until the latest events in Georgia,
there was a very serious push for a Georgian membership action
plan with NATO at the next NATO summit, yet every possibility
that after that you would have had the same events occurring;
in other words, they obviously were not ready. I believe that
such a push for further NATO enlargement in the short to medium
term would be disastrous as far as relations with Russia are concerned.
On the one hand, it would be extremely provocative. On the other
hand, it would be very tempting to Russia because we could not
actually defend these places in a crisis. The holding open of
NATO enlargement also makes it much more difficult to solve a
number of specific issues, because there is a strong tendency
in Moscow at the moment to hang on to every possible bargaining
chip in order to counter such a move. So I do believe that relations
with Russia are problematic, that full partnership is not possible
and that we do need to draw certain lines against Russian influence.
The question is where we draw those lines.
Q172 Chairman:
Thank you very much indeed, Professor Lieven. Perhaps I can begin
the questioning by asking a rather general question, some of which
you have begun to address in those remarks. What do you feel should
be the fundamental objectives of European Union policy with regards
to Russia? What does the European Union have to offer Russia in
the context of a negotiation, and how can it best influence Russian
thinking and policy?
Professor Lieven: The single most fundamental
interest is peace. That may sound melodramatic but we should not
forget that West European countries have fought several catastrophic
wars with Russia in modern history and there are developments
which could make that a not absolutely impossible scenario in
future. The first is peace. The second is stability. Both of these
things are necessary if progress is to occur in Russia and in
the former Soviet Union. On the basis of this also a relationship
which is good enough that we can resolve future unexpected crises.
We have the kind of basis to do that without them spiralling into
disaster. Finally, of course, we have a very strong mutual interest
in economic growth, their investment in us, our investment in
them. Russia's need for European investment is one of our strongest
suits. The problem is, of course, it is difficult to orchestrate
from a policy point of view because it is the product of innumerable
business decisions. Nonetheless, the Russian establishment is
aware, as I think the eventual Shtokman deal indicates, that they
do very badly need Western investment. We can play on this both
when it comes to improving the transparency and legality of Russian
business but also, in the last resort, if it comes to warning
the Russians that a complete meltdown of relations will have serious
implications for Western business investment.
Q173 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
In respect of enlargement of NATO, you referred to Ukraine and
Georgia. You used two arguments; one, that it would be provocative
and two, that these countries could not be defended in a crisis.
I agree with that but, of course, those same arguments were used
against the expansion of NATO to the Baltic countries, which has
proceeded fairly smoothly.
Professor Lieven: I think that the case of Ukraine
and Georgia is vastly more dangerous. In the case of Georgia,
because after all, unlike the Baltic States or the Central Europeans,
it has an unresolved war with two separatist republics backed
by Russia. If we make an alliance with Georgia, we are actually
committing ourselves to Georgian reunification, if necessary by
military force. In the case of Ukraine because it is simply much
more important to Russia emotionally and morally. I have had quite
sensible Russians, sometimes after a few glasses of vodka, it
must be said, saying that "If there were ever a situation
in which NATO was going to evict us from Sebastopol, we should
do what the Americans would do if anyone offered to evict them
from Pearl Harbour", in other words, fight. I would add one
third thing, which is that as latest developments in Georgia and
Ukraine indicate, indeed that internally these countries are nowhere
near ready for such a move.
Q174 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
With that explanation I of course agree. You began by saying that
the Western or EU attitude to Russia had veered from catastrophism
to euphoria; equally, the Russian position to the European Union
under Yeltsin, from total engagement to now a new assertiveness,
and presumably the actual attitudes are rather more important
than the institutions within which we operate. What do you say
about how the PCA has in fact operated based on the four "common
spaces" and the Northern Dimension? Has it worked reasonably
well? What would be your advice to the European Union in the current
context about negotiating a successor to the PCA?
Professor Lieven: It obviously has not worked
very well. However, it has not worked very badly, as I think the
deal over Shtokman indicates. The Russians started with, in a
way, a wildly optimistic and almost super-French view of the EU
as a future superpower with which they could negotiate as power
to power and, of course, they then discovered that the EU does
not work like that at all. The Russians are very disappointed
in the EU, it must be said, because they complain, much like Kissinger,
with his "Where's the telephone number?"
Q175 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
But also anti-American.
Professor Lieven: Yes. They were hoping of course
after the Iraq war that the EU would emerge under French and German
leadership as a real counterbalance to America, which has not
happened. I think when it comes to the general framework, part
of the problem is that the EU, partly for reasons of principle
but also of course because of what it is, it is always looking
for structures, for formal rules, for general agreements based
on general principles which will govern everything. Of course,
the EU in practice by no means always follows that itself but
the Russians' idea of reciprocity is on a case-by-case basis:
you give us that, we give you that; we do this, you do that. Yes,
we can change certain rules and you can change other rules but
they are not going to tie themselves, into a general framework
which would bind them directly.
Q176 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
As we move from the PCA, what, in your judgement, should we move
towards?
Professor Lieven: I think it is more important
to draw up a set of general principles and aims, and then decide
individual cases on a more ad hoc basis while keeping those
principles in mind, rather than committing ourselves to rules,
strict rules, which then continually break down in practice and
lead to bad blood. That said, of course, we probably do need some
kind of formal agreement but almost more for propaganda and atmospheric
processes, because if we do not get it, it will be seen and portrayed
as a great step backwards. But, to be honest, I am not sure that,
in practical terms, this is the most important objective.
Q177 Lord Chidgey:
May I move on to Member States and solidarity? Professor, I would
like to link this concept of what the range of options may be
among Member States to your opening remarks regarding the sort
of partnership that we in the EU could have with Russia. It occurs
to me that you will have as many different opinions of what our
relationship might be with Russia as there are members of the
EU. So the concept of developing a common position and the possibility
of forging greater unity and coherence of approach among Member
States may well be impossible to have. I wonder if you could link
that therefore with your views on what sort of partnership we
might have with Russia in the EU. You mentioned that it might
well be similar to those that we aspire to have with Asian states
but then there are as many different forms of democracy, culture,
religion and whatever in Asia as there are members of the EU.
I find it quite challenging. I wonder if you could perhaps reassure
us that the challenge can be met.
Professor Lieven: Obviously, the reality of
deep divisions of interest and perception among EU Member States
just is true; it is there and it is a constant challenge, and
I do not think anything I can say or recommend will abolish that.
From that point of view, one does also have to think seriously
about British policy because, after all, one is talking about
players within the EU influencing EU policy rather than the EU
making up its mind in some abstract context. What I would say
on the score of solidarity is that, as far as the East Europeans,
let us say the Balts and the Poles, are concerned, they cannot
have it both ways. They do have real fears as regards Russia,
some of them, frankly, paranoid, others more real, particularly
when it comes to energy dependence. They also of course have real
ambitions in the former Soviet space which are seen from the Russian
point of view as actually in historical terms expansionist or
aggressive. What I would say is this. We have to back the Balts
and the Poles in certain circumstances against illegitimate and
dangerous Russian pressure, and also just where we think that
the Russians are clearly wrong. That could be the case, for example,
with Polish meat exports; it could most certainly be the case
in future if Russia uses the energy weapon against Poland or the
Balts for explicitly political purposes. On the other hand, if
we think that on particular issues the Poles and the Balts are
wrong, their policies are wrong and they are acting with unnecessary
provocation, we cannot allow them to tell us to shut up in the
name of European solidarity. That is what I mean about not having
it both ways. The problem is, of course, on so many issues, in
doing what they do, the East Europeans have American backing,
which brings the whole transatlantic relationship into play. From
a Russian point of view, so many times things have occurred, actions
have been taken, which we and our representatives have said to
the Russians clearly in private that we do not approve of, that
we do not like, but we have not been willing to say that in public.
I think we should be willing to say it in public. For me, that
would include most recently the whole issue of missile defence,
at least the short-term plans to extend American missile defence
to Poland and Eastern Europe, because it does, I think, in strict—maybe
paranoid but nonetheless strict military terms undermine Russia's
nuclear deterrent and, from the Russian point of view, that is
something they take very seriously.
Q178 Lord Chidgey:
Can I ask a supplementary here, Lord Chairman? From what you say,
Professor, it would appear that one of the ways of getting a coherent
approach amongst Member States is recognizing that the threat
of military force of Russia is the unifying aspect of NATO and
therefore of the European Union, which I would have thought was
the path they would not want to go along but it seems that history
is almost repeating itself, that European interests come together
when there is a unifying threat from elsewhere, whether it be
commercial, industrial, strategic or military. That seems to be
an opinion that might find a certain sympathy amongst a range
of EU states, which, as I say, is very disappointing if that is
the case.
Professor Lieven: I think it is worth saying
that I do actually believe in keeping NATO as ultimate residual
guarantee against a future insane Russia. I think it is good to
keep it there in reserve but that leads straight to my previous
point about where the borders are. If you are talking about defensible
borders—and by this I do not just mean militarily defensible
but defensible in terms of the solidarity of the places that you
are defending—once again, we can defend the eastern border
of Poland; with somewhat more difficulty we can defend the eastern
border of the Baltic states, not because of the military issue
but because of the whole ethnic Russian issue within the Baltic
states; I do not believe that we can defend the eastern borders
of Ukraine, let alone the northern border of Georgia, defined
as including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The thing is, there is
a reality about a great difference between the Russian and the
West European systems; there is a reality about a latent threat.
I think we should frankly acknowledge that and base some of our
ultimate planning on it. We should not allow some of our allies
to turn a defensive posture into what would be seen by the overwhelming
majority of Russians as an offensive posture and which would actually
make the possibility of a clash very much more likely.
Q179 Lord Jones:
Taking the solidarity theme further, what do you think the Russians
are getting from their constant pressurisation of individual EU
Member States? What is in it for them? Is it in the United Nations?
Do you think that the EU is up to the challenge of giving good
advice and assistance to individual states which are coming under
pressure?
Professor Lieven: There is Russian pressure
and there are also Russian bribes, especially in the energy sector.
The pressure is simply the Russians reacting to policies that
they see as anti-Russian and hostile to Russian interests. The
question is how far they are prepared to go in the last resort.
So far they have not gone so very far. These have, after all,
been limited clashes; a clash over Polish meat exports is not
refighting the Battle of Poltava or whatever but pressure of a
more or less discreet kind will continue and we have to be prepared
to push back. One of the ways we can push back is when it comes
to Russian investments in Western Europe. Of course, we have to
be able to calibrate this in an intelligent way, firstly, because,
after all, we do not want the Russians to stop us investing in
Russia. That is a good thing from every point of view. Secondly,
there are issues of fairness and unfairness involved here. There
was a French diplomat who said to me that it probably was not
a very good idea to bar Russia from the Airbus consortium on grounds
of lack of transparency the week after its chief executive had
been forced to stand down for insider trading. The EU has an institutional
capacity, for example, a formal, legal capacity to insist on much
greater transparency from Russian corporations, and we can use
that to hit back. This is what I mean also about making up our
policy on a clever tactical basis rather than tying ourselves
rigidly to general principles. We can hit back on that. The other
Russian policy which is much more difficult to counter is, the
Russians going round offering, I cannot remember how many European
countries it is, that each of them is going to be the energy hub
of Russia's exports to Eastern Europe. Frankly, if all 11 of them
are stupid enough to believe that, we either have to persuade
them that they cannot all be, but then some of them can be, or,
I suppose, we have to make counter-offers. The problem is that
in the energy field, if the counter-offer is Nabucco, for example,
and the alternative pipelines across the Caspian, Russia is in
a very strong position there and without having to go too far
in the direction of absolutely illegitimate moves. It is in a
very strong position geographically and, of course, the legal
status of the Caspian is genuinely undecided. That is a perfectly
legitimate issue under international law and particularly, given
the fact that the International Law of the Sea has not entered
into general force. The other reason why the Russians are so strong,
or at least why they may not be so strong but we are not so strong
in that regard—there is geography and cost, of course, when
it comes to building these pipelines but it is also because there
is also China. If it comes to real power in Central Asia, in future
it may be the Chinese who come first, the Russians who come second
and we will come very much third. I always remember a Kazak official
saying to me "Look, we want to deal with you, we would like
to export to you if possible, and we certainly need your investments,
but always remember, in the end, for us, Russia is there, China
is there and we are in the middle. Everything we do will be ultimately
determined by that irreducible fact."
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