Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200
- 206)
THURSDAY 15 NOVEMBER 2007
Professor Anatol Lieven
Q200 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:
Do you think they feel threatened by the instability in Pakistan?
Professor Lieven: Yes, directly and indirectly.
They do worry greatly—too greatly but then so do we; it
is not an imminent threat—about the collapse of the state
and the fate of the nuclear weapons, but they also worry much
more immediately about the impact on Central Asia of a really
destabilised Pakistan being used as a base for Islamist militants
who would move not just towards India and Afghanistan but further,
which has of course happened in the past under the Taliban. Afghanistan
was used as a base not just for Al Qaeda but also for Muslim extremist
groups trying to destabilise Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and so on.
Q201 Lord Swinfen:
How far and how successfully can Russia restore influence beyond
its borders, and possibly even control?
Professor Lieven: I do not think it is aiming
at control. Control is very expensive. Direct control also leads
to revolt. The Russians are aiming, I think, much more at what
one might call a neo-colonialist approach or, put another way,
the liberal empire idea set forth by Anatoly Chubais (and, by
the way, the fact that Chubais set that forward is another real
indication of the degree of consensus on these issues now existing
in the Russian establishment). How far can they achieve this?
They cannot achieve an exclusive sphere of influence. That is
now threatened not just by the West but by China as well in Central
Asia—I keep coming back to the Monroe doctrine, something
the Russians talk about all the time, of course. It is fascinating
to see how Uzbekistan has manoeuvred between Russia and China
and has developed much greater freedom of action from that point
of view, by the way, vis-a"-vis us. I think they stand
a reasonable chance of retaining predominant influence, which
is to say possibly a somewhat weaker version of what America enjoys
in the Caribbean and Central America, not ignoring the fact, that
Monroe doctrine notwithstanding, the Americans had to swallow
first Castro and then Hugo Chavez and have not been able to do
anything about it. The Russians will have two go on swallowing
Saakashvili and whoever follows him in Georgia, and some uncomfortable
people elsewhere as well. I think though that they stand a very
good chance of being able to exclude what they would see as a
potentially hostile military alliance, i.e. NATO, expanding further
on to their territory. I think they stand a very good chance of
continuing to be or becoming again the predominant outside investors
in several of the other republics. They stand a very good chance,
not always, as they see it, to their benefit, of remaining by
far the greatest target of emigration from most of the former
Soviet republics, something that they like in the case of Ukraine,
something that they used as a weapon in the case of Georgia, and
something which, frankly, they have to put up with in the case
of Azerbaijan in Central Asia, which they control as best they
can. I think they stand a reasonable chance that Russian, the
Russian language, will remain the biggest medium of exchange,
discourse, business, culture, between the states of the former
Soviet Union. That is something they are obsessed by, the notion
that Russian has to remain an international language, that we
are not going to see Russian simply decline to the level of German
or whatever. It has to be like Spanish or Chinese—not like
English; they do not aspire to that. The funny thing I keep telling
the French is that the Russians are very French but I think they
stand rather better chances than the French actually. I think
they stand reasonable chances of all those things and you could
say as long as the United Nations Security Council retains its
present slightly weird configuration they will retain the image
of, once again, not a superpower but one of the leading states
of the world, below China more and more, I think, unless China
hits a rock and disintegrates or has a big step backwards, but
up there with India and with us.
Q202 Lord Swinfen:
What are they doing in the way of looking forward in their influence
by educating young people in comparison to the West, educating
young people in the countries that surround them?
Professor Lieven: You mean spreading Russian
language education in Ukraine?
Q203 Lord Swinfen:
I am not talking about Russian language education. I am talking
about students going to Russia to receive education in all sorts
of different subjects and students coming to the West from the
surrounding countries, again, to be educated in all sorts of different
topics in the way of making long-term relations.
Professor Lieven: An enormous amount of that
has happened just by decisions of the students themselves. I must
say that I looked at this issue a few months ago and I have not
looked at it since. There was actually a debate in Russia then
about whether students from the former Soviet Union and, if so,
from which countries, should in fact be given equivalence of fees
and so fourth with Russian students, precisely as the basis for
spreading this kind of Russian influence but I must confess that
I do not know what decision they came to or if they have in fact
come to a decision on that. It is an obvious thing for them to
do and I think they probably will do it in future, partly as they
get more money in order to do it. Education has traditionally,
of course, been one of Russia's great strengths. Putin is very
dedicated to trying to restore that. I think they have also real
possibilities in that regard.
Q204 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:
We know that the Russians like dealing with European notions on
a separate basis, one by one. Do they have a coherent policy towards
the EU as a whole? What would they like to see happen to the EU?
If all their wishes were fulfilled, would they like to see it
disintegrate as an entity?
Professor Lieven: It depends on what we do.
At present, no, they would not like to see it disintegrate, partly
because they are very interested, for their own very good reasons,
in the prosperity and the growth of Europe, and they are interested
in our investment, they are interested in their investment in
us, and our markets. It is not a Russian policy to disrupt or
destroy that. What they would really like in their deepest hearts
is, of course, frankly, once again, a super-French version of
Europe in which Europe is essentially a great power allied with
Russia against America. The sensible ones now realise that they
are never going to get that. Their nightmare, I suppose, ultimately
is of a Polish Europe, a Europe which is where policy towards
Russia is made in Warsaw and Riga, and not in Berlin, Paris or
even London, and in which the EU does become a kind of battering
ram against their influence and interests, especially in the former
Soviet Union. To put it at its simplest, they would like there
to be one telephone number that they can ring in Europe and they
would like when they ring that telephone number to get an answer
that they like. If they think there is a reasonable chance of
that, then they think the more united Europe is the better. If
they think that the answer is going to be in Polish and is an
answer that they do not like, then of course they want Europe
to be as divided as possible. You could say partly, and certainly
that is what they would say, they do not have a coherent policy
towards the EU because the EU is not a coherent force, so they
cannot have. This is what Russian officials say, of course: "Of
course we have to deal with you on a bilateral and individual
basis. That is how you deal with us."
Q205 Lord Truscott:
Just moving on to domestic politics, if I may, very briefly, yesterday
President Putin was quoted as saying that if United Russia won
the Duma elections, he would have the moral authority to continue
leading the country. So he made a Margaret Thatcher, "I intend
to go on and on" statement. What is your view on that? Do
you think he will go on and on and what form do you think his
leadership might take?
Professor Lieven: He also, it must be said,
made what you could call a very Thatcherite remark about his own
party. He said basically they were a completely useless lot without
a determined common ideology. He actually said that he was only
going along with them because there was not anything better—I
do not think Thatcher would ever have said that about the Conservatives.
It was rather striking, and certainly reflected his own personal
autocracy. Yes, I think that basically he will go on. I think
that he has been convinced by enough people that he is necessary
to hold things together. One of the fascinating questions—and
this for me is the question in the short to medium term—about
what happens in Russia is that one of the reasons, apparently,
why he has been convinced that he has to stay on in an explicitly
very powerful role is that there are real fears that otherwise
the ruling group, the establishment, will split. Members of the
establishment themselves fear that they are not sufficiently united
and disciplined to manage their rivalries without somebody in
a real, clear position of authority over them. If it splits, then
things really do begin to unravel—not, I fear I have to
say, in the democratic and liberal direction that we would wish.
I would be much more worried about groups appealing to nationalist
forces on the streets, trying to turn these up to now fairly pathetic
youth movements into something much more menacing. The stability
of the country would then disintegrate and lots of people in the
establishment would lose their jobs, and possibly even their freedom—not
their lives probably, although that cannot be excluded either.
The problem is that if one takes that threat really seriously,
then, of course, it will threaten Putin's position as well, and
this is, of course, as many people have said, the critical question.
It is not about how he manages his way through the immediate succession
and the elections; it is how he manages his future position relative
to the next Russian President and whether the President escapes
from Putin's control and decides to continue with a strong presidency.
This is not China, with a really strong institutional Communist
Party. Putin could not go on still exercising dominant control
through the apparat because there is not an apparat in that sense.
I do not know if this version is true, and they do not know. The
Russian elites are worried about themselves. They distrust themselves.
It is an indication of the fact that although in many ways Russia
today is much more of an oligarchy than it ever was under Yeltsin,
it still has not really fully gelled as an oligarchy. They still
feel they need a leader to keep them under control. One of the
fascinating things is that support for Putin staying on in a dominant
role comes not just from Russian business, including apolitical
Russian business, it also has tremendous sympathy in Western business
investing in Russia. What will actually happen? These people do
have enormous influence. There is still a degree of military discipline
among a good many of these people from the former Secret Service.
They are even inter-married to a considerable extent, although,
of course, as we all know, that does not necessarily lead to family
harmony. They also have immense incentives to stick together.
To put it at its bluntest, if I could not get to be a director
of Gazprom, I think I would accept a directorship of Rosneft as
a pretty acceptable substitute. If you kick over the entire table
in an effort to get supreme command, you risk getting nothing
and, of course, if you go back to the 1990s and really serious
levels of assassination, you risk getting nothing, including your
life. Whether that will be enough, including with Putin staying
on, to keep them together, I do not know. If I were a big investor,
which, alas, I am not, I would not bet the farm on that but I
would bet a significant investment in Russia. The other fascinating
thing from that point of view is the risk that if Putin takes
the premiership you get a situation in which power migrates from
state institution to state institution, leading to tremendous
uncertainty and also, of course, tremendous delays and uncertainty
in decision-making, including economic decision-making, and also
a surge in corruption, as people try to buy support left, right
and centre. If, on the other hand, Putin does make United Russia
his real base, I suppose there are two questions. One is whether
United Russia then really does emerge as a serious political party,
a mass political party, rather than what it is now, which is a
kind of heap of local bosses. That is why some of Putin's recent
statements about United Russia, while on the one hand, of course,
reflecting his autocratic character, are also rather interesting
because, if that does become his base, I think he is going to
really start kicking people around and indeed turning this into
a cadre party. If that happens, does it lead to other parties
emerging along similar lines? After all, one of the fundamental
weaknesses of Russian democracy since the fall of Communism, as
in so many other places, is not just the power of state but also
that Russian society has not been able to generate serious mass
reformist parties. That is the first question. The second question
is, obviously, a critical issue for the future of Russian democracy:
whether the middle classes mobilise behind various forms of reform,
democratic politics and ultimately cutting down on the power of
the state oligarchs—the South Korean model, cutting down
the Chaebol and their allies in the military. Could United Russia
itself be the vehicle for this? Does Putin start to appoint local
middle-class people to run United Russia in the Russian provinces,
the small businessmen I talked about, with a seriously reformist
and, in the end, anti-oligarch agenda or, in the end, does United
Russia continue to be a vehicle for the present top elite? I am
not sure on that one. I suppose I have to say that the latter
is more likely but one cannot necessarily exclude the former at
all, particularly, of course, if Putin does begin to have difficulties
with his successor and other people in the apparat and actually
genuinely needs mass middle-class support against some of his
own former lieutenants. I do not know. I really cannot possibly
give any firm predictions on that but that is the kind of thing
I will be watching for in the years to come, to see if it happens
or not. I would not say therefore, from that point of view, that
by no means all the indications we have had out of Russia about
future processes are as inherently negative as the Western media
usually make out.
Q206 Lord Swinfen:
I think I am right in thinking that Putin cannot stand as President
again. What position to keep control of Russia would he hold and
who would therefore appoint him to that position?
Professor Lieven: It is like America. He cannot
stand for President next year. He can stand after an interval
of four years. He can stand again in 2012, so he can come back.
That is the dramatic scenario which so many people have held out.
He puts in a standing President for four years, he wants to come
back in 2012 and the standing President decides that actually,
he rather likes the job and does not want to let Putin come back.
What Putin does in the interim ... There still appear to be basically
now, unless something comes completely from left field, which
I myself cannot actually see, two choices. One is United Russia,
that he makes his position as party leader the basis—not
I think that that is a parallel that would please him, that he
does a Sonia Gandhi in India. She does not take the prime ministership,
government leadership, but she exercises very great influence
as party leader. That is one thing. Then of course there does
come the whole question of whether United Russia does become a
stable and powerful basis for that. The other possibility, which
I myself consider is actually more dangerous, is that he takes
the prime ministership, and of course, he has to be formally appointed
by the President. An interesting point: then he can be sacked
by the President, which he cannot be as leader of United Russia.
I am sure that is one of the reasons why he is thinking about
being leader of United Russia. The other problem if he takes the
prime ministership is what I talked about, the migration of power
between government institutions, because then obviously he tries
to make the government, the Cabinet, more and more powerful and
the presidency less powerful. Up to now the presidency has been
all-powerful and the Cabinet has been an executive. That leads
to clash after clash after clash on specific issues in ways that
could unravel, frankly, even the closest of relationships, even
the closest of friendships. If you find yourself fighting with
someone on a daily basis over irritating and not small issues,
involving huge amounts of money, the whole question of the direction
of the whole infrastructure restoration programme, a figure which
has been set at $1 trillion. You can have quite a number of battles
over the distribution of $1 trillion if it comes down to a question
whether it is the presidency or the Cabinet which distributes
them, which is why it looks on balance probably, but not certainly,
that it is United Russia that he will go for, and then come back
as President in 2012—probably.
Chairman: Professor Lieven, thank you
very much indeed. I think the Committee has very much enjoyed
the style as well as the substance of the replies which you have
been able to give us. We are going to Moscow in a couple of weeks'
time and we will certainly have benefited by the introduction
you have given to us to quite a number of the current problems.
We will be able to see them much more clearly because of that.
Thank you very much again.
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