Examination of Witnesses (Questions 207
- 219)
MONDAY 19 NOVEMBER 2007
Sir Anthony Brenton
Q207 Chairman:
Ambassador, thank you very much indeed for coming and seeing us
here. As you know, ome members of the Committee will be coming
to Moscow next month but we really felt it would be very useful,
as you were here, to take evidence; we are taking a record, which
we will not be doing when we are in Moscow. We will of course
send you the transcript and you will be able to make any corrections
that you wish to at that time. Thank you again for coming. You
have obviously had a rather interesting period in Moscow over
the last 18 months and we may want to comment on some of that
as we go through. I wonder whether I could begin by asking a question
whether you have any comment on Russian domestic politics in this
pre-electoral period, pre two elections.
Sir Anthony Brenton: Before I answer your question,
can I just say it is a great pleasure to be here. My diary is
in a certain amount of flux but if I do find myself in Moscow
when members of the Committee are also there, I am very keen to
do what I can for you. Maybe you can come round for dinner or
something. On your question about Russian domestic politics, we
are obviously in a certain amount of flux at the moment. There
have been a couple of recent surprises. The one thing that I can
say is that we will be watching very carefully and we are very
keen that Russia conducts its upcoming elections for the Duma
on 2 December and then for the president some time next March
in the free and fair way which it is committed to do under its
obligations to the Council of Europe.
Q208 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Will you comment on the ODIHR decision. Clearly, on any objective
analysis, the list headed by President Putin is going to win in
any event so what was the motive? How can we best interpret the
attempt to restrict the number of observers from the OSCE arm,
ODIHR? What sort of message do they want to give?
Sir Anthony Brenton: I do not think I would
want to delve into their minds particularly. We have put firmly
on public record our disappointment that the ODIHR observers have
not been able to get in because they have not been able to get
visas. This is obviously very disappointing and it does raise
questions about how the elections will be conducted. It does not
mean that the elections will be unobserved, of course, because
there are an awful lot of liberal-minded independent Russians
who will be watching very carefully what goes on, plus a lot of
international people already there, including myself, who will
be following very closely what will go on. I think the story of
how the elections are conducted, even in the absence of ODIHR
observers, will become very clear but it is obviously a great
shame that these observers are not going to be there.
Q209 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
It does seem a rather crass position because, if they are going
to do well in any event, why not let people in to monitor?
Sir Anthony Brenton: I really do not know why
this has worked out the way that it has. The Russians are uncomfortable
with ODIHR altogether, they are uncomfortable with the comments
that it has made on other elections in their immediate neighbourhood,
including, of course, in Ukraine two years ago, and Georgia, and
I think some of that discomfort may be being expressed in the
way things are going at present.
Q210 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
Can I ask a related question and that is the Mafra Summit and
the proposal of President Putin for what he calls a Russian European
Institute for Freedom and Democracy. At first sight, this does
not wholly accord with the restrictions on monitors in the elections.
Again, if I might ask you to look into the mind of the Russian
President, what really are they hoping to promote by this proposal?
Sir Anthony Brenton: I think the important point
here, without delving into their minds, is that their constitution
commits them to a democratic way of government. They are committed
by international obligations to the Council of Europe to a democratic
way of government. It is our business, the UK and the EU, to do
everything we can to hold them to those commitments, and your
visit, if you personally are coming in a few weeks' time, the
continuing attention from Western political figures, particularly
in the run-up to the current elections, is a very important way
to maintain that pressure.
Q211 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
That said, what do they hope to achieve by the proposal which
is not achieved by the Council of Europe, OSCE and so on?
Sir Anthony Brenton: I do not think the details
of the proposal have been made clear but, as it was explained
to me, the idea is—and this is a legitimate Russian concern—that
attention to the proprieties of how democracy works, which we
have focused very heavily on in Russia, should also be extended
to other countries in the European area. The idea was that this
institute would operate in all directions.
Q212 Lord Anderson of Swansea:
If they do not allow a sufficient number of monitors to their
own elections, how well placed are they to seek to monitor other
elections?
Sir Anthony Brenton: I agree that it does not
feel entirely consistent.
Q213 Lord Truscott:
If I may follow up, Lord Anderson mentioned the Mafra Summit.
I think it is quite interesting what Putin said about his personal
prospects—I do not know if you are able to comment on that—that
he would not change the constitution, he would not alter the balance
of power of the executive or change the powers of the presidency,
which does not seem to leave a lot of room for manoeuvre if, as
he also said, he wants to retain a role in political life in Russia.
What you think is a possible role for President Putin's future
career?
Sir Anthony Brenton: There are two important
points here. One is that the Russian constitution is still a very
young document. There is no doubt in my mind that the single best
thing that President Putin can do to ensure the stability of Russia's
fledgling political institutions is precisely to leave at the
end of his second term, as he has repeatedly promised to do. If
he actually delivers on that promise, that will be a major act
on his part in support of Russian democracy and Russian stability.
The second thing to say about this is that I think he is right
to feel, having been, from the point of view of the ordinary Russian
citizen, rather a good President of Russia over the last seven
years, that he has things that he can continue to contribute to
Russian governance going forward. He has advice that he can offer
in the way that departing Prime Ministers can in the UK. I agree
with you it is not entirely clear how he would do that, but Russia
would lose if it lost President Putin's advice.
Q214 Lord Swinfen:
Is he able to come back as President after a short period of absence?
Sir Anthony Brenton: Yes, he is. The constitution
limits a president to two terms but if a successor were elected
and then, for example, fell ill and there was an election, President
Putin would be free to stand again.
Q215 Lord Crickhowell:
You partly explained their attitude about this "What right
has the rest of the world to lecture us, and so on, in these things
when so much is going on in the rest of the world?" but you
also said that we must continually apply the pressure. What is
their reaction going to be if we apply this close and critical
look at what is going on? How do they react to that?
Sir Anthony Brenton: I think it depends which
Russian you are dealing with. Their democratic institutions are
still quite young, there is still an instinct in some officials'
minds to try and produce the results which they think authority
wants, but there is also the instinct in a lot of people's minds
that they want a healthy, open, free, democratic system and they
will welcome outside observation which will tend to produce that
result.
Q216 Lord Truscott:
On foreign policy, if I can ask you, Ambassador, what you see
as Russia's foreign policy objectives and do you see that to a
certain extent it is trying to use Russia and the EU as a counterbalance
to US power? Alongside that, what do you think are the main security
issues facing Russia? There has been a lot of talk about their
unhappiness with missile defence and wanting to change the Treaty
on Conventional Forces in Europe, so combining those two?
Sir Anthony Brenton: Looking at Russian foreign
policy, we have to remember that Russia has gone through a period
of what they regard as national humiliation. They have ceased
to be a superpower, the Soviet Union has broken up, they are a
significantly smaller, less rich, less influential country than
they were at the collapse in 1991. I think one of their main aims
and one of President Putin's main aims is to recreate a strong,
stable, successful Russia. That is what an awful lot of Russia's
foreign policy activity has been about. They are particularly
concerned to maintain and to reinforce their influence in what
they regard as their immediate neighbourhood in the near abroad,
in places like Georgia, Ukraine and so on. In regard to their
relations with the West, they retain a lot of the suspicions and
concerns which are hangovers from the time when the West was in
confrontation with Russia during the Cold War. They deeply dislike
NATO, they deeply dislike what they see as Western attempts to
encircle them and to weaken them in various ways. It is for that
reason that they are very hostile in particular to the US plans
to site ballistic missiles in Poland and in the Czech Republic.
In pursuit of that dislike of Western encirclement, obviously
they will carry forward their arguments in different countries
in whatever ways they think will appeal in those countries, and
there are some European countries which are more sympathetic to
those arguments than others.
Q217 Lord Crickhowell:
You say they aim to be a strong, stable, successful Russia. They
are now, of course, immeasurably smaller than the Russia which
was humiliated. They are not even very large in comparison with
their neighbours, such as Turkey, in population terms and, what
is more, they have a declining population. What do you think therefore
in this smaller state Russia constitutes a successful Russia?
They are no longer a great power in the sense that America is,
a dominant power, but they clearly want to be a great power among
the lesser powers. I am not at all clear what they would see as
being a strong, stable and successful Russia.
Sir Anthony Brenton: I think you put it correctly.
Obviously, they are not in the same league as the United States
any more, although in some ways, particularly with regard to strategic
nuclear power, they remain very comparable and a very serious
global player—indeed, one of the two serious global players—and
they see themselves, rightly, as negotiating on that subject with
the United States in a position of more or less equality. Apart
from that, I think they are looking for a similar level of global
influence perhaps to that which we exercise, although in different
ways. They are a permanent member of the Security Council, they
have significant friends and allies around the world whom they
view as particularly attached to them in one way or another. They
have one huge trump which we do not have, which is that they are
now a very major energy exporter, oil and gas exporter. On the
other hand, they are weaker than us in other ways: we have a huge
financial sector, which they do not yet have. They see themselves,
I think, playing a role of comparable weight perhaps to that of
second-ranked powers such as ourselves.
Q218 Lord Chidgey:
I am trying to judge how successfully Russia can restore its influence
and control beyond its borders. I would like to qualify that concept
by saying what does Russia really perceive its sphere of influence
to be? If we go back to Soviet times, when Russia was a key, major
player in terms of influencing other continents, for example,
the classic case of vying for influence with the USA and China,
where does Russia see itself in regard to the importance of trying
to restore influence in those major continents and major players
compared to yesteryear?
Sir Anthony Brenton: First and foremost, of
course, they see themselves as having special interests and concerns
in their near abroad, in countries like Ukraine and Georgia and
so on. Beyond that, they see themselves as having expertise and
skills and strengths to bring to key international problems, a
conspicuous one being the problem of the Iran's search for nuclear
weapons, where they have been a member of the core group of countries
which have tried to address that issue, and on major issues of
European security, such as Kosovo independence, where again, they
see themselves—they are—one of the core group of countries
which have been in negotiation over how that process may or may
not go forward.
Q219 Lord Chidgey:
Can I ask a supplementary on that? Can I compare again with the
days of the Soviet empire, when literally thousands of young people
were given free education in University in Russia as part of the
wider influence of Russia's aims. Has that now completely finished?
Is it at a lower level? I am thinking of the wider influence,
the soft power as well as the hard power.
Sir Anthony Brenton: I am not an expert in this
area but my instinct is that most of that has stopped simply because
they have been through a period where they have not had any money
but they are edging back also to concerns with soft power, with
cultural power, with spreading the language and spreading Russian
culture. Notably, here in London there is now a Pushkin Festival
every year. They are re-engaging on that sort of agenda as well.
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