Examination of Witnesses (Questions 320
- 339)
FRIDAY 23 NOVEMBER 2007
Mr Robert Cooper, Mr David Johns and Mr Björn
Fagerberg
Q320 Lord Truscott:
Moving on from energy to a less controversial area, European defence!
Perhaps you would like to comment on how the EU embryonic defence
role, security role, is compatible with Member States' commitments
to NATO, particularly given the background of President Sarkozy's
recent comments that he would like to see the EU's defence role
enhanced under the French Presidency. I wonder whether you could
comment on that and, also, how the EU should respond, if at all,
to Russia's proposed withdrawal from the CFE Treaty.
Mr Cooper: To start with the second one, which
is slightly less complicated, that is not a matter which is handled
in the European Union. Nevertheless, it has an impact on European
Union's relations with Russia. They have "suspended"
at the moment, whatever that means, but I do not think in the
short run withdrawal from the Treaty would pose a direct threat
to the European Union but, nevertheless, it is not something people
feel more comfortable with. We saw the CFE Treaty as part of the
structure of the end the Cold War, which provided for transparency
in military arrangements and I think made everybody feel much
safer. It is very undesirable that Russia should withdraw from
it. I think that is the view shared right across the European
Union.
Q321 Chairman:
The EU does have a special representative in Moldova, and it is
possible that if one was able to resolve the issues about the
Russian forces in Transnistria, that might create a situation,
given the withdrawals of the Russian forces from Georgia, whereby
the NATO members would be able to ratify the modified CFE Treaty
and that might change the environment in which Russian attitudes
might occur. Is there not there also an interaction between EU
activities and the CFE Treaty?
Mr Cooper: Yes, the CFE Treaty and all of those
arrangements are the context within which we operate. We would
like to see the Treaty ratified and continue in existence and,
indeed, we would like to see some kind of a deal on Moldova and
Georgia. The USA has been making some quite imaginative proposals
to try and meet the problems the Russians have raised. Although
we are not directly involved, the people who are involved in the
US normally keep us informed about what they are doing and we
hope very much that they succeed. On the first question, it would
be very strange if NATO and the European Union were in some way
incompatible or in contradiction with each other because the overlap
of the membership is so enormous; and indeed they are not. Occasionally
you get elements of institutional rivalry but that is not very
serious. In practice we co-operate extremely well together, with
one reservation, the reservation being connected to Turkey. At
the level of our secretariat here and the NATO secretariat, for
example, we work extremely closely on arrangements for the possible
future situation in Kosovo where the European Union would be responsible
under the Ahtisaari proposals for a very large deployment in the
area of police, and NATO would be responsible for KFOR. It is
clear there is a boundary line between those two responsibilities
where you have to have rather precise agreements and you also
need arrangements for intelligence sharing and so on. All of those
things worked out extremely smoothly. In another way we operate
what is now a rather small military mission in Bosnia through
SHAPE with Deputy SACEUR as the Operational Commander. That works
perfectly well. From where I sit, although there is a lot of talk
about it, I see an extremely good relationship with NATO. The
European Union does not do defence in the sense that European
military activities are not there to do the classical defence
task of defending national territory: that still belongs to NATO.
In terms of other military operations, it is not that we are fighting
over who does what, there is more than enough to go around. On
the contrary, it is a strength for the West that there is more
than one option available. For example, we are about to make a
deployment to Chad, which has the useful function of providing
a backstop for the UN deployment in Sudan, in the Darfur area.
Chad would probably not accept a NATO deploymentI do not
know why, but the image of NATO is different from that of the
European Unionwhereas they are quite happy to accept European
Union deployment. That seems to me to be a good thing for the
West, that one has got alternative bodies available which you
can use.
Q322 Chairman:
On that particular point, we are obviously following this in our
other work and we had a letter saying that you had a force generation
conference here on 9 November as far as Chad and deployment was
concerned. Has there been any public statement as to how successful
that meeting was, and what are the probabilities of deployment
under the Irish General?
Mr Cooper: I do not think I am sufficiently
up to date on that. I know there are still a couple of shortfalls
which, as a matter of fact, are the same shortfalls one finds
with almost every deployment and you can probably guess which
ones they are.
Q323 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
Helicopters.
Mr Cooper: Helicopters, yes. (There followed
a short discussion of the record)
Q324 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:
You will be aware that at the moment in the United Kingdom there
are furious rows going on about the overstretch in British Forces.
With the combination of Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously, this
seems to be too much for what we have got. At the same time, on
a rotating basis Britain contributes to the European Battle Group,
which has the unique thing that it seems to never be designed
to go into battle, but that is another question altogether. What
would happen if it was deployed, because I do not think we could
meet the commitment we have undertaken to do because there is
a serious amount of double-hatting, if not triple-hatting going
on?
Mr Cooper: I do not think I have the expertise
to answer that question, which you can put to the British Ministry
of Defence. They would probably be better than me to answer that.
The only comment I would like to make is Britain is not the only
country that is overstretched at the moment.
Lord Truscott: There does seem to be
a debate about the way forward for European security. The French
seem to be pressing for more institutional changes and the British
Ministry of Defence are always saying the focus should be on developing
the capability. I wonder what your view is on that. Secondly,
another concern vis-a"-vis Europe and NATO is the whole question
of avoiding duplication, and is there a danger that some of the
functions could be duplicated?
Q325 Chairman:
We must be a little careful we do not go too far away from our
relations with Russia.
Mr Cooper: I do not think we know exactly everything
that the French have in mind at the moment, but I know when President
Sarkozy put forward these ideas, the sentence has always had two
halves: one is about strengthening EU defence arrangements and
the other is about a stronger French contribution to NATO. I think
those two things would be in balance.
Q326 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
In this area of NATO enlargement, possible; missile defence, on
the table already; multilateral disarmament instruments under
stress whether it is CFE or INF or all these other things, do
you not feel there is a pretty strong risk, if not even a likelihood,
that the Russians, who seem to be reverting to many old practices,
will revert in this area to attempting to split the Europeans
from the United States? If so, do you think the Europeans are
in a mode to resist that attempt to divide them or are they likely
to be a victim of it? How does the prospective election of a new
American President affect all that?
Mr Cooper: Yes, right! While you were speaking
I was thinking, I am not sure if the US is not split on some of
these questions itself. I think probably the best answer I can
give is to say that this is not my daily bread. These are things
which determine the environment within which the EU operates with
Russia, but they are discussed essentially in the Alliance rather
than here. They have a big effect on the atmosphere in all kinds
of way, and probably they have an effect on other things where
the European Union is very deeply engaged, like the Kosovo question.
It is not really my business, so I do not think I can give you
a respectable answer.
Q327 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
Let us switch away completely from that to the PCA and the role
it currently plays and the role a new PCA could play in the EU-Russia
arrangements. To what extent do you think it is a high priority
to negotiate a new PCA, or is it the case that the common spaces
and the existing PCA, which, as I understand, will just go on
providing an institutional framework for as far as the eye can
see, are, in fact, a reasonably satisfactory way of managing the
relationship now? To what extent do you think the tensions which
have arisen in EU-Russia relations in recent months make it very
dubious that a new PCA of a meaningful kind can in the short-term,
or should in the short-term, be negotiated, or is it a very high
priority indeed?
Mr Cooper: I will give you my answer but maybe
David would like to add something. I think we can probably live
without negotiating a new PCA and that probably goes for the Russians
as well. There is still more to be done which can be done under
the existing PCA, which is by no means exhausted. This was an
attempt to see if we could go further. Well, this may not be the
right moment for it. In due course it would be desirable, but
I do not think it is vital.
Mr Johns: I would agree that it is not necessarily
a tragedy if we do not negotiate a new PCA soon. The current PCA
will be rolled over and will continue to apply. We have the road
maps that were agreed, which have taken our co-operation even
further, and they can continue to be implemented. The only disadvantage,
of course, is road maps are not legally binding. The interest
in a new PCA would be to have some legally binding framework where
we could then further intensify our co-operation with Russia.
On the other hand, I agree with you entirely that the current
atmosphere is not conducive to starting negotiations at the moment.
We still have a number of problems which need to be addressed,
not least the question of Polish meat where there may be a possible
opening in the future with the new Polish Government, but we have
to bear in mind that Russia also is in a pre-election period and
I do not see much happening on the PCA front in the next few months,
certainly not up to the presidential elections. You never know,
there might be some miraculous development, but I do not see it
coming for at least the foreseeable future. We will continue to
co-operate nonetheless on the basis of the Institutional Framework
that is in place.
Q328 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:
If the existing PCA is legally binding, I cannot believe the Russians
have gone along with all the things in it, so what are we doing
to legally enforce the breaches of the existing one?
Mr Johns: Interestingly enough, the Russians
present themselves as being one of the few countries in the world
that respect international rules. They turn around and accuse
the EU, the US, et cetera, of not respecting international rules,
they are the only ones sticking to the rules, they say. On the
PCA, of course, we have various possibilities to discuss areas
where, for example, the Russians do not live up to their commitments,
but it is true, the possibilities for forcing them to act are
very limited.
Q329 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:
Why do we make them legally binding if we cannot legally enforce
them?
Mr Cooper: It is a different level of commitment
and one hopes that when people accept a legally binding commitment
they take it more seriously. The Russians do take legal obligations
seriously.
Q330 Chairman:
On that question of the negotiations, we have been impressed by
the size of the Russian mission here to the European Union. As
we were waiting to come in to meet you, we saw Ambassador Chizhov
who was waiting for a number of ministers from Moscow who were
coming to take part in discussions on the common space dealing
with justice and home affairs matters today. There is a lot of
business being done. How do you see the balance of the business
which is done between the EU and the Russians in Brussels and
the EU and the Russians in Moscow? Do you see any changes in that
relationship?
Mr Cooper: In terms of formal business, numbers
of meetings held, Russia is probably number one, more than with
the USA. With the USA there is a much more informal relationship
and a rather more productive relationship as well. As between
Brussels and Moscow, I see mostly Brussels, I do not know how
much there is in Moscow.
Mr Johns: My viewpoint is also entirely from
the Brussels' viewpoint. The Council, of course, does not have
any representation in Moscow, which is the strength of the Commission
because it has a delegation there, and they have very strong contacts
and daily contacts with the Russian administration.
Q331 Chairman:
On that point, and perhaps straying into the second inquiry which
we are undertaking on the Reform Treaty, I wonder if I could ask
you whether once there was the existence of a European External
Action Service, would that mean that almost automatically in any
other major country, such as Moscow, the presence of the European
External Action Service would mean that the Council, as well the
Commission, would be represented in somewhere like Moscow?
Mr Cooper: (There followed a short discussion
off the record)
Q332 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:
This question is about the political situation in Russia, which
seems to be one of the weaker areas of the four common spaces.
Are we making any progress on the rule of law, democracy, human
rights and good governance?
Mr Cooper: No, I think is probably the short
answer to that.
Q333 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:
That is what I had imagined.
Mr Cooper: I was going to say most people would
say the situation has got worse, on the other hand, I think a
large number of Russians would probably say the situation has
got better. At least in a free and fair election it is pretty
clear that Mr Putin could be elected for whatever he wanted to
be elected for. It is also clear that Russians have very bad memories
of the 1990s, which they saw not as being democratic but as being
chaotic. Nevertheless, the kind of unhealthy way in which it is
difficult to tell whether you are talking to the Russian business
community or the Russian political system and the extent to which
it seems possible to exploit the law to attack political enemies,
none of those things make Russia look very much like a liberal
democracy at the moment.
Q334 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:
And poisoning people in London!
Mr Cooper: There is that also, yes, and not
just in London as well.
Q335 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
Quite a lot of the people who we have taken evidence from have
suggested that the European Union's approach to this democracy,
human rights and other agenda has proved a rather misdirected
and mistaken one in the past, as well as being ineffective, in
the sense that it was directed at the concept of Russia becoming
more like us, the concept that the Russians would become just
another European country. With that in mind, much of the spirit
of the Copenhagen criteria hovered over it and this, it has been
suggested to us, is a mistake, an overambitious approach which
has not worked and is now rejected effectively by the Russians,
whether you fly under a rather peculiar label called "sovereign
democracy" or whatever it is, it is not what they are doing.
Do you feel some redirection of this human rights, democracy,
good governance, rule of law agenda is desirable? If so, should
it be explicit or should it just come about by a process of osmosis,
by a shifting of emphasis? If so, how much of it do we retain
in a future relationship if we do decide to shift away from simply
trying to make the Russians more like us?
Mr Cooper: It is very difficult to get any other
county to do what you want, to become more like us, which I think
was the answer I gave to the first question, it is a natural thing
for everybody to want because it is easy to deal with people who
are like you. Expecting that that is what is going to happen though
is a different thing. What is the most effective way of promoting
those ideas, democracy, the rule of law? I do not think there
is a straightforward answer to that, it depends on particular
countries. To some extent, I think intellectually the idea of
democracy and the rule of law has won. In some ways they promote
themselves because it is what lots of people want and lots of
people expect. There are some times when from outside you can
contribute to that process, but the primary drive for that has
to come from within countries. The EU tries to help that process
by supporting NGOs in Russia. How effective that is, I do not
know. I guess you may have to talk to the Commission about that
because they are the people who are running the programmes and
who know what is going on.
Q336 Chairman:
We are going to see Mr Franco when we are in Moscow and I think
it will be discussed there rather than with the Commission here.
Mr Cooper: He would be the person who would
know best. Perhaps I will add one other personal hobby horse,
which is that if Ukraine continued in the direction that it seems
to be going in, it is certainly a more liberal country now than
it was and if it could establish a well functioning democratic
government and a rule of law, I think that would have a very big
impact on Russia; but directly changing Russia from Brussels is
not a feasible project.
Q337 Lord Hannay of Chiswick:
Do you think we should state that is no longer what we are trying
to do or do you think it should just be allowed to happen?
Mr Cooper: I do not think we would be allowed
to state that because throughout the European Union, although
there are variable opinions, it is not what governments want.
We have to try and do it in a way which is practical and does
not seem aggressive to the Russians.
Q338 Lord Hamilton of Epsom:
When the British Government reacted robustly to having a Russian
citizen poisoned in London, I do not think there was ever any
hope that we were going to get anybody extradited for doing it.
On the other hand, it had to be helpful in terms of making the
Russians think twice before they would do the same thing again.
Mr Cooper: Yes. I think everybody who deals
with Russia would say that one ought to be absolutely clear and
firm about principles, preferably in a way which is not aggressive
and provocative, but you need to continue to make the points.
(There followed a short discussion off the record)
Q339 Lord Truscott:
I hope in coming years we will not be asking, "Who lost Russia?"
because it seems to me there was an opportunity in the early 1990s
to send Russia on the path of Western style democracy, but clearly
that window has closed now with Putin, although there is still
the opportunity to develop the market economy. I think that is
an historical opportunity which was probably lost in Russia's
case.
Mr Cooper: I think this is a world of second
chances and I do not think anything is closed. Russia is very
different now from the way it was in the 1980s, for example. In
the 1990s, undoubtedly there were a gigantic number of mistakes
which were made. There are a large number of countries which have
moved from authoritarian systems to democracy. Maybe naively,
I do not believe it is going to remain exactly where it is now.
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