Select Committee on European Union Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 320 - 339)

FRIDAY 23 NOVEMBER 2007

Mr Robert Cooper, Mr David Johns and Mr Björn Fagerberg

  Q320  Lord Truscott: Moving on from energy to a less controversial area, European defence! Perhaps you would like to comment on how the EU embryonic defence role, security role, is compatible with Member States' commitments to NATO, particularly given the background of President Sarkozy's recent comments that he would like to see the EU's defence role enhanced under the French Presidency. I wonder whether you could comment on that and, also, how the EU should respond, if at all, to Russia's proposed withdrawal from the CFE Treaty.

  Mr Cooper: To start with the second one, which is slightly less complicated, that is not a matter which is handled in the European Union. Nevertheless, it has an impact on European Union's relations with Russia. They have "suspended" at the moment, whatever that means, but I do not think in the short run withdrawal from the Treaty would pose a direct threat to the European Union but, nevertheless, it is not something people feel more comfortable with. We saw the CFE Treaty as part of the structure of the end the Cold War, which provided for transparency in military arrangements and I think made everybody feel much safer. It is very undesirable that Russia should withdraw from it. I think that is the view shared right across the European Union.

  Q321  Chairman: The EU does have a special representative in Moldova, and it is possible that if one was able to resolve the issues about the Russian forces in Transnistria, that might create a situation, given the withdrawals of the Russian forces from Georgia, whereby the NATO members would be able to ratify the modified CFE Treaty and that might change the environment in which Russian attitudes might occur. Is there not there also an interaction between EU activities and the CFE Treaty?

  Mr Cooper: Yes, the CFE Treaty and all of those arrangements are the context within which we operate. We would like to see the Treaty ratified and continue in existence and, indeed, we would like to see some kind of a deal on Moldova and Georgia. The USA has been making some quite imaginative proposals to try and meet the problems the Russians have raised. Although we are not directly involved, the people who are involved in the US normally keep us informed about what they are doing and we hope very much that they succeed. On the first question, it would be very strange if NATO and the European Union were in some way incompatible or in contradiction with each other because the overlap of the membership is so enormous; and indeed they are not. Occasionally you get elements of institutional rivalry but that is not very serious. In practice we co-operate extremely well together, with one reservation, the reservation being connected to Turkey. At the level of our secretariat here and the NATO secretariat, for example, we work extremely closely on arrangements for the possible future situation in Kosovo where the European Union would be responsible under the Ahtisaari proposals for a very large deployment in the area of police, and NATO would be responsible for KFOR. It is clear there is a boundary line between those two responsibilities where you have to have rather precise agreements and you also need arrangements for intelligence sharing and so on. All of those things worked out extremely smoothly. In another way we operate what is now a rather small military mission in Bosnia through SHAPE with Deputy SACEUR as the Operational Commander. That works perfectly well. From where I sit, although there is a lot of talk about it, I see an extremely good relationship with NATO. The European Union does not do defence in the sense that European military activities are not there to do the classical defence task of defending national territory: that still belongs to NATO. In terms of other military operations, it is not that we are fighting over who does what, there is more than enough to go around. On the contrary, it is a strength for the West that there is more than one option available. For example, we are about to make a deployment to Chad, which has the useful function of providing a backstop for the UN deployment in Sudan, in the Darfur area. Chad would probably not accept a NATO deployment—I do not know why, but the image of NATO is different from that of the European Union—whereas they are quite happy to accept European Union deployment. That seems to me to be a good thing for the West, that one has got alternative bodies available which you can use.

  Q322  Chairman: On that particular point, we are obviously following this in our other work and we had a letter saying that you had a force generation conference here on 9 November as far as Chad and deployment was concerned. Has there been any public statement as to how successful that meeting was, and what are the probabilities of deployment under the Irish General?

  Mr Cooper: I do not think I am sufficiently up to date on that. I know there are still a couple of shortfalls which, as a matter of fact, are the same shortfalls one finds with almost every deployment and you can probably guess which ones they are.

  Q323  Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Helicopters.

  Mr Cooper: Helicopters, yes. (There followed a short discussion of the record)

  Q324  Lord Hamilton of Epsom: You will be aware that at the moment in the United Kingdom there are furious rows going on about the overstretch in British Forces. With the combination of Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously, this seems to be too much for what we have got. At the same time, on a rotating basis Britain contributes to the European Battle Group, which has the unique thing that it seems to never be designed to go into battle, but that is another question altogether. What would happen if it was deployed, because I do not think we could meet the commitment we have undertaken to do because there is a serious amount of double-hatting, if not triple-hatting going on?

  Mr Cooper: I do not think I have the expertise to answer that question, which you can put to the British Ministry of Defence. They would probably be better than me to answer that. The only comment I would like to make is Britain is not the only country that is overstretched at the moment.

  Lord Truscott: There does seem to be a debate about the way forward for European security. The French seem to be pressing for more institutional changes and the British Ministry of Defence are always saying the focus should be on developing the capability. I wonder what your view is on that. Secondly, another concern vis-a"-vis Europe and NATO is the whole question of avoiding duplication, and is there a danger that some of the functions could be duplicated?

  Q325  Chairman: We must be a little careful we do not go too far away from our relations with Russia.

  Mr Cooper: I do not think we know exactly everything that the French have in mind at the moment, but I know when President Sarkozy put forward these ideas, the sentence has always had two halves: one is about strengthening EU defence arrangements and the other is about a stronger French contribution to NATO. I think those two things would be in balance.

  Q326  Lord Hannay of Chiswick: In this area of NATO enlargement, possible; missile defence, on the table already; multilateral disarmament instruments under stress whether it is CFE or INF or all these other things, do you not feel there is a pretty strong risk, if not even a likelihood, that the Russians, who seem to be reverting to many old practices, will revert in this area to attempting to split the Europeans from the United States? If so, do you think the Europeans are in a mode to resist that attempt to divide them or are they likely to be a victim of it? How does the prospective election of a new American President affect all that?

  Mr Cooper: Yes, right! While you were speaking I was thinking, I am not sure if the US is not split on some of these questions itself. I think probably the best answer I can give is to say that this is not my daily bread. These are things which determine the environment within which the EU operates with Russia, but they are discussed essentially in the Alliance rather than here. They have a big effect on the atmosphere in all kinds of way, and probably they have an effect on other things where the European Union is very deeply engaged, like the Kosovo question. It is not really my business, so I do not think I can give you a respectable answer.

  Q327  Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Let us switch away completely from that to the PCA and the role it currently plays and the role a new PCA could play in the EU-Russia arrangements. To what extent do you think it is a high priority to negotiate a new PCA, or is it the case that the common spaces and the existing PCA, which, as I understand, will just go on providing an institutional framework for as far as the eye can see, are, in fact, a reasonably satisfactory way of managing the relationship now? To what extent do you think the tensions which have arisen in EU-Russia relations in recent months make it very dubious that a new PCA of a meaningful kind can in the short-term, or should in the short-term, be negotiated, or is it a very high priority indeed?

  Mr Cooper: I will give you my answer but maybe David would like to add something. I think we can probably live without negotiating a new PCA and that probably goes for the Russians as well. There is still more to be done which can be done under the existing PCA, which is by no means exhausted. This was an attempt to see if we could go further. Well, this may not be the right moment for it. In due course it would be desirable, but I do not think it is vital.

  Mr Johns: I would agree that it is not necessarily a tragedy if we do not negotiate a new PCA soon. The current PCA will be rolled over and will continue to apply. We have the road maps that were agreed, which have taken our co-operation even further, and they can continue to be implemented. The only disadvantage, of course, is road maps are not legally binding. The interest in a new PCA would be to have some legally binding framework where we could then further intensify our co-operation with Russia. On the other hand, I agree with you entirely that the current atmosphere is not conducive to starting negotiations at the moment. We still have a number of problems which need to be addressed, not least the question of Polish meat where there may be a possible opening in the future with the new Polish Government, but we have to bear in mind that Russia also is in a pre-election period and I do not see much happening on the PCA front in the next few months, certainly not up to the presidential elections. You never know, there might be some miraculous development, but I do not see it coming for at least the foreseeable future. We will continue to co-operate nonetheless on the basis of the Institutional Framework that is in place.

  Q328  Lord Hamilton of Epsom: If the existing PCA is legally binding, I cannot believe the Russians have gone along with all the things in it, so what are we doing to legally enforce the breaches of the existing one?

  Mr Johns: Interestingly enough, the Russians present themselves as being one of the few countries in the world that respect international rules. They turn around and accuse the EU, the US, et cetera, of not respecting international rules, they are the only ones sticking to the rules, they say. On the PCA, of course, we have various possibilities to discuss areas where, for example, the Russians do not live up to their commitments, but it is true, the possibilities for forcing them to act are very limited.

  Q329  Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Why do we make them legally binding if we cannot legally enforce them?

  Mr Cooper: It is a different level of commitment and one hopes that when people accept a legally binding commitment they take it more seriously. The Russians do take legal obligations seriously.

  Q330  Chairman: On that question of the negotiations, we have been impressed by the size of the Russian mission here to the European Union. As we were waiting to come in to meet you, we saw Ambassador Chizhov who was waiting for a number of ministers from Moscow who were coming to take part in discussions on the common space dealing with justice and home affairs matters today. There is a lot of business being done. How do you see the balance of the business which is done between the EU and the Russians in Brussels and the EU and the Russians in Moscow? Do you see any changes in that relationship?

  Mr Cooper: In terms of formal business, numbers of meetings held, Russia is probably number one, more than with the USA. With the USA there is a much more informal relationship and a rather more productive relationship as well. As between Brussels and Moscow, I see mostly Brussels, I do not know how much there is in Moscow.

  Mr Johns: My viewpoint is also entirely from the Brussels' viewpoint. The Council, of course, does not have any representation in Moscow, which is the strength of the Commission because it has a delegation there, and they have very strong contacts and daily contacts with the Russian administration.

  Q331  Chairman: On that point, and perhaps straying into the second inquiry which we are undertaking on the Reform Treaty, I wonder if I could ask you whether once there was the existence of a European External Action Service, would that mean that almost automatically in any other major country, such as Moscow, the presence of the European External Action Service would mean that the Council, as well the Commission, would be represented in somewhere like Moscow?

  Mr Cooper: (There followed a short discussion off the record)

  Q332  Lord Hamilton of Epsom: This question is about the political situation in Russia, which seems to be one of the weaker areas of the four common spaces. Are we making any progress on the rule of law, democracy, human rights and good governance?

  Mr Cooper: No, I think is probably the short answer to that.

  Q333  Lord Hamilton of Epsom: That is what I had imagined.

  Mr Cooper: I was going to say most people would say the situation has got worse, on the other hand, I think a large number of Russians would probably say the situation has got better. At least in a free and fair election it is pretty clear that Mr Putin could be elected for whatever he wanted to be elected for. It is also clear that Russians have very bad memories of the 1990s, which they saw not as being democratic but as being chaotic. Nevertheless, the kind of unhealthy way in which it is difficult to tell whether you are talking to the Russian business community or the Russian political system and the extent to which it seems possible to exploit the law to attack political enemies, none of those things make Russia look very much like a liberal democracy at the moment.

  Q334  Lord Hamilton of Epsom: And poisoning people in London!

  Mr Cooper: There is that also, yes, and not just in London as well.

  Q335  Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Quite a lot of the people who we have taken evidence from have suggested that the European Union's approach to this democracy, human rights and other agenda has proved a rather misdirected and mistaken one in the past, as well as being ineffective, in the sense that it was directed at the concept of Russia becoming more like us, the concept that the Russians would become just another European country. With that in mind, much of the spirit of the Copenhagen criteria hovered over it and this, it has been suggested to us, is a mistake, an overambitious approach which has not worked and is now rejected effectively by the Russians, whether you fly under a rather peculiar label called "sovereign democracy" or whatever it is, it is not what they are doing. Do you feel some redirection of this human rights, democracy, good governance, rule of law agenda is desirable? If so, should it be explicit or should it just come about by a process of osmosis, by a shifting of emphasis? If so, how much of it do we retain in a future relationship if we do decide to shift away from simply trying to make the Russians more like us?

  Mr Cooper: It is very difficult to get any other county to do what you want, to become more like us, which I think was the answer I gave to the first question, it is a natural thing for everybody to want because it is easy to deal with people who are like you. Expecting that that is what is going to happen though is a different thing. What is the most effective way of promoting those ideas, democracy, the rule of law? I do not think there is a straightforward answer to that, it depends on particular countries. To some extent, I think intellectually the idea of democracy and the rule of law has won. In some ways they promote themselves because it is what lots of people want and lots of people expect. There are some times when from outside you can contribute to that process, but the primary drive for that has to come from within countries. The EU tries to help that process by supporting NGOs in Russia. How effective that is, I do not know. I guess you may have to talk to the Commission about that because they are the people who are running the programmes and who know what is going on.

  Q336  Chairman: We are going to see Mr Franco when we are in Moscow and I think it will be discussed there rather than with the Commission here.

  Mr Cooper: He would be the person who would know best. Perhaps I will add one other personal hobby horse, which is that if Ukraine continued in the direction that it seems to be going in, it is certainly a more liberal country now than it was and if it could establish a well functioning democratic government and a rule of law, I think that would have a very big impact on Russia; but directly changing Russia from Brussels is not a feasible project.

  Q337  Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Do you think we should state that is no longer what we are trying to do or do you think it should just be allowed to happen?

  Mr Cooper: I do not think we would be allowed to state that because throughout the European Union, although there are variable opinions, it is not what governments want. We have to try and do it in a way which is practical and does not seem aggressive to the Russians.

  Q338  Lord Hamilton of Epsom: When the British Government reacted robustly to having a Russian citizen poisoned in London, I do not think there was ever any hope that we were going to get anybody extradited for doing it. On the other hand, it had to be helpful in terms of making the Russians think twice before they would do the same thing again.

  Mr Cooper: Yes. I think everybody who deals with Russia would say that one ought to be absolutely clear and firm about principles, preferably in a way which is not aggressive and provocative, but you need to continue to make the points. (There followed a short discussion off the record)

  Q339  Lord Truscott: I hope in coming years we will not be asking, "Who lost Russia?" because it seems to me there was an opportunity in the early 1990s to send Russia on the path of Western style democracy, but clearly that window has closed now with Putin, although there is still the opportunity to develop the market economy. I think that is an historical opportunity which was probably lost in Russia's case.

  Mr Cooper: I think this is a world of second chances and I do not think anything is closed. Russia is very different now from the way it was in the 1980s, for example. In the 1990s, undoubtedly there were a gigantic number of mistakes which were made. There are a large number of countries which have moved from authoritarian systems to democracy. Maybe naively, I do not believe it is going to remain exactly where it is now.


 
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