Memorandum by Dr Sabine Fischer, European
Institute for Security Studies
Question 6: Russian perceptions of the EU
Russian perceptions of the EU have undergone
several changes since the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Foreign
policy during the early Yeltsin years was mainly focused on the
US and NATO. At that time, the Russian leadership saw Washington
as its main political partner on the international stage. Later
on, it was NATO's eastward enlargement which provoked the fiercest
political reactions from Moscow, reaching a crisis point and the
near break-up of relations over NATO's intervention in Kosovo
in 1999. So essentially it was the US and NATO which kept political
minds in Russia occupied, the debate being narrowly focused on
classical security and military issues. At the same time, the
first steps towards EU enlargement went almost unnoticed by the
Russian political elite. Although the EU had become Russia's most
important economic partner and deliverer of technical assistance
as early as 1995, it did not play a crucial role in Russian debates
about foreign policy, European security or international relations
in general.
Russian thinking on international relations
and all related matters was, and still is, dominated by classical
realist and neo-realist ideas. Throughout the 1990s, the EU from
a Russian point of view was seen essentially as an economic integration
project rather than a political actor in its own right. In terms
of this world view, issues like "normative" or "civilian
power", often associated with the EU's role in international
relations in the Western debate, do not play an important enough
role for the EU to be considered as a "heavyweight"
player. This perspective certainly obstructed Russian views on
political developments within the EU, and the EU's slowly growing
weight in international relations.
At the same time, it was the slow and often
uneasy development of EU foreign policy which made it rather difficult
for Russian political actors to fit the EU into their picture
of the international system. Therefore, while economic relations
with the EU (and its member states) figures very high on the Russian
agenda, foreign and security policy remained clearly focused on
bilateral relations with individual EU member states, the US and
NATO.
This changed significantly after 1999-2000.
The war in Kosovo led to the deepest crisis between Russia and
the West since the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Already in 1999,
it was the EU who took over the role as a mediator between Russia
and NATO, and it was during the EU summit in Cologne in June 1999
that Russia was brought back to the negotiating table.
The creation of CFSP and ESDP as stronger and
more visible instruments of the EU's second pillar changed Russian
perceptions of the EU as a foreign policy actor and also created
hopes for more intensive cooperation in the field of security,
with the idea that the EU could, ultimately, become an alternative
or counterweight to NATO. This motive was particularly important
after the war in Kosovo and the resulting "chill" in
Russia-NATO relations.
Another motive that was at least as important
for the newly elected Russian leadership was strengthening economic
partnership with the EU. By the end of the 1990s, significant
parts of the Russian political elite had slightly shifted their
view on international relations and Russia's role as a great power.
Economic influence and integration in a globalised economic environment
were now seen as preconditions for Russia recovering its status
as a great power. The economic and financial breakdown in 1998-99
had also left its mark on policymakers' understanding of the priorities
that Russia should set in order to regain a strong position on
the international stage. The strengthening of the state and the
Russian economy, therefore, and the quest for closer cooperation
with the EU as Russia's most important modernisation partner,
became a central issue in Russia's foreign policy during the early
Putin years.
Together with the EU's emerging profile as a
foreign policy actor and its growing political and economic weight
in Eastern Europe, this renewed interest in economic cooperation
triggered a shift in the way Russian elites perceived and talked
about the EU. For the first time since the breakdown of the Soviet
Union, the EU was seen as a political actor in its own right.
Russian elites seemed to be getting used to the idea that supranational
institutions in Brussels could play a role independent from member
states' capitals.
However, there was almost no time for this shift
in thinking to translate into practical policy. EU-Russia relations
deteriorated quickly after the "Colour Revolutions"
in Georgia, and particularly Ukraine. Russia had already watched
the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with
suspicion and insisted on being acknowledged as having a special
position in the EU's neighbourhood (leading to the Roadmaps for
the Four Common Spaces signed in May 2005). Domestic events in
Georgia and Ukraine, however, led to a radical change in Russia's
attitude. From a Russian perspective, the EU now became one of
the main suspects in what it saw as a plot to try and topple Russia-friendly
regimes in the region and roll back Moscow's influence in its
own backyard. Quite a few Russian observers, traumatised by the
"Orange Revolution", even went so far as to see the
ultimate goal of this "conspiracy" as the collapse of
the Russian government, so that "the West" could gain
control over the country and its energy resources. Hence, to a
certain extent the EU now became a part of the potentially adversarial
"political" West, a category from which it had been
excluded throughout the 1990s.
However, this new attitude whereby Russia took
the EU seriously as an important actor and possible rival in the
former Soviet Union did not last very long. After 2005, the crisis
that occurred in the wake of the rejection of the constitutional
treaty in the French and Dutch referenda, and resulting paralysis
of internal decision-making, led to the EU's importance shrinking
in Russian eyes. This shift is also a function of the fact that
Moscow, according to its new image of itself as a global player,
now claims to act with total independence. The harmonisation of
norms and values, which is at the core of the EU's foreign policy
approach, is alien to this concept. A third reason for the downgrading
of the EU in Russian foreign policy thinking is Moscow's altered
perspective on global politics. The perceived decline of the US's
capacity to shape international developments seems to have broadened
Russia's room for manoeuvre. These two developments are mutually
reinforcing and weaken, from a Russian perspective, the EU's weight
as a supranational actor. By 2007, Russia has therefore returned—and
explicitly so—to a bilateral approach in its relations with
the EU.
Russia's perceptions of the EU, and their implications
for Moscow's policy, have always been a mixed product of changing
Russian discourses, internal developments within the EU and the
emergence of an EU foreign policy, as well as the global, above
all transatlantic, context of EU-Russia relations. Taking into
consideration the upcoming elections in Russia, there is no change
to be expected before March 2008. As will be discussed below,
the EU has lost much of its leverage on domestic developments
in Russia. Given Russia's growing economic strength and the elite's
increasing rejection of any involvement from outside, it will
become increasingly difficult for the EU to influence Russian
attitudes. The only way out for the EU is to find common positions
on the most relevant issues in relations with Russia (namely energy
relations, regional relations in the Eastern neighbourhood/former
Soviet Union etc) and to pursue them more decisively than has
been done in the past.
Questions 4-12: EU deomocracy promotion, technical
assistance and democratisation in Russia
The EU has acted as an external promoter of
democracy in Eastern Europe after the breakdown of the socialist
systems. However, in the case of Russia, the results of this policy
remain very limited, and the EU's scope for action in the sphere
of democracy promotion has narrowed down considerably in recent
years.
President Putin's term in office has been characterised
by simultaneous processes of domestic political and economic reform
and the increasing de-democratisation of the political system.
Between 2000 and 2004, several big reform projects were launched
by the Russian government, focusing on pressing issues like administrative
reform, reform of the civil and social services, and budgetary
reform. Since 2005, however, reform processes have stalled, the
liberalisation of the social systems reversed, and a strong role
of the state in the economy re-established.
The domestic political situation in Russia changed
during the same period. What began as a campaign—supported
by the US and the EU—aiming to restore the Russian state
after its devastating decline throughout the 1990s, ended in a
highly ambivalent process of de-democratisation, re-centralisation
of the political system, establishment of state control over the
party system, media and civil society. At the same time, thanks
to revenues from energy exports, an unprecedented stabilisation
of the state budget and rapid economic growth, Russia managed
to shake off its dependence on external donors.
The EU has been providing technical assistance
to Russia since 1992, aiming at promoting democracy and good governance.
After 2002, this assistance was explicitly linked to the reform
projects of the Russian government. However, any claims as to
the overall efficiency of this assistance and its impact on democratisation
would have to be very modest. On the micro-level, EU efforts at
democracy promotion have run up against difficult conditions of
implementation, corruption, and (for most of the time) the lack
of a strong state actor pursuing a coherent reform strategy. During
the last few years, however, it has been first of all the de-democratisation
of the macro-political context, which as prevented the EU and
other external actors from having a democratising impact on Russian
domestic development. This has been accompanied by the already-mentioned
reluctance of Russian elites to accept any foreign involvement
in domestic politics or lecturing on democracy and human rights.
Last but not least, economic growth and increasing financial independence
put the Russian government in a position to fund reform measures
from its own resources, whereas TACIS funds for Russia have steadily
shrunk in recent years.
The success of external democracy promotion
crucially depends on whether political elites and the population
in the respective state support the democratisation project. It
no less crucially depends on whether a state is strong enough
to pursue a policy of democratisation with the support of external
actors. During the 1990s the Russian state was too weak to develop
a thorough reform agenda oriented towards democracy and the market
economy. Hence, external actors did not have a strong partner
in their effort to promote democracy in Russia. Furthermore, EU
means provided to Russia and the other former Soviet Republics
through TACIS have been very limited in comparison to the assistance
to the Central and Eastern European (CEE) candidate countries,
so that political elites and potential bureaucratic and economic
veto players saw little incentive to engage in the project of
democratisation. Recently, it is, in contrast, the apparent strength
of the Russian state which prevents external democracy promotion
in the name of sovereignty.
Although technical assistance in the framework
of TACIS has had a positive impact on single reform areas, the
EU's and other external actors' attempts to promote democracy
in Russia have largely failed. With a semi-authoritarian regime
firmly controlling the political and societal system, Russia's
growing economic strength and its claim to be treated as an equal
partner (which implies the strict acceptance of its sovereignty)
the prospects of efficient democracy promotion are doomed for
the year to come. Therefore the EU should concentrate on keeping
Russia involved in various political dialogues and societal exchange,
and on economic cooperation. The dialogues and sectoral cooperation
in the framework of the Four Common Spaces provide a—as
measured by the current situation—good opportunity to prevent
Russian isolation and to a limited extent also to further promote
international norms and standards.
Questions 8-9 EU policy coherence and integration
rivalry in the Common Neighbourhood/former Soviet Union[22]
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs)
which the EU concluded with Russia and the other former Soviet
Republics throughout the 1990s are mixed trade and economic cooperation
agreements, with both the Commission and the member states involved.
The aim of these agreements is the deepening of economic cooperation
and legal harmonisation between the EU and its partner countries.
The agreements codified the support of transformation of the post-Soviet
states and societies towards democracy as a main principle. Therefore,
in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
all relevant actors within the EU committed themselves to the
same approach in relations with Russia, largely based on the EU's
identity as a value-oriented actor and civilian power.
However, in the actual implementation process
the EU looks much less unified. The Commission is in charge of
the coordination of cooperation between the EU and Russia, and
of the implementation and administration of TACIS funding and
projects. Therefore, it stands out as the main promoter of the
goals fixed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. At the
same time, its room for manoeuvre always depends on whether there
is coherence between the EU and member states, and among member
states themselves. In the case of Russia, such coherence is lacking
because member states have strong and contradictory interests
regarding bilateral as well as multilateral relations with Russia.
Before 2004, EU member states could be divided
into two groups with regard to relations with Russia. One group,
containing bigger member states like France, Germany and Italy,
emphasisted Russia's economic importance and advocated a pragmatic
relationship safeguarding EU economic interests, first of all
in the energy sector. Anti-democratic tendencies and human rights
violations were not seen by these states as reasons to take a
more distanced attitude toward Russia. Rather, they argued that
Russia should be involved more intensively in European integration
processes because this was the only way to promote European values
in the Russian political system and society. The other group,
most explicitly represented by Great Britain, denounced de-democratisation
in Russia and advocated a tougher approach in the EU's relations
with Moscow. However, before 2004, no EU member perceived an immediate
security threat emanating from Russia. As a consequence, the debate
about Russia within the EU almost completely lacked classical
geopolitical and security considerations. This "de-securitised"
discourse came to an end with the accession of the Baltic States,
Poland and the Czech Republic. Central European states and societies
share a traumatic and violent history with Russia, which leads
them to have an extremely critical attitude towards Moscow and
to advocate a policy of "containment" of Russian influence
in Europe.
The inclusion of the Central European perspective
shapes the overall European political process on two levels. The
new EU members pushed for a more active EU policy toward the states
adjacent to EU and Russian borders. Furthermore, they took a much
tougher stance in direct relations with Russia, on a bilateral
as well as on the EU level. The new members saw the "Orange
Revolution" in Ukraine as a window of opportunity to accelerate
the democratisation of a key country in the so-called "common
neighbourhood" and its closer alignment with the EU. From
their perspective, such a development promised not only a desirable
spread of democratic values beyond EU borders, but also a significant
improvement of their national security. Consequently, the Baltic
States and Poland pushed vehemently for strong EU involvement
to support the democratic forces in Ukraine during the conflict
over the presidential elections, and they succeeded. Later on.
Warsaw's veto in response to a Russian ban on the import of Polish
meat and the Estonian monument dispute in early 2007 led to a
blockade of the negotiations on the follow-up of the Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement, which is due to expire by the end of
November 2007. The new member states, thus, are well capable of
influencing the EU's policies towards russia, and have done so
successfully several times since 2004.
Enlargement has added a new dimension to the
EU's Russia policy, which is characterised by strong historical
and security components. This has become especially visible in
the EU's and Russia's growing competition over the common neighbourhood/former
Soviet Union.
The EU and Russia approach their common neighbourhood
with very different concepts of regional governance. The EU has
a post-modern and at the same time hybrid identity. Common values
form the basis of internal integration as well as foreign policy.
In its relations with non-members, the EU aims to communicate
its basic values outwards and to support partner countries in
adapting them. Through the "Europeanisation" of its
neighbours (the underlying principle of the PCAs as well as ENP),
it aims to create a stable democratic and peaceful regional and
international environment. EU foreign policy, therefore, transcends
state borders and influences domestic political, economic and
societal development.
Russian policy, by contrast, is guided by the
classical idea of competing zones of influence. Russia claims
for itself a dominant position in the CIS. External actors' presence
is interpreted in terms of a zero-sum game undermining Russia's
position and primacy in the region. Although the focus of Russia's
policy towards its neighbours has shifted to profitable economic
relations and has been shaped by an attempt to develop soft power
skills, Moscow has time and again used economic and energy interdependence
as well as its involvement in the protracted conflicts in the
region in order to keep "deviant" states under its umbrella.
Seen from the point of view of the realist Russian mindset, the
EU's claim for the Europeanisation of adjacent states lacks legitimacy.
What Brussels sees as support of internal and external stabilisation
is interpreted in Moscow as an attempt to expand the EU's influence
over the region—at Russia's expense.
If they want to overcome the current misunderstandings
in bilateral as well as regional relations, both sides have to
critically reconsider their approaches and engage in an open and
sincere dialogue. The EU should be aware of the fact that its
policy can have unintended geopolitical elements, which might
be perceived as a threat by Russia. Russia, for its part, must
abandon its outdate zero-sum thinking, because it precludes any
form of regional cooperation. This would pave the way for a more
constructive policy towards the most pressing problems of the
region, above all the protracted conflicts and energy relations.
Ultimately, it would help to defuse the most serious tensions
in bilateral relations between the EU and Russia.
12 October 2007
22 Both terms are politically loaded. The EU prefers
to speak of a common neighbourhood, glossing over Russian-EU disputes
over the territory and its overall fragmentation and polarisation.
The Russian use of the term "former Soviet Union", on
the other hand, implies Moscow's claim for a predominant position
in the region. Back
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