Memorandum by Dr Iris Kempe, Centre for
Applied Policy Research
THE 2004 PARADIGM CHANGES AND BEYOND. ADJUSTING
EU-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
I. IN 2004: A
THREE-FOLD
PARADIGM CHANGE
From the early 1990s, European-Russian relations
were driven by two key concepts: building a market-based democracy
within Russia and using EU enlargement as a mechanism to promote
democratic changes throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The
year 2004 can be seen as the turning point in this approach, one
that has required reshaping relations between the European Union
and Russia, a task that remains incomplete. President Putin's
second term in office, which started in March 2004, led to changes
in Russia that altered the chaotic but open-minded Yeltsin period
into an era characterized by attempts to create a strong state
based on (1) recentralisation of the political system, (2) the
"dictatorship of law" and (3) a Souverenaya Democratiya.
Since 2004, Russia has staked its claim to a new role in the international
system as an energy-based power to be taken seriously in international
organisations, in conflict resolution and in fighting against
terrorism. Even if Russia and the European Union do not share
the same values, both partners need each other and widespread
linkages have superseded Cold War thinking.
By 2004 the European Union was a success story
of simultaneous broadening and deepening. The EU grew to 27 member-states,
eight of them from the former Soviet bloc and sensitive about
building new relations with the Kremlin. Since then, however,
European integration has suffers from both the failure to adopt
the constitutional treaty and a more general enlargement fatigue.
Since then, decision making in the EU of 27 depends greatly on
national influence and strategic alliance building among members.
The rainbow revolutions in Georgia (2003) and
Ukraine (2004) initiated and a new wave of transition, both in
the national arena aiming for democracy and a market economy,
and closely interlinked to the countries' international orientation.
Georgia and Ukraine, but potentially also other states formerly
or still belonging to the Kremlin's sphere of influence, are struggling
for transition, Western orientation and a balanced position with
Moscow. The deterioration of relations affects more than just
Russia itself. Moscow sees countries such as Ukraine, Georgia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan as its "near abroad". while Brussels
regards them as the "new neighbourhood". Disputes with
the Kremlin are also carried out by proxy in these states since
the rainbow revolutions highlighted their striving for transition,
Western orientation, and a balanced position toward Moscow. As
former United States National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski
asserted, democratic and Western-oriented states bordering Russia
would be the most reliable guarantee to prevent any kind of post-Soviet
power play. As far as Russia is concerned, the paradigm change
of the rainbow revolution indicates alternatives for post-Soviet
transition while at the same time limiting Russia's international
influence.
II. TOWARDS A
NEW FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENT
The formula of partnership and cooperation between
Russia and the EU has to be perceived as both the guideline and
the institutional framework for the EU-Russian relations. These
were expressed into the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
which was signed in 1994 but came in force only in 1997. This
framework agreement is at a low ebb and not an instrument applying
to the 2004 paradigm changes. Both the Finnish EU presidency during
the second term 2006, and the following German presidency announced
their aim to renegotiate at least some of the outdated Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia. The
PCA expires at the end of 2007. Though it is automatically extended
every year as long as none of the partners withdraws from the
treaty, in assessing the value of the agreement one has to consider
the impact of the 2004 paradigm changes.
The search for a new framework remains a rocky
road, as the Polish veto in Helsinki EU summit in 29 October 2006
shows, and is bound to lead to a heated debate during the ratification
process, circling the issue of "common values" and energy.
The experience of domestic development in Russia, as well as the
continued strong-handed foreign policy in the neighbouring region
has drastically changed perceptions of Russia. It is also likely
to provide a stage for the Baltic states and Central and East
European countries to criticise Russian shortcomings in implementing
democratic values and its tendency to pursue hegemonic external
relations.
Russian policymakers point out that in its current
form the PCA regards Russia as a transition state en route to
a free market economy. Its main principle is the gradual adoption
of the EU regulatory framework. Therefore the Kremlin is in favour
of a a new framework considering Russia and the EU as equal partners,
with Russia having been accepted as a market economy facing WTO
accession. It should also address more directly the Russian interest
in a visa-free regime or, at a minimum, lowered standards for
visa for Russian citizens travelling to the EU, as well as closer
economic and technological cooperation. The principle of equality
would also mean that any conditionality concerning domestic developments
in Russia be removed from the joint framework with the sensitive
exclusion of opting for the rights of the Russian minorities in
the Baltic states in particularly.
The lack of a common European Russian Policy
Individual governments have been using EU institutions
to pursue narrow national interests, rather than acting within
the Union's framework. To illustrate the current situation one
has to differentiate among three groups of actors: first, the
group of Russia sceptics, who are guided by legacies of the past
and are blocking cooperation with Russia. The Polish veto of the
mandate for a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the problem
of the Druzhba pipeline in Lithuania and the conflict surrounding
Tallinn's war memorial are all examples. Second are countries
that do not care much about Moscow, such as Portugal and Greece.
Third are the proponents of fruitful relations with Russia, such
as Finland and Germany.
Some countries use tension with Russia in connection
with paying historic debts. Others find it useful to distract
from other issues (the British position in Iraq for example),
while for others it plays a role in domestic politics (competition
within Germany's grand coalition, for example). Beyond this instrumentalisation,
national solo acts are first and foremost caused by conflicting
values. At the same time, economic initiatives driven by the interests
of single EU member states are bypassing deadlocked EU-Russian
relations while also taking advantage of other member-states'
reservations. For example, the North Stream gas pipeline, directly
connecting Vyborg, Russia, with Greifswald, Germany, literally
bypasses Polish, Lithuanian, Swedish and other countries' economic,
security and ecological interests. British-Russian conflict about
the ex-spy Alexander Litvinenko who was poisoned by polonium combines
economic interests on the one hand with strong value dissonances
on the other. While the first motive prevents London from overreacting,
the British government convinced the Portuguese EU Presidency
to issue a statement on 18 July calling on Russia to extradite
Andrei Lugovoi. Both cases show how European solidarity of values
can be subordinated to economic interests.
European discussion by building alliances
Since the 2004 three-fold paradigm change, prioritising
a European consensus over national interests in EU-Russian relations
has been increasingly difficult. Running Russian relations bilaterally,
however, includes the danger of undermining the interests of other
EU members, circumventing EU processes and challenging the EU's
external capacity in general. Bi-lateral cooperation does have
some positive impact in EU-Russia relations.
Alliance building depends on two main factors:
geographic and historic proximity. As a reaction to the American
military intervention in Iraq, Paris and Berlin used their historic
concept of alliance building with Moscow to add weight to their
position. This was also the very moment when the concept of "old"
and "new" Europe was born, complicating EU policy toward
Russia from the other direction. In their strained relations with
Russia, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius coordinate their positions to
provide both carrots and sticks. Even when the Baltic states and
the Visegard countries share very close positions on Russia, the
impact of cooperation is still far from its full potential. Furthermore,
the EU's Russian policy has been restricted by missing alliances
between the leading proponents and the sceptics. The results of
the May 2007 EU-Russia summit in Samara were an example of how
taking each other more seriously would broaden European opportunities.
Only once Merkel took Polish concerns more seriously was a moderate
outcome possible. Had she not, a complete disaster in European-
Russian relations might have resulted. In addition, the lack of
cooperation among the different groups offers the Russians opportunities
to play members off against each other and to undermine common
EU positions.
III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Short term
1. The 2004 paradigm change in EU Russian
relations requires readjusting EU Russian policy adequately, a
task that has not yet been fully addressed. In a short term Europe
has to awake from its illusions about a Westernised Russia. A
rentier state that uses energy as a foreign policy weapon
is not susceptible to outside influence. So it is time for more
pragmatic relations that keep in mind that Europe and Russia need
each other for energy and security. At the same time, it would
be short-sighted to neglect the risks related to the growing values
gap between Russia and the West. In practical terms EU governments
and institutions would be well advised to move from lecturing
Russia on democracy, freedom of the media and the rule of law
in general to pointed criticism targeted to specific issues.
2. Negotiating a new Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement became a litmus test of the state of affairs, but also
showed the deadlocks and shortcomings of the mutual relations.
Beyond the current blockade situation, one might have some doubts
about the far-reaching character of the agreement. The content
and actors of EU-Russian relations are dominated by single, even
contradictory interests, which can not be simply adjusted in the
framework agreement. Therefore thinking in short-term perspectives
should be more targeted toward individual agendas such as energy
dialogue, the overlapping neighbourhood, European values, etc.
Only in the medium-term perspective is building linkages between
the different agendas worth considering.
3. The national solo acts have caused more
harm than good, therefore it is high time to stop using Russia
policy for purposes other than shaping EU-Russian relations. From
an institutional perspective, alliance building among member states
should used to its full potential. These groupings should combine
EU members with differing historic experiences, geographic proximity
and economic interests in Russia. Beyond the European perspective,
a dialogue on building an asymmetric partnership with Russia should
be put on the transatlantic agenda.
4. Putin has been using conflicts with EU
member-states to demonstrate Russia's importance as a global player
as well as to pay historic bills, demonstrating his position that
the breakdown of the Soviet Union is the biggest tragedy of the
20th century. To reduce the vulnerability of the Central European
and the Baltic states would handle this challenge well by overcoming
the legacies of the past which might otherwise burden the EU-Russian
relation as a whole. Furthermore the new EU Foreign Policy Representative
should create a special representative in charge of an early warning
mechanism about upcoming bilateral problems that could also have
an impact on the entire EU.
Medium and long term
1. Policy-makers should always bear in mind
that the last 10 to 15 years in Russia have brought enormous and
rapid changes. Continuation of the present situation is probably
the last thing that one should expect. The Putin system is at
pains to look permanent, but so were its predecessors. Further
dynamic development is more likely, and European leaders should
be prepared to take the opportunities that present themselves.
In this regard upcoming elections—not perhaps the 2007-08
elections but more likely the following ones—should be followed
with the considerable attention.
2. Following the assertion that democratic
and Western-oriented states bordering Russia would restrict any
kind of post-Soviet power play, the West should pay pretty close
attention to the outcomes of the rainbow revolutions in countries
such as Ukraine and Georgia. Even if Belarus is still dominated
by the authoritarian regime of president Lukashenka a high level
of human capital, the geographic proximity to Europe and a calculable
size of the country would are clearly indicating the country's
need for European affiliation, presuming the necessary regime
change. The EU and its member state should be offering all forms
of support for further domestic transition and integrate these
countries into Euro-Atlantic structures.
3. Adjusting EU-Russia relations can not
be isolated from a Gesamtkonzept of a new European Eastern policy
targeted at two main aspects: mapping the future architecture
of Europe as a whole and developing further European integration,
starting with successfully implementing the European reform treaty.
This is a point at which bilateral relations with Russia are,
for instance, similar to bilateral relations with the new neighbours,
and at which the mechanisms of European policy begin to supersede
the mechanisms of individual national policy. Over the long-term,
national interests will be pursued within the European Union,
but beyond its borders, a common European interest will be pursued.
5 November 2007
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