Select Committee on Intergovernmental Organisations Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200 - 201)

MONDAY 25 FEBRUARY 2008

Professor Peter Borriello, Professor Mike Catchpole, Professor Francis Drobniewski and Professor Peter Chiodini

  Q200  Lord Howarth of Newport: There is nothing that we should be doing that we are not doing?

  Professor Borriello: I do not think so. One of the key areas of major interest and activity, of course, has been whether we can develop a vaccine very quickly. So yes, we might catch the first phase but can we have a vaccine soon after that? The answer is, technically, probably yes; but, again, scale-up and distribution is where the issue is. That is why governments around the world, including the UK, are saying "Should we stockpile one that might work just in case, which will give us a breathing space to hit that first phase or not?" It is a dilemma to which there is not actually a clear-cut, evidence-based answer, to be honest. It is the best view based on the evidence available.

  Q201  Baroness Falkner of Margravine: There has been quite a lot of reporting around Tamiflu, which we know of, but is there scientific research going on across the world, not just in the UK, to develop a range, to anticipate the virology and to develop a range? In other words, should Tamiflu fail, are there back-ups that we know of already?

  Professor Borriello: Yes, if I understand correctly, there are three classes of antivirals for flu which hit different targets, so that if you get a mutation in one gene to a particular target, it is less likely, or it is very unlikely, to confer resistance to some of the other anti virals which hit it at a different place. In crude terms, one goes for the head, one goes for the heart and one goes for the legs, so if you develop the hard head, you still can hit it in the heart. The problem with flu is that—and I will not go into the detail—because of the nature of the organism, it does not have a method to quickly and readily correct mistakes, so the downside is that, if mistakes in its genetic armoury are bad for the organism, it kills itself, but if they confer just by chance a survival capability or a resistance, that can also happen very quickly. So, because it does not correct its errors, it is always making them, and frequently it can be to its advantage. That is what makes it such a hard target.

  Chairman: That is a very cheerful note to end on. Thank you very much for that. I am very grateful. My apologies for the interruptions, which are an occupational hazard here. Again, it enables me to say that, if there are issues which we have not covered that you think we should have covered, or indeed one or two where I asked you to come back on anyway, please do so. Thank you very much again for your time.






 
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