Select Committee on Intergovernmental Organisations Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 505 - 519)

MONDAY 21 APRIL 2008

Dr David Heymann, Dr Paul Gully, Mr Pat Drury and Dr Max Hardiman

  Q505  Chairman: Welcome to the Intergovernmental Organisations Select Committee. We are very pleased to have you here and very grateful for the written evidence you have already given. The Clerk has already suggested to you that we are going to split this into two one-hour sessions. The bad news is that there is not a break in-between! We will go from organisational structure mode into the local outbreak alert issues. Perhaps I could start, as someone said to me last night, by wishing the World Health Organisation a happy birthday as of a week or two ago. It is a good time to review one's life's progress so far. I did the same at 60 and I am still here, so there must be something going for it! The purpose today is to look at the way in which, from the British perspective, the British Government uses its funds in intergovernmental organisations, in this case the World Health Organisation, in order to combat these diseases. As I indicated, for the first hour I am particularly interested in looking at the strategy, structure and organisation of the WHO, and in the second hour some of the application, if you like, although there will not be an absolute division. I would very much like to invite any of the witnesses to chip in when you feel you have something useful to say. At the end of this session in a few days' time, it might be longer than that, you will get a transcript of the evidence and will have an opportunity to look at that and correct it before it is published in its final form. Again, if you feel there is anything we have not covered that we should have covered, or anything that needs clarifying, then do not hesitate to write to the clerk. The whole purpose of this is to understand rather better than we do at the moment how the system is functioning, where the problems and the possibilities are, and to move forward. Perhaps I should start by asking each of you to very briefly introduce your roles within the organisation. I think that would help us, if you do not mind.

  Dr Heymann: My name is David Heymann. I am the Assistant Director-General for Health Security in the Environment and the representative of the Director-General for Polio Eradication.

  Dr Gully: My name is Paul Gully. I am a Senior Adviser to Dr Heymann in his office. I am actually seconded from the Public Health Agency of Canada and have been in WHO for the last two years.

  Mr Drury: My name is Pat Drury. I work in the Department of Epidemic and Pandemic Alert Response, which is under David's chapeau. The Department is responsible for managing epidemic risks across the spectrum of all diseases, except for the big three. I work in a team called Alert and Response Operations, in which I manage the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network.

  Dr Hardiman: My name is Max Hardiman. I work in the programme on the International Health Regulations, which is under David Heymann. My role is Coordinator of the International Health Regulations Secretariat, which is one of the teams within that programme.

  Q506  Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. Perhaps I could start the questions with this overall strategy one and on the organisation of the WHO. I think everyone accepts that the diseases we face now are particularly serious, particularly difficult and on a global scale because of other changes that have happened in the world generally. I particularly want to know how you see your strategy. One of the areas of interest to us is this problem of our health structure within nations and within areas of the world, and it is often lacking particularly in areas of Africa, say, and the issue of vertical treatment of diseases. We are conscious that you have many organisations putting a lot of money into these diseases but often there are not the health structures within the country. My first question is very much on your strategy. What strategy do you have in view of the conflicting interests of these various groups, and there are a lot of them in our understanding?

  Dr Heymann: Thank you. If I might start off by just thanking the United Kingdom for the strong support that it has given to WHO. We are all very grateful for that support in many different areas. To address what many people like to talk about as the vertical and the horizontal programmes, the strengthening of health systems versus the vertical programmes which concentrate on a specific disease, the easiest answer to give is that if a vertical programme is functioning properly, it will be horizontal in its nature and will permit other programmes to follow on. I will give you a good example: tuberculosis. Tuberculosis requires community action to provide supervised treatment to patients. If that can be accomplished for tuberculosis, that same system can be used for HIV treatment and a whole series of other interventions. Vertical programmes, if they are implemented properly, will end up in a strengthening of the health system to get the goods to the people. Vertical programmes can also strengthen disease surveillance or detection systems. The example of that is the Polio Eradication Initiative, which has a surveillance system which comprises over 3,000 health officers throughout the world who have real-time communications and at the same time have transport and fuel. They are constantly identifying foci of polio and reporting. This network is a vertical network supported by the Polio Eradication Initiative, but we have now begun to broaden it to include Yellow Fever in Africa, the haemorrhagic fevers in Africa, and to include measles, other immunisable diseases worldwide and a whole series of other interventions to make this vertical programme more horizontal. Both in surveillance and response, vertical programmes can lead to a horizontal strengthening of the infrastructure. In order that these systems can work properly there must be the correct health system environment in a country that develops the funding and other policies which will permit sustainability of that health system, and a whole series of other policies to make sure that what is occurring occurs in an integrated matter. No matter how vertical a programme is, either from the centre, the government, or from a region, when it gets to the peripheral areas it must be horizontal by necessity because there are only one or two people who can implement those programmes there. I will call on my colleagues if there are any other comments.

  Mr Drury: In terms of explaining a bit of the operational glue that we are putting in place as well, the Alert Response Operations Team in Geneva runs a series of activities which are about using all sources of information to identify what we call "events", that is a spike, and some news story or some incident of interest to us, and then puts that through a process of risk assessment, and out of that risk assessment we make recommendations for the country to take action and for WHO and its partners to take action. That is a system and a process which has been in place for ten or 15 years since David took over what was then the new Department of Emerging Diseases in WHO. It is now governed legally by the International Health Regulations and it is a major challenge for us to take it forward to the next step. We hook in on a daily basis to the Global Polio Network. So, if there is an incident in Angola, where we know there are polio people on the ground, we will be in touch with them for information about what is happening so that we can inform the risk assessment.

  Q507  Chairman: The answers you have given suggest a slight blurring of the line between vertical and horizontal in a way that we have not quite heard from other people. What strikes me is that, in order to pull that together, you need a very strong central body. Is WHO that strong central body given that you are dealing with groups that are profoundly well-funded, better funded than you are in a sense? I am not quite sure that you are going to be able to manage this. Can you tell me a bit more about what you think about that?

  Dr Heymann: Let me just give a brief reply and then I will call on Paul Gully. WHO is many times at the whim of its investors and funders, and many countries prefer to fund vertical programmes, others prefer horizontal programmes. We must do what those countries request us to do because they are our Member Countries and they decide how we will function. With a very small budget that comes in from our assessed contributions to countries we are required to take extra budgetary resources. For example, from the United States it is very seldom that they will invest in infrastructure or a system. What they will invest in is diseases because that is what their Congress is used to funding in a vertical manner. Paul may want to say something about this as well.

  Dr Gully: What I was going to say in reference to your point was that there has now been reference to diagonal processes, a combination of vertical and horizontal. The promotion of health system strengthening, vertical, as opposed to polio, HIV, TB programmes, horizontal, and primary healthcare could be used as an example. The health system strengthening is there to ensure that, if there are vertical programmes and you want to promote them horizontally, then you have got an infrastructure in the health system which can then carry out those programmes and not just those vertical programmes. It has been described as something which pulls them together. The G8 meeting this year under the chair of Japan is promoting that concept of health system strengthening, and now in WHO there is an Assistant Director General with responsibility for health system strengthening to try and pull them both together. In terms of the other players, WHO is often on the frontline, and I will use the recent example of H5N1 in Pakistan, where we used the infrastructure which is in Pakistan for polio eradication in order to be able to investigate and respond there. The other main players, the funders and so on, are not there to do that, they are not there at the frontline and, in fact, I do not think they would regard it as being their responsibility. In order for those kinds of interventions to take place, which are going to be an inevitable reflection of new and emerging diseases, WHO has to be there, but that strengthened health system has to be there as well in order to be able to make it better, improve it and then make those responses more rapid on the ground.

  Q508  Chairman: Before I bring my colleagues in, it is an interventionist role that you are describing in what we might call the horizontal health system. That requires funding and also raises questions about what happens to the government in the country that is also trying to structure it and presumably not always welcomes this intervention. What is your response to that?

  Dr Gully: WHO does not enter into a country without being invited by the government of that Member State. I think one could draw parallels to that in the way that an operation such as the Health Protection Agency in the UK or CDC in the US or the Public Health Agency in Canada work internally, that you do not go into a jurisdiction that has responsibility for health without being invited. However, having said that, the country representatives in those countries, such as Pakistan for example, will be there promoting working together with the government of the Member State to try and sell the advantages of that intervention. Often where it becomes difficult is if we want to encourage intervention not just in the health sector but perhaps in the agricultural sector and other sectors as well. Often that is not helped by a lack of intersectoral collaboration within the country itself. We do not go in without being invited but we can be there promoting that. Often health is more likely to be invited than perhaps other sectors, such as agriculture. On numerous occasions there have been illustrations of where those invitations have been extended. For example, the Government of Madagascar on Rift Valley fever, both from the health and agricultural side, has extended an invitation to investigate that as of Wednesday this week.

  Q509  Lord Avebury: I was interested to hear what you said about the Assistant Director being responsible for health system strengthening, particularly in the light of what Dr Chan said about countries needing a primary healthcare basis to deliver relevant services. You said earlier that the organisation was constrained to a large extent by the voluntary funding. But would there not be very strong support in developing countries for assistance with the financing of their health services if that was something that WHO was prepared to provide?

  Dr Gully: I think that is correct. The challenge is that countries often do not come forward and say generically, "We wish to support health system strengthening". This goes to the collaboration within countries too, because often there you have a development agency, a department of health, a department of foreign affairs or equivalent, and they do not necessarily reflect a unified policy within a country. So, whereas one might be in favour of that, another might not be. This comes down to how individual government policy is manifest. Often there is a wish to be much more precise and say health system strengthening. I think you are right, countries would welcome it, but it is not necessarily there. The other point I might make is that often countries do offer support in areas in which they are strong and often developed countries are strong in healthcare delivery as opposed to public health per se and, therefore, what they might offer specifically might be less enabling for that health system strengthening across the board than perhaps might be needed.

  Q510  Lord Howarth of Newport: I would like to ask you to talk about questions of synergy. If you look at an organogram of the different international intergovernmental organisations in the health field, you see a mass of organisations interlocking, overlapping, independent, and the world looks, fairly or unfairly, to the WHO to achieve a strategic vision to bring in some coherence, some coordination. It would be interesting to us if you could talk a little bit about how this works, where your successes are achieved, what the key has been to achieving success, and equally where the deficiencies are. You say in your excellent evidence to us that there is a strong level of synergy between the various organisations concerned with disease control but you also acknowledge that the synergy is not complete. Where it works well, why does it work well? Where it does not work well, why does it not work well?

  Dr Heymann: I will start with that and pass it to others. The Polio Eradication Partnership is a very good example of a partnership that brings together four principal actors in polio eradication and it succeeds because each of those actors has found and adheres to its comparative advantage. In the Polio Eradication Initiative, the World Health Organisation is responsible for setting the norms and standards in global policy and providing technical support to governments to develop the appropriate responses to polio. UNICEF provides all the vaccines necessary and at the same time works on social mobilisation in countries and with countries. Rotary International advocates internationally, and if any of you are Rotarians you will know that it is a very important role. Not only do they advocate internationally, but they advocate in countries like the United States, where they ensure each year that there is a significant contribution to the Polio Eradication Initiative, as they do in the United Kingdom, in Sweden and in many other countries. The Polio Eradication partners are WHO, UNICEF and Rotary, they have each found their comparative advantage and stick to it, and CDC, the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, where I come from, is a technical partner that provides technical support to countries through provision of staff to work on certain issues mainly involved in surveillance, monitoring and evaluation. Each partner sticks to its specific role and all four partners together mobilise resources, and to date have mobilised over US$5.5 billion for polio eradication. The United Kingdom has been one of the very important partners in that financial partnership. Another partnership that has begun is the—

  Q511  Lord Howarth of Newport: Just before you move on to that, can I ask you how is that excellent orchestration achieved? And is the WHO the leader in coordination?

  Dr Heymann: Yes, the WHO is the leader in that. This is achieved by weekly telephone calls with the four partners. There has never been a formal governance mechanism set up, it has been purely by the will of these four partners to talk together once a week or once every two weeks if it involves a specific area of work, and, in addition, working in concert at country level. For example, if I want to go and see a Head of State in a country, it is usually Rotary that is the most rapid in getting that visit, it is not the health sector, it is Rotary International. When the meeting occurs, it is Rotary, UNICEF and WHO who attend that meeting. CDC usually does not attend because they prefer to stay in the background. It works very well that each member uses its own comparative advantage, but it is a mechanism which is informally run, it is not formal governance. The other partnerships are partnerships that have formed around avian influenza. There are two major ones. There is GLEWS, which is a surveillance network, and Paul will speak more about that, which works with FAO, WHO and the OIE in Paris to be sure that we understand where avian influenza is occurring in animals and where the risk is greatest to humans. This is a partnership which is run with no formal governance, but it is run because one of our financial partners, Canada, insisted that we work together and provide the resources in such a way that it forces us to work together. Another initiative is the Tripartite Agreement of WHO, FAO and the World Organisation for Animals Health (OIE) in Paris: and UNICEF that has just begun to work with the partnership as well. Together we are working to set up a one health/one world programme, which will be a programme that operates at the country level and which provides programme capacity in both veterinary and human health making sure that together we are working to not let humans be the indicator of animal disease but animals themselves be the indicator. Today, in countries zoonotic infection, or an infection that comes from an animal to a human, is mostly found first in humans and then the infected animals are found and dealt with, but it needs to be the other way around, so that when BSE or other zoonotic diseases occur, the disease is dealt with so that the barrier that protects humans from being infected is strengthened early on.

  Dr Gully: If I could just add a couple more examples. One is in relation to Yellow Fever, where there have been recent outbreaks in South America, particularly of note in Paraguay, where there had not been an outbreak for decades. Rapidly WHO, together with private industry, a vaccine manufacturer in Brazil but also one from the US and France, Sanofi, and UNICEF, that has the logistics capability for delivery, worked together to deliver 1.6 million doses of vaccine to Paraguay in a very short space of time. That was also helped by a broader agreement about Yellow Fever vaccine, which was in collaboration with GAVI, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation. That is one which does work between other UN countries but also with the private sector as well. The other relates to other intergovernmental organisations, such as the International Federation of the Red Cross, where WHO is working together with IFRC and the UN agencies involved in humanitarian response, and this relates to pandemic preparedness. IFRC has received a large amount of money from USAID to work on what they describe as Level Six pandemic preparedness. It has meant that the UN agencies, plus and including ones such as the World Food Programme, for example, which did provide a logistic response in the recent Ebola outbreak in Democratic Republic of Congo, together with other organisations do respond. They do relate to specific needs, specific initiatives, so there is not one big organisational structure that meets to say how they work together, but when it is necessary we believe that synergy does exist and I am sure it can be proved.

  Q512  Lord Howarth of Newport: Those instances are admirable and encouraging but, on the less cheerful side, the world is an imperfect place; and, if we look at the tragic predicament of Africa, for example, you must be concerned at WHO that there are important problems where we are failing to get the coherence of effort that is needed to be properly effective. Will you talk to us about some of those as well?

  Dr Heymann: An example in Africa is very important. Several years ago, maybe in the early 2000s, I cannot recall exactly the year, one country in Africa bought all the meningitis vaccine available on the open market because meningitis vaccine was required for pilgrims going to the Hajj, but that vaccine is also required to save the lives of children because each year there are major epidemics of meningitis. At that time, in order to deal with this issue, WHO formed a partnership and set up what is called the International Coordinating Group for Meningitis. We brought together all those competitors for vaccine internationally—Doctors without Borders (MSF), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent, Societies, UNICEF and WHO, the major partnerships for countries in meningitis. We got together and began to make forecasts on needs for meningitis vaccine, worked with industry to make sure that those needs were met, and mobilised resources which were made available to purchase vaccine in advance. That mechanism continues to function and each year provides vaccine to countries based on criteria that have been pre-established by the four partners so that when there is an outbreak vaccine is immediately made available to those countries. Again, it is an informal mechanism, no formal governance, but there is intensive work by our staff to make sure that these activities occur. Another example in Africa is the Polio Surveillance Networks. When Nigeria developed avian influenza in humans, the only network that was able to respond was the Polio Eradication Network. That Network went to communities and began social mobilisation, explaining to people about influenza and how they should prevent themselves from becoming infected, a very important tool that we have called into action. Those are some of the successes in Africa. It is very difficult to work in Africa and very difficult for countries to understand all the issues that are going on, but we hope that with the International Health Regulations, and the requirement that all countries have accepted to establish core capacities in surveillance and response, these countries will be able to establish the capacity if the bilateral donors and international partnerships occur to deal with that. I could tell you, if you would like to hear about it, of a partnership that is just forming with the Commonwealth and Health Protection Agency on strengthening core capacities in countries.

  Q513  Lord Howarth of Newport: Understandably enough, you are still talking about your successes. We would like you, if you will, to be candid with us about where your frustrations are, where your disappointments are, and whether these are systemic or what the explanation may be for the failures in progress that occur.

  Dr Heymann: I will start just with an honest, open statement and then I think others will come in. As you know, our WHO system is such that the Director-General is an elected official and so are the six Regional Directors of WHO. At times this causes a great challenge in coordination and in making sure we work as a corporate World Health Organisation. Dr Brundtland, when she was here, worked very hard, and now Dr Chan is working even harder, much, much harder and more intensively, to make sure that we can work together and understand what each group can offer best, and promote that in working together. I must admit that many times there are delays in how WHO Headquarters responds to a situation and how our African Regional Office responds to that situation. On the other hand, there are very many successes in which Directors take the time to work closely with their regional counterparts at a technical level and succeed in accomplishing major events. There are some political issues because of the elected Director General and Regional Directors and responsibilities to countries that elected them, while at the same time as there are great successes working at a technical level within the organisation and sometimes those two areas are not in synch.

  Q514  Lord Howarth of Newport: You said synergy is not complete. Are you also frustrated from time to time by failure of synergy between the WHO and some of the other major organisations that have appeared on the scene, particularly in recent years, which command a lot of funding but which have their own terms of reference, their own impetus and may not dance to your tune?

  Dr Heymann: We do not want people necessarily to dance to our tune. Our function for 194 Member Countries, is to set global policies, norms and standards and hope that others will work with them. The Global Fund came into Geneva several years ago and this was encouraged by WHO, WHO advocated with the G8 for the Global Fund. The Global Fund has come in, and it is not a technical agency whereas WHO is a technical agency. WHO has spent much time and energy, as you will hear from the tuberculosis people when you speak to them later on, in developing national proposals for the Global Fund so they can be effective in mobilising the resources from the Global Fund. Early on we approached the Global Fund for support to WHO in the endeavour to help countries develop their proposals and we were told that the Fund could not directly provide resources to WHO, those resources would go to countries and countries could engage WHO should they wish to have WHO work with them whilst developing their proposals. Of course, this is not the way countries work, countries do not pay WHO. If countries ask WHO for support we provide it to them at no cost.

  Q515  Lord Jay of Ewelme: I just wanted to pick up one thing you said in your very interesting discussion about polio eradication and your handling of that. I think you said that the CDC's role in Atlanta in all of this, amongst other things, was that of monitoring and evaluation of progress on the ground?

  Dr Heymann: Yes.

  Q516  Lord Jay of Ewelme: I just wondered if you could enlarge a little bit on that and talk about how WHO ensures that there is proper monitoring and evaluation of its programmes more generally. Is that something which normally, as it were, you would outsource to something like the CDC? Or is it something you would do in-house? How do you ensure that there is that constant monitoring and evaluation so that you can learn the lessons and improve the programmes in the future?

  Dr Heymann: Monitoring and evaluation are not outsourced, they are done by WHO in the partnership. What is outsourced is the provision of technical support to countries to do their national monitoring during campaigns. The monitoring system for polio eradication is a very strong monitoring system. Wednesday morning here in Geneva the entire polio team meets and at that meeting the indicators that have been established for surveillance are reviewed coming up from countries through Regional Offices into WHO, all the way from a district level. The indicators that have been set up concern the number of children with flaccid paralysis who are identified and the number of those children who are properly examined and provide the proper specimens of stool in the case of polio. The indicators have been established at one per 100,000 children under the age of 15 years must have been reported with flaccid paralysis because flaccid paralysis occurs for diseases other than polio and there is a background level of paralysis. This is reported and, if a country falls below that threshold, the next week the Regional Office, through its Country Office, contacts the government to find out what has happened and attempts are made to address the problem. We know, sitting here in Geneva, in which local government area in Nigeria there is not surveillance for polio because we receive that information once a week and we monitor it closely. If there is polio, the indicator goes up to two cases per 100,000 children required and that is how we continue to monitor polio surveillance. Polio response is monitored by the reports of countries of polio and those viruses that are isolated from countries are genetically sequenced so we can see where they come from. If a country has polio and it has not had polio in the last two years, we can see from the genetic sequence where that virus has come from and most times today it comes from Nigeria or India.

  Q517  Lord Jay of Ewelme: Thank you very much for that. Just moving for a second on to evaluation, ex-post evaluation of programmes, is that done centrally, is that done here? Or would that be built into each programme so that there is a process for a year or two or three afterwards of checking how successful the programme has been and learning the lessons from that?

  Dr Heymann: Each programme has a technical advisory group set up which consists of experts from each of our regions and headquarters. Through yearly or bi-yearly meetings they monitor progress and make broad recommendations. In the case of polio, each country has its own technical advisory group on which WHO sits and that advises in the countries. Also built into polio eradication and most other programmes are external assessments which are done by an external group which comes in and does those assessments to determine whether or not there is success. Right now one of those external assessments is being thought about for the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and I wonder, Pat, if you could say a word about that.

  Mr Drury: Maybe if I could take a step back to some of the earlier stuff and stick my neck out a little bit. It is natural for us to blow our own horn and be more comfortable talking about the successes, not least because any failure is a failure of a Member State, and as the Secretariat, we are protecting them. Our real success over the past seven or eight years has been in responding to events. The process that David spoke about, about meningitis vaccine, ensuring that the vaccine is there, is only useful because it can be transferred very rapidly and these groups come together to review the evidence and make a decision that the vaccine should be made available cheaply to the country within a matter of two or three days. The outbreaks in West Africa of Yellow Fever threatened all the major urban areas. In 2001 and 2002 there were outbreaks which threatened the populations of Dakar and Senegal, Abidjan and Cote d'Ivoire. Because WHO was able to deploy teams to investigate these cases, identify the outbreak and then call in the additional support, that created a powerful argument for the likes of GAVI and others who now have taken the example of the meningitis model and cloned it to apply to Yellow Fever. But we are in a constant struggle, and as soon as we think we have these two things in place and they are useful, the outbreaks happen in a different part of the world. This is to do with the meningitis belt in Africa and West Africa where the Yellow Fever outbreaks have taken place predominantly. The mosquitoes did not understand the rules, and this year outbreaks have taken place in Latin America. Up until the beginning of this year we felt we were comfortable and any evaluation would have said a six million dose vaccine stockpile available, support and money from GAVI and others, UNICEF and WHO and everybody is working together. But, as soon as one of the factors changes, the outbreaks happen in Latin America, the stockpile is not enough and what was an emergency stockpile is now being directed to Latin America to support a more programmatic approach. That is OK until the next crisis element comes in, which is that there are now outbreaks in Liberia and the Liberians should really have first claim on the emergency stockpile. But the emergency stockpile has been needed to support a more programmatic approach there. That is a bit long-winded. Where we have been successful is in our outbreak response and we measure that in terms of the time we got there, how many people died in the outbreak and how quickly it was brought under control. It may be that we are not measuring the right thing and, although these interventions and international missions are opportunities and the primary function is on controlling the outbreak, they should really be measured in terms of how they contribute to building national capacity and how these events are used to draw in the more programmatic approach to support the building of core capacities as envisaged under the IHR. The Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network is a network of about 140 technical institutions around the world that WHO coordinates with to ensure that there are experts available to support these types of activities.

  Chairman: We will come back to the global outbreak a bit later. I am getting a bit worried that we are going to lose some of our areas. If I could leave it at this stage and ask Lord Desai to come in.

  Lord Desai: My question has more or less been answered.

  Q518  Chairman: We need to come back on the overlap.

  Mr Drury: I was so long-winded I did not get a chance to answer Lord Jay's question about evaluation. There are two evaluations just about to kick off. One is the internal WHO audit group, which looks at performance, which during the month of April is going to begin an audit of performance in our group and in influenza and one or two others. That is an internal audit of performance. The partners in GOARN have asked that we bring together an external panel of experts to review the activities of the Network over the first seven or eight years and on the basis of that external evaluation provide guidance for the future development of the Network. We hope that will happen within the next six months with a view to having a meeting of the Network before the end of the year.

  Q519  Lord Avebury: I was wondering, as you were talking about WHO's success in responding to outbreaks, whether you had any strategic scenarios over the years ahead which enable you to plan for the structures that will be needed to cope with what appear to be an enormous variety of unpredictable outbreaks occurring in different parts of the world. How do you develop scenarios within your own organisations to enable you to develop the structures that will cope with such a wide variety of possible outcomes?

  Dr Heymann: Let me respond to that by giving you an example of how we cope. When the SARS outbreak was first identified in 2003, WHO, in order to notify countries about this disease, was obliged to put it in the press so that every country could read about it. Today, when an outbreak occurs, such as Rift Valley Fever in East Africa or many other diseases, we can have access immediately to an International Health Regulations Focal Point in each country so that information can be fed immediately to a country within its own system. These focal points are nominations made by the country. This helps us greatly in our response to make sure that countries understand what is going on immediately. In order to test this new International Health Regulations system there will be a series of three different tabletop exercises. The first occurred last year, when the International Health Regulations came into force and WHO had an internal exercise to see how we would communicate about an outbreak should it occur. We found many difficulties, many weaknesses, which we have since remedied. This year on 11 and 12 June there will be another exercise within WHO and also involving our country Focal Points. These country Focal Points and WHO will have an exercise to see how they can best work together should there be a pandemic that occurs. I think this scenario will probably be an influenza outbreak. In addition, at the level of the United Nations we have an exercise coming up on 19 June, which will be an exercise to see how the United Nations systems work together in a pandemic; and in September there will be a further exercise which involves NGOs and the UN system to see how we can best respond internationally. We are working on several different scenarios and exercises which we hope will permit us to identify problems and solve those problems as we move ahead. This is all possible because we have this coordination with over 140 different networks and we have the International Health Regulations which penetrate countries.


 
previous page contents next page

House of Lords home page Parliament home page House of Commons home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008