Select Committee on Intergovernmental Organisations Minutes of Evidence


Memorandum by the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health

  Thank you for your invitation to provide evidence to your committee which I accept with pleasure. First of all I give a view word to my background for better interpretation of my views expressed in my personal capacity. I have a double background in medicine and international relations. After working as clinical physician for an international environment and health NGO I joined government service 5 years ago. During this time as head of international affairs of the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health (corresponding to the ministry of health) I have been leading the Swiss delegation to many WHO and OECD meetings and negotiations. I was and am lead negotiator during the negotiations of the International Health Regulations and the Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights. I chaired the drafting groups of the World Health Assembly leading to Resolutions WHA 58.3 on the Adoption of the International Health Regulations and WHA 59.24 on Public Health, Innovation, Essential Health Research and Intellectual Property Rights: Towards a Global Strategy and Plan of Action.

INPUTS TO YOUR QUESTIONS

1. The globalized world has increased in vulnerability. People and therefore infectious agents travel faster and more often. Despite significant improvements in the fight against infectious diseases the threats are still present and will remain so. In addition the just in time production concept and other economic integration and globalisation tendency have increased the vulnerability of the economic system. Furthermore information travels faster in a way we know of epidemics around the world which were in earlier times simply ignored. Nevertheless I would not speak of a crisis since the control systems are also improving.

  2.  (no answer)

  3.  The Global Outbreak Alert and Response System GOARN of WHO is the key system functioning overall very well. Through the IHR this system has now an adequate legal backing.

  4.  (no answer)

  5.  We need to push further the horizontal strengthening or health systems and therein the strengthening of capacities for epidemic surveillance and response. Vertical disease specific efforts will remain necessary but have to be better integrated in the horizontal efforts to strengthen health systems.

  Poverty remains the main risk factor for any disease. Economic development and poverty reduction is therefore also crucial in the fight against infectious diseases.

  6.  The Swiss Federal Office for Public Health plays in Switzerland a similar role to the Department of Health in the UK. In Switzerland we have together with the cantons the main responsibility for the surveillance and control of communicable diseases. The main responsibility within the Swiss administration for the support of developing countries lies with the Swiss development cooperation SDC. In order to strengthen policy coherence we have elaborated jointly with colleagues in foreign affairs and development cooperation the Swiss Health Foreign Policy signed by the ministers of health and foreign affairs:

  Several of the objectives are directly linked to the four diseases:

    1.  Strengthen the international monitoring networks for communicable diseases (e.g. pandemic influenza) through rapid implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR).

    7.  Strengthen the normative role of WHO.

    9.  Improve international access to essential drugs—both recognized and newly developed.

    14.  Make appropriate contributions to eliminating the three significant poverty-related diseases—AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (MDG 6)—paying particular attention to gender issues.

  7.  (no answer)

  8.  (no answer)

  9.  (no answer)

  10.  The question is asked in a dangerous way. Balancing short term health gains (through the use of DDT to fight malaria) and long term health threats (by the bioaccumulation of all POPs like DDT) need careful balancing and an active search for alternative solutions.

  11.  The coordination of WHO, FAO, OIE, the World Bank and the UN System coordinator (www.influenza.undg.org/) as key actors is working well compared with other cases of collaboration of intergovernmental organisations (or indeed inter-ministerial collaboration).

  The particular challenge with the fight of H5N1 bird flu and the linked human pandemic threat is rather in the historically grown sector system in most governments. In industrialized countries usually health ministries, development ministries and defence ministries all have budgets in the billions. Health ministries are using the large budgets they have for domestic health issues. Development ministries are investing in their long term development priorities and in immediate humanitarian aid. Defence ministries spend their billions on the classical security issues. The animal epidemic of bird flu and the threat of a human influenza pandemic fall between these competences. Health ministries don't have the international budgets, development ministries see pandemic preparedness neither as immediate humanitarian emergency nor as long term development goal (why invest in a potential threat if we don't have enough money to fight the actual diseases ...) Defence ministries don't have the appropriate toolbox nor mandates to invest heavily in this major human security threat. Through the intergovernmental organisations and the ad hoc series of meetings of the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza IPAPI in Washington DC, Vienna, Delhi, Beijing, Bamako and next October in Cairo major efforts of international donors are undertaken. Much more will be needed.

  Finally the media and political attention to the issue was probably exaggerated in autumn 2005 and risk to become too small currently.

  12.  (no answer)

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  14.  The current patent system can be impeding the access to existing medicines in the short run, but is absolutely necessary as key incentive for research and development as a basis for access to new medicines in the long run. Much progress has been made in recent years in access to medicines through public private partnerships, bulk purchasing, differential prizing, the implementation of the Doha declaration, voluntary action by the researching pharmaceutical industry, the development of the generics industry, etc. More efforts will be needed. A comprehensive global strategy and plan of action is currently under negotiation by the WHO intergovernmental working group on public health, innovation and intellectual property rights. This process is important but constantly under danger from too simplistic positions of "patents are good" or "patents are bad". Major efforts will be needed by governments, intergovernmental organisations, industry, the private sector, civil society, academia, philanthropy, etc. for the implementation of this action plan. Access to medicines as a complex issues depending on a long chain of factors in the so-called innovation chain and by far not only on intellectual property: Basic & applied research on all diseases, drug development, production in the appropriate galenic form and good quality for an affordable prize, a distribution chain, health systems sufficiently staffed capable of delivering treatments, etc.

  15.  (no answer)

  16.  IHR (2005) are a historic agreement bringing the global system to fight public health emergencies of international concern truly into the 21st century. The agreement does currently not need a revision but vigorous efforts for its implementation. The national capacity building in accordance with Annexe 1 of IHR will be key for implementation. One of the few weaknesses of the IHR is the fact that there is no assurance for countries in need to receive necessary support in building their capacity, especially when this task competes for resources with many other pressing needs.

  17.  The IHR apply to events irrespective of their origin and therefore also for deliberate use. Deliberate use of infectious agents might result in two simultaneous crisis: an epidemic and a security crisis. These two aspects should be dealt with separately but need nevertheless coordination. The lead of the international management of the health crisis should remain with WHO through the IHR mechanisms independently of the origin of an epidemic.

  18.  Over the last 20 years there was on average yearly a new or emerging infectious disease, many of which are of animal origin. Therefore we need to remain vigilant and prepared for new unknown diseases. The algorithm of annexe 2 of IHR is an adequate instrument for the recognition of new diseases.

1 February 2008



 
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