Statement on Improving Global Biosecurity
Presented to the BWC 2007 Meeting of States Parties By the Partnership
for Global Security 10 December 2007
The forces of technological and economic globalization
have radically altered the nature of the biological challenges
the world faces. There is general agreement on the need for improved
global biosecurity, but there is currently no consensus on how
to design or implement it. New approaches are needed to develop
a stronger, more flexible biological security strategy that can
adapt to the rapid pace of technological and economic changes
and include all stakeholders. There are several key issues to
be considered in building a consensus for this enhanced global
biosecurity system. A successful approach to improved global biosecurity
will have to balance the need for adequate controls with flexible
mechanisms. The goals should be to mitigate risk, increase confidence
in bioactivities, and limit intrusiveness to that research which
is truly dangerous. Any improvements in this area must account
for the fact that the majority of research, activities and applications
are beneficial and therefore the emphasis must be on minimizing
the dangers without hindering the wide-ranging benefits of bio
research.
The majority of biological materials and most
research are controlled by the private sector. Unfortunately,
to date the participation of this sector in the dialogue on how
to improve global biosecurity has not been commensurate with its
dominance in the field. Eighty percent of the world's biotechnology
companies are privately held. Revenues for the world's 710 publicly
traded companies in 2006 totaled $73.4 billion, or 14% growth
over 2005. Therefore, because the private sector plays a dominant
role in the advancement of the life sciences it must be better
integrated into the discussion of global biosecurity.
Another major challenge is harmonizing global
biosecurity regulations and oversight. Currently more than 40
nations are involved in biotechnology and life sciences research
and development. However, there is a lack of consistency around
the globe in biosecurity regulation, oversight, standards, and
facility transparency. Creating a balanced approach is the key
to success. In the near term much more could be done on a voluntary
basis by the private sector and governments. A voluntary and balanced
approach could allow for the creation of uniform security standards,
practices, and procedures in the developed world. For example
the biosecurity standards and practices in most OECD countries
are not that different and their common characteristics could
be informally codified. These could then be endorsed through industry
or trade organizations or intergovernmental organizations. The
biotech industries in the developing world then could be encouraged
and assisted to work toward these levels.
Another significant challenge is the need to
coordinate and facilitate communication and knowledge sharing
among the broad range of stakeholder communities. In this regard,
PGS proposes that the states parties to the Biological and Toxin
Weapon Convention endorse the creation of a yearly global convention
on biosecurity that would involve all relevant stakeholders. Such
a global conference would facilitate the goal of establishing
harmonized global biosecurity norms and allow for the interdisciplinary
coordination and information sharing that are now lacking.
PRIORITY ACTIONS
To help achieve this new level of biosecurity
this statement endorses the five priorities for urgent action
by the international community that were proposed in November
2007. Titled the Consensus Statement of Priority Actions for
the Promotion of Global Biosecurity, it was endorsed by six
biological security policy and technical experts: Kenneth N Luongo,
Executive Director of the Partnership for Global Security; Maurizio
Martellini, Secretary General of the Landau Network-Centro Volta;
Gerald Epstein and David Heyman, Co-directors of the Biological
Threat Reduction Forum at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies; Harvey Rubin, Professor of Medicine, Microbiology, and
Computer Science at the University of Pennsylvania; and Barry
Kellman, Professor of Law at DePaul University.
Sharing Baseline Information
Development of a baseline of information on
global biological holdings, research facilities, and infectious
disease patterns. Specifically this could include identification
and alignment of all existing global databases of pathogen stockpiles,
research facility and collection storage locations, inventories
of biological materials and equipment, and infectious disease
monitoring and patterns. This network should be connected and
integrated by an information technology architecture that will
allow it to be utilized for the benefit of global public health
and security while protecting sensitive and proprietary information.
Education and Awareness Raising Promotion
Greater education and heightened awareness promotion
on the nature of the biological threat in the scientific, academic,
and policy communities. The potential for the accidental or intentional
misapplication of biological technology needs to be recognized
while protecting the enormous benefits the life sciences, provide
to humankind.
Interdisciplinary Coordination
Interdisciplinary coordination and information-sharing
in support of the improvement of global biosecurity. The threat
posed by the misapplication of the life sciences cuts across numerous
sectors, including public health, science, technology, law enforcement,
and private industry. Therefore greater cross-communication among
the diverse stakeholder sectors is essential to improve information
flow and promote awareness of the concerns and major issues in
each sector. Yearly global conventions on global biosecurity featuring
a broad cross section of life sciences stakeholders should be
convened.
Engaging the Private Sector
Engaging in a dialogue with the private sector
on the risks posed by the potential misapplication of biological
materials and advanced scientific techniques while emphasizing
the need to protect the scientific and economic value created
in the biotechnology and life sciences fields. This dialogue must
advance—not hinder—the vast benefits biotechnology
can contribute to the promotion of public health and raise the
quality of life globally.
Promoting Compliance with Harmonized Standards
and Practices
Development and acceptance of globally harmonized
biosecurity standards, improved gathering of intelligence, and
better integration of law enforcement to enhance the quality,
rapidity, and effectiveness of efforts to prevent and respond
to biological dangers.
18. Though our remit is focused specifically
on known infectious diseases, we would be interested to know how
you view the global threat from new or previously unrecognised
ones and from the transmission of infections from animals to humans.
There is an enormous database confirming that
there is a significant global threat from new or previously unrecognised
infectious diseases and from the transmission of infections from
animals to humans. The issue should not be left unaddressed by
the Committee.
19. What resources (subscriptions, staff,
training, medicines etc) does the UK Government commit to intergovernmental
bodies to help in the fight against the four diseases listed?
I do not have the information necessary to adequately
respond to this important question.
20. Do you wish to provide any other relevant
information in addition to what you have said in answer to the
above?
I think I may have already exhausted the Committee
with the above responses. I am happy to discuss these issues in
person with the Committee if the Committee would find that helpful.
May 2008
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