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Evaluation of these pilots is under way, and it is intended that the National Screening Committee will be made aware of the findings of these projects. I am sure that the issues raised both by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, will be taken on board. Decisions about the follow-up action that should be taken will then be taken at that point.
The noble Lord, Lord Colwyn, raised the problem of getting people at risk to visit a dentist, and I hope some of the remarks I have made will demonstrate that we have taken that on board. Indeed, the Steele report, which I have looked at today, very much emphasises the importance of information services and awareness.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, mentioned the HP virus and we understand that people with the virus receive a thorough review of their overall health. I shall write to the noble Baroness about the involvement of dentists in any follow-up examinations and treatment.
The UK National Screening Committee advises Ministers about all aspects of screening policy and supports implementation. As noble Lords have remarked, there is no national screening programme for any form of head and neck cancer in the UK. National population screening programmes are introduced only where there is evidence that screening would be effective in reducing the incidence of the mortality of the disease. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, eloquently described the issues surrounding that.
The committee ran a series of expert group workshops on oral cancer which reported in March 2003. It recommended that the epidemiology of the disease could be further investigated with long-term studies; that opportunistic screening of individuals, as mentioned by the noble Earl, by health professionals should be encouraged with the intention of detecting high-risk individuals with early stages of the diseases; and that population awareness should be increased through health promotional programmes. That is what has guided the Government’s actions since that time.
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In June 2006, the committee considered a report produced by the NHS R&D health technology assessment programme, which has been referred to already by the noble Earl, on the cost-effectiveness of screening for oral cancer in primary care. On the basis of that analysis, the authors of the report recommended that further study is needed on the natural history of oral cancer and its precursors, and on the effectiveness of interventions, before any further consideration is given to a national population screening programme.
In the light of concerns about the increased incidence, the UK National Screening Committee is currently reviewing its policy position on screening for mouth cancer. The review is likely to be conducted in the autumn, when Members will be provided with information from the Cancer Research UK pilots. While I cannot pre-empt the committee’s findings, it would seem that the results of the pilots and many of the points that noble Lords have made during the debate show that it will be possible to conduct a thorough review on the options for a more systematic approach to screening for mouth cancer.
8.27 pm
Policing and Crime Bill
Bill Main Page
Copy of the Bill
Explanatory Notes
Amendments
10th Report from JCHR
15th Report from JCHR
9th Report from DPC
Committee (1st Day) (Continued)
8.38 pm
Viscount Bridgeman: The dinner hour came rather unexpectedly; I was caught out by not being able to thank the Minister for his full explanation of the whole of this clause. As we draw our scrutiny of the clause to a close, I am reminded by the remark of the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, who is not in her place—she said, “That’s not quite how it works” of the delicate relationship between the Secretary of State, the police authority and the chief constable. I am sure that we are agreed in all parts of the Committee that our aim is to ensure that the Bill leaves here with that relationship as close and as complementary as it possibly can be.
Amendment 36 would draw out a small part of new Section 23G. It seeks to probe the circumstances in which the Secretary of State might envisage prohibiting a collaboration agreement. Given the requirements on chief officers to seek the approval of their authorities and the requirements on both of them to assist the efficiency and effectiveness of the agreement, when would the Government consider stepping in to stop one being made? The Minister gave us a fairly comprehensive explanation of that in the previous amendment, but I beg to move.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord West of Spithead): As was the case with Amendment 25, proposed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Harris of Richmond and Lady Miller of Chilthorne
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Our approach to promoting collaboration has been to encourage forces and authorities to take bold and, at times, innovative steps to work jointly. We continue to encourage this approach and have issued some guidance and good practice on a range of issues to ensure that we learn from those leading the way. However, as our knowledge develops further, we will become better at identifying those instances where experience tells us either that collaboration is not the right form of delivery or that a certain type of collaboration is not going to deliver the improvements needed. Rather along the lines mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, when we were discussing a previous issue, this is something to draw on.
In those instances, which are likely to be rare, it is the Secretary of State’s duty to ensure that policing more generally does not suffer from the few badly executed collaborations. This growing pool of knowledge will also begin to identify preferred models of collaboration for certain policing functions that will need to benefit from a minimum level of consistency nationally in order to be effective. Police functions such as serious organised crime and counterterrorism are already providing good examples of this. In these rare instances, it is in the public interest that the national interest is reflected through the Secretary of State’s powers to intervene as a last resort.
While we hope that we will not need to use this power, Clause 5 provides a legitimate attempt to ensure that, where a collaboration agreement goes against the interests of policing more generally, the Secretary of State is able to reflect and defend the public interest. Should this power need to be used, it will of course be for Parliament to scrutinise and judge the Secretary of State’s decision to act. I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
Viscount Bridgeman: I am grateful to the Minister for that reply and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
8.45 pm
37: After Clause 7, insert the following new Clause—
“Authorisations of covert human intelligence sources: conditions
(1) Section 29 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c. 23) (authorisation of covert human intelligence sources) is amended as follows.
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(2) In subsection (2) for paragraph (c) substitute—
“(c) that arrangements exist for the source’s case that satisfy—
(i) the requirements of subsection (4A), in the case of a source of a relevant collaborative unit;
(ii) the requirements of subsection (4B), in the case of a source of a relevant Scottish collaborative unit;
(iii) the requirements of subsection (5), in the case of any other source;
and that satisfy such other requirements as may be imposed by order made by the Secretary of State.”
(3) After subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2)—
(a) a relevant collaborative unit is a unit consisting of two or more police forces whose chief officers of police have made an agreement under section 23(1) of the Police Act 1996 which relates to the discharge by persons holding offices, ranks or positions with any of the forces of functions in connection with the conduct or use of the source; and
(b) a relevant Scottish collaborative unit is a unit consisting of two or more Scottish police forces whose chief constables have made an agreement under section 12(1) of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 which relates to the discharge by persons holding offices, ranks or positions with any of the forces of functions in connection with the conduct or use of the source.”
(4) After subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) For the purposes of this Part there are arrangements for the source’s case that satisfy the requirements of this subsection if such arrangements are in force as are necessary for ensuring—
(a) that there will at all times be a qualifying person who will have day-to-day responsibility for dealing with the source, and for the source’s security and welfare;
(b) that there will at all times be another qualifying person who will have general oversight of the use made of the source;
(c) that there will at all times be a qualifying person who will have responsibility for maintaining a record of the use made of the source;
(d) that the records relating to the source that are maintained by virtue of paragraph (c) will always contain particulars of all such matters (if any) as may be specified for the purposes of this paragraph in regulations made by the Secretary of State; and
(e) that records maintained by virtue of paragraph (c) that disclose the identity of the source will not be available to persons except to the extent that there is a need for access to them to be made available to those persons.
(4B) For the purposes of this Part there are arrangements for the source’s case that satisfy the requirements of this subsection if such arrangements are in force as are necessary for ensuring—
(a) that there will at all times be a Scottish qualifying person who will have day-to-day responsibility for dealing with the source, and for the source’s security and welfare;
(b) that there will at all times be another Scottish qualifying person who will have general oversight of the use made of the source;
(c) that there will at all times be a Scottish qualifying person who will have responsibility for maintaining a record of the use made of the source;
(d) that the records relating to the source that are maintained by virtue of paragraph (c) will always contain particulars of all such matters (if any) as may be specified for the purposes of this paragraph in regulations made by the Secretary of State; and
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(e) that records maintained by virtue of paragraph (c) that disclose the identity of the source will not be available to persons except to the extent that there is a need for access to them to be made available to those persons.”
(5) After subsection (7) insert—
“(7A) For the purposes of subsection (4A) a person is a qualifying person if—
(a) the person holds an office, rank or position with a police force whose chief officer of police is a party to the agreement mentioned in subsection (2A)(a); and
(b) persons holding offices, ranks or positions with that force are permitted by the terms of the agreement to have the responsibility mentioned in paragraph (a) or (c) of subsection (4A) or the general oversight mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection (as the case may require).
(7B) For the purposes of subsection (4B), a person is a Scottish qualifying person if—
(a) the person holds an office, rank or position with a Scottish police force whose chief constable is a party to the agreement mentioned in subsection (2A)(b); and
(b) persons holding offices, ranks or positions with that force are permitted by the terms of the agreement to have the responsibility mentioned in paragraph (a) or (c) of subsection (4B) or the general oversight mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection (as the case may require).”
(6) After subsection (9) insert—
“(10) For the purposes of this section—
(a) references to a police force are to the following—
(i) any police force maintained under section 2 of the Police Act 1996 (police forces in England and Wales outside London);
(ii) the metropolitan police force; and
(iii) the City of London police force; and
(b) references to a Scottish police force are to a police force maintained under or by virtue of section 1 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967.””
Lord West of Spithead: The new clause inserted by Amendment 37 is related to provisions already in the Bill in Clauses 6, 7 and 8. These clauses are intended to facilitate the work of police collaborative units. They ensure that, where two or more police forces reach collaboration agreements in respect of certain techniques regulating the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the fact that investigative teams may comprise officers from different forces will not cause any operational problems for the authorisation of these techniques.
This new clause has a similar effect in relation to covert human intelligence sources—CHIS. It may help if I explain precisely what a CHIS is. A CHIS is an individual who establishes or maintains a relationship with someone else for the covert purpose of obtaining information. A CHIS can be a member of the public—for example, a member of a drug-trafficking gang who is recruited to provide information to the police—or a member of a public authority, such as an undercover police officer who infiltrates a drug-trafficking gang to obtain information of a similar kind. In either case, RIPA requires each CHIS to have both a controller and a handler. These play different roles in managing and supervising the CHIS. The controller is responsible for overseeing the use made of a CHIS; the handler has day-to-day responsibility for dealing with the CHIS and for his security and welfare.
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With one key exception, the controller and handler of a CHIS have to be from the same authority or, in this case, police force. The exception to which I have referred is relevant to the need for this new clause. If the activities of a CHIS take place for the benefit of more than one public authority—in this case, more than one police force—the controller and handler can be from different authorities or forces. This exception will solve the problem for many collaborative units that tackle cross-border crime. Where a number of smaller forces agree to delegate all CHIS activity to a dedicated unit, it might not apply. This is because the dedicated unit may be required to investigate purely local, as well as cross-border, crime. In such circumstances, therefore, the controller and handler would have to be from the same force. Obviously, this would limit the point of having a joint investigative unit as part of a collaboration agreement.
A further benefit of the new clause is that it will facilitate the way in which undercover officers are used across the country. As I have mentioned, the handler of a CHIS is responsible for his or her security or welfare. Often, an undercover officer’s own police force likes to keep this responsibility even if the officer is deployed in another force area or is tasked by another force. Under this new clause, such a division of labour between the home and the host force would be possible. We even anticipate that all 43 forces in England and Wales may choose to form an agreement to permit such a sharing of roles in relation to undercover officers. The eight forces in Scotland may also choose to form their own collaboration agreement to this effect.
Unfortunately, the limited impact of the exception that I have described has come to light only recently. I apologise, therefore, for this new clause being tabled late in the passage of the Bill. It is, however, a relatively minor adjunct to the key provisions in Clauses 6, 7 and 8, which are intended to facilitate the work of police collaboration units, including, in some circumstances, the collaborative work of all 43 forces in England and Wales or the eight forces in Scotland.
Amendments 38 to 41 are minor and technical. Where all the conduct authorised is likely to take place in Scotland, Section 46 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 prohibits Scottish police forces from authorising under RIPA unless the authorisation is granted or renewed in the interests of national security or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Clause 8 of the Bill replicates this restriction unnecessarily. These amendments remove this replication. I hope that noble Lords will agree with the benefits that these provisions will bring. I beg to move.
Clause 8: Authorisations for surveillance etc
42: Clause 10, page 15, line 10, at end insert—
“( ) After subsection (1B) insert—
“(1C) Before making any regulations under this section, the Secretary of State shall seek advice from Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary.””
Baroness Harris of Richmond: Amendments 42 and 44 stand in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Miller, although they also stand alongside related proposals on whether Clauses 11 and 12 should stand part. Both amendments are intended to modernise the operation of regulation and order-making powers under Sections 53 and 57 of the Police Act 1996, to bring them into line with more recent legislation exemplified by Section 53A of the same Police Act. These changes would require the Secretary of State to take into account the expertise of HMIC in the fields of police equipment and facilities and services before exercising powers under this section.
I believe the Government intend that these provisions in the Bill will enable the Home Secretary to mandate the use of national IT systems. However, the provisions are not limited to this and once again contain wide-ranging order-making powers which could have a much broader application. I accept that it might not be the intention of the current Home Secretary to use the powers more widely, but that does not guarantee that they will not be misused in the future. It therefore seems sensible to include mechanisms that help to ensure that these powers are used wisely and proportionately. The reference to HMIC advice is one way of trying to ensure this. I beg to move.
Lord West of Spithead: We fully recognise that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary plays an important role in promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces. However, we feel that the existing consultation provisions in Sections 53 and 57 of the Police Act 1996, which relate to regulations that the Secretary of State can make regarding standards of equipment or requiring police forces to use specified facilities or services, are sufficient. Both Sections 53 and 57 already provide that the Secretary of State must consult the Association of Police Authorities and the Association of Chief Police Officers. Existing safeguards are therefore in place to ensure that the force requirements are fully understood and considered by those who have the greatest expertise in understanding the implications of making those regulations.
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Although we recognise the important role of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in advising the Secretary of State, it is conceivable that the inspectorate—in certain technical cases on matters related to the regulations under Sections 53 and 57 of the 1996 Act as amended, for example relating to IT software procurement—would have neither the interest, inclination nor expertise to provide a consultative opinion to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may of course wish to consider consulting HMIC on these regulations in other circumstances, but he should not be required to do so as the amendments propose.
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