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Many of those who regard humankind as no more than elevated animals are no less wary of fraying and fretting at those constraints than those who believe

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that life is God-granted and that the taking of life is to infringe on divine territory. Of course, that common position is less assured over whether we have the right to dispose of our own lives and, even less so, on whether we have the right or the obligation to assist others to do so. It seems to me that to claim, as the noble Baroness just did, that it is an act of discrimination not to assist a disabled person to take their own life, because an able-bodied person could take their own in the same circumstances, is a curious argument. One might as well say that, if a person is mentally ill and seeks to take their life, because they are disabled we should assist them to do so, because if they were able and had come to that conclusion they would have been able to do so. That is totally absurd.

Amendment 66 would decriminalise, under prescribed circumstances, the giving of assistance to certain classes of people to take their own lives. It would require a particular group of people, the coroners, to issue licences of immunity-that is, certificates that would turn what would otherwise be a criminal offence into a normal act that was not criminal. I do not like the idea of giving certain classes of people that right or obligation to say in advance that a certain course of action, which would otherwise have been against the law, is within the law. In my view, that is to tread on a slope that is not merely slippery but downhill to an extent where not even the ingenuity of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, can effectively prescribe limits.

I cannot imagine coroners welcoming this task of certifying who would qualify for a certificate of the kind described in the amendment, or which other group of people would be suitable for the job. Indeed, a coroner would have to decide whether the individual was capable of making a free and settled decision that he or she wanted to kill themselves. What about those suffering from dementia? How would they be treated? Would they be judged as being capable of taking a decision or not and, if not, would we be discriminating against them?

I am not sure that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, really has his heart in this. The expression,

"bring their life to a close",

has about it a taint of weasel words to avoid the use of the more accurate words "kill themselves". The plain fact is that there have been no prosecutions of people who have facilitated suicide by delivering those for whom life has become an excessive burden to the suicide factories in Switzerland. The fact that there could be such a prosecution may have deterred-indeed, I am sure that it has deterred-the compassionate from assisting the act of suicide in that way. Far more important, it has also deterred those who might have exerted pressure on a weak, ill and vulnerable person from whose death they might profit. In my view, the law is working perfectly well, or in some cases not working at all perfectly well, and we should leave it alone.

10.30 pm

The Lord Bishop of Ripon and Leeds: My Lords, I, too, hope that we shall not proceed with the amendment, despite the power of the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, and the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy.

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Many of the things that I might have said have been said much better by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and in her most powerful speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell.

I want to take up two points from what the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, said. First, it sounded as though it was likely that those in this tragic and difficult situation would become the subject of court cases. There would have to be ways of discovering when an illness was confirmed "incurable and disabling" and what a "free and settled wish" was. Surely the experience of all of us who meet people in these sorts of circumstances is that the last thing that will be helpful for them, or which they want, is to become the subject of a court case.

Secondly, I do not think that the parallel being made with the disability legislation is accepted. I believe that it is true, as others have argued, that any legalising of assisted suicide will inevitably put pressure on the sick and vulnerable. It is not so much that relatives or others will deliberately pressure them but rather that there will be those who seek assistance to end their own lives because they consider themselves a nuisance. That is a state of mind that those of us involved in pastoral work recognise only too well as dangerous and destructive to the life of that individual.

Let us reject the amendment and increase our efforts to support and encourage palliative care and the work of hospices, which provide so much more appropriate a way forward for the tragic circumstances that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, described for us.

Lord Goodhart: My Lords, it is plain that there is little or no support in the House this evening for the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Alderdice, even from the noble Lord, Lord Low, the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and me, who supported, and remain supporters of, the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, in Committee. Given that this debate has lasted for three-quarters of an hour, can I assume that it is now time to bring it to an end?

Lord Bach: My Lords, I agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. Perhaps I may make one or two final comments and then the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, will respond. As the House knows, the Government believe that any change to the law in this area is an issue of individual conscience and, of course, a matter for Parliament to decide. We have been reminded of the debate that we held as recently as 7 July, when, on a free vote, the House came to a view.

The House has great respect for the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, and for all those who have contributed to this debate on whichever side. Our firm view remains that the Coroners and Justice Bill has never been, and is not now the appropriate vehicle for change in the criminal law as it applies to assisted suicide. The provisions in Clause 53 do not change the scope of the current law. Our aim is to simplify the law by bringing together two existing offences, and to modernise the language to aid clarity and understanding. Conduct that is illegal now would remain illegal.

Unlike the amendment that we debated on 7 July, this amendment seems to tackle the issue of assisted dying head-on, by making it legal in limited circumstances

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to assist the suicide of a person who is suffering from a confirmed, incurable and disabling illness. The House has debated around this issue on a number of occasions, most notably in the context of Private Members' Bills introduced by my noble friend Lord Joffe. His second Bill was considered at some length by a Select Committee-some of whose members may be in the House tonight-chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, which reported in April 2005. That committee did not take a position either way on the central issue, but it made a number of recommendations with regard to any future Bills that are relevant.

The moral and ethical issues raised by this amendment have been well rehearsed. I simply remind the House that, whatever the moral arguments, any Government are duty-bound to ensure that amendments to the criminal law are fit for purpose. It therefore falls to me to set out some of the difficulties with the amendments as drafted. These points pick up many of the themes that the Select Committee, chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, identified. The amendment does not limit the rendering of assistance with suicide to doctors or address significant implications that legislation in this area would have for healthcare professionals. Nor, unlike the amendment debated in July, does it address the crucial issue of mental capacity. It refers to,

"confirmed, incurable and disabling illness",

which potentially goes much wider than terminal illness, but it does not define those terms.

We have already had the discussion on whether the coronial system and coroners are in any way appropriate. To be fair to the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, he suggested in his opening remarks that that might not be so. I certainly get the impression, although I may be wrong, that the noble Lord has raised this issue, whether appropriately or not, late at night on Report, to have a discussion around it. He made it clear, and I was very pleased to hear it for a number of reasons, that he does not intend to press his amendment this evening.

Some members of the Government go one way on this issue, and others go the other way, and there is nothing wrong in that. The amendment arguably raises more questions than it answers. Any proposal to change the law would properly require detailed and careful scrutiny by both Houses of Parliament. This Bill is not the place for that.

Lord Alderdice: My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this debate, perhaps particularly to the Minister for pointing out the purpose behind what I am doing, and for drawing some attention to a number of the points that I made in my introduction, which were studiously ignored by a number of colleagues because of a degree of discomfort about the whole business.

I am used to dealing with people who have decided for the moment that they wish to bring their lives to an end. Before I left Belfast to come here today, I dealt with two such situations and, when I return tomorrow morning, I will be dealing with some more. It is a constant issue for me, and in making the judgment on

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whether it is free and settled will, which in the vast majority of cases it is not, hugely significant efforts must be made over periods of years to try to protect people from bringing their lives to a close when it is clearly a function of mental illness rather than of free and settled will. But I can appreciate that that is not the experience of many noble Lords-in many ways, these are rather more academic than political matters. But I make it clear that this is for that minority of people who do want to take such a course. The suggestion that somehow or other I do not understand that that, properly, is the desirable, alternative course for the majority of people is not really a fair listening to what I have said.

One can easily strike debating points. There was the issue about whether I could name a particular physician who had been opposed to chloroform. Well, as it happens, it was brought to my attention subsequently that one of the fiercest critics of Sir James Simpson, who developed the use of chloroform, was a professional colleague of the noble Lord, Lord McColl-the American surgeon, Henry Jacob Bigelow.

Let us not pretend that there are not people to whom this applies, even if it is a minority. Medical practitioners, politicians, theologians and others have not always got it right in terms of how the future judges their judgments about morality. This is not about putting disabled people in a bad place, but it faces the reality that they often find themselves in a bad place. Caring for that is not some academic issue, but a painful and difficult emotional issue with which we must find a way of struggling.

It is clear that the House is not at this point in a position to offer me any guidance as to how things might be taken forward in such a way that this small minority of people might have their concerns held, just as for the majority of people their concerns are being addressed. Despite the comments about the coroners, I still take the view that some judicial figure is more appropriate than a medical, theological or, perish the thought, political figure to make judgments of this sort. With that, and with appreciation of those who have struggled with these questions and continue to do so, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 66 withdrawn.

Amendment 66A

Moved by Lord Bach

66A: Before Clause 64, insert the following new Clause-

"Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes

(1) The International Criminal Court Act 2001 is amended as follows.

(2) In sections 53 and 60 (trial and punishment of main offences), after subsection (6) add-

"(7) Subsections (5) and (6) are subject to section 65B (restriction of penalties in relation to retrospective application of certain offences)."

(3) After section 65 insert-

"65A Retrospective application of certain offences

(1) Sections 51 and 58 apply to acts committed on or after 1 January 1991.

26 Oct 2009 : Column 1090

(2) But those sections do not apply to a crime against humanity, or a war crime within article 8.2(b) or (e), committed by a person before 1 September 2001 unless, at the time the act constituting that crime was committed, the act amounted in the circumstances to a criminal offence under international law.

(3) Section 52 applies to conduct in which a person engaged on or after 1 January 1991, and in subsections (2) and (3) of that section references to an offence include an act or conduct which would not constitute an offence under the law of England and Wales but for this section.

(4) Section 59 applies to conduct in which a person engaged on or after 1 January 1991, and in subsections (2) and (3) of that section references to an offence include an act or conduct which would not constitute an offence under the law of Northern Ireland but for this section.

(5) Any enactment or rule of law relating to an offence ancillary to a relevant Part 5 offence-

(a) applies to conduct in which a person engaged on or after 1 January 1991, and

(b) applies even if the act or conduct constituting the relevant Part 5 offence would not constitute such an offence but for this section.

(6) But sections 52 and 59, and any enactment or rule of law relating to an offence ancillary to a relevant Part 5 offence, do not apply to-

(a) conduct in which the person engaged before 1 September 2001, or

(b) conduct in which the person engaged on or after that date which was ancillary to an act or conduct which-

(i) was committed or engaged in before that date, and

(ii) would not constitute a relevant Part 5 offence, or fall within section 52(2) or 59(2), but for this section,

unless, at the time the person engaged in the conduct, it amounted in the circumstances to a criminal offence under international law.

(7) Section 65, so far as it has effect in relation to relevant Part 5 offences-

(a) applies to failures to exercise control of the kind mentioned in section 65(2) or (3) which occurred on or after 1 January 1991, and

(b) applies even if the act or conduct constituting the relevant Part 5 offence would not constitute such an offence but for this section.

(8) But section 65, so far as it has effect in relation to relevant Part 5 offences, does not apply to a failure to exercise control of the kind mentioned in section 65(2) or (3) which occurred before 1 September 2001 unless, at the time the failure occurred, it amounted in the circumstances to a criminal offence under international law.

(9) In this section "relevant Part 5 offence" means an offence under section 51, 52, 58 or 59 or an offence ancillary to such an offence.

65B Modification of penalties: provision supplemental to section 65A

(1) In the case of a pre-existing E&W offence committed before 1 September 2001, in section 53(6) "30 years" is to be read as "14 years".

(2) In the case of an offence of the kind mentioned in section 55(1)(d) which is ancillary to a pre-existing E&W offence committed before 1 September 2001, nothing in section 53(5) and (6) disapplies the penalties provided for in sections 4 and 5 of the Criminal Law Act 1967.

(3) In the case of a pre-existing NI offence committed before 1 September 2001, in section 60(6) "30 years" is to be read as "14 years".

(4) In the case of an offence of the kind mentioned in section 62(1)(d) which is ancillary to a pre-existing NI offence committed

26 Oct 2009 : Column 1091

before 1 September 2001, nothing in section 60(5) and (6) disapplies the penalties provided for in sections 4 and 5 of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967.

(5) In this section-

"pre-existing E&W offence" means-

(a) an offence under section 51 on account of an act constituting genocide, if at the time the act was committed it also amounted to an offence under section 1 of the Genocide Act 1969;

(b) an offence under section 51 on account of an act constituting a war crime, if at the time the act was committed it also amounted to an offence under section 1 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (grave breaches of the Conventions);

(c) an offence of a kind mentioned in section 55(1)(a) to (c) which is ancillary to an offence within paragraph (a) or (b) above;

"pre-existing NI offence" means-

(a) an offence under section 58 on account of an act constituting genocide, if at the time the act was committed it also amounted to an offence under section 1 of the Genocide Act 1969;

(b) an offence under section 58 on account of an act constituting a war crime, if at the time the act was committed it also amounted to an offence under section 1 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (grave breaches of the Conventions);

(c) an offence of a kind mentioned in section 62(1)(a) to (c) which is ancillary to an offence within paragraph (a) or (b) above."

(4) After section 67 insert-

"67A Supplemental provision about UK residents

(1) To the extent that it would not otherwise be the case, the following individuals are to be treated for the purposes of this Part as being resident in the United Kingdom-

(a) an individual who has indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom;

(b) any other individual who has made an application for such leave (whether or not it has been determined) and who is in the United Kingdom;

(c) an individual who has leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom for the purposes of work or study and who is in the United Kingdom;

(d) an individual who has made an asylum claim, or a human rights claim, which has been granted;

(e) any other individual who has made an asylum claim or human rights claim (whether or not the claim has been determined) and who is in the United Kingdom;

(f) an individual named in an application for indefinite leave to remain, an asylum claim or a human rights claim as a dependant of the individual making the application or claim if-

(i) the application or claim has been granted, or

(ii) the named individual is in the United Kingdom (whether or not the application or claim has been determined);

(g) an individual who would be liable to removal or deportation from the United Kingdom but cannot be removed or deported because of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 or for practical reasons;

(h) an individual-

(i) against whom a decision to make a deportation order under section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 by virtue of section 3(5)(a) of that Act (deportation conducive to the public good) has been made,

26 Oct 2009 : Column 1092

(ii) who has appealed against the decision to make the order (whether or not the appeal has been determined), and

(iii) who is in the United Kingdom;

(i) an individual who is an illegal entrant within the meaning of section 33(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 or who is liable to removal under section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999;

(j) an individual who is detained in lawful custody in the United Kingdom.

(2) When determining for the purposes of this Part whether any other individual is resident in the United Kingdom regard is to be had to all relevant considerations including-

(a) the periods during which the individual has been or intends to be in the United Kingdom,

(b) the purposes for which the individual is, has been or intends to be in the United Kingdom,

(c) whether the individual has family or other connections to the United Kingdom and the nature of those connections, and

(d) whether the individual has an interest in residential property located in the United Kingdom.

(3) In this section-

"asylum claim" means-

(a) a claim that it would be contrary to the United Kingdom's obligations under the Refugee Convention for the claimant to be removed from, or required to leave, the United Kingdom, or

(b) a claim that the claimant would face a real risk of serious harm if removed from the United Kingdom;

"Convention rights" means the rights identified as Convention rights by section 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998;

"detained in lawful custody" means-

(a) detained in pursuance of a sentence of imprisonment, detention or custody for life or a detention and training order,

(b) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,

(c) detained pursuant to an order under section 2 of the Colonial Prisoners Removal Act 1884 or a warrant under section 1 or 4A of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984,

(d) detained under Part 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983 or by virtue of an order under section 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 or section 6 or 14 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (hospital orders, etc),

(e) detained by virtue of an order under Part 6 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (other than an order under section 60C) or a hospital direction under section 59A of that Act, and includes detention by virtue of the special restrictions set out in Part 10 of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 to which a person is subject by virtue of an order under section 59 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, or

(f) detained under Part 3 of the Mental Health (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 or by virtue of an order under section 11 or 13(5A) of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980;

"human rights claim" means a claim that to remove the claimant from, or to require the claimant to leave, the United Kingdom would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (public authority not to act contrary to Convention) as being incompatible with the person's Convention rights;

"the Refugee Convention" means the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 and the Protocol to the Convention;

26 Oct 2009 : Column 1093

"serious harm" has the meaning given by article 15 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted;

and a reference to having leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom is to be construed in accordance with the Immigration Act 1971.

26 Oct 2009 : Column 1094

(4) This section applies in relation to any offence under this Part (whether committed before or after the coming into force of this section).""

Amendment 66A agreed.

Further consideration on Report adjourned.

House adjourned at 10.43 pm.

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