The Barnett Formula - Select Committee on the Barnett Formula Contents


Memorandum by Professor James Foreman-Peck

  1.  This note first shows the spending pattern achieved under the current system of devolution financing. Consistent with the untrammelled operation of the Barnett Formula, Welsh public expenditure per head increased by a smaller proportion than English spending between 2002 and 2007. But Scotland, unlike Wales, obtained considerably more funding than predicted by a simplified application of the Barnett Formula. In the second section, an alternative rule is presented that maintains existing proportionate differentials in public spending between UK countries. This permits by comparison a calculation of the "Barnett Squeeze" on different assumptions. For Wales, taking 2002-03 as the baseline, the predicted "squeeze" on the 2007-08 budget was about £630 million, and compared with actual (planned) spending, it was around £860 million. The third section suggests a simple needs-based rule to replace Barnett. Household disposable income is a more appropriate needs indicator than GVA per head (when both are adjusted for price differences between regions) because GVA measures production which is less related to need than is income. The rule takes as the needs standard variations with household income of UK state spending on benefits in kind. According to this approach a continuing "Barnett squeeze" is justified.

I.  SPENDING PATTERNS UNDER THE BARNETT FORMULA

  2.  Under the Barnett Formula, once extra spending has been agreed by central government, it is divided between UK countries on the basis of population. Increases in English public spending in relevant categories ("comparable programmes") are matched by equal increases per head in devolved administration budgets. But since the devolved administrations spend more per head of their populations, their budgets are therefore augmented by smaller proportions than England's. Hence their expenditures per head tend to converge slowly to that of England (the "Barnett Squeeze").

  3.  Historically there was some "bypass" of Barnett Formula (and use of incorrect population factors). HM Treasury expected that the greater transparency introduced with the Devolution Settlement would reduce such anomalies—and certainly more information as to the operation of the Formula is now in the public domain.

  4.  The present exercise attempts to assess how much convergence of spending per head the operation of the formula has produced during the period 2002-03—2006-07 (and also to 2007-08, although only planned rather than outcome figures are available for the last date at present). This allows a calculation of (net) formula "bypass".

  5.  As a reasonable simplification, assume of total identifiable public spending on services at the country and region level, only "social protection" and "agriculture" are not devolved functions. Then the growth of such spending per head can be compared between England and the devolved administrations.

  6.  This calculation in Table 1 shows that public spending in Wales increased about as much as predicted by the Barnett Formula between 2002 and 2006. Despite Objective One funding, there was minimal net "bypass". Welsh "devolved" spending rose by a little more than 33 per cent, while comparable expenditure in England increased by over 38 per cent. With greater public spending per head, the Formula prescribes a smaller percentage rise in expenditure for Scotland than for Wales (about 31 per cent compared with 33 per cent). Yet Scotland, unlike Wales, appears to have "bypassed" the Formula, almost matching England's percentage increase in spending per head 2002-03—2006-07.

  7.  Between 2006-07 and 2007-08, planned spending was to rise by 8.6 per cent in England (Table 1). Allocating the implied sum of money per head to the devolved administrations according to the populations, should have given Wales a 7.5 per cent increase and Scotland 6.8 per cent. However Welsh "devolved" spending increased by 1.8 percentage points less than predicted by the Barnett Formula, while Scottish spending increased by one percentage point more.

  8.  These figures show that the "Barnett Squeeze" took less from Welsh spending than other budgetary influences between 2006-07 and 2007-08. For one way of calculating the squeeze is to compare the actual budget increment with how much money, say, Wales would receive if the percentage increase in budget was the same as England's under the Formula. But this approach would require a larger total UK budget. Calculating the "squeeze" within the existing budget requires an alternative budgetary rule against which the current Formula can be assessed.

TABLE 1
IDENTIFIABLE PUBLIC SPENDING ON SERVICES


2002-03
2006-07
2007-08
2002-06
2002-07
2006-07
%
%
%

Wales
"Devolved" per head (£)
3,662
4,802
5,051
31.1
37.9
5.2
"Devolved" (£ million)
10,693
14,241
15,049
33.2
40.7
5.7
"Barnett" predicted
budget increase
32.9
42.9
7.5
  
Scotland
"Devolved" per head (£)
3,922
5,289
5,676
34.8
44.7
7.3
"Devolved" (£ million)
19,824
27,061
29,168
36.5
47.1
7.8
"Barnett" predicted
30.6
40
6.8
  
N Ireland
"Devolved" per head (£)
4,497
5,368
5,684
19.4
26.4
5.9
"Devolved" (£ million)
7,751
9,349
10,008
20.6
29.1
7
"Barnett" predicted
26.7
34.9
6.7
  
England
"Devolved" per head (£)
3,092
4,192
4,522
35.6
46.3
7.9
"Devolved" (£ million)
153,522
212,774
231,082
38.6
50.5
8.6
"Barnett" predicted
budget increase
39.1
50.7
8.6


  Notes: Calculated from HM Treasury PESA. Tables 10.1-10.4. "Devolved" = total identifiable spending—agriculture—social protection. "Barnett" predicted = increase over period* average population share.

II.  BARNETT WITHOUT THE SQUEEZE.

  9.  The objective of allocating a given sum of money without the convergence property of the Barnett Formula is easily achieved. Calculate the total devolved categories of spending for England, as well as for the other administrations. Divide the total UK figure into the sum to be distributed. Then allocate to each administration a proportionate increase in their budgets equal to the resulting fraction. This ensures the continuation of existing disparities in proportionate terms. For any "comparable programme" a similar exercise can be undertaken.

  10.  As an illustration, suppose the increased money available is expected to be £15 billion and the current spend is £300 billion on "comparable programmes". Under Barnett the £15 billion is allocated according to population. For ease of calculation we assume in the planned expenditure period that England's population is 50 million, Wales three million, Scotland five million and Northern Ireland two million. Under Barnett England gets £(50/60)*15 billion = £12.5 billion and Wales gets £(3/60)*15 billion = £750 million. With "Barnett relaxed" each country receives (15/300=) 5 per cent. The corresponding number in sterling depends upon the country baseline. If England's baseline was £235 billion (£4,700 per head with no population growth according to these numbers) and Wales' £20 billion (£6,667 per head), England would receive (235*.05=)£11.75 billion, less than under Barnett, and Wales gets (20*.05=) £1 billion, more than under Barnett.

Table 2
BARNETT RELAXED AND THE SQUEEZE 2006-07


% 2006-07
% point
difference from
UK %
increase
2006-07 (8.3)
"Squeeze"
2006-07
£ million
%
2002-07
"Squeeze"
2002-07
(48.8%
UK increase)

Wales
Actual "devolved"
increase
5.7
2.6
370
40.7
866
Barnett predicted
increase
7.5
0.8
114
42.9
631
Scotland
Actual "devolved"
increase
7.8
0. 5
135
47.1
337
Barnett predicted
increase
6.8
1.5
406
40
1744
N Ireland
Actual "devolved"
increase
7
1.3
122
29.1
1527
Barnett predicted
increase
6.7
1.6
150
34.9
1077
England
Actual "devolved"
increase
8.6
-0.3
-638
50.5
-2610
Barnett predicted
increase
8.6
-0.3
-638
50.7
-2917


  Note: The "Squeeze" columns do not sum to zero because of rounding errors.

  11.  Table 2 takes the figures for 2006-2007 and 2002-7 from Table 1 to calculate the difference the "relaxed formula" would have made to the allocation of 2007-08. Applying the "relaxed formula" for 2007-08 only, England loses 0.3 percentage points of the increase, amounting to almost £640 million. Wales gains £114 million compared with the Barnett formula and £370 million compared with the actual allocation. Scotland gains £406 million from removal of the "squeeze", but only £135 million more than planned.

  12.  The impact of the "squeeze" is cumulative. Had the "relaxed formula" been adopted in 2002, the effect in 2007-08 would have been much greater. A given percentage increase exercises a larger absolute effect the higher the base on which it is calculated. The earlier the base is raised (by adopting the "relaxed formula") the higher will be the base in any subsequent year. Table 2 shows that in 2007-08 England's allocation would have been £2.6-2.9 billion less, if the relaxed formula had been introduced in 2002, and Wales would have been better off by £0.5-0.8 billion. As with the one year exercise, the Barnett squeeze on Scotland is much more severe in theory than in practice. The opposite is the case for Wales.

III.  NEEDS AND DEVOLUTION

  13.  The "Relaxed Barnett Formula" shares with Barnett the advantages of budgeting simplicity and ease of calculation. It also removes the apparently arbitrary convergence property of Barnett. But it embeds no less arbitrary differences in public spending per head of population between the countries of the United Kingdom. These differentials cannot readily be explained in terms of variations in "needs" between the countries. One reason is that there is no agreed measure of general public spending "needs".[5] GVA per head has been suggested as an aggregate regional indicator but GVA differences reflect divergent regional employment participation rates. Wales's rate was 55.4 per cent at the end of 2006 compared with the UK's 60 per cent. If Wales had achieved the UK rate it is reasonable to expect Welsh GVA per head to be 81 per cent of the UK average rather than 75 per cent.[6]

  14.  Household disposable income (standardised for household membership and including transfer payments) is not subject to this difficulty and is more obviously related to need than GVA, which concerns productivity and participation. Differences in regional costs of living should be factored into the needs indicator for an adequate comparison as well. Subject to these and other adjustments, it is possible to obtain a relationship between household income and utilization of public services for a cross-section of the UK population and apply this to a modified income index to obtain a public expenditure allocation model.

  15.  We use the approximation to "devolved" expenditure under Barnett across UK countries, because England is not subject to the Formula and the other countries do not have identical devolved spending powers. For present purposes we will assume that this measure of "devolved" spending is equivalent to "state benefits in kind"—of which health and education are the largest components. We can compare the equivalent benefit categories received by different income groups in the UK with the comparable benefit possibilities allocated to devolved administrations and English regions by average household income. If the Barnett Formula is working well, we should find similar relations between UK household receipt of state benefits in kind by income as between devolved spending and household income across regions.

Table 3
UK HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND STATE BENEFITS IN KIND


Household Income
decile
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th

Equivalised
disposable income £)
7,420
11,665
14,203
16,749
19,403
State benefits in kind
(£)
8,003
6,951
6,495
6,324
5,774


  Source:  Economic and Labour Market Review, Vol 2 No 7 July 2008.

  16.  Populations of the devolved governments account for only about one sixth of the UK total, so atypical spending allocations to these countries will not significantly influence the total distribution in the present exercise. Table 3 shows the average state benefits in kind received by households by decile of disposable incomes in the UK. As incomes rise, state benefits utilised fall.

  17.  In table 4 and Appendix figure 1, which show the relation between household income by region and public spending, no such negative relationship is observed—once the lowest spending area (in figure 1 the bottom right), England, is excluded. The two highest areas of "devolved" public expenditure are Northern Ireland and Scotland. The lowest household income area is the North East region of England, which received higher public spending in 2007-08 than Wales. Consistent with the negative relation of Table 1, Wales has a greater household disposable income in 2006 than the North East. The anomalies by UK spending standards then are Northern Ireland and Scotland. These countries receive more in relation to household after-tax income in public spending than the rest of the UK. But Wales is slightly below a line connecting the North East and England as a whole, at least hinting that Wales, unlike Northern Ireland and Scotland, is receiving a slightly poorer deal than comparable English regions.

Table 4
GROSS VALUE-ADDED, HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND PUBLIC SPENDING


GVA per head 2007
Gross Household
Disposable Income 2006
"Devolved" public
spending per head,
2007-08 planned

Wales
14,877
12,300
5,051
North East
15,688
11,800
5,425
N Ireland
16,170
12,000
5,684
Scotland
19,152
13,100
5,676
England
20,463
14,000
4,522


  Source:  ONS 12 Dec 2008 Regional, sub-regional and local gross value added; HM Treasury PESA Tables 9.10a and 9.10b.

  Note: Definition of "devolved" as in Table 1.

  18.  Table 2 shows regional variations in the cost of living. Whereas prices excluding housing costs in Wales were about 4 per cent below the UK average, when housing costs are taken into account, the Welsh cost of living was 7-8 per cent lower than the UK average in 2004. How housing is taken into account in the needs indicator is therefore critical.

Table 5
PRICE INDICES IN 2004 RELATIVE TO THE UK (UK=100)


Excluding housing
Including housing
National weights
Regional Weights
National Weights
Regional Weights

Wales
96.5
95.8
93.1
92.1
Scotland
98.0
96.1
94.5
93.1
Northern Ireland
100.9
98.7
95.8
95.3
North East
96.1
94.9
94.2
93.0


  Source:Wingfield, D. Fenwick, D. Smith, K. "Relative regional consumer price levels in 2004" Economic Trends 615 February 2005.

  19.  The bulk of devolved spending is on state benefits in kind. Figure 2 shows how these benefits vary with household disposable income. One description of the relation between income and benefits is that a one per cent rise in income is associated with 0.39 per cent fall in state benefits consumption (Table 3) A fair allocation would then be obtained from the proportionate deviation of devolved household disposable income from the UK average, adjusted for differences in costs of living.

Table 6
REGRESSION OF PROPORTIONAL RELATION BETWEEN HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE INCOME AND BENEFITS IN KIND


Adjusted R Square
0.98
Observations
   10




Coefficients
Standard Error

Intercept
12.55
0.20
Disposable income
-0.39
0.02


  20.  In the case of Wales, household disposable income, now 11 per cent lower than the UK average, must be divided by 0.921 (Table 2) or 0.931 to correct for lower Welsh prices. Real income per head is then approximately 4 per cent lower than the UK average. Wales therefore requires 0.39*4 per cent = 1.6 per cent more spending per head or per household than the UK average, if the distribution of state benefits in kind in relation to income across the UK is taken as the standard.

  21.  According to this needs measure Welsh devolved spending per head should be reduced. Wales' identifiable state spending net of social protection and agriculture 2007-08 was £5,051 per head and the UK was £4,679. That is, Welsh state spending per head was 7.9 per cent greater than the UK average, compared with the 1.6 per cent warranted. For the other devolved administrations, the excess of budgets over those warranted by UK spending are far greater.

  22.  This aggregate approach to needs assessment has the advantage of relative simplicity, consistent with devolution. Devolved administrations themselves employ needs-based rules to allocate spending between health authorities and among local governments. They make the decision about the resources to allocate between spending departments. So for central government to employ a needs-based formula that explicitly takes into account health, education, transport and so on, would be second guessing the lower tier government. The weights assigned to the various indicators would reflect the central government's valuations not those of the devolved administrations.

  23.  A cost-based formula is unsatisfactory in removing incentives to control costs and to adjust provision according to circumstances. Scotland might have chosen a less expensive housing policy before devolution had it faced a less accommodating budget constraint. By contrast, a modified income approach provides encouragement for cost-containment and flexible cost-minimisation, at least in the short-run. If a devolved authority is less efficient than the UK average at providing public services, it will be less able to conceal the shortcoming by spending more on them.

  24.  While at first sight the Barnett squeeze appears arbitrary, the application of an aggregate needs indicator suggests it is a pragmatic solution to the excessive budgets granted to the devolved administrations.



5   Particular needs indicators are more common but still controversial. Free school meals are sometimes used as an indicator of educational needs and the standardised mortality rate on occasion has been adopted for health needs. Back

6   (GVA/Population.)= (GVA/worker).(workers/pop.). UK GVAP=100, Wales GVAP=75. (100/75)= [UK/WalesGVAper worker]*[0.60/0.554.]. Implied Welsh GVA per worker 81.2 per cent of UK. With UK employment rate Wales would achieve the same GVA per head. Back


 
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