Memorandum by the Surveillance Studies
Network (Dr Kirstie Ball, Senior Lecturer in Organisation Studies
at the Open University Business School, UK, Professor Stephen
Graham, Professor of Human Geography, University of Durham, UK,
Professor David Lyon, Professor of Sociology and Director of the
Surveillance Project, Queens University, Canada, Dr David Murakami
Wood, Lecturer in Town Planning, Newcastle University, UK, and
Professor Clive Norris, Professor of Sociology and Deputy Director
of the Centre for Criminological Research, University of Sheffield,
UK)
The Surveillance Studies Network is a charitable
company, registered with the UK Charities Commission, dedicated
to public education on the subject of surveillance.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The Surveillance Studies Network welcomes this inquiry
by the House of Lords and the opportunity for further high level
debate on the surveillance society that it offers. We make observations
in five broad areas that we feel the committee should consider:
(i) Current Surveillance Practices, especially
those which are of most concern;
(ii) Reasons for the increasing spread and intensification
of surveillance;
(iii) Relationships between citizen and state;
and,
(iv) Five models for society, including our favoured
option of "The Reciprocal Society", which rebuilds trust
and introduces assessment of the impact of surveillance technologies
and processes.
We argue that the limitations of Data Protection
and Freedom of Information law do not provide adequate protection
for citizens in a world of pervasive (real-time, at-a-distance,
computerised and automated) surveillance. Further that the nature
of citizenship in such a society must be reconsidered and the
constitution and law of Britain adjusted to reflect this.
INTRODUCTION
The Directors of the Surveillance Studies Network
welcome the decision of the Committee to hold this inquiry. The
details of our arguments may be found in our full revised Report
on the Surveillance Society, which we append. We are making
a submission separate from the Information Commissioner as there
are significant differences of emphasis.
We outline four broad areas for consideration:
current surveillance practices; reasons for the spread and intensification
of surveillance; relationships between state and citizens; and,
five models for society.
1. CURRENT SURVEILLANCE
PRACTICES
1.1 Contemporary surveillance, often called
the "new surveillance," or "digital surveillance",
is characterised by:
pervasivenesssurveillance
tends to spread everywhere;
greater intensitysurveillance
is able to "dig deeper";
greater speedsurveillance
can happen quicker, even in "real time";
action at a distancesurveillance
can take place a long way from the person being surveilled;
interconnectiondifferent
surveillance systems can be more easily linked, and information
shared;
social sortingsurveillance
is aimed at categorising, sorting and profiling people based on
"risk" or profitability;
automationsurveillance
is increasingly driven by computer systems and algorithms analyse
collected data;
simulation and Pre-emptionsurveillance
is tending towards anticipation of possible actions, risks and
profits, and in many cases to simulate possibilities and pre-empt
events;
data doubles, the emergence
of the virtual citizens composed of the information about us within
databases, that stand for our real selves in all sort of transactions
with the state.
1.2 The technological forms that characterise
"new surveillance" are:
Computer databases, which
have added a distinctive dimension in that they are both searchable
and remotely accessible. These databases are also increasing in
scope, size and functionality.
Digital imaging and sensory technologies,
for example digital CCTV and scanning technologies, which allow
storage of data, and algorithmic operations to be performed on
that data.
Biometrics, technologies that
"recognise" individual or characteristic human bodily
traits or movements, including facial recognition, iris scanning,
movement recognition and so on.
Geolocation, technologies
that combine mapping and surveillance to track and control either
individuals or patterns of behaviour, for example, satellite monitoring
of offenders.
Micro- and Nano- technologies,
the decreasing size of sensors to the very small, including microcameras
and "smart dust" or "motes".
Mobile technologies, the increasing
development of either temporarily-installed, remote-controlled
or independently mobile systems, for example miniature Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
1.3 The characteristics and systems lead
to increases both in targeted and mass surveillance.
By targeted surveillance we
refer to the surveillance of distinct individuals or groups, for
a particular purpose.
By mass surveillance, we refer
to the undifferentiated and general surveillance of the population
as a whole.
Both of these take place, but the
re-emergence of mass surveillance (which had been a key part of
the authoritarian regimes of the mid-Twentieth Century) and the
much greater use of intensive targeted and pre-emptive surveillance
poses particular problems for constitutional rights in democracies
like the UK.
2. REASONS FOR
THE SPREAD
AND INTENSIFICATION
OF SURVEILLANCE
2.1 Risk. We live in a society obsessed
by risk. Risk management techniques dealing with external threats
have come a key part of organisational activities. Internal risk
assessment procedures are also more common. The "war on terror"
has made the "state of emergency" almost normal. We
have seen the emergence of a "safety state" obsessed
with security and stability, and increasingly favouring the precautionary
surveillance of groups, categories and individuals by the state.
This can confer personal and social benefits, but at the same
time the conception of safety and security has important implications
for liberty, privacy and other social values, as well as for innovation
and change, which are inherently risky.
2.2 Militarisation. The obsession
with risk is facilitating an increasing interchange between the
military and civil realms. Technologies and assessment procedures
that were pioneered in armed conflict are now seen on our streets,
from "emergency powers" to stop and search, through
Automatic Numberplate Recognition (ANPR) and the Geographic Positioning
System (GPS) to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
2.3 Economics. The security industry
is one of the most profitable and fastest growing sectors of the
global economy. R&D and promotion of new systems by the industry
runs far ahead of the ability of bureaucrats and politicians to
understand the systems, how they function separately and together,
and particularly their longer-term implications for society and
state-citizen relations. Sales pitches follow swiftly after key
events like 9/11 or the Soham killings, and "silver bullets"
are eagerly promulgated and too readily purchased.
2.4 Information Society. New generations
are growing up information-literate and with new presumptions
about their own visibility, privacy and exposure to surveillance.
Those with greater access to knowledge resources are realising
that it pays to try look after their "data double".
This has become critical for life-chances, especially as credit
scoring and other forms of database-driven rankings of the worthiness
of individuals becomes the basis for the provision of a whole
range of services.
3. RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN STATE
AND CITIZENS
3.1 There are multiple components to state-citizen
relations, including:
3.2 The qualities of these relationships
depend on the roles, power and performance of both state and citizens,
and all are subject to both abuse and the development of dependencies.
3.3 Trust. There is clearly a decline
of public trust in the state for many reasons. This is not aided
by the use of exceptional/extreme arguments for every new security
policy. The lesson of history suggests that states can and do
fall prey to malign regimes, should we not be wary of creating
an infrastructure that would greatly enhance their capacity to
inflict harm.
3.4 What is the right balance? In
the context of the deeper understanding of surveillance, talk
of balance between "security" and "liberty"
is highly misleading. We argue that liberty is an integral component
of what makes security for citizens. Without liberty there is
no citizenship, and there is only insecurity. Security is not
a trump card.
3.5 Where is the line crossed? There
is no one line to cross. Many lines have already been crossed:
for example, we are watched by multiple CCTV systems in public
places, and the police now have the right to take and retain intimate
bodily samples even from those not charged with crimes. However
a line crossed does not indicate irreversibility. There is no
inevitable technological pathway predetermining how society and
citizen-state relations should evolve. Genies can be put back
in bottles.
3.6 Is data simply information? In
the information society, citizens are made up of both physical
and virtual characteristics. In terms of our relations with the
state (and other institutions) we exist as much in databases as
on the streets. Data therefore has a more intimate relationship
with the physical person. In many ways we are data, and our "data
doubles" are us. However the state sees the non-consensual
acquisition of our data as its right, and citizens subject to
punishment for withholding (eg: National Identity Register; proposed
"stop and question" laws). This is archaic, and requires
a rethinking of "data" in the constitution and in law.
3.7 Can the state "opt out"
of human rights? There have been threats that the state might
"opt out" of international human rights obligations,
and roll back long-standing British legal rights. These rights
are in most countries constitutional and irrevocable, the foundation
of the relationship between state and citizen. Some might be new
to Britain, but respect for these rights is what gives the state
legitimacy. It is not for the state to decide to revoke them.
3.8 Crucially, the state should also be
concerned about non-citizens. In a world of global flows, and
porous borders, the position and treatment of non-citizens is
crucial. Intensive and intrusive surveillance of non-citizens
is not a sign of a mature society.
4. FIVE MODELS
FOR FUTURE
SOCIETY
4.1 The Status Quo:
We continue to rely on existing institutions
and law, with the Data Protection Act (1998) and Freedom of Information
Act (2001) and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2001),
amongst others, as the bases.
Codes of Practice and volunteerism
predominate. The Information Commissioner is an effective but
shackled regulator.
The state is able to produce contingent
arguments for exceptions and exemptions from human rights and
existing constitutional protections and laws.
Technological advances continue to
run ahead of regulatory policy rather than designed with proper
accountability and regulation built-in from the outset.
The problem of trust is not addressed.
4.2 Laissez-Faire:
The state encourages increasing privatisation
and the development of a "Personal Information Economy",
wherein personal data is a commodity.
State and private sector pays market
value of data it wants, but in turn citizen has to pay for access
to information.
Levels of "privacy" are
set by these market relations and technological capacity. Citizens
defend their privacy through Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETS),
and you get the privacy you can afford within existing unequal
market relations.
4.3 The Security State:
The State of Emergency argument becomes
the norm and security trumps all other considerations.
Rights are permanently contingent on
national security considerations. "Nothing to Hide, Nothing
to Fear" is the motto.
Citizen can obtain what information
state feels is relevant and necessary, and the state can share
data as it wishes and can change the purposes to which data is
used as it wants.
4.4 The Transparent Society:
The state prioritises information
flow, and assumes that everything citizens do is public knowledge
or liable to be known by the state and other citizens, but also
that everything the state or private companies do is equally available.
Minimal protections are created based
on contracts between citizens and citizens and states, allowable
in clearly-defined circumstances.
4.5 The Reciprocal Society:
Create a new basis for information
relationships between state and citizen with a comprehensive "Information
Act".
Liberty and privacy are considered
to be an integral part of national security, not opposed to it,
and surveillance and Freedom of Information are considered as
reciprocal.
Mandatory Surveillance Impact Assessment
(SIA) for new technologies and systems, covering the social effects
of the technologies and systems themselves and their interaction
with other existing technologies and systems.
Technologies are fitted to policies
not vice-versa. Data-sharing is clearly about joined-up government,
not "because we can."
Citizens' data is treated as theirsa
kind of digital habeus corpus. States and companies are
"custodians" of data not owners. Citizens have the rights
to correct data, but custodians are responsible for errors and
omissions.
The ICO becomes a serious guardian
of information rights and responsibilities, and of all surveillance
relationships between state and citizen, and other institutions,
with greater resources and strengthened oversight and audit capacities.
The only model we regard as both acceptable
and workable is that of "The Reciprocal Society". If
trust between state and citizen is to be rebuilt in a society
built increasingly on information and surveillance, then a new
constitutional settlement between state and citizens, and mature
assessment of technologies and processes in the context of social
purpose and effects are essential.
8 June 2007
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