Appeal of Lord Truscott to the Committee
for Privileges
4 May 2009
The Lord Brabazon of Tara,
Chairman, Committee for Privileges,
House of Lords.
APPEAL
I very much regret having to write this letter,
and repeat my unreserved and profound apology for any of my actions
which have caused any embarrassment or affected the high reputation
of the House of Lords.
For over three months I have refrained from
any comment. I placed myself in the hands of the Sub-Committee
on Lords' Interests, and entrusted them to look at my case with
objectivity and impartiality. I co-operated at every stage of
the inquiry process, and appeared before the Sub-Committee for
three hours.
I was therefore stunned when I read the Sub-Committee's
report. It seemed to bear very little relation to the evidence
I had given at my Hearing. The Sub-Committee's conclusions are
a crude attempt to arrive at a pre-determined judgement, and are
surprisingly and disappointingly intellectually flawed. At the
Hearing itself I felt like a Guantanamo inmate. I was continually
interrupted, with one Member in particular being aggressive and
descending at times into sarcasm (see Hearing minutes, 13 March).
I at once felt that my "guilt" had been pre-judged.
My wife, whose uncle spent time in the Gulag,
can't escape a feeling of déjà vu. 1930s Russia.
Stalin is in power. Political committees decide an individual's
fate on the basis of ill-founded allegations and without any evidence
of actual wrong-doing.
The Sub-Committee's report also contains a less
than subtle warning to other Members (paragraph 64):
"Members willing to take money in return
for parliamentary services place themselves in great danger of
crossing the boundary, knowingly or inadvertently. Even when a
Member's intention is limited to obtaining information, the very
fact of approaching, on behalf of paying clients, MPs, other Lords,
Ministers and civil servants, may give rise to a perception of
advocacy and lobbying. The impression can easily be given that
not only advice but advocacy has been bought by the client."
In effect, to arrive at their guilty verdict,
the Sub-Committee had to re-define the rules, and then apply them
retrospectively. The Sub-Committee re-defined the rules so broadly
that I, and a significant number of other peers, would currently
be in breach of the Code of Conduct. The Sub-Committee's new definition
of the use of "parliamentary influence", "paid
advocacy", and "hosting meetings" were clearly
very different from my understanding. I outlined my views over
the last three months in my letters and at the Hearing. Evidently
the Sub-Committee just took no notice (see my correspondence and
minutes of the Hearing).
My interpretation of the rules is based on my
reading of the Code of Conduct and Advisory Committee on Business
Appointments (ACOBA) rules, which expressly allow lobbying. It
is also based on personal experience and what I saw properly practised
by my colleagues over the past five years, both as a backbencher
and Minister in the House. The Sub-Committee never contested my
views, nor did they reveal that they had a completely different
interpretation of the rules. So to say that I was aware and accepted
these definitions as agreed by the Sub-Committee, and was willing
hypothetically to cross the boundary of what was permissible and
what was not, is disingenuous.
When this story first broke it was about "cash
for amendments", despite the fact there was no cash and no
amendments. In subsequent reports, even the Sunday Times became
more objective, and reported my comments where it was apparent
I believed I was acting within the rules as I saw them ("no
amendments, no lobbying, no paid advocacy"). On 30 January
Sky TV broadcast a report in which Sir Alistair Graham, the former
Chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, acknowledged
a contradiction in the rules: "It's very clear at the beginning
that you mustn't accept any financial inducement ... yet you're
allowed to have a consultancy agreement, provided you register
it. It seems a strange contrast." There was no suggestion
in that report that I had broken any rules. There were subsequently
many calls, from Lord McNally and others, to clarify the rules
so that all Members understand what is and what is not permissible.
(also see my letter of 19 April)
THE COMMITTEE'S
INTERPRETATION OF
THE CODE
OF CONDUCT
AND HOUSE
RULES
The Sub-Committee attempts to define the rules
in its report (paragraphs 39-64). It then follows this analysis
with examples from my case. The Sub-Committee never acknowledges
the existence of the ACOBA rules, and in fact contradicts them.
Here I cite just some examples where my understanding
of the rules differs from that of the Sub-Committee:
1. Many Members will be surprised that acting
as host at functions in the Palace of Westminster, where the Member
has a direct financial interest, will be considered a breach of
the Code. This is currently common practice, and I have an invitation
on my desk where a Member with direct financial interests is hosting
a dinner with a Minister in the House. I am sure that the Member
concerned does not believe this to be in breach of the Code, neither
do I.
2. "Exercising parliamentary influence"
is defined as meaning "exercising influence in and over Parliament
by virtue of membership of Parliament." Thus the very fact
of being a peer means that if a Member picks up a phone to a Minister,
official or even a colleague, one would be in breach of the Code.
This is not a fanciful interpretation, because this is exactly
why the Sub-Committee alleges I breached the Code. The Sub-Committee
argues it was not plausible to approach a Minister without seeking
to lobby or influence them.
"We regard it as unrealistic
to suppose that Lord Truscott could have asked the Minister about
the Government's reaction to the proposed amendment without in
substance promoting the amendment, and it should have occurred
to Lord Truscott that by offering to use his Parliamentary influence
to secure a meeting with the Minister on the subject of the amendment
he would inevitably cross the boundary between what the Code permits
and what it prohibits" (paragraph 166)
Further, "Parliamentary influence"
appears to include arranging a one to one meeting between a Member
and a Minister (without the clients involved), and is therefore
prohibited.
This interpretation of the Code is
reiterated throughout the report when my conversation with the
Sunday Times journalists is analysed and dammed. For instance
at paragraph 152:
"We do not find it plausible
that a Labour ex Minister could have approached Conservative Members
of the House merely to seek their views on the desired amendments.
The Conservative Members would almost certainly have the impression
that they were being asked to give their support. The very action
of approaching other Members of the House in these circumstances
inevitably gives rise at least to a perception of lobbying, if
not actual paid advocacy".
Can I again appeal to sanity and a
little bit of common sense here?
3. The Sub-Committee also claimed the phrase
"mention my name" would be a breach of the Code, which
I think is ludicrous.
"We consider that `They're
expecting your call' means that he would have mentioned the lobbyists
to the Member and his client. Such an introductory call seems
to us to cross the boundary from the permissible to the prohibited".
(paragraph 143)
"Lord Truscott in his own words
of explanation was proposing to "sound out" Members
and Officials to `make suggestions' to them [ie the lobbyists].
To ask other Members `Have you thought about this?' suggests advocacy".
I find these interpretations of the
Code inconsistent with the statement at paragraph 63 that it is
permissible for a Member, in return for payment, to approach other
Members, Ministers, MPs and officials to gain information.
4. The Sub-Committee said that sitting-in a meeting
with lobbyists and not lobbying oneself was not a "credible"
scenario (paragraph 154). In fact, I have been in this situation
several times as a Minister, and on one occasion the consultant/lobbyist
was actually a Member's partner. I never felt I was being lobbied
by colleagues, and believe that it is perfectly possible for a
Member to sit-in at a meeting with lobbyists and not actually
lobby themselves. At no time did I feel colleagues were acting
in breach of the Code or ACOBA rules, and I am sure they did not
believe themselves to be in breach either.
5. Any Member with an outside financial interest
(particularly where this has been newly acquired) speaking or
acting in any capacity in Parliament whatsoever, can be accused
of paid advocacy, and can be declared in breach of the Code under
the Sub-Committee's interpretation of paid advocacy (see report,
paragraphs 51-58). Paragraph 53 states: "In other words,
it must be clear that a Member who has expert knowledge is choosing
of his own accord, without financial inducement to speak, vote,
lobby or otherwise use his expert knowledge in Parliament ..."
Again, it concludes (paragraph 58)
"It follows that the Code does not allow a Member of the
House of Lords to assist a paying client directly or indirectly
to influence Parliament, other than by giving advice."
Simply declaring interests, as many
Members currently do before moving amendments, speaking or putting
down questions, will not be sufficient to avoid breaching the
Code. For example, under this definition it is accepted that Lord
Lloyd-Webber would be free to speak on any aspect of the Arts.
However, a newly appointed non-executive director of a bank or
financial body, without a long proven track-record in that sector,
who then goes on to speak to the House, a Minister, official or
colleague about the financial sector, would be in breach of the
Code and House rules. The Member would be in breach of the no
paid advocacy rule, because they were promoting a cause linked
to their newly-acquired outside interests. Public interest would
not be a defence (paragraph 49).
Similarly, if it can be shown that
a Member only started speaking in the House, chatting to colleagues,
officials or a Minister, moving amendments or putting down questions
after or around the time he or she acquired a financial interest
in that sphere (and where they did not have a proven track-record),
they would also be in breach of the Code.
The implication is that if a Member
takes-up a financial interest in a new area of expertise, they
would be prevented from speaking on that matter in the House or
discussing that subject with colleagues, Ministers or officials,
on pain of being accused of exercising their parliamentary influence
or engaging in paid advocacy.
In my view, this was not a reasonable interpretation
of how I, or a majority of Members, view the current Code and
rules of the House. I believe all these Members think, as I did,
that they are acting within the rules and spirit of the present
Code of Conduct. As I wrote to the Sub-Committee on 19 April:
"Even the Sub-Committee itself was originally
established to deal with Members who fail to declare relevant
interests and to cover the "no paid advocacy rule."
This means by definition, that Members are allowed to speak and
put down questions and amendments, provided they declare their
relevant financial interests at the appropriate time. It is the
failure to declare such interests, which can be referred to the
Sub-Committee, not the fact of speaking or moving amendments itself."
If the Sub-Committee's new definition of the
rules is applied retrospectively, a very large number of Members
of the House would find themselves in breach. The question would
then be, how far back would this new definition apply: five, 10
or 20 years?
If the Privileges Committee adopts the Sub-Committee's
interpretation of the rules, I will of course abide by them. Such
an interpretation would, however, in my opinion be an unfair curtailment
of the legitimate activity of peers in the House, not only with
regard to Parliamentary consultancies but with any Member having
an outside financial interest.
If the Sub-Committee's report is endorsed by
the Privileges Committee, this will become a reference point and
encourage the Murdoch Press to step-up its campaign against the
House, and stimulate an atmosphere of "Open Season"
on Members and their presently legitimate outside interests.
In looking at the issue of retrospective sanctions,
the House should have regard to historical precedent. If the Privileges
Committee is considering the retrospective sanction of suspension
(if one believes the Press) for a hypothetical and contested willingness
to breach the Code, what will it do in cases of actual breach:
reintroduce the sanction of imprisonment, fines or capital punishment?
It is still my ardent view I did not express
a willingness or any intention to breach the rules as I understood
them. I thus reject the notion that I did not act on my personal
honour. I thought I was having two tentative, exploratory meetings
with a public affairs company to discuss a 12 month contract to
give advice on several issues and campaigns. In the event, as
my letter of 26 January states, I decided not to proceed to work
with the fictitious company.
My experiences with the Sub-Committee have led
me to the conclusion they should be replaced by an independent
Lords' Commissioner for Standards.
I therefore urge the Privileges Committee to
dismiss the Sub-Committee's outrageous and slanderous report,
and conduct a proper and detailed review of the rules of the House
of Lords, which can be properly debated by the House. Such rule
changes will be far-reaching, and should not be introduced by
the back door.
My appeal rests on the grounds that:
— The Sub-Committee has admitted that it
decided to short-circuit its own investigative procedure from
day one (see my letter of 16 April).
— The definition of the Code of Conduct
and House rules by the Sub-Committee is new and overly broad,
and should not be retrospectively imposed.
— A proper review and debate of any new
definition of the rules and Code of Conduct should be embarked
upon, with new guidance issued to all Members.
— The new interpretation of the rules will
affect many Members in the legitimate exercise of their outside
interests.
— Any new sanctions should be agreed by
the House, and not made retrospective, as this would be a clear
breach of the principle of natural justice.
I reserve the right to take my appeal directly
to the House.
Lord Truscott
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