CHAPTER 2: Supporting the Prime Minister
11. A core responsibility of the Cabinet Office
is "Supporting the Prime Minister—to define and deliver
the Government's objectives".[2]
The Cabinet Office and the Prime
Minister's Office
12. In the opinion of several witnesses, a key
issue was the relationship between the Cabinet Office and the
Prime Minister's Office. The Cabinet Secretary, Sir Gus O'Donnell,
said that prior to 1997, the Prime Minister's Office "comprised
of four main areas: a private office, a political office, a press
office and policy unit. Between 1997 and 2001 changes made included
the appointment of a Chief of Staff, the creation of a Strategic
Communications Unit and the Social Exclusion and Performance and
Innovation Units (reporting to the Prime Minister although they
were based in the Cabinet Office). Following the General Election
in 2001 the policy unit was merged to form a policy directorate.
In addition three new units were set up, the Prime Minister's
Delivery Unit, the Office of Public Sector Reform and the Prime
Minister's Forward Strategy Unit again all based in the Cabinet
Office." (p 170) According to figures provided by the
Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister's Office currently has 200
members of staff on its payroll, an increase of 79 since 1998,
but lower than the high of 226 in 2005. (p 166)
13. Evidence conflicted about the relationship
between the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister's Office. In
the view of some witnesses, the boundary between the two was blurred.
Sir Richard Mottram, a former departmental Permanent Secretary
and senior official at the Cabinet Office, asserted that "it
is difficult to disentangle the roles and responsibilities of
'Number 10' and 'the Cabinet Office'", although "Number
10 is part of the Cabinet Office for public expenditure planning
purposes". (p 34)
14. Professor Peter Hennessy, Attlee Professor
of Contemporary British History, Queen Mary University of London,
argued that since May 1997 a Prime Minister's Department had existed,
"in all but name pretty well a fusing of the Cabinet Office
and Number 10" (Q 2), while Dr Richard Heffernan, Reader
in Government, Open University, claimed that "we do not know
where the Prime Minister's Department begins and where the Cabinet
Office ends". (Q 40)
15. The joint submission of three former Cabinet
Secretaries, Lords Armstrong of Ilminster, Butler of Brockwell
and Wilson of Dinton stressed that the two offices were functionally
distinct: "The function of the Prime Minister's Office is
to serve the Prime Minister exclusively, whereas the function
of the Cabinet Office is to serve the Cabinet (including the Prime
Minister as chairman of the Cabinet) collectively … In our
view this functional distinction remains real, valid and important."
(p 54)
16. In the light of this evidence, we asked Sir
Gus O'Donnell and the Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister's
Office, Jeremy Heywood, to explain their respective roles, and
the nature of the relationship between the two offices.
17. Sir Gus O'Donnell told us "there are
not two departments. I stress there is one department. There is
one Cabinet Office of which Number 10 is a subset … a business
unit." (Q 377, p 161) He also stated that "they
are functionally distinct within the Cabinet Office and Number
10 has been for decades part of the Cabinet Office. That works
well. Number 10's particular function is supporting the Prime
Minister but … when there comes a policy issue, they call
upon the resources of the Cabinet Office." (Q 376)
18. Jeremy Heywood told us that although "Number
10 has a discrete role and a discrete identity within the Cabinet
Office, the border between the two is very porous. Many of the
Prime Minister's top advisers are located in the Cabinet Office
… the apparently clear distinction between the Prime Minister
supported by Number 10 staff and the Cabinet Office supporting
the Cabinet … just does not capture the reality of the situation."
(Q 376)
19. Jeremy Heywood is the first Permanent Secretary
to the Prime Minister's Office, having been appointed by the Prime
Minister in 2008. (p 170) He explained how his post had been
created:
"Probably the biggest difference in some ways
between the Blair Downing Street and the Brown Downing Street
is that Tony Blair specifically had a chief of staff who was a
special adviser, Jonathan Powell. Gordon Brown did not want to
replicate that model … he decided about six months in that
he needed a more senior figure to run Number 10 in the absence
of a Jonathan Powell type figure … I was brought in not as
a Chief of Staff, but as technically a second Permanent Secretary
as the most senior person running Number 10 in the absence of
the sort of special adviser model that we had under Tony Blair
… From my perspective, I think it is a good idea to reassert
the Civil Service being in the lead in Number 10 overall. I think
that is a better model than the model from 1997 onwards."
(Q 343)
20. He also told us what his role entailed:
"I oversee the whole of Number 10 from the Civil
Service perspective. I act as a sort of senior adviser to the
Prime Minister day-to-day … I oversee Number 10—200
people. I make sure the Prime Minister has the advice and support
he needs to carry out his multiple functions as head of government,
Chairman of the Cabinet, Chairman of about 12 Cabinet committees".
(QQ 343-4)
21. Mr Heywood also sought to explain the nature
of his relationship with the Cabinet Secretary, and with the Cabinet
Office more widely:
"[I work] very closely with Gus … This
is not some completely separate organisation. I get a lot of support
from the rest of the Cabinet Office. Gus remains the Prime Minister's
principal adviser on significant issues … I think there is
a clear demarcation between really important issues of propriety
or security or immensely difficult issues relating to individual
personalities or whatever, where we keep Gus's powder dry for
those. The day-to-day does require a certain gravitas and experience
… Gus is the boss." (QQ 343-5, 378)
22. We consider the role of the Cabinet Secretary
in more detail in Chapter 4 below.
23. The Minister for the Cabinet Office, Rt Hon
Tessa Jowell MP, told us that "there are six senior officials
of permanent secretary rank within the Cabinet Office". (Q 268)
As well as Sir Gus O'Donnell and Jeremy Heywood, the six include
Jon Cunliffe, the Prime Minister's adviser on international economic
affairs and Europe, Matt Tee, Permanent Secretary for Government
Communication, Alex Allan, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence
Committee and Stephen Laws, Permanent Secretary at the Office
of Parliamentary Counsel. (p 170) When we asked Sir Gus O'Donnell
why this was so, he told us that "what you have in Number
10 and what Prime Ministers want is very senior people because
what you have to do is talk to other governments … When you
are talking to your opposite numbers at head of government level,
you do need to have some very senior people. We will always be
a very top-heavy department." (Q 428) However, Rachel
Lomax told us that "part of this is because people want the
recognition and they want the salary that goes with being a Permanent
Secretary. But they do not have the accountability that goes with
being a departmental Permanent Secretary. They are not doing a
managerial job on the same scale. I would not attach too much
importance to the titles. I think titles are there as a device
for motivating people." (Q 199)
24. Formally defining the administrative relationship
between the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister's Office is
not simple, as there are no official documents codifying it. Some
experts on Britain's machinery of government argue that they are
two distinct, but closely-related entities operating at the centre
of British Government.[3]
The annual Civil Service Year Book presents the Cabinet
Office and Prime Minister's Office as two distinct entities, with
separate entries for each.[4]
25. Sir Gus O'Donnell asserted that "there
is one Cabinet Office of which Number 10 is a subset". This
description of the relationship between the Cabinet Office and
Prime Minister's Office was not reflected in other evidence that
we received. It conflicts, for instance, with the statement of
Lords Armstrong, Butler and Wilson, that the two offices are "functionally
distinct". It is open to doubt whether Sir Gus O'Donnell's
description of the Prime Minister's Office as a "subset"
and a "business unit" goes beyond what Sir Richard Mottram
told us, that "Number 10 is part of the Cabinet Office for
public expenditure planning purposes", and whether it accurately
describes how the centre operates in practice. We believe that
the nature of this relationship should be clarified by the Cabinet
Office, and should be reflected in government publications, which
appear to suggest that the two offices are independent institutions.
26. The role of the Prime Minister's Office
is central to the role and structure of the centre of government.
The establishment by the current Prime Minister of the post of
Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister's Office is an important
step in the evolution of the structure of the centre. We recognise
the arguments set out by Sir Gus O'Donnell and Jeremy Heywood
in favour of the current arrangements, and Sir Gus O'Donnell's
explanation of the role of the six permanent secretaries located
in the Cabinet Office. We recommend that the Prime Minister's
Office, and the Permanent Secretaries that operate within it,
are subject to appropriate parliamentary accountability mechanisms.
The role of the Prime Minister
27. Our evidence suggested that the role of the
Prime Minister has changed, which has affected the structure and
function of the centre. There was evidence that the Prime Minister's
role depended on a combination of factors.
I) PERSONALITY AND EXPERIENCE
28. Witnesses opined that each Prime Minister
had a personal style which was often influenced by their personality
or by their experience. Sir Gus O'Donnell told us that "the
style of the Prime Minister is very important. I worked with John
Major who had a very collegiate style. He used the Cabinet committees
in that way. Tony Blair, when he came in in 1997 … had a
strong emphasis on stock takes and delivery … There is a
personality element." (QQ 383, 387) He also said that
recent Prime Ministers had had varying levels of prior ministerial
experience. (Q 387)
29. Jeremy Heywood told us that Tony Blair and
Gordon Brown "had different styles in many respects and some
similarities. We found it important to be responsive to their
changing styles, the way they wanted to work and of course the
evolving priorities of the day." (Q 342) Professor Hennessy
contrasted "destiny" Prime Ministers such as Margaret
Thatcher and Tony Blair with those "more attuned to a collective
style", such as James Callaghan and John Major. (Q 5)
II) POLITICAL CONTEXT
30. Witnesses also recognised that the power
of any Prime Minister was highly dependent upon the political
context of the time. Sir Gus O'Donnell told us that Gordon Brown's
time as Prime Minister had been dominated by global events and
the economic agenda. (Q 383)
31. Lord Wilson told us that "Prime Ministers
are only as powerful as their colleagues allow them to be. You
may have times, we have had times, when Prime Ministers have been
so strong that their colleagues accepted anything that they wanted
to do … but that does not alter the fundamental fact that
if circumstances are different and a Prime Minister is in a weak
position … it is not possible for the Prime Minister to have
his way". (Q 110)
32. Sir Michael Barber, former Head of the Delivery
Unit, referred to one specific example which illustrated that
"the power of a given Prime Minister is very contingent on
the moment … I remember in 2003 that one of the things Tony
Blair was considering was ring-fencing funding for schools …
but he chose not to take it to the Cabinet because he was exhausted.
It was immediately after the Iraq War and he did not think he
had the political capital to take it through … A year later
there was exactly the same issue, exactly the same principles;
he felt powerful enough to take it through, so you get an ebb
and flow in prime ministerial power." (Q 220)
III) SECULAR TRENDS
33. We considered what Sir Robin Mountfield,
former Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office, referred to as a "secular
trend" (Q 139) towards a more dominant Prime Minister.
Dr Heffernan said that "there is a reality that the Prime
Minister is much more now than primus inter pares [first
among equals] … The old days of Baldwin and Attlee as chairmen
of the Cabinet have gone … The Prime Minister will be much
more significant than other ministers". (Q 53)
34. Sir Gus O'Donnell asserted that the role
of Prime Minister had evolved: "The number of overseas visits
for the Prime Minister has gone up. That is a trend of globalisation.
Prime Ministers inevitably are going to be much more involved
in that global role and I think that is important." (Q 342)
Sir Michael Barber agreed. (Q 210)
35. Lord Lipsey, who in the late 1970s was a
special adviser to the then Prime Minister James Callaghan, observed
that "the media did not, in our day, hold the Prime Minister
responsible for every single thing that happened in every single
corner of Whitehall … and there was not need for the Prime
Minister to react swiftly to everything that happened, as present
Prime Ministers have to. I think that is a very strong pressure
which tends in the direction of a more prime ministerial system."
(Q 101) Lord Armstrong and Sir Robin Mountfield agreed. (QQ 111,
139)
36. Conversely, Jonathan Hill, Head of the Prime
Minister's Political Office under John Major, thought that "the
24/7 thing everyone talks about is a complete red herring …
Personally I think that the relationship which has developed over
a long period of time between the media and government and politics
is too close, is not healthy and it is perfectly possible to have
a situation where government is not constantly drip-dripping to
the media". (Q 321)
37. Lord Heseltine had "a very clear view
that the Prime Minister is primus inter pares … That
is basically why I left government in 1986; there was a discussion
as to what extent it was primus inter pares. I thought
I had rights as a Cabinet Minister and those rights were effectively
denied me". (QQ 229, 233)
38. A number of witnesses reflected upon the
experience of the Blair government. Lord Butler, who was Cabinet
Secretary in 1997, told us that "it was part of the explicit
purpose of Mr Blair to strengthen the centre, and … to make
the Cabinet Office a part of the Prime Minister's Department".
(Q 121) Dr Heffernan told us that Tony Blair "thought
his problem as Prime Minister was not that he was too powerful:
he was not powerful enough … he thought that he did not have
enough control over government. That is why he built up, incrementally
… [the] central capacity of Downing Street". (Q 53)
39. Sir Michael Bichard, a former departmental
Permanent Secretary, told us that this was part of a process rather
than a single event. (Q 198) Sir Robin Mountfield thought
that it was an acceleration of a longer-term, if inconsistent,
trend. (QQ 161-2) Sir Michael Barber argued that prime ministerial
input into policy decisions was nothing new, although he suggested
that the scale of what Tony Blair sought to achieve was greater.
(Q 219)
40. Tessa Jowell argued that "the character
of the centre is very heavily defined by the phase of the electoral
cycle, so the role of the centre in 1997 was much more vigorously
interventionist. You had a government of ministers who were in
government for the first time, you had departments that were faced
with radically new policy priorities and you had a government
that was in a hurry to achieve results. Now the Government is
much more mature, you have much more self-confident departments
and self-confident ministers—that is a good thing. The role
of the centre changes in response to that". (Q 284)
Assessing the implications
41. The evidence which we received suggested
a change in the Prime Minister's role.
I) A PERCEIVED INCREASE IN THE PRIME
MINISTER'S INVOLVEMENT IN POLICY DELIVERY
42. There was widespread agreement that the Prime
Minister's involvement in policy delivery had increased. (QQ 45,
55, 188, p 34) Sir Gus O'Donnell stated that "there
has been a greater involvement in the initiation and delivery
of policy since 1997. This has resulted from the centre being
stronger and more influential since then." (p 162) Witnesses
argued that one of the reasons for an enhanced prime ministerial
role is the growth of cross-cutting issues. Sir Robin Mountfield
said that "many of the great issues that face a modern government
are ones that span organisational boundaries … therefore
there needs to be a stronger co-ordination". (Q 139)
Geoff Mulgan, former Director of the Strategy Unit, argued that
this growth had put pressure on the traditional structures of
government. (Q 210) Dr Tony Wright MP, Chairman of the House
of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, agreed and
told us that the centre was seeking to respond appropriately.
(Q 13)
43. We conclude that a greater involvement
and influence by the Prime Minister on policy delivery is inevitable
in the modern age, that the Prime Minister's role has evolved
over a long period under different governments, and that Prime
Ministers will wish to use all possible resources in pursuit of
the role. We recommend that the Prime Minister's role and the
centre's role in policy delivery are transparent and accountable
to Parliament.
II) THE DELIVERY UNIT AND THE STRATEGY
UNIT
44. A consequence of the Prime Minister's increased
involvement in policy delivery has been the growth of units at
the centre tasked with delivery of policy aims. Witnesses referred
to two examples, the Delivery Unit and the Strategy Unit. The
Delivery Unit was set up in 2001 "with a remit to strengthen
the Government's ability to deliver the Prime Minister's key public
service priorities" in four key areas—education, health,
crime and transport.[5]
The Strategy Unit was established in 2002 to improve the Government's
capacity to address long term and/or cross-cutting strategic issues.
45. Sir Gus O'Donnell told us that the Delivery
Unit was set up to allow the Prime Minister "to look at delivery
in certain key areas and to say, 'I have four really big priorities
and I want to ensure this Government delivers them.' Nowadays,
the big things like climate change, obesity … require departments
to collaborate across those boundaries, so having a Delivery Unit
… that works with departments … can be a very effective
way of ensuring that those particular delivery outcomes are achieved."
(Q 352) Tessa Jowell asserted that the Delivery Unit "exists
to ensure that all departments have access to the best advice
on how to continually improve delivery and that Ministers collectively
have access to information about the performance of priority areas".
(p 131)
46. Other witnesses commended the role of these
two units. Dr Wright thought that the Strategy Unit "was
extremely valuable", although he was concerned that much
activity went to waste because departments ignored it. (QQ 7,
14) He also thought that the Delivery Unit "did excellent
work trying to identify government priorities across the board
and then chasing them with departments and having prime ministerial
backing". (Q 7) Professor Hennessy and Sir Richard Mottram
agreed that the units had been successful. (QQ 7, 85)
47. The former Head of the Delivery Unit, Sir
Michael Barber, told us that they "regularly got independent
people to ask permanent secretaries and ministers and senior civil
servants what they thought about the Delivery Unit, and the thing
they constantly came back to was (1) we were very helpful; (2)
we kept the priorities of the Prime Minister clear and consistent;
and (3) we enabled them, we strengthened their capacity to deliver."
(Q 211)
48. Other witnesses noted the significance of
these units in terms of the evolution of the role of the Prime
Minister. Professor Martin Smith, Professor of Politics, University
of Sheffield, thought that the involvement of the Prime Minister
in the implementation of policy through the Delivery Unit "really
is a considerable change. Before then, the Prime Minister might
become involved but essentially it was the departments that were
left to handle it. What has happened … is that departments
to some degree have either been bypassed or have been very strongly
pushed by the centre." (Q 45)
49. Lords Armstrong, Butler and Wilson warned
that whilst they had no objection in principle to such units being
located in the Cabinet Office, it was necessary to establish "that
their role is one of co-ordination, that their responsibilities
do not overlap and that they do not impinge upon or conflict with
the executive responsibilities of Ministers in charge of Departments.
We believe that these conditions are not always satisfied at present."
(p 55) Simon Jenkins, Columnist, The Guardian, argued
that the Delivery Unit was disempowering of departments, Permanent
Secretaries and ministers. (Q 21)
50. The Delivery Unit was originally located
in the Cabinet Office, but was moved to the Treasury in 2002,
although it continued to report directly to the Prime Minister.
After 2007, it was again reformed and in its current guise it
now reports "jointly to the Prime Minister and to the Chancellor
and … [is] based in the Treasury, working … closely
with No 10, Cabinet Office and HM Treasury officials, and Departments,
on the critical priorities and actions needed to strengthen delivery
across Government, and on the reform of key public services".[6]
51. Peter Riddell, Chief Political Commentator,
The Times, told us that Sir Michael Barber had ensured
that the Delivery Unit "actually worked out of the Treasury
even though he was technically part of the Cabinet Office at Number
10, because he knew that the only way to get effective was to
get alongside the Treasury. And indeed it has now been absorbed
effectively by the Treasury in that way." (Q 30) Sir
Robin Mountfield told us that although it was "established
originally in the Cabinet Office … [it] has moved essentially
into the Treasury now". (Q 164) Tessa Jowell told us
that the Delivery Unit was currently located in the Treasury "because
its focus is very specifically on measuring the impact of public
service reform". (Q 262) She seemed uncertain whether
the Delivery Unit still retained its original title of "the
Prime Minister's Delivery Unit". (QQ 263, 272)
52. We believe that the Delivery Unit and
the Strategy Unit play a useful role in delivering the Government's
policy agenda, for instance in co-ordinating work across government
departments, and that there should be transparency and accountability
for the work of these units.
III) A "DUSTBIN FUNCTION"?
53. Evidence was submitted that the Delivery
Unit and the Strategy Unit had done a worthwhile job, but there
was concern about the formation of new policy units. Sir Robin
Mountfield used the term "dustbin function", to mean
that the Cabinet Office, under both the current and previous administrations,
"has from time to time been seen as a home for special units
or other activities for which no other natural home had been established".
(p 70) In his memoirs, Lord Heseltine referred to the Cabinet
Office as a "bran tub".[7]
54. Professor Dennis Kavanagh, Emeritus Professor
of Politics, University of Liverpool, argued that the Cabinet
Office had become a "dumping ground", (Q 45) while
Lords Armstrong, Butler and Wilson, opined that "the proliferation
of units" had made the centre "an over-large and over-crowded
area". (p 55) Dr Anthony Seldon opined that "the
new system is bloated" and "a mess". (p 181)
55. Whilst Sir Michael Bichard argued that compared
with other countries the UK has a relatively small centre, he
opined that from 1997 to 2002 there has been "a growth of
units at the centre but no loss of units at the centre",
and that this growth diluted the effectiveness of the centre.
(QQ 187, 198)
56. Rachel Lomax thought that there had been
a period from the late nineties when the centre was very incoherent
but that things had improved "in the sense that everything
is in the Cabinet Office". (Q 186)
57. Rt Hon David Blunkett MP told us that the
Cabinet Office had historically been used as a repository for
units and functions which did not obviously fit elsewhere. Lord
Heseltine said that the Cabinet Office had become a repository
when he arrived there in 1995. (QQ 229, 252) Sir Michael
Barber asserted that "both strategy and delivery … are
key functions of the centre of government wherever you are in
the world". (Q 214) Several witnesses referred to specific
functions which they thought were misplaced in the Cabinet Office.
Peter Riddell and Sir Richard Mottram questioned why social exclusion
and the third sector were located in the centre. (QQ 24,
p 35) Sir Robin Mountfield likewise said that it was "wholly
inappropriate" for responsibility for the third sector to
lie with the Cabinet Office and concluded that "alternative
homes should be found for most of these activities". (Q 171)
58. Jonathan Powell, former Chief of Staff to
Tony Blair, suggested that, after each election, most of the units
which had "accreted to the Cabinet Office over the previous
four or five years" should be assigned "to individual
departments so that the Cabinet Office can focus on its core functions".
(p 181)
59. Peter Riddell told us that the Cabinet Office
should be slimmed down. (Q 33) Jonathan Hill told us that
"having more and more people performing different functions
in different silos does not, in my view, make government or the
centre more efficient or stronger". (Q 316)
60. Simon Jenkins said that "you will not
slim down the Cabinet Office; you either abolish it or it will
muddle through getting bigger every year, I promise you that".
(Q 33)
61. Sir Gus O'Donnell said that the "core
functions … lead us to focus on the priorities of the Government
of the day. Providing the support necessary to deliver the priorities
of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office Minister does at
times lead to a necessary widening of the strategic objectives,
and consequentially, the functions of Cabinet Office. Our aim
in such circumstances, however, is to incubate functions in the
Cabinet Office which, when ready, can be transferred to a more
permanent home." He cited as examples the Better Regulation
Executive, now located in the Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills; DirectGov, now part of the Department for Work and
Pensions, and the Office of Cyber Security, recently established
in the Cabinet Office. He also asserted that when he arrived in
the Cabinet Office "there were also a number of functions
that did not necessarily fit well with our core functions",
such as the Government Car and Despatch Agency, the National School
of Government and the Office of Public Sector Information, which
were transferred to other departments "where the fit was
more obvious". (p 161)
62. Tessa Jowell did not favour the description
of the Cabinet Office as a dustbin, but argued that "the
role of the centre … is dynamic, and … sometimes functions
which do not have a logical home elsewhere may reside for a time
in the Cabinet Office … it is to the Government's advantage
that resource at 'the centre' instigates and oversees some policy
priorities, particularly in the early stages of development …
the centre of Government should continue to ensure it is no larger
than it needs to be to get the job done and that it has the skills
and personnel it needs to respond flexibly as requirements change."
(Q 268, pp 131-2) She described the flexibility of the
centre's structure as an advantage, so that it could be "responsive
to the demands of the day". She cited the way in which the
centre had "adapted to some of the more contemporary changes",
for instance its response to the economic downturn. (Q 258)
63. Like Sir Gus O'Donnell, Tessa Jowell told
us that "there are areas where the Cabinet Office will intervene
and incubate and then the specific policies and the units to support
their development and delivery will be repatriated to the relevant
department". (Q 265) She cited the Cabinet Office's
work on social exclusion as an exemplar of this "incubator"
role. (QQ 268, 271)
64. When it was established in December 1997,
the Social Exclusion Unit was situated in the Cabinet Office.
It was later transferred to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.
In 2006 the Unit was abolished and replaced by a smaller Social
Exclusion Task Force, yet this was transferred from the Department
of Communities and Local Government back to the Cabinet Office.
65. Dr Wright told us that "if you went
through the last ten years and just drew up a list of all these
different named units … it is utterly bewildering".
(Q 14) The Committee asked the Cabinet Office to provide
details of those units that had been established in, entered into
or left the Cabinet Office. In addition to four units that were
already present in the Cabinet Office in 1996, and three for which
no "in" date has been listed, a further 18 units have
either been established in or entered the Cabinet Office since
1996. Of this total of 25 units, 18 have been transferred out
(some of which have since been disbanded) and seven remain. At
least two units were transferred out, only to be subsequently
transferred back in, whilst the remnants of other transferred
units, subsequently disbanded, have also returned to the Cabinet
Office. Other units were transferred in from other departments,
only to be transferred out again. (pp 167-9) We agree that
this picture is "utterly bewildering".
66. We agree with the Minister for the Cabinet
Office that the flexibility of the structure of the centre of
government is an asset. We also recognise the value of an "incubator
role", where the Cabinet Office develops units and functions
that are consequently transferred to the relevant government departments,
but we fear that the Cabinet Office has tended to function less
as an incubator and more as a dustbin. The fact that policy units
for which no other home can be found have been placed in the Cabinet
Office underlines the constitutional importance of ensuring that
the Cabinet Office and the units within it are properly held to
account.
67. We recommend that a review of the units
that have accrued to the centre be undertaken by the Government,
including an examination of the rationale for each unit's continued
existence, and for its location at the centre of government rather
than in a department. In order to ensure that the Government are
properly held to account, we recommend that a copy of this review
be sent to this Committee and also, should they wish to receive
it, to the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee.
We also recommend that the same review process be repeated regularly.
Appropriate mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that those
units that remain are held to account in an effective manner.
IV) SPECIAL ADVISERS
68. Special advisers date back to the nineteenth
century. The current system of special advisers was formalised
by the Wilson Government in 1974, when ministers were permitted
to appoint advisers on a permanent and regular basis. In 1974,
there were 31 special advisers and by the end of the Major Government
the figure had risen to 38 (including eight in Number 10). There
was an increase in the number of special advisers after 1997,
with 70 being employed during the first year of the Blair Government
(including 18 in Number 10), rising to 84 by 2004 (including 28
in Number 10) and declining to 74 in July 2009 (including 25 in
Number 10).[8]
69. The change in numbers since 1997 include
two different types of advisers currently working in Whitehall,
the political advisers working with ministers in individual departments
to offer either political or policy advice, and the media strategist
advisers introduced after 1997.
70. Sir Robin Mountfield argued that although
the Civil Service should not be "a monolithic provider of
advice", neither should special advisers provide the primary
source of advice. He warned that many special advisers acted as
"unaccountable junior ministers". (QQ 139, 175)
Although he felt that there had been a growth in the influence
of special advisers since 1997, he denied that 1997 had constituted
a watershed. (Q 181)
71. Lord McNally, a former special adviser in
the Callaghan administration, told us that the balance between
civil servants and special advisers has changed for the worse.
He also thought that it was now too easy for an individual to
cross over from political appointment to civil servant or from
civil servant to political appointment. (Q 100)
72. Jonathan Hill told us that the behaviour
of special advisers today was very different from the behaviour
of special advisers in the 1980s: "When I first became a
special adviser I would describe the role as being that of a political
private secretary and it was there to meet the need—which
had crept up on Cabinet ministers, they were busy being Cabinet
ministers—there was political stuff that they needed to
do". (QQ 301, 327)
73. Baroness Hogg, Head of the Prime Minister's
Policy Unit under John Major, agreed that "having civil servants
in the mix not only helped to make the bridge secure, it helped
us to think carefully about what we were doing because obviously
the whole point of it would be to ensure that the civil servants
were not drawn into inappropriate activities". (Q 297)
74. Lord Butler told us that special advisers
"have a definite role to play … What is important is
that a good minister will bring to bear both the ideas of special
advisers and the experience and advice of the Civil Service."
(Q 125) Whilst he acknowledged the increase in numbers, he
pointed out that "it is not large in relation to the size
of the Civil Service". (QQ 128-9)
75. Lord Wilson, whilst agreeing that a special
adviser used well by a Secretary of State is an advantage for
the Civil Service as well as for the minister, wanted a clear
definition of the powers and duties of special advisers and a
limit on their numbers. (Q 129) Lord Armstrong thought that
there should be a limit of two per Secretary of State as a maximum.
(Q 129) Jonathan Hill suggested a limit of one special adviser
per department as had been the case in the 1980s. He also thought
that if the government wanted more than this number, the political
party in Government should pay for it. (Q 328)
76. Lord Burns, a former Permanent Secretary
to the Treasury, stressed that he was not opposed to special advisers,
but was concerned that the increase in their number had created
a culture of "informality and of lack of structure …
of interference and second-guessing". (Q 87)
77. The former Cabinet Secretary, Lord Turnbull,
suggested that the "balanced triangle of the minister, the
special advisers and the civil servants" had been disrupted
to the extent that "the authority and closeness of civil
servants has diminished". (Q 174)
78. There was evidence that the role and influence
of special advisers in the centre had been particularly subject
to change in recent times. Lord Turnbull observed that "the
massive increase" in numbers of special advisers "has
been in Number 10". (Q 181) Professor Kavanagh told
us that the role of a special adviser is now "a much bigger
job … When John Major left Number 10, I think he had
seven special advisers. That had been pretty well the norm …
Under Tony Blair it reached nearly 30. Gordon Brown reduced
it but it is going back up again." (Q 55)
79. Sir Richard Mottram told us that this "led
to a Number 10 Downing Street that was more powerful relative
to the rest of the system, was less interested in formal processes
of decision-making, was more dominated by special advisers and
less dominated by officials". (Q 78)
80. A number of witnesses referred to the Blair
Government's decision in 1997 to pass an Order in Council that
granted the political advisers Alastair Campbell and Jonathan
Powell the power to instruct civil servants. The then Cabinet
Secretary, Lord Butler, told us that he was responsible for the
Order in Council, which was made in order to place the de facto
practice on a legal footing. He said that "it rather shook
me to realise how easily the fundamental structure of our Civil
Service could be changed, and once that Rubicon was crossed you
could never go back". (QQ 130-1) Lord Wilson and Lord
Armstrong agreed that advisers should not possess this power.
(Q 133) The Order in Council was revoked after Gordon Brown
became Prime Minister in 2007.
81. Other witnesses called for reform of the
role of special advisers. Dr Heffernan thought that special advisers
were "necessary and inevitable", but argued that their
role and the nature of their relationship with civil servants
should be regulated in statute. He also thought there should be
more "technocratic" special advisers as opposed to those
who "simply leak and brief on behalf of their principal".
(Q 55)
82. Lord Heseltine distinguished between advisers
with specialist policy knowledge and political advisers: "I
would have the lot out if they are political advisers, out with
the whole lot. It has done nothing but undermine something of
the probity of public life … Special advisers are invaluable,
but special advisers are people who have an expertise outside.
They act very largely in a non-party political way … I am
all for those sorts of special advisers, I am totally opposed
to the politicisation of advisers." (Q 249)
83. Whilst David Blunkett agreed about the usefulness
of specialist policy advisers, he argued that "a small number
of political advisers who do not actually give advice but are
the eyes, ears and arms of the Secretary of State can be invaluable
in protecting the Civil Service, particularly those very close
to the ministers, from being politicised". (Q 249) Tessa
Jowell told us that in her experience, "civil servants and
special advisers work very well together recognising that for
a policy to work it needs political context as well as a range
of public service skills". (p 132)
84. We believe that special advisers have
an important role to play in the work of government, but that
it is necessary to ensure that advisers fulfil an appropriate
function that complements, rather than diminishes, the role and
responsibilities of ministers and civil servants. Transparency
should apply to the work of special advisers. We welcome the provision
for a Code of Conduct for special advisers included in the Constitutional
Reform and Governance Bill. This Code should include a procedure
to limit the numbers of special advisers. We recommend that the
Government should define the role of special advisers, and prevent
a recurrence of the 1997 Order in Council giving advisers the
power to instruct civil servants. We will pay particular attention
to these issues when we conduct our scrutiny of the Bill.
Constitutional implications
85. This raises the question of the constitutional
implications of the changing role of the Prime Minister. Sir Gus
O'Donnell claimed that in 1997, "in formal terms, constitutionally
nothing changed. Cabinet carried on and the Cabinet committees.
What you saw … was a change in style of the Prime Minister
and a change in desire to do different things. The machinery adapted
to meet the desires of that Prime Minister, as it will always
do." (Q 391) The Committee has identified three relevant
constitutional issues.
I) PRESIDENTIALISM?
86. It is sometimes asserted that there is a
growing trend towards a "presidential" style prime ministership.[9]
Lord Turnbull said that there has been a "growth in profile
of the Prime Minister. I would not call it 'presidentialism';
it is a strong Prime Minister. Some of those things are inevitable
… a growing international role, a growing media role, the
fact that the Prime Minister attends the G8 summit and the European
Council. All those things will tend to push the profile of the
Prime Minister". (Q 139)
87. Sir Robin Mountfield argued that "there
is probably a secular trend towards a more dominant or presidential
style. The constitutional issue is where that balance is most
appropriately drawn in modern circumstances." (Q 139)
88. Prime Ministers have increasingly sought
to answer questions which cut across the responsibilities of departmental
ministers. Lord Armstrong told us that "whereas Mr Attlee,
and … Mr Macmillan and Mr Heath, were quite content to say,
'You must ask that question to the Foreign Secretary or the Chancellor
of the Exchequer or whoever', Mrs Thatcher certainly prided herself
on being able to field all the questions and know all about them.
That, in a sense, has persisted." (Q 111) Lord Butler
said that this development was to be welcomed since it overcame
the absurdities of the old system whereby MPs tried to entice
the Prime Minister into answering a question on a given subject.
(Q 111) Lord Wilson argued that "it does not have to
go quite as far as it sometimes does go. I think there has been
a tendency sometimes, say, for the budget to include statements
which could still quite reasonably be referred to a Secretary
of State … there are degrees to which it could still be clawed
back, even in this age when the media expects so much." (Q 111)
89. Jonathan Hill expressed concern that "this
trap that we have fallen into, where the Prime Minister par
excellence but all ministers are supposed to be omniscient,
is a huge mistake and leads to poor decision-making. I would love
to hear someone say, 'I don't know. I'll think about it.'"
(Q 332) On the other hand, Mr Hill recognised the value of
Prime Minister's Questions (at least in its former twice-weekly
format) in allowing the Prime Minister to get a sense of "what
was going on in individual government departments". (Q 308)
90. Sir Gus O'Donnell argued that "the Prime
Minister remains very much that: the Prime Minister who is head
of his Cabinet; an elected MP who is responsible to Parliament
very directly through PMQs (Prime Minster's Questions) and the
announcement of policy through statements to Parliament. Equally
we have the Head of State in Her Majesty the Queen. That said,
there are global trends in this direction driven partly by world
events over recent years, which have resulted in some high profile
joint responses by many countries and delivered on a world stage.
It would be difficult and the Government would be criticised if
the UK Prime Minister were to be absent from the development and
delivery of such responses." (p 162)
II) THE SYSTEM OF CABINET GOVERNMENT
AND COLLECTIVE MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY
91. Any "secular trend towards a more dominant
or presidential style" would inevitably have implications
for the traditional accountability structure of Cabinet government
and collective ministerial responsibility. We address this subject
in the next chapter.
III) ACCOUNTABILITY
92. Baroness Hogg told us that "it is Parliament
that is the check and balance on the Prime Minister and …
it is on the strength of Parliament and structural improvements
to increase the strength of Parliament that one should focus".
(Q 307)
93. Some witnesses expressed concern that the
accountability of the centre had been undermined by the changing
role of the Prime Minister. Dr Wright argued that historically
"the key bit of the centre, which is Number 10, the Prime
Minister, is not directly accountable to Parliament … unlike
other ministers there is no Select Committee on the Prime Minister".
He did however acknowledge that "Tony Blair finally announced
that he was going to appear twice a year before the Liaison Committee
and of course that has now … become a constitutional feature
and that, in its own small way, is quite a constitutional breakthrough
because it will never be altered—it will only be improved
upon." (Q 17)
94. Professor Kavanagh spoke about the importance
of "the question of the accountability of the informal office
of the Prime Minister to the House of Commons". (Q 35)
Professor Smith asserted that "accountability is the key
issue. One of the problems about accountability is that it is
not clear who is making decisions in the centre and who is responsible
for decisions." (Q 35)
95. Lord Wilson told us that "if the Prime
Minister were to be seen to be presidential, it is worth remembering
that we have none of the limits on the power of the President
which exist, say, in the United States … If, in the end,
you did really want to move to what is called colloquially a presidential
system, I think you would need to give a great deal more thought
to what were the constraints on the power of the Prime Minister
… I do not think you can have a system in which the
Prime Minister has absolutely no constraints and unlimited power.
That is contrary to the very essence of a British constitution
and our traditions." (QQ 109, 121)
96. There has been a trend towards the Prime
Minister playing a more dominant role in the UK's political system.
We believe that this trend has been brought about by a combination
of external pressures and a conscious desire by Prime Ministers,
both before and after 1997, to exert greater influence on the
policy-making process. We also acknowledge that this has been
an uneven trend, and that the role of any given Prime Minister
is dependent upon his or her style, and the political circumstances
of the time.
97. We reaffirm that structures of accountability
should mirror structures of power. Greater prominence in the role
of the Prime Minister should be mirrored by increased transparency
and more effective accountability. Whilst we welcome the biannual
appearance by the Prime Minister before the House of Commons Liaison
Committee, we do not believe that this goes far enough in securing
the parliamentary accountability of the Prime Minister's Office.
A case for reforming the structure
of the centre?
98. Some witnesses argued that accountability
would be enhanced by reform of the structure of the Cabinet Office,
either by the formation of a separate Department of the Prime
Minister, or by reshaping the Cabinet Office into a new Department
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
I) A DEPARTMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER
99. Dr Heffernan told us that whilst "there
are lots of checks and balances upon [the Prime Minister's power]
… the Cabinet Office does not remotely play that role; and
it should play a role in supporting the Cabinet beyond the Prime
Minister. At present all it tends to do is support the Prime Minister".
(Q 53) He therefore proposed that a Prime Minister's Department
should be established which was transparent and accountable to
Parliament. (Q 46) He argued that such a model would regularise
"what is in a sense the reality", in particular since
a Permanent Secretary, Jeremy Heywood, already exists in Number
10. (Q 35) Professor Kavanagh gave a conditional assent to
this idea, also noting that it would improve the Prime Minister's
accountability to Parliament. (QQ 65, 69)
100. Lord McNally thought that "an Office
of the Prime Minister with a more specific job description would
be more fit for purpose than a Cabinet Office that seems to be
trying to spread its talents too thinly". (Q 106) Lord
Burns expressed sympathy with the idea, but was wary of the impact
that it would have on the objective of supporting the Cabinet.
(Q 95)
101. David Blunkett told us that he would be
in favour of the establishment of a Department of the Prime Minister
were it not for the fact that "it would enhance the role
of the Prime Minister in a way which would be seen as presidential".
(Q 229)
102. Baroness Hogg doubted that the solution
to concerns about accountability was to set up a Prime Minister's
Department. (Q 337) Lord Donoughue, senior policy adviser
to the Prime Minister in the 1974-79 Labour administration, told
us that both Harold Wilson and James Callaghan had opposed such
a proposal because "they preferred not to have the formal
hierarchy of a department". (Q 101)
II) A DEPARTMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER
AND CABINET
103. Sir Michael Barber advocated a "department
of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet" on the grounds that
this would strengthen the Prime Minister, strengthen the Cabinet
and enhance accountability to Parliament. (Q 208)
104. Geoff Mulgan asserted that such a model
would be a "reasonable compromise" between the authority
of the Prime Minister and "the need to reflect the power
and interests of other Cabinet ministers". (Q 210) He
and others referred to the Australian model of such an office
as an exemplar. (QQ 210, 165, pp 182-4)
105. Sir Richard Mottram concluded that a centre
supporting the Prime Minister and sustaining collective government
was needed, and therefore he favoured a Department for the Prime
Minister and Cabinet, "with the Cabinet Secretary clearly
the Prime Minister's principal official adviser". (p 36)
He explained that such an arrangement "could enhance collective
government, as well as the support the Civil Service can give
to the Prime Minister in his or her leadership role". (Q 88)
He thought that this would improve parliamentary accountability
and lead to more structured decision-making. (QQ 90, 95)
106. There was a difference of opinion amongst
the former Cabinet Secretaries about restructuring the centre.
Lord Butler told us that the proposal to make the Cabinet Office
a part of the Prime Minister's Department would blur responsibilities.
He said that he and Lords Armstrong and Wilson "argue for
the old system and believe it works better and my own view is
that the evidence for that is that the changes have not worked
particularly well over the last ten years". (Q 121)
107. Lord Wilson argued that "if there is
an alternative view that we should have an Office for the Prime
Minister and that the Prime Minister's role should be in some
way presidential … the question is whether that works well
… it is also a question of whether future Prime Ministers
could actually have the political strength to do that because
if they did not, then you would find that the Office was not very
strong and they would be driven back to recognising the importance
of collective responsibility." (Q 121)
108. Lord Turnbull said that there was danger
in the Office of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office being
functionally distinct on the grounds that, "if you say to
the Prime Minister, 'We in the Cabinet Office basically work for
the Cabinet and you, in so far as you are a part of the Cabinet',
I think that you will be inviting the Prime Minister to say, 'I will
create my own apparatus'. The big danger is that, instead of treating
the Cabinet Secretary and his staff as his life support system
… he then creates an apparatus of his own of vastly inferior
quality ... I think that creating a strong bond between the Cabinet
Secretary and the Prime Minister is the way to ensure that the
interests of the rest of Cabinet are properly looked after and
defended, and a go-it-alone, poorly advised Prime Minister
is the biggest danger that we face." (Q 165)
109. Tessa Jowell thought that it was "more
important to get things done rather than having dialogue about
what 'the centre' is called. This in my view is more important
than whether we have a 'Prime Minister's Department'." (p 132)
110. We do not support the calls for the creation
of a separate Office of the Prime Minister, or an Office of the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, because we do not believe that
this would significantly enhance the effective functioning or
accountability of government. Instead we recommend that "Supporting
the Prime Minister" should remain a core function of the
Cabinet Office, so long as there is full transparency in the way
in which the Cabinet Office fulfils this role, and so long as
accountability mechanisms effectively reflect the importance of
this function.
2 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/about_the_cabinet_office.aspx Back
3
See for example J.P. Mackintosh (1968) The British Cabinet
2nd edn. London: Methuen, R. Blake (1975) The Office
of Prime Minister Oxford: Oxford University Press, D. Kavanagh
and A. Seldon (1999) The Powers Behind the Prime Minister
London: Harper Collins. Back
4
See for example Cabinet Office (2009) The 47th Civil
Service Year Book, London: HMSO. Back
5
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/newsroom/news_releases/2005/051215_watmore.aspx
cf. Richards and Smith (2006a) 'Central Control and Policy Implementation
in the UK: a Case Study of the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit'
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis Special Issue Vol.
8 No.4 Winter 2006 pp 325-346. Back
6
HC Debs 28 June 2007, col 39WS. Back
7
M. Heseltine (2000), Life in the Jungle: My Autobiography
London: Hodder and Stoughton, p 489. Back
8
Numbers drawn from Richards, D. (2008) New Labour and the Civil
Service: Reconstituting the Westminster Model Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan and HC Debs 16 July 2009, Col 74WS Special
Advisers. Back
9
See for instance M. Foley (2003)The Rise of the British Presidency
(Manchester University Press); M. Foley (2000) The British
Presidency: Tony Blair and the Politics of Public Leadership
(Manchester University Press); M. Foley, 'Presidential Attribution
as an Agency of Prime Ministerial Critique in a Parliamentary
Democracy: The Case of Tony Blair', The British Journal of
Politics and International Relations, Vol. 6 (3), 2004, pp.
292-311; R. Heffernan and P. Webb (2005) 'The British Prime Minister:
Much More Than 'First Among Equals', in T. Poguntke and P. Webb
eds., The Presidentialization of Politics (Oxford University
Press). Back
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