CHAPTER 6: Summary of Recommendations
Introduction
251. In our view, structures of accountability
should mirror structures of power, and where structures of power
have changed, the structures of accountability should be adjusted
accordingly. Two considerations flow from this view:
- Upholding and improving parliamentary
accountability;
- Ensuring that all elements of
the centre, and all aspects of the centre's work are transparent.
(Para 8)
Supporting the Prime Minister
252. Sir Gus O'Donnell asserted that "there
is one Cabinet Office of which Number 10 is a subset". This
description of the relationship between the Cabinet Office and
Prime Minister's Office was not reflected in other evidence that
we received. It conflicts, for instance, with the statement of
Lords Armstrong, Butler and Wilson, that the two offices are "functionally
distinct". It is open to doubt whether Sir Gus O'Donnell's
description of the Prime Minister's Office as a "subset"
and a "business unit" goes beyond what Sir Richard Mottram
told us, that "Number 10 is part of the Cabinet Office for
public expenditure planning purposes", and whether it accurately
describes how the centre operates in practice. We believe that
the nature of this relationship should be clarified by the Cabinet
Office, and should be reflected in government publications, which
appear to suggest that the two offices are independent institutions.
(Para 25)
253. The role of the Prime Minister's Office
is central to the role and structure of the centre of government.
The establishment by the current Prime Minister of the post of
Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister's Office is an important
step in the evolution of the structure of the centre. We recognise
the arguments set out by Sir Gus O'Donnell and Jeremy Heywood
in favour of the current arrangements, and Sir Gus O'Donnell's
explanation of the role of the six permanent secretaries located
in the Cabinet Office. We recommend that the Prime Minister's
Office, and the Permanent Secretaries that operate within it,
are subject to appropriate parliamentary accountability mechanisms.
(Para 26)
254. We conclude that a greater involvement and
influence by the Prime Minister on policy delivery is inevitable
in the modern age, that the Prime Minister's role has evolved
over a long period under different governments, and that Prime
Ministers will wish to use all possible resources in pursuit of
the role. We recommend that the Prime Minister's role and the
centre's role in policy delivery are transparent and accountable
to Parliament. (Para 43)
255. We believe that the Delivery Unit and the
Strategy Unit play a useful role in delivering the Government's
policy agenda, for instance in co-ordinating work across government
departments, and that there should be transparency and accountability
for the work of these units. (Para 52)
256. We agree with the Minister for the Cabinet
Office that the flexibility of the structure of the centre of
government is an asset. We also recognise the value of an "incubator
role", where the Cabinet Office develops units and functions
that are consequently transferred to the relevant government departments,
but we fear that the Cabinet Office has tended to function less
as an incubator and more as a dustbin. The fact that policy units
for which no other home can be found have been placed in the Cabinet
Office underlines the constitutional importance of ensuring that
the Cabinet Office and the units within it are properly held to
account. (Para 66)
257. We recommend that a review of the units
that have accrued to the centre be undertaken by the Government,
including an examination of the rationale for each unit's continued
existence, and for its location at the centre of government rather
than in a department. In order to ensure that the Government are
properly held to account, we recommend that a copy of this review
be sent to this Committee and also, should they wish to receive
it, to the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee.
We also recommend that the same review process be repeated regularly.
Appropriate mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that those
units that remain are held to account in an effective manner.
(Para 67)
258. We believe that special advisers have an
important role to play in the work of government, but that it
is necessary to ensure that advisers fulfil an appropriate function
that complements, rather than diminishes, the role and responsibilities
of ministers and civil servants. Transparency should apply to
the work of special advisers. We welcome the provision for a Code
of Conduct for special advisers included in the Constitutional
Reform and Governance Bill. This Code should include a procedure
to limit the numbers of special advisers. We recommend that the
Government should define the role of special advisers, and prevent
a recurrence of the 1997 Order in Council giving advisers the
power to instruct civil servants. We will pay particular attention
to these issues when we conduct our scrutiny of the Bill. (Para
84)
259. We reaffirm that structures of accountability
should mirror structures of power. We reaffirm that the
structure of accountability should mirror the structure of power.
Greater prominence in the role of the Prime Minister should be
mirrored by increased transparency and more effective accountability.
Whilst we welcome the biannual appearance by the Prime Minister
before the House of Commons Liaison Committee, we do not believe
that this goes far enough in securing the parliamentary accountability
of the Prime Minister's Office. (Para 97)
260. We do not support the calls for the creation
of a separate Office of the Prime Minister, or an Office of the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet, because we do not believe that
this would significantly enhance the effective functioning or
accountability of government. Instead we recommend that "Supporting
the Prime Minister" should remain a core function of the
Cabinet Office, so long as there is full transparency in the way
in which the Cabinet Office fulfils this role, and so long as
accountability mechanisms effectively reflect the importance of
this function. (Para 110)
Supporting the Cabinet
261. We reaffirm our belief in the importance
of Cabinet government, which plays an essential role in upholding
the principle of collective ministerial responsibility. (Para
128)
262. We believe that the Cabinet committee system
remains an essential part of the UK's government structure, as
part of the system of collective ministerial responsibility. In
order for Cabinet committees to function effectively, we believe
that they should be mirrored by committees of officials. We ask
the Government to clarify the extent to which Cabinet committees
continue to be supported in this way. (Para 137)
263. We reaffirm the constitutional importance
of the principle of collective ministerial responsibility. Executive
responsibility should not lie solely with the Prime Minister,
not least because accountability mechanisms are not designed to
reflect such responsibility. In the light of the trends and changes
described above, it is important that the principle of collective
responsibility is maintained. (Para 153)
264. The increasing recognition of issues involving
more than one department has placed pressure on the traditional
departmental delivery model. In order to ensure that structures
of accountability mirror structures of power, Parliament should
ensure that its accountability mechanisms adapt to the changing
nature of policy formation and delivery. Government should ensure
that the mechanism of the policy formation and delivery process
remains transparent. (Para 154)
265. We believe that the post of Minister for
the Cabinet Office should be maintained in order to ensure that
the work of the Cabinet Office is transparent, and to ensure that
Parliament is able to hold the Department to account in an effective
way, but are concerned that the responsibilities of the Minister
in relation to the Cabinet Office are at present ill-defined.
We recommend that the Government reassess the current function
of the Minister for the Cabinet Office to ensure that the postholder's
responsibilities accurately reflect and account for the strategic
role that the Cabinet Office plays. (Para 163)
266. In the case of the proposal to abolish the
Office of Lord Chancellor in June 2003, the Cabinet Office was
unable to ensure compliance with proper constitutional norms in
the adoption of a change of such constitutional significance.
It is particularly disturbing that these failures occurred without
there being any external crisis which might explain, far less
justify, such failures. Consideration should be given by the Cabinet
Office to means of ensuring that such failures do not recur. (Para
214)
267. Whilst we accept the general proposition
that the ability to undertake machinery of government changes
should remain as a prerogative power of the Prime Minister on
behalf of the Crown, this should be subject to a number of provisos.
In the case of the proposal to abolish the Office of Lord Chancellor,
the fact that it marked a constitutional change of great significance,
with implications for both Parliament and the judiciary and that
the post could only be removed by statute, meant that it required
totally different handling. (Para 215)
268. We recommend that the Cabinet Office should
play a formal role in investigating the likely consequences of
any machinery of government changes, particularly those with constitutional
implications. (Para 216)
269. We further recommend that parliamentary
scrutiny of machinery of government changes should be enhanced,
and that, as a minimum requirement, the Government, advised by
the Cabinet Office, should be required to set before Parliament
a written analysis of the relevant issues and consequences relating
to a proposed machinery of government change with constitutional
implications, and that an oral ministerial statement be made in
Parliament. We affirm the value of the scrutiny work of parliamentary
committees in this context, and recommend that relevant committees
of both Houses be given the opportunity to scrutinise proposed
changes, both before and after they take place. (Para 217)
Strengthening the Civil Service
270. We find persuasive the arguments which we
have heard that the current arrangement where the Cabinet Secretary
acts as Head of the Civil Service has worked well. We therefore
recommend that the Cabinet Secretary should continue to fulfil
the function of Head of the Civil Service, and that the Cabinet
Office should retain responsibility for managing the Civil Service.
(Para 231)
271. We note the work undertaken by the Cabinet
Office in delivering Capability Reviews of departmental activity.
We believe that the Cabinet Office is the most appropriate department
to undertake this work. (Para 242)
272. We note the work undertaken by the Cabinet
Office in delivering Capability Reviews of departmental activity.
We believe that the Cabinet Office is the most appropriate department
to undertake this work. (Para 249)
Conclusion
273. In undertaking this inquiry we have considered
a complicated and at times confusing web of offices, structures,
jobs and personalities. This complicated picture should not obscure
the fact that the operation of the centre of government is of
unique and vital importance to the effectiveness of the UK's system
of government. We repeat our view that structures of accountability
should mirror structures of power. Our recommendations have sought
to ensure that where structures of power have shifted, structures
of accountability are adjusted accordingly. As the General Election
approaches, we call on all political parties to bear this principle
in mind. (Para 250)
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