Memorandum by Dr June Burnham, formerly
Senior Lecturer, Middlesex University
1. I apologise for providing this response
at the very last minute. Despite having what I think is relevant
expertise,[17]
I initially decided I could not respond, because I see the issues
in different terms from those posed in the Call for Evidence.
However, I would like to help the Committee as far as I can and
am submitting my observations in case they are of some use.
2. As I understand it from the Call for Evidence,
the Committee's concerns stem from the many recent changes to
the "architecture" of "the centre of government",
in a context of "governance" that has made the task
of central units "more challenging". Yet it is a positive
feature of the central offices that they are flexible enough to
provide homes for new public domains (eg education, statistics,
science), or short-term projects (eg devolution 1973-78, 1997-99).
Their strong reliance on temporary postings enables them to expand
to meet challenges (two World Wars, the preparation of post-war
reforms) without creating a permanent bureaucracy.
3. The suggestion that the Cabinet Office
needs to add capacity to cope with governance is, I think, a red
herring. First, a diversified governance seems to be the norm
in Britain—the periods of directly-managed government being
exceptional.[18]
Second, there is a contradiction between political decisions to
delegate and decentralise, and the assumption that the Cabinet
Office must therefore work harder to control and coordinate. It
would be more appropriate for the centre to let go and reduce
this self-imposed burden.
4. Frequent changes have negative implications
for staff morale,[19]
and can lead to confused accountability. That said, few changes
listed in the Call for Evidence are novel. For example, there
has been a women's unit in the Cabinet Office for at least 40
years; units on social policy come and go, and domains of policy
secretariats alter as different issues come to the fore. Moving
top official advisers back from Number 10 to the Cabinet Office
could even be seen as a return to more constitutional arrangements.
5. Most of the centre's work falls under
three headings: (1) the hosting of interdepartmental units (civil
and military), of which the policy secretariats are the standing
core; (2) the servicing of Prime Minister and ministers without
departmental portfolio; and (3) civil service management. The
"architecture" joining civil service management to the
Cabinet Office policy role is the least settled organisationally.
Constitutionally, the Prime Minister's responsibility for the
Civil Service enables this role to be assigned to the Cabinet
Office, the Treasury or a dedicated department. The least problematical
solution has been attachment to the Cabinet Office, with a minister
exercising the Prime Minister's political responsibility.
6. There should have been no need for a
new post to "enhance cohesion between Number 10 and the Cabinet
Office": the Cabinet Secretary should play that role—one
argument for separating the posts of Cabinet Secretary and Head
of the Home Civil Service. There is much for a Head of the Civil
Service to do, as shown in simple terms by the continuing division
between Foreign Office diplomats and the Home Civil Service; and
the limited consideration of Civil Service issues during the process
of devolution to Scotland and Wales,[20]
in addition to the widely cited failings of the senior Civil Service.[21]
7. Units of outsiders set up by prime ministers
within Number 10 or the Cabinet Office are usually accepted if
they are occupied with policy or delivery matters and do not publicly
contradict ministers or departmental advice. In contrast, the
use of the central offices for promoting party interests is indefensible.
There are specific issues about the use of public resources for
private purposes, and wider concerns about bringing the central
offices into disrepute. The concept of an impartial Civil Service
is eroded in public eyes when overtly political aides refer to
themselves as civil servants; it would be better to remove their
official status as "temporary civil servants".
8. The Call for Evidence enquires about
"the Cabinet Office's constitutional position ... in terms
of responsibility and accountability ..". The Cabinet Office
is subject to the constitutional conventions applying to departments,
but the obstacles to full accounting loom larger (for example,
restrictions on questions about interdepartmental discussions,
and ministers' unwillingness for special advisers to be questioned).
There has been a deterioration in the last decade even in simple
ways—in 2006 the annual Cabinet Office report replaced verifiable
facts with glossy photos and a glossing over of inconvenient statistics.
The "unscripted" meetings mentioned in the Butler Report
and elsewhere make accounting impossible.
9. Accountability of the central offices
is weakened when parliamentarians are not sufficiently robust
in holding ministers and officials to account. The public learn
about the work of the central offices mainly through published
inquiries into disastrous failures (Scott, Hutton, Butler).
10. Political scientists often argue that
the institutional arrangements seriously constrain Prime Ministers.
My own research (in France) found that is not the case: political
leaders can deploy the machinery to further their objectives.[22]
Rather than trying to fix the machinery, I feel the main concern
should be to encourage those operating it act constitutionally.
Incoming governments need sufficient confidence in the permanent
bureaucracy not to bypass it by importing their own staff; they
must feel that civil servants will be loyal without being political,
be technically competent and not self-serving. The solution is
mainly in the Civil Service's hands, but as far as constitutional
mechanisms are concerned, a Civil Service Act could help reassure
ministers and strengthen the position of officials who want to
uphold high standards.
14 June 2009
17 Working with Professor George Jones and Professor
Michael Lee. See in particular, JW Lee, GW Jones, J Burnham, At
the Centre of Whitehall (Macmillan, 1998). Back
18
R Lowe and N Rollings, Modernising Britain, 1957-64: A classic
case of centralisation and fragmentation?, in RAW Rhodes,
Transforming British Government, I. (Macmillan and ESRC,
2000), 99-118. Back
19
House of Lords Public Service Committee, Report, HL 55 (Stationery
Office, 1998). Back
20
J Burnham and R Pyper, Britain's Modernised Civil Service
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Back
21
See the evidence of Robin Mountfield, Colin Talbot and David Walker
in Public Administration Select Committee, Skills for Government,
HC 93ii (Stationery Office, 2006). Back
22
J Burnham, Politicians, Bureaucrats and Leadership in Organizations
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Back
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