CHAPTER 7: Summary of Recommendations
Referendums—Arguments for and against
209. The balance of the evidence that we have
heard leads us to the conclusion that there are significant drawbacks
to the use of referendums. In particular, we regret the ad
hoc manner in which referendums have been used, often as a
tactical device, by the government of the day. Referendums may
become a part of the UK's political and constitutional practice.
Where possible, cross-party agreement should be sought as to the
circumstances in which it is appropriate for referendums to be
used. (Para 62)
Referendums on constitutional issues
210. Notwithstanding our view that there are
significant drawbacks to the use of referendums, we acknowledge
arguments that, if referendums are to be used, they are most appropriately
used in relation to fundamental constitutional issues. We do not
believe that it is possible to provide a precise definition of
what constitutes a "fundamental constitutional issue".
Nonetheless, we would consider to fall within this definition
any proposals:
· To abolish the Monarchy;
· To leave the European Union;
· For any of the nations of the UK to secede
from the Union;
· To abolish either House of Parliament;
· To change the electoral system for the
House of Commons;
· To adopt a written constitution; and
· To change the UK's system of currency.
This is not a definitive list of fundamental constitutional
issues, nor is it intended to be. (Para 94)
211. A written constitution could provide a more
precise definition of a "constitutional issue", and
define which issues required a referendum before any change. The
arguments for and against introducing a written constitution are
outwith the scope of this inquiry. (Para 102)
212. It is possible to set out in legislation
specific issues which should be subject to a referendum, as has
been done in the past. Although one Parliament cannot bind another,
Parliament might not lightly repeal such legislation. But, since
it is impossible precisely to define what constitutes a "fundamental
constitutional issue", it follows that it is impossible to
set out in legislation an all-encompassing list of such issues
that should be subject to a referendum. (Para 111)
213. Parliament should judge what issues will
be the subject of referendums. In its first report, this Committee
stated that it would "focus on issues of constitutional significance"
determined by whether an issue raises "an important question
of principle about a principal part of the constitution".[28]
We believe that this provides a useful test, first, of whether
an issue is of fundamental constitutional significance, and second,
of whether a referendum is therefore appropriate. (Para 118)
Other uses of referendums
214. Given our concerns about the use of referendums,
we are not convinced by the arguments in favour of citizens' initiatives.
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that there is a need to encourage
greater citizen engagement in the democratic process. The use
of such tools as citizens' assemblies and citizens' juries may
be worthy of consideration in this regard. (Para 130)
215. We do not believe that local referendums
are the most effective way of increasing citizen engagement with
the local democratic process. (Para 140)
216. We recommend that referendums should not
be held on the same day as General Elections. For other elections
we recommend there should be a presumption against holding referendums
on the same day as elections but that this should be judged on
a case-by-case basis by the Electoral Commission. (Para 145)
217. Notwithstanding the Electoral Commission's
assessment that it was extremely unlikely that a Secretary of
State would ignore its advice on the wording of the referendum
question we recommend that, rather than the Government making
the final decision, the Electoral Commission should be given a
statutory responsibility to formulate referendum questions which
should then be presented to Parliament for approval. (Para 154)
218. We recommend that the presumption should
be in favour of questions posing only two options for voters but
recognise that there may be occasions when multi-option questions
are preferable. We look to the Electoral Commission to assess
the merits of multi-option questions in their referendum question
assessment exercise. (Para 159)
219. We are concerned about the effectiveness
of the regulation of information provision in UK referendums.
We commend the model provided by the 1992-3 electoral reform referendums
in New Zealand when an independent body provided information and
ran the public education process. (Para 167)
220. Current regulation governing funding and
campaigning in a referendum has not yet been tested in a national
referendum. We note the concerns about the possible loopholes
in the provisions of the PPERA relating to the funding of referendum
campaigns. We welcome the Electoral Commission's decision to make
its decision-making relating to designating lead campaign groups
more transparent. (Para 175)
221. Current regulation regarding the role of
government and political parties in a referendum has not yet been
tested in a national referendum. Whatever role government and
political parties play, it is necessary to ensure that the referendum
process is seen by all to be fair. (Para 179)
222. We recommend that there should be a general
presumption against the use of voter turnout thresholds and supermajorities.
We recognise however that there may be exceptional circumstances
in which they may be deemed appropriate. (Para 189)
223. We recognise that because of the sovereignty
of Parliament, referendums cannot be legally binding in the UK,
and are therefore advisory. However, it would be difficult for
Parliament to ignore a decisive expression of public opinion.
(Para 197)
224. Any assessment of the overall regulatory
framework relating to referendums and the role of the Electoral
Commission are theoretical as neither has been tested in a UK-wide
referendum. We therefore recommend that after the next UK-wide
referendum:
· The Electoral Commission should analyse
its experience (as it did for the 2004 North East referendum)
and make recommendations for change to the regulatory framework
and its role; and
· There should be thorough post-legislative
scrutiny of the PPERA at an early date. (Para 202)
225. We are sympathetic to the changes to the
legislative framework suggested by the Electoral Commission following
its analysis of the 2004 North East referendum. We recommend that
the Government take steps to ensure that they are implemented.
(Para 203)
Conclusion
226. Referendums are not a panacea. We note the
arguments for their use as a way of strengthening the democratic
process. The drawbacks and difficulties of their use are serious.
(Para 204)
227. Referendums may become a part of the UK's
democratic and constitutional framework. There has been little
consistency in their use. They have taken place on an ad hoc
basis, frequently as a tactical device rather than on the basis
of constitutional principle. (Para 205)
228. Notwithstanding this, we acknowledge arguments
that, if referendums are to be used, they are most appropriately
used in relation to fundamental constitutional issues. There are
difficulties in defining what constitutes a "fundamental
constitutional issue". Although some constitutional issues
clearly are of fundamental importance,[29]
and others not, there is a grey area where the importance of issues
is a matter of political judgment. (Para 206)
229. To leave such judgments entirely in the
hands of the government of the day is in our view inappropriate.
Parliament should decide whether or not a referendum is appropriate
in a given circumstance. (Para 207)
230. We note the recent commitments by the main
parties to use referendums in specific circumstances and the proposals
for further referendums in Scotland and Wales in the near future.
The question of referendums will arise in the forthcoming General
Election campaign. We have set out in this report some considerations
which we hope will inform future debate. (Para 208)
28 ibid., para 27. Back
29
See para 94. Back
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