Letter and memorandum by John Laing
On behalf of John Laing plc, it is my pleasure
to respond to your call for evidence to support the Economic Affairs
Committee's enquiry: "Private Finance Projects and off-balance
sheet debt".
John Laing is a specialist owner, operator and manager
of public sector assets in the UK and internationally. Our reputation
is the product of our success in delivering 67 privately-financed
infrastructure schemes for the public sector, ranging from the
award-winning MoD HQ in London's Whitehall, to the ground-breaking
Croydon Urban Regeneration Vehicle, as well as hospital, school
and major road projects in the UK, Europe and North America. Our
project development and management skills draw on our long heritage
in infrastructure—the group was established over 160 years
ago, and until 2001 was a leading international construction contractor.
Our response to your call for evidence is attached.
In summary, we strongly believe that the use of private finance
in publicly procured infrastructure, whether through PFI or other
forms of PPP, has delivered (and can continue to do so) substantial
benefits to governments. It is not, of course, a one-size-fits-all
solution, and improvements could be made in how it is used, but
used appropriately, it can make a valuable contribution to supporting
public sector infrastructure investment.
We would be happy to supplement the attached
written evidence if the Committee so requests.
Chief Executive
25 September 2009
1. Question 1—How should the cost and
benefits of Private Finance projects be assessed? What discount
rate should be used in comparing Private Finance with conventional
public procurement? Are current procurement procedures satisfactory?
Is enough information disclosed on Private Finance projects fully
to assess whether the taxpayer is getting value-for-money?
1.1 Cost-benefit analysis for private finance
projects should be evaluated holistically using a Value for Money
(VfM) assessment. In its VfM guidance, HM Treasury defines value
for money as "the optimum combination of whole-of-life costs
and quality (or fitness for purpose) to meet the user's requirements".1
The very nature of Private Finance projects, whereby a consortium
contracts with a procuring authority not only for design and construction
but also for maintenance, operation and asset management of a
facility, embeds this principle of whole-life costing. Similarly,
quality to meet defined long-term end-user's requirements is a
fundamental part of Private Finance projects, requiring ongoing
active management to make this a success.
1.2 HM Treasury's guidance on VfM combines both
a qualitiative and quantitative assessment, so that too much weight
is not placed on comparative costs (PFI versus traditional procurement)
which can only ever be approximate. Accurate cost-benefit comparisons
between projects delivered through private finance and traditional
procurement are hard to make because like-for-like information
on traditional procurement is limited. The VfM Quantitative Assessment
which HM Treasury provide in their guidance2 is based on assumed
Optimism Bias (understatements in forecasts for capital expenditure
and long-term maintenance in traditionally procured projects)
which, although based on previous experience, cannot be regarded
as definitive. The guidance emphasises the need for a combined
approach, not placing too much reliance on the quantitative assessment,
which seems entirely appropriate in the circumstances. The VfM
assessment could be improved if more information were available
on the cost of traditionally procured projects, including costs
of procurement, construction and long-term maintenance, to match
the extensive body of information on PFI projects. This information
should not only be used to make the internal VfM assessment more
accurate, but should also be made public to allow a more informed
debate on the merits of PFI in the public arena.
1.3 Caution must be shown when seeking to
make comparisons between traditional and privately financed projects
that are based on "brick for brick" pricing alone, since
this disregards the fundamental differences in the scope of traditional
and privately financed projects. Private finance allows a clearer
focus on long-term outcomes for clients and communities, including
non-monetary targets (such as educational outcomes within the
Building Schools the Future Programme, or Health & Safety
targets for some roads projects), that cannot be effectively incorporated
into traditionally procured projects.
1.4 A sensible measure for the discount
rate used in comparing private finance with conventional public
procurement is the public sector cost of funds plus a risk premium
to recognise the differences between the two approaches. Independent
reviews comparing the effectiveness of PFI and traditional procurement
have consistently shown that traditional procurement compares
very badly in terms of its failure to deliver capital works on
time and the frequency of cost overruns (see 2.4 below). Under
HM Treasury's VfM Quantitative Assessment, the risk premium is
recognised by means of estimates for Optimism Bias in traditional
procurement, and a single discount rate (3.5% real) is applied
to all assessments.
1.5 Current PFI procurement procedures have
successfully delivered a large number of infrastructure projects,
as illustrated by the substantial increase in UK infrastructure
investment pre and post 1997, and the part played by PFI in that.3
Nevertheless, the process could benefit from the following improvements:
— Procurement through the private finance
route under the Competitive Dialogue process can sometimes be
more costly than necessary. The costs borne by each bidder can
represent a significant percentage of capital expenditure, including
duplication of early stage costs (eg investigations and early
design work). In part, we believe that this derives from a fear
of criticism in public sector bodies, which leads them to be particularly
risk-averse in the extent of detailed development at early stages
of a bid. Far less scrutiny is applied to equivalent projects
procured under framework or traditional procurement routes. Procuring
authorities are well aware of this issue in PFI procurement, and
have improved processes to some extent, although there is further
to go.
— Procurement through the private finance
route can be a lengthy process. This in itself creates significant
costs for both the public and private sector parties, in terms
of direct staff resource and expenditure on external advisors.
Sometimes, delays can occur because of insufficient pre-launch
planning, or unrealistic expectations on cost or scope, which
can lead to the need to seek re-approval for higher funding support
during a procurement, causing delay. Comprehensive planning before
launch is clearly critical, which is embedded in Government procedures,
but still needs to be adhered to more closely.
— More focus should be placed on developing
new models for procurement that capture the potential for Public
Private Partnerships to deliver multi-sector regeneration projects
that are better aligned to the joined-up needs of communities
(we have considered this in more detail in our response to Question
9, below).
— Supporting the need for more "like
for like" comparisons between privately and publicly financed
projects, more information should be disclosed about the performance
of both types of project, analysed by sector/type to facilitate
its use (as noted in 1.2 and 1.3 above). For example, delivery
dates, budget control, customer satisfaction, response and rectification,
change control, lifecycle management and end user outcomes. Such
information would help effectively communicate how VfM is achieved
through these projects and would ensure that a more meaningful
assessment and comparison with private finance is possible. As
outlined above, all privately financed projects are subject to
scrutiny on a regular basis, meaning that performance information
is readily available for these projects. This is rarely communicated
outside of industry press and successes are not widely acknowledged
in the mainstream press.
2. Question 2—How does the performance
(eg, cost, delivery dates and service quality) of schools, hospitals,
prisons, roads and other projects operated under private finance
compare to those which were traditionally procured?
2.1 All projects delivered using private
finance are subject to regular performance scrutiny from both
the Public Sector partner and senior lenders. This ensures that
the infrastructure is operated to a high quality, failing which
there are financial penalties to enforce this, and in extremis
the contract can be terminated. These long-term incentives and
drivers do not exist in traditional procurement. The private finance
procurement route creates a clear focus of accountability for
an infrastructure project in its entirety, which is not typically
the case for traditionally procured projects that may involve
multiple contracts and give little guarantee that the infrastructure
will be maintained and serviced to a consistently high standard
over the long-term.
2.2 Timely delivery of key facilities brings
clear benefits to communities, as does the high quality operation
and maintenance of facilities and technologies by specialist providers.
Furthermore, clearly defined availability criteria assist the
private sector in ensuring the maximum availability of highways,
classrooms, hospital wards and fire stations. Each of these mechanisms
are components of Private Finance projects. We see this evidence
in many of our projects.
2.3 On our M40 road PFI contract, innovation
was required to meet performance expectations. Replacing a traditional
surfacing treatment with an alternative preventative solution
ensured that there was minimum disruption to motorists. Cost efficiencies
were delivered, as well as a dramatic reduction in the environmental
impact—as evidenced by an independent sustainability consultant
that calculated a 94% CO2 saving, when comparing preservatives
against a resurfacing application.
2.4 The superior performance of PFI-procured
projects is reflected within the findings of a number of independent
assessments:
— A 2001 NAO report4 found that 81% of
of public sector managers reported at least satisfactory VfM,
with 52% reporting excellent or good VfM.
— A 2003 NAO report5 found that only 30%
of major non-PFI construction projects were delivered on time
and 27% on budget, compared with 76% of PFI projects delivered
on time (and only 8% more than two months late) and with no cost
overrun paid by the public sector. Further, a Mott McDonald "Review
of Large Public Procurement in the UK" for HM Treasury
in 2002 reported cost overruns on traditionally procured projects
of up to 51% for building projects and 66% for engineering projects
attributed to "the large number of risks excluded from the
contractor's price at the award stage".
— Significant delivery problems have materialised
in some traditionally procured projects, with a number of high
profile examples, such as the Scottish Parliament building (which
was initially estimated to cost £109 million but ultimately
cost the tax payer £430 million with a three year delay)
and the Jubilee Line extension to the London Underground (major
delays and cost overruns, contrasted with the on-time/on-budget
delivery of the privately-financed Lewisham Extension to the Docklands
Light Railway).
— The 2003 HM Treasury paper "PFI:
meeting the investment challenge" highlighted that a
number of key projects procured traditionally had been delivered
late and significantly over budget; (such as Guy's hospital, the
Trident submarine project, and the top 25 MOD equipment projects
at a total cost of over £4.5 billion), which could have necessitated
cuts elsewhere in the public purse to balance the over-spend.
— Guy's hospital in London was the last
traditionally procured major hospital before the introduction
of private finance. The hospital was due for completion at the
end of 1992 however due to a number of problems was not completed
till April 1997. The National Audit Office described the project
as "one of the worst cases of overspending in recent NHS
history" and the HM Treasury put the rise in cost of the
project at £124 million to £160 million.
— A 2006 survey6 on operational PFI projects
by Partnerships UK found that 96% of public sector managers believed
that operational performance was satisfactory or better, with
66% believing it good or very good.
— A 2008 review of educational performance
in PFI schools by KPMG7 indicated a statistically significant
correlation between PFI school projects and improved educational
outcomes.
3. Question 3—Is there significant risk
transfer to the private sector or is it more apparent than real?
3.1 Yes, there is significant risk transfer
to the private sector. John Laing have experienced this first
hand with the termination of the National Physical Laboratory
PFI contract in December 2004. The private sector partners, including
John Laing as a project sponsor and (in that project) construction
contractor, reported an overall loss in excess of £100 million.
3.2 The significance of risk transfer has been
illustrated through a few high profile cases of private sector
ventures going into administration, the most recent of which being
the announcement that Newschools (Cornwall) Ltd had gone into
administration in July of this year.
3.3 In certain LIFT projects, we are assuming
full risk on the development and construction of community primary
care facilities that can then be utilised by Primary Care Trusts
(PCT). The financial risk on residual value of these properties
remains with the private sector should the PCT no longer have
need for the facilities. This innovation gives PCTs significant
flexibility in their care delivery models but requires a substantial
transfer of risk to the private sector.
3.4 The benefit to the public sector of
transferring the risk to the private sector is that should a project
encounter difficulties, the private sector contractor typically
carries responsibility to remedy any significant problem, and
if a facility is not completed or is not available for use by
the public sector client, then the private sector partner will
receive no payment.
3.5 There are also a much larger number
of lower profile instances where the private sector partner has
had to bear the consequences of unforeseen circumstances; but
has successfully managed the implications of these to safeguard
the long-term sustainability of a project. The following are examples
from our own portfolio:
— M40 road project: to meet our maintenance
obligations we undertook works to the Loudwater viaduct. As a
result of our testing regime we identified that reinforcement
of the parapets was failing, even though we had not anticipated
this pre-existing condition and had made no allowance in our budget,
we undertook the additional rectification works at a cost of circa
£4 million, all without recourse to the taxpayer.
— All our road projects (M40, A55, M6,
A130) link payment to traffic volumes, We are required to take
this risk on traffic for the 25 year project period. As we have
seen over the last few years, changes in oil price (and its impact
on the price of fuel) and performance of the economy have had
a significant impact on peoples travel patterns, consequently
all our roads projects are suffering from a significant drop in
traffic and a related drop in our revenue.
3.6 These examples not only illustrate that
the transfer of risk is very real for privately financed projects,
but also that such projects are actually highly adaptable to change;
and able to manage change effectively to safeguard the long-term
provision of the services.
4. Question 4—How effective and costly
has it been to monitor the private sector providers' performance
and quality of service in Private Finance projects in comparison
with traditional procurement?
4.1 It should be recognised that for all
private finance projects, the private sector partner is obliged
to commit to high levels of scrutiny and to produce regular performance
reports on a monthly basis as required by the senior lenders and
the public sector. This covers service availability, end-user
satisfaction, financial performance and any deductions. Such extensive
information and objective analysis of the performance of traditionally
procured projects is not available.
4.2 The performance monitoring is intensive and
carries and administration cost. The more detailed the requirements
the more expensive it is to provide them. Most organisations are
becoming streamlined so they will achieve economies of scale for
the reporting process.
4.3 The information collected does allow
measurements to be taken on performance levels and for problems
to be identified and mitigated before they become material.
4.4 The translation of identified problems
into remedial actions is one of the particular strengths of private
finance projects. Because of the holistic nature of the service
requirements procured, public sector clients will have a single
point of contact, increasing the effectiveness of privately procured
projects, with whom all performance issues can be raised and dealt
with. With projects procured using the traditional route, the
composite elements that make up the "whole" of the project
are often separate contracts, with no single partner taking overall
responsibility for the long-term performance.
5. Question 5—When the basis of a Private
Finance contract needs to be altered post procurement because
of changing client needs—for example, a bigger jail is required
due to a larger than expected prison population—has this
proved problematic compared to projects under traditional procurement?
What has been the experience of PFI projects that have reverted
to the public sector?
5.1 PFI contracts have improved and evolved
their variation process to make them more efficient for all parties
involved. A process, contract and delivery are already in place.
The interfaces are established and a working framework already
exists. A best value approach will have been evaluated with the
help of the SPV such that the Authority will have benefitted from
the private sectors expertise on budget and programme control
to keep the variation on track. Historically, some contractual
variations have sometimes proved to be more challenging within
projects delivered through the private finance route than those
traditionally procured. This is because the holistic nature of
private finance projects implies that most variations will create
consequences for a number of other linked activities and processes,
which shape the long-term performance of the project. Such variations
must be planned carefully, to protect overall project performance.
There are also significant legal costs associated with larger
variations because of the complex nature of such contracts. The
variation process within PFI contracts has been significantly
improved in recent years, in recognition of these issues.
5.2 An example of a successful variation from
John Laing's project portfolio is the addition of two wards (144
beds), a renal unit and medical school facilities to the Norfolk
and Norwich University Hospital. This was a result of the client's
changing requirements, decided during construction of the new
hospital. A variation process, as defined in the original PFI
contract, was followed and construction on the additional facilities
was able to start prior to handover of the original hospital.
The same architectural and engineering design team and building
contractor was used, which ensured both timely delivery and full
integration of the additional facilities with the original hospital
project. The additional facilities were completed on time. Since
then the NHS Trust has instructed the Special Project Company
to complete a further £12 million (capex) of variations,
thereby demonstrating the strength of our partnership.
5.3 It is important to recognise that whilst
such changes can bring additional complexities over traditional
procurement, the long-term success of a project can be enhanced
by the level of scrutiny applied when planning and implementing
change.
5.4 At our Cleveland Tactical Training Centre
project, an extension was built via a traditional procurement
process which linked onto our PFI facility, it was procured in
isolation of the SPV and ultimately delivered late, and over budget,
and was not operational for over twelve months after completion
due to confusion over the project management and ownership of
a number of building quality issues. The preferred route for change
of John Laing's public sector partner for this project is now
via the PFI variation procedures route. Examples of this kind
are rarely reported, because there is no process by which to do
it for traditionally procured projects.
5.5 Not all variations come at a cost, however.
Variations can be banded in a PFI contract depending on their
complexity and size, and so simple changes need not create expensive
and laborious processes. On many occasions the initial outlay
can be offset by savings in the maintenance budget; for example
at one of John Laing's London hospitals we were able to offer
value added lifecycle changes through the replacement of previous
flooring with that offering improved performance. Not only was
this flooring easier to install and replace, but it also provided
for an extended lifespan, reducing the frequency with which the
disruption to patients and staff during replacement need occur.
5.6 By working hard to build effective partnerships
and partnering behaviours between the public and private sector
partners even complex variations can be managed efficiently. The
police authority at our Cleveland Tactical Training Centre wished
to make a £300k upgrade to their firearms range. We worked
with the authority to accommodate a number of their new requirements
at no additional cost. The client recognised the concessions made
by the SPV and successfully used the variations process to fulfil
their needs. This has been achieved because of the ethos of cooperation
and trust that has developed between the Client and the service
delivery teams, as has been generally acknowledged by Partnerships
UK in their 2006 report.8
5.7 In 2008, the NAO9 reported that 90%
of contract managers are satisfied or very satisfied with the
quality of work done to implement changes.
6. Question 6—How should future payments
by the Government under existing Private Finance contracts be
recorded in public sector accounts? Is risk transfer an appropriate
test? Should all such liabilities be included in the national
debt? Should they be accounted for separately from government
debt? How much does the public sector accounting treatment of
capital and revenue aspects of projects matter?
6.1 The public sector should apply the same
accounting principles as the private sector does when accounting
for future PFI payments. The wider adoption of International Accounting
Standards, and the harmonisation of public sector accounting rules
between the EU and the UK, should enhance comparability and transparency.
To the extent that risk transfer is a criterion to assess accounting
treatment, it should be applied.
6.2 The accounting treatment of PFI projects
should not influence the procurement approach to be used by the
public sector—this should be based on which can provide
the best VfM.
6.3 There is a tendency for misleading figures
to be reported on PFI commitments, whereby aggregate commitments
are quoted implying that this is equivalent to a debt already
incurred by the public sector. In fact, a significant part of
the commitment relates to the future cost of maintenance and the
future cost of servicing debt in the project, which in traditionally
procured projects will not be recognised until incurred.
7. Question 7—Would public sector investment
in the last decade have been lower without Private Finance? If
so, by how much?
7.1 In HM Treasury's 2008 report "Infrastructure
procurement: delivering long-term value", the part played
by PFI in delivering UK infrastructure is strongly emphasised,
but kept in perspective. It states that "... [although],
the vast majority of investment in the UK's public services has
been, and will continue to be, procured through conventional means
... the PFI programme continues to play a small but important
plan in the Government's investment plans ...". PFI has delivered
very large number (over 500) of large infrastructure projects
since its inception, so there is no question that it has played
an important role. It is difficult to assess hypothetically whether
traditional procurement would have been able to deliver to the
same extent, but the evidence of comparative performance of the
latter suggest that it would not have done. It is clear that the
past decade has witnessed the most active period of infrastructure
investment within the UK since the period of mass reconstruction
after the Second World War and privately financed projects have
made a significant contribution to this activity.
7.2 For example, since May 1997 Department of
Health data identifies that projects totalling £10,878 million
have been procured through private finance. To give some examples,
in its 2008 report10, HM Treasury noted that: in education, the
total schools capital investment rose from less than £700
million in 1996-97 to £5.9 billion in 2007-08, and is projected
to rise in 2010 to £8.2 billion; and in health in the same
period 70 PFI (and 23 traditionally) procured hospital schemes
were completed, and as at the time of the report another 27 PFI
(and seven public capital) projects were under construction, modernising
the NHS estate such that only 20% of the NHS estate is pre-1948
(down from 50% in 1997). This demonstrates the significant contribution
made by PFI to investment in NHS infrastructure over the last
decade.
7.3 As illustrated by the independent findings
comparing the performance of private and traditional projects
cited in our response to Question 2, a major benefit that private
finance has yielded for the public sector is cost certainty. This
certainty has enabled it to plan effectively for long-term infrastructure
renewal within the UK; and has enabled the UK Government to embark
on a very large volume of projects.
8. Question 8—How much impact has the
financial crisis had on launching new Private Finance projects?
Is the crisis likely to have a permanent effect on the Private
Finance market?
8.1 The impact of the financial crisis has
been felt in two main respects: the impact on senior debt financing
for projects (availability and cost), and the impact on Government's
future spending plans (potential reductions in investment programmes).
8.2 Having said this, despite less than favourable
market conditions, it is important to recognise that significant
projects delivered through the private finance route are still
closing during this challenging time. It is still possible to
secure financial backing for high quality projects. For example,
John Laing secured a major waste project with the Greater Manchester
Waste Disposal Authority. This was achieved through extensive
work between the Authority, John Laing, partners and funders;
together with vital support from Government and backing from the
Treasury's Infrastructure Finance Unit. The project is recognised
as the largest municipal waste contract in Western Europe, with
a total value to the Viridor Laing consortium of £3.8 billion.
In addition, John Laing has also closed significant projects in
the UK education and fire and rescue sectors, including the Barnsley
Building Schools for the Future programme valued at over £250
Million and the North East Fire And Rescue Authority project (NEFRA),
valued at £27 million.
8.3 In response to financial market difficulties,
HM Treasury established the Infrastructure Financing Unit ("IFU")
in 2009, which has facilitated the closing of projects which might
have otherwise suffered from funding shortfalls (for instance,
the Greater Manchester Waste project referred to above).
8.4 Conditions in the project financing
markets are gradually easing, with debt pricing beginning to reduce,
albeit still high by historical levels.
9. Question 9—Are there realistic alternative
roles for private finance than the current PFI-type private finance
models? Should the UK be aiming for more diversity in private
finance models? Would a national infrastructure bank (such as
the proposed Dodd-Hagel NIB in the US) add any value in the UK?
Should the public sector have a more hands-on role in financing
and/or delivery?
9.1 John Laing is at the forefront of developing
new and innovative Public Private Partnership models with private
finance at their core. For example, over the past year we have
entered into the two of the UK's first Local Asset Backed Vehicles
("LABV") in the UK: a £450 million, 25 year joint
venture with the London Borough of Croydon; and a 10 year joint
venture with Tunbridge Wells Borough Council.
9.2 Each of these innovative projects has been
designed to effectively deliver local regeneration and re-provide
key Public Sector infrastructure. They will achieve this through
adopting a long-term partnership model, in which the Public Sector
partner commits land and assets and John Laing provides equity
and development expertise, to maximise the value of existing land
assets through the planning process and subsequent developments,
including commercial and residential uses.
9.3 There are already alternatives to PFI
in its traditional form. The "LIFT" programme created
framework partnerships in primary healthcare and included the
public sector as co-investor in the project companies; the "BSF"
programme further capitalised on in the education sector. The
LABV model has been developed as a direct response to the Public
Sector's agenda to realise greater efficiency in the use of its
assets. It enables the Public Sector partner to share risk with
an equity-holding Private Sector partner and to draw upon the
development expertise of this partner, incorporating an inherent
flexibility within the project delivery approach to respond to
changing market conditions and pursue the most mutually advantageous
route to realising the agreed outcomes of each project.
9.4 There is diversity in private finance
models already. We have considerable experience in Europe and
North America and bring this experience to the projects we bid.
European procurement can sometimes be significantly shorter than
UK procurement, lowering the procurement costs for all parties.
Preferred Bidder periods can be very short (down to six weeks
or less), and the entire procurement from OJEU launch to close,
can be as short as 12 months. Some of these more positive aspects
could be learnt from and incorporated in the UK model.
9.5 We are not opposed to a NIB structure.
We do think that its terms of reference would need to be very
carefully considered to ensure that it becomes a valuable tool
to facilitate privately financed infrastructure, but does not
restrict the key drivers of PFI/PPP (for instance, the commercial
drivers and incentives within these projects).
9.6 In considering the roles most effectively
performed by Public and Private Sectors within the realisation
of infrastructure projects, John Laing believes that the Public
Sector is always best placed to judge and define the strategic
and social requirements within its infrastructure projects. The
Private Sector can assist within the successful fulfilment of
these requirements through its expertise in delivering efficiency,
innovation and management of risk, enabling the delivery of high
quality infrastructure and services. The key to the successful
realisation of new Public Private Partnership models is achieving
an effective combination of the key strengths of both the public
and private sectors and ensuring these are effectively reflected
in the roles they are obliged to perform.
10. Question 10—Is there an optimal
mix between conventional public procurement and Private Finance
for public sector investment? What is the long run role of private
finance in the delivery of infrastructure both in the UK and globally?
10.1 From data and experience to date, there
does not seem to be an optimal mix of private and public sector
procurement. HM Treasury have consistently stated that PFI should
only account for 10-15% of public sector investment, and it is
clearly only appropriate as a tool in certain situations (large
capital projects, with clearly defined future requirements, etc).
It is very much dependent on the risk profile and project characteristics.
We recommend that both models continue to be used so one acts
as a benchmark for the other.
10.2 John Laing has significant experience in
both overseas and UK markets for private finance projects; including
projects in Germany, Poland, Finland, Norway, Netherlands, Hungary,
Australia, Canada and India. We have seen that many countries
have looked to the UK and its experience of private finance as
a solution for infrastructure renewal. Further, the Private Finance
project skills that we have developed within the UK are hugely
exportable. Whilst each country will look to adapt the model to
suit its own respective requirements and market conditions, the
UK will remain as the reference for innovation and further evolution
of public private partnership models for many years to come.
REFERENCES1 Value
for Money Assessment Guidance, HM Treasury, November 2006.
2 Quantitative Assessment User Guide,
HM Treasury, March 2007.
3 Infrastructure Procurement: delivering long-term
value, HM Treasury, March 2008.
4 Managing the Relationship to secure a successful
partner in PFI projects, National Audit Office, 2001.
5 PFI: Construction Performance, National
Audit Office, 2003.
6 Report on Operational PFI Projects,
Partnership UK, 2006.
7 Investment in school facilities and PFI—do
they play a role in educational outcomes? KPMG, 2008.
8 Report on Operational PFI Projects,
Partnership UK, 2006.
9 Making changes in operational PFI projects,
National Audit Office, 2008.
10 Infrastructure Procurement: delivering
long-term value, HM Treasury, March 2008.
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