Memorandum by Dr Nicola Casarini,* Marie
Curie Research Fellow in the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies at the European University Institute Florence
Science and technology have become, over the
years, one of the central issues for bilateral cooperation between
China and the European Union (EU). Chinese leaders have always
emphasized that enhancing S&T cooperation with developed nations
is a crucial factor for sustaining the country's modernisation
process. Today, Europe is China's most important source of scientific
expertise and advanced technology. EU-China cooperation in S&T
is beneficial for both sides: for the EU and its Member States,
as it advances Europe's role as a global centre in S&T affairs;
for China, as it contributes to its economic growth and overall
modernisation. Cooperation between the two sides has, however,
evolved over the years, reflecting China's own advances in S&T.
* Nicola Casarini obtained his PhD in
International Relations from the London School of Economics.
* Part of the material contained in this report
draws from my book: Remaking Global Order: The Evolution of
Europe-China Relations and its Implications for East Asia and
the United States which will be published by Oxford University
Press in Autumn 2009.
1. CHINA'S
S&T LEAP FORWARD
In the 2001 blueprint for Medium to
Long-term Social and Economic Development, the Chinese government
singled out science and technology as the "primary production
forces".[1]The
necessity of narrowing the gap between China and the world's advanced
science and technology nations figured among the main tasks. In
2004, the Chinese government adopted the 2020 Science
and Technology Plan, with the objective of catching up with
the developed countries and becoming a knowledge-based economy
by 2020. In the outline of the 11th Five-Year Plan for
China's National Economic and Social Development, approved
in March 2006, it was stated that China will launch a number of
major S&T projects, especially in ICTs, energy, water resources
and environmental protection, biotechnologies, healthcare, industrial
re-engineering, new materials, and space technology. Calling for
a "scientific approach to development", the plan recognises
that scientific research and innovation are key factors in increasing
the overall technological level of industry and improving competitiveness
across all sectors. Moreover, the Chinese State Council published
an Outline of the National Programme for Long and Medium-term
Development of S&T, indicating that the country's expenditure
on S&T would account for 2.5% of GDP by 2020 and that
the annual R&D budget would be around US$ 110 Billion,
similar in percentage to that of the developed nations.[2]
In 2008, China spent 1.45% of its GDP (up from 0.7% in 1998) on
research and technological innovation (the highest percentage
among developing countries). At the end of 2008, China would account
for almost 3.5 million people engaged in various S&T
areas, making this the largest S&T community in the world.
Of these, around 1.5 million work on R&D related activities,
putting China in second place after the United States.[3]
In 2006, according to the World Intellectual Property Organisation
(WIPO), China deposited 5,935 patents, (up 56.8% from the
previous year) ranking eighth in the world.[4]
2. EU-China Knowledge Based Strategic Partnership
Owing to China's advances in S&T, there
has been a gradual shift from unilateral receipt of aid at the
beginning of China's reform period in the late 1970s to the present
environment of joint investment and research based on equality
and mutual benefit, as in the case of high S&T projects such
as ITER (the International Thermonuclear Reactor) and Galileo
(the EU-led global navigation satellite system). Chinese leaders
have highlighted on various occasions that cooperation in science
and technology is a key element of the EU-China strategic partnership.
In the 2003 China's EU policy paper it is stated that:
"It is essential to promote China-EU scientific and technological
cooperation on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and
reciprocity, sharing of results and protection of intellectual
property rights."[5]
In its last policy document on China, the European Commission
recognised that scientific and technological cooperation is one
of the "flagship" areas in EU-China relations.[6]
Sino-European cooperation in S&T goes back
to the beginning of the relationship and has greatly improved
in recent times. The two sides launched their first science and
technology cooperation programme in 1983. In 1998 an Agreement
on Scientific and Technological Cooperation was signed and
renewed in 2004 with the aim of linking research organisations,
industry, universities and individual researchers in specific
projects supported by the EU budget. A joint EU-China office for
the promotion of research cooperation was established in Beijing
in June 2001 to help Chinese scientists access the EU's Sixth
Framework Programme (FP6—2002-06). In 2005, on the occasion
of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the European Community and China, the two sides held a
high-level forum in Beijing after which they signed the Joint
Declaration on EU-China Science and Technology Cooperation: Building
a knowledge-based strategic partnership. The Joint Declaration
highlights eight areas as specific themes of common interest:
(i) environmental protection; (ii) ICTs; (iii) food, agriculture
and biotechnologies; (iv) transport and aerospace, including Galileo;
(v) urbanisation; (vi) health; (vii) socio-economic sciences;
(viii) other joint platforms such as GRID (Global Research Information
Database). EU-China knowledge-based strategic partnership is intended
to provide the overall framework for a wide range of initiatives
to establish cooperation on projects of common interest that will
bring together companies, universities, and research institutes,
as well as promote an increasing mobility of scientists, researchers
and students.
More recently, there have been attempts to link
the EU Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) for Research, Technology
and Development (RTD) for the period 2007-13 and the Competitiveness
and Innovation Framework Programme (2007-13) with China's 11th
Five-Year Plan (2006-10). The launch of the China-EU Science
& Technology Year (CESTY) in October 2006 provided
such an opportunity. China and the EU have also agreed to promote
further cooperation in large science initiatives through early
consultation (both in basic and applied R&D) and to open their
research programmes to accommodate the increasing number of joint
research projects. Chinese researchers are invited to participate
in the EU-funded FP7 and to submit applications to the recently
established European Research Council (ERC). In turn, China is
attracting Europeans into projects under the Chinese National
High-tech and Basic Programmes (P863 and P973) and joint
calls are planned to combine funding under the FP6/FP7 and
P863/P973 programmes, especially in research areas of mutual
interest. To increase mobility within the scientific community
and amongst university students, research institutes have been
encouraged to provide better conditions for mobility as well as
grant joint degrees for students studying on the two continents.
With the establishment of strategic partnership
between the two sides in 2003, a strategic element would be added
to already growing S&T cooperation. This was best epitomised
by the political agreement on the joint development of the Galileo
satellite system, viewed by Chinese leaders and officials in the
European Commission as a "model" for S&T collaboration
between the EU and China.[7]
3. EU-CHINA SATELLITE
NAVIGATION COOPERATION
The European Union and the European Space Agency
(ESA), kicked off the Galileo project in March 2002. Galileo is
a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) that will offer both
civilian and military applications once it becomes operational
(which is now expected to be in 2013).[8]
It is deemed to be an alternative to the dominant US Global Positioning
System (GPS), though the EU and the US have reached an agreement
on the interoperability of the two systems in June 2004.[9]
Galileo is designed to encircle the globe with 30 satellites
in medium earth orbit, comprising 27 operational satellites
and three reserves, plus two control centres on the ground.[10]
According to the European Commission, the estimated cost of the
project would amount to €3.4 Billion.[11]
It will provide users, ranging from aircraft and shipping to cars
and trekkers, with a navigational fix accurate to within just
one metre.
On 30 October 2003, an agreement was reached
for China's cooperation and commitment to finance 200 million
euros (out of an estimated total cost at that time of 2.2-2.4 Billion
euros) of Galileo. In the first phase (ie the manufacturing and
launching of the first four satellites of the constellation) Beijing
pledged to spend 70 million euros of which five million euros
for the entrance fee. The Cooperation Agreement on Galileo
between the European Community and the PRC provides:
"for co-operative activities on satellite
navigation in a wide range of sectors, notably science and technology,
industrial manufacturing, service and market development, as well
as standardisation, frequency and certification".[12]
In February 2003, a joint Sino-European satellite
navigation cooperation centre had been opened in Beijing. The
China-Europe Global Navigation Satellite System Technical Training
and Co-operation Centre (CENC) would serve as a focal point for
all S&T activities on the Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS), as well as promote industrial cooperation with special
attention given to development of applications. The CENC is jointly
run by the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology, the Chinese
Remote Sensing Centre, the European Commission and the European
Space Agency.
Cooperation in Galileo is meant to facilitate
European businesses' entry into the promising Chinese aerospace
market while also promoting the EU as a space power and a centre
of gravity in international high S&T affairs.[13]
This form of collaboration is also benefiting China, as it allows
Chinese companies to acquire know-how and advanced space technology
while fostering Beijing's space power internationally.
The EU-designated Chinese industrial partner
for the Galileo project is the National Remote Sensing Centre
of China (NRSCC). The NRSCC, a coordination body under the Chinese
Ministry of Science and Technology, is mandated to choose domestic
research institutes and companies to undertake relevant research
and development of Galileo applications in China. In October 2004,
the two sides signed a Technical Agreement for the first phase
of the implementation, including manufacturing and launch, of
the first four satellites and a substantial part of the ground
infrastructure.[14]
The Agreement included details regarding the amount of money that
the Chinese government would invest in Galileo (€70 million
at that time) with the provision that these sums will remain inside
the country and serve to build the Chinese infrastructure, components,
and services for the satellite navigation system. Moreover, the
Agreement contained clear indication that the rights of the technology
developed while working on Galileo would remain the property of
the National Remote Sensing Centre of China.
By July 2008 (when the publication of the
ESA's tender package for the second phase of the implementation
would leave out Chinese contractors) around 35 million euros
had been contracted to Chinese industries and research institutes
for developing various applications of the Galileo system in China,
including: Galileo Fishery Application (FAS); China Galileo Test
Range (CGTR); Project of Location Based Services Standardization
(LBS); Galileo Laser Retro-Reflector (LRR); Search and Rescue
Transponder (SART); Early Galileo Service in China (EGSIC); Forward
Link Service End-End Validation (EEV); Medium-altitude Earth Orbit
Local User Terminal (MEOLUT).[15]
The number of projects and the amount of money
invested so far would make China the most important non-EU partner
in Galileo. Chinese officials at the MOST and CENC are adamant
in recognising that without the active involvement of European
partners and European scientific expertise/know-how, including
technology travelling to China, the local sub-contractors (companies
and research centres) would have been unable to complete the above
projects.[16]
Among EU member states, French, German and Italian aerospace companies
would be at the forefront of collaboration with Beijing. Since
the late 1990s, European companies have sold telecommunication
satellites and other space technologies to Beijing. Furthermore,
some European commercial remote sensing companies (like their
American counterparts) have been selling spatial imagery to China.
According to analysts and official documents, some low-resolution
micro-satellites have been sold by France to China.[17]
4. CHINA'S
SATELLITE CHALLENGE
TO EUROPE
Cooperation in the Galileo project is assisting
China in fostering the development of its own, independent satellite
navigation system. China has launched so far a number of navigation
satellites (the high-resolution Ziyuan-2 and the Dongfanghong
series, multi-function geostationary satellites) which have been
employed in numerous areas, including mapping, telecommunications,
water resources monitoring, traffic and transport, fishery, resources
prospecting, forest fire fighting, and national security. In September
2007, the Chinese government unveiled plans for a Chinese GNSS
announcing the intention to convert its previous regional system
made up of the various above-mentioned geo-stationary orbit satellites
into a fully-fledged global navigation satellite system: the Compass—or
Beidou in Chinese (which stands for the Big Dipper constellation).
The Beidou is set to become a global positioning system
like the American GPS (and Galileo, once operational) and is meant
to be used for both civilian and military purposes. Like the American
GPS, the Beidou is not open to the outside world (unlike Galileo).
For China, the development of an autonomous satellite navigation
system stands as a powerful symbol of great power status, something
to which the country's leaders (and the population as well) are
very sensitive.
The development of Beijing's own satellite navigation
system is raising fears of a satellite challenge from China, triggering
countermeasures from Europe. On 1 July 2008, the European
Space Agency (ESA) published the procurement criteria for the
second phase of Galileo, ie the manufacturing, services and launch
of the remaining 26 satellites of the European satellite
system.[18]
In the document, the tender would be limited to a select number
of countries divided up in two groups. In the first group—the
inner circle with priority access to the procurement scheme—there
are all the 27 member states of the EU (as the procurement
is entirely financed out of the European Community budget). In
the second group—the outer circle—there are a number
of countries which can participate to the tender if they are signatories
of the pluri-lateral Agreement on Government Procurement
(GPA) adopted in the framework of the WTO.[19]
As China is not a party to the GPA, its industries
and research centres would not be able to access the second phase
of the public procurement for Galileo. The publication of the
ESA's document was a slap in the face for China which had always
regarded space and satellite navigation cooperation with the EU
as a model for Beijing's international cooperation in big S&T
projects.
The Europeans appear to be more and more wary
of lack of significant progress in China's legislation, and actions,
toward enforcement of IPR and increasingly preoccupied that the
Chinese would use European advanced space technology to develop
their own satellite system and challenge Galileo itself. The Beidou
is now expected to be completed with 30 satellites before
2015, with 10 or more new satellites scheduled to be launched
in the period 2009-11.
The satellites put into orbit by China so far
(as part of the Beidou system) seem to be using frequencies previously
allocated to Galileo. Back in 2000-01, EU and Chinese diplomats
would join forces at the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) in Geneva to obtain the frequencies for Galileo. However,
while the Galileo project was slowed down in Europe due to problems
encountered by the private-public partnership, the Chinese continued
to work on research, manufacturing and service applications for
Galileo in China as well as on their own system. Since 2006-07,
there seems to have been an overlap between the Galileo Public
Regulated Service (PRS) and some Beidou frequencies, in a situation
where the Chinese system appears to be in a more advanced phase
of development than Galileo, with at least 7-8 satellites
in orbit (the last having been launched on 15 April 2009)
against only two for Galileo. While US and EU policy makers (and
technicians) have met various times to discuss the interoperability,
and frequency compatibility, between their two systems following
the transatlantic summit in Ireland in June 2004, EU and Chinese
officials have not yet resolved their outstanding issues, including
the question of signal compatibility discussed at the last bilateral
technical working group in December 2008. As a result, while EU-China
satellite navigation cooperation continues on the ground, the
two sides' policy makers are currently reviewing their collaboration
in light of recent changes in their respective GNSS policies and
programmes.
CONCLUSION
The case of satellite navigation represents
a good example of the opportunities, and the challenges, inherent
in EU-China S&T cooperation. The EU and its member states
have substantial economic interests in developing S&T ties
with China and collaborate on joint big science research projects
such as Galileo. By doing that, they can promote scientific advances
and take advantage of the seemingly limitless opportunities of
the Chinese market with the overall aim of helping maintain Europe's
global competitiveness and socio-economic welfare position. Similarly,
scientific and technological cooperation with Europe is highly
strategic for the Chinese leadership in order to modernise, improve
the country's competitiveness across all sectors, and deliver
higher standards of living to the Chinese population.
However, since the beginning of the reform period,
China has made dramatic achievements in the development of S&T.
Thanks to domestic efforts and international cooperation with
developed nations—in particular the European countries—China
has succeeded in gradually upgrading the scientific and technological
content of its productions. As a result, Beijing is now in a position
to seriously challenge Europe on high-tech sectors such as satellite
navigation. This provides EU policy-makers with the challenge
of how to develop further the cooperation with China in science
and technology and, at the same time, seek to manage China's emergence
as a strategic competitor in high-tech sectors.
April 2009
1 Report on the Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan
for National Economic and Social Development, delivered by Zhu
Rongji, premier of the State Council, at the Fourth Session of
the Ninth National People's Congress, 5 March 2001. Back
2
Data from interviews and personal consultations at the Chinese
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the Chinese Academy
of Sciences, Beijing, August 2008. See also: Yang Yang, "China
and the EU: Science and Technology Cooperation as a Binding Factor
in Partnership", in David Kerr and Liu Fei (eds.), The
International Politics of EU-China Relations, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2007, pp. 280-288. Back
3
Data from interviews and Yang (2007), p. 285. Back
4
Le Monde (Supplement Economie), 6 March 2007, p. vii. Back
5
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China's EU Policy Paper,
October 2003 (Title III). Back
6
European Commission, EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities,
Brussels, COM 632 final, 24 October 2006. Back
7
Interview, Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and
European Commission delegation in China, Beijing, August 2008. Back
8
For more details on the technical, military and political aspects
of Galileo see: Gustav Lindstr½m and Giovanni Gasparini,
The Galileo Satellite System and Its Security Implications,
European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper
n. 44, April 2003; see also: European Community, Regulation
(EC) n. 683/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 9 July 2008 on the futher implementation of the European
satellite navigation programmes (EGNOS and Galileo), Brussels,
9 July 2008. Back
9
Agreement on the promotion, provision and use of Galileo and
GPS satellite-based navigation systems and related applications
(between the European Community and its Member States, of the
one part, and the United States of America of the other part),
Dublin, 28 June 2004. On 26 July 2007, the
United States and the European Union announced their agreement
to jointly adopt and provide an improved design for their respective
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals. These signals
will be implemented on the Galileo Open Service and the GPS IIIA
new civil signal. Back
10
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: Progressing GALILEO: re-profiling
the European GNSS Programmes, COM (2007) 534 final, Brussels,
19 September 2007. Back
11
Ibid., p. 3. Back
12
Cooperation Agreement on a Civil Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS)-Galileo-between the European Community and its Member
States and the People's Republic of China, Beijing, 30 October
2003, p. 2; for more details on the political and strategic implications
of EU-China satellite cooperation see Nicola Casarini, The
Evolution of the EU-China Relationship: From Constructive Engagement
to Strategic Partnership, Paris, EUISS, Occasional Paper n.
64, October 2006, pp. 26-29. Back
13
David Braunschwig, Richard L. Garwin, and Jeremy C. Marwell, "Space
Diplomacy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, n. 4, July/August
2003, pp. 156-164; Nicholas Peter, "The EU's emergent space
diplomacy", Space Policy, Vol. 23, 2007, pp. 97-107. Back
14
Galileo Programme Technical Agreement between the National
Remote Sensing Center of China and the China Galileo Satellite
Navigation Corporation, Beijing , 9 October 2004. Back
15
For more details see: Nicola Casarini, Remaking Global Order:
The Evolution of Europe-China Relations and its Implications for
East Asia and the United States, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2009 (forthcoming), in particular Chapter 5. Back
16
These claims are based on interviews conducted by this author
with officials at the MOST and CENC in Beijing in August 2008. Back
17
Council of the European Union, Eighth Annual Report on the
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 2006/C 250/01, Brussels,
16 October 2006, pp. 265-266. Back
18
European Space Agency, Galileo Full Operational Capability
(FOC) Procurement: Tender Information Package (ESA-DTEN-NG-DOC-03087),
Paris, 1 July 2008. Back
19
On the pluri-lateral Agreement on Government Procurement
see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm Back
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