Memorandum by Bill Rammell MP, Minister
of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
MANAGING THE
EU-CHINA RELATIONSHIP
1. Does the European Union have an overarching
strategy on China; and to what extent have the Commission, the
Council and the Member States been able to agree on common policies
towards China?
The EU-China relationship is currently governed
by the 1985 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between
the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China
(the 1985 Agreement). The Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security
Policy in East Asia (also known as the East Asia Policy Guidelines)[39]
adopted during the 2005 UK Presidency added a security policy
dimension to the EU's relations in East Asia. These guidelines
have since been declassified and shared with third countries.
They demonstrate that the EU has an interest in fostering China's
emergence as a responsible global player.
The Commission's China Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013
provides an overarching direction for relations with China. Negotiations
began in 2007 to upgrade the 1985 Agreement to a Partnership and
Co-operation Agreement to better reflect the scope of relations
today and encompass cooperation across the political, trade and
economic spectrum. The launch of an annual High-Level EU/China
Economic and Trade Dialogue Mechanism in April 2008 gives the
EU a further tool to develop the EU-China relationship.
December 2006 Council Conclusions endorsed the recommendations
made in the 2006 Commission Communication "EU-China: Closer
Partners, Growing Responsibilities" and the Commission working
paper "Competition and Partnership", stating that "they
are an important contribution to the continuing development of
an integrated and coherent EU policy towards China ... constituting
a comprehensive review and restatement of EU policy towards China."
The Council's endorsement indicates agreement between the Commission,
Council and Member States on a common approach towards China.
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND
THE RULE
OF LAW
2. How successful has the EU been in encouraging
Chinese participation in international conventions as the International
Convention on Civil Political Rights; and the UN Human Rights
Council?
On the question of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, the EU reported in its Annual Report
on Human Rights 2008 that there had been no progress on this area
of concern. The EU continues to press for a detailed timetable
for ratification and for reform of the Chinese legal system to
ensure compliance with the Covenant. The National Human Rights
Action Plan of China (2009-2010) does mention work towards ratification
in general terms. China reported at the EU-China Human Rights
dialogue 25-26 October 2008 that it had been actively preparing
for 10 years for the ratification process, and that since 2003
there had been a series of reforms of the judicial and legislative
system. However, in reality the situation is complicated by incompatibilities
between Chinese legislation and the Covenant.
On the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the EU seeks
to work with all members of the Council to promote and protect
the victims of human rights violations wherever they occur. China
is currently a member of the Council and is standing for re-election
in May. We support their engagement at the UNHRC and believe it
is important in helping to develop cross-regional understanding
of how to approach key human rights challenges. The EU will continue
to work with the Chinese and look to gain their support in responding
to these challenges effectively. China has played a role in the
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process at the UNHRC by asking
constructive questions in other Member States' reviews. The EU
has encouraged all States to prepare rigorously for their UPR,
engage independent civil society in every stage of the process,
and adopt an open, self-critical approach. We were satisfied that
the Chinese approached their review in February seriously but
were disappointed that all recommendations proposed by EU Member
States were rejected.
3. When he gave evidence to the Committee,
Mr Lillie mentioned that institutional reform was one of the areas
where the human rights dialogue with China was fruitful; what
are the main examples of concrete progress made in this area?
Over recent years the European Commission, which
takes part in the Human Rights Dialogue as a member of the EU
Troika, has used its co-operation programme to promote human rights
in China. For instance, the European Commission has supported
Human Rights Seminars for European and Chinese experts to exchange
views and experiences. Other activities carried out in recent
years include the EU-China Legal and Judicial Co-operation Programme,
by far the most important foreign assistance project of its kind
in China. This has given substantial assistance to strengthen
the rule of law in China. A further example of constructive collaboration
has focused on developing civil rights awareness at grass roots
level through an EU-China Village Governance Programme in Yunnan
province. Currently, the European Commission also implements an
initiative on Governance for Equitable Development with the UNDP.
This project aims at strengthening the rule of law and the participation
of civil society in China. The programme will promote participatory
and inclusive approaches to selected legislative, judicial and
governmental processes.
4. To what extent do the differing legal cultures
and histories of the Europeans on the one hand, and the Chinese
on the other, influence their approach to the question of human
rights, the rule of law and democracy? On what points do European
and Chinese views converge and diverge most?
Respect for human rights and the rule of law are
founding principles of the European Union. Fundamental rights,
as expressed in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
as well as those derived from constitutional traditions common
to the Member States, form general principles of Community law
which underpin all EU action. All 27 EU Member States are bound
by the ECHR and adherence to the Convention is a condition of
EU membership. Countries seeking to join the EU are required to
demonstrate stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy,
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities.
The Chinese government has made progress in establishing
effective legal and judicial systems and has acceded to a number
of international human rights conventions: it has signed and ratified
the International Covenant on Social, Cultural and Economic Rights
(ICSCER) and signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). However, China continues to prioritise economic
rights ahead of political and civil rights, often restricting
the latter in the name of protecting progress during China's economic
reforms. China also places collective rights and interests on
at least an equal footing as individual rights, often qualifying
the application of the latter in the interests of the state. While
the authorities continue to stress the importance of government
and Party officials operating within the constraints of Chinese
legislation, the judicial system is under the control of the Chinese
Communist Party. This approach impacts on judicial independence
and the rule of law.
Whilst China has lifted more people out of poverty
than any other country over the last 30 years, there are still
many civil and political rights which remain of serious concern,
including the death penalty, freedom of expression and a commitment
to representative democracy in a pluralist system.
5. What is China's policy on the rule of law
and democracy in Hong Kong?
The Chinese government undertook that the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) would enjoy a high
degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs, and
that the continuation of Hong Kong's social and economic systems,
lifestyles, rights and freedoms would be guaranteed. This is enshrined
in the Sino-Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, an international treaty
to which the UK is a party. We consider that the "One Country,
Two Systems" principle of the Joint Declaration has worked
well in practice and that the rights and freedoms guaranteed in
the Joint Declaration have been, on the whole, respected.
However, in certain areas, notably on constitutional
development, we have expressed our concern when we have felt that
progress has not been rapid enough. In December 2007, for example,
the Foreign Secretary expressed disappointment that the National
People's Congress ruled out universal suffrage in Hong Kong in
2012 despite this being the wish of the majority of Hong Kong's
people. We have since welcomed a clear commitment from the Hong
Kong authorities that 2012's elections will be progressively more
democratic in preparation for the introduction of universal suffrage
in 2017 and 2020.
FOREIGN, SECURITY
AND DEFENCE
POLICY
6. What is the kind of cooperation being conducted
at the moment between the EU and China on disarmament and non-proliferation?
What discussion do the EU and China have on these questions in
UN forums and other bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament,
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar regime on dual-use
goods and the Ballistic Missile Technology Control regime?
The EU has been working closely with China over
the past three years, under the auspices of the EU Export Control
Project. The project mainly focuses on capacity building within
the Chinese export control authorities, and has included work
with Chinese licensing and customs officials and also with Chinese
industry. The main goal of the project is to bring China's national
export control legislation and practices in line with international
standards, including incorporating control lists from export control
regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (AG) and
the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).
The first EU Working Groups on Global Disarmament
and Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Troika meeting to take
place in Beijing was held on 20 March. In this meeting China showed
an interest in establishing a specific dialogue with the EU on
Small Arms and Light Weapons Dialogue (SALW) issues, as well as
the UN Register of Conventional Arms. China is ready to listen
to the EU on assistance to third countries as it has little experience
on the subject.
The Presidency noted that the EU is currently focusing
its efforts on the air trafficking of SALW and would be happy
to discuss these issues further with China at a later date.
EU Member States regularly discuss issues bilaterally
with China at the Conference on Disarmament. In particular, China
and the UK, as recognised nuclear weapon states, regularly discuss
disarmament issues in Geneva. China is not a member of the WA,
however on 12-13 November 2008 the WA organised an Outreach event
in Beijing. The WA delegation included experts from the UK, who
met with Chinese counterparts.
7. What is the kind of cooperation being conducted
at present between the EU and China on counter-terrorism, and
what points would the UK and the EU like to include in the EU-China
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on that topic?
There has been little concrete activity to date
between the EU and China on counter-terrorism. The draft Partnership
and Co-operation Agreement includes reference to the possibility
of a consultation mechanism on counter terrorism between the EU
and China. The Chinese have approached the European Commission
to initiate a formal EU-China annual counter-terrorism dialogue.
Member States decided to pursue informal exploratory talks to
clarify what the Chinese want from a counter-terrorism relationship
with the EU.
8. To what extent does the technical and scientific
cooperation between Europe and China assist in China's modernisation
in areas such as defence and space; and is the EU confident that
it has adequate mechanisms in place for oversight and regulation
of these interactions?
The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports regulates
defence exports from the EU to China. When fully implemented,
the legally binding Council Common Position Defining Common Rules
Governing the Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment
(The Common Position) will further build on this framework.
Some EU Member States have working relations with
China on space issues. For example, the UK, through bi-lateral
links between UK and China and through UK participation in European
Space Agency-China programmes, has a number of joint Space education
initiatives. These include exchange of students, exchange of scientists
and engineers, provision by the UK of space training courses for
Chinese scientists, engineers and government space officials,
and invited lectures.
The UK has sold a small satellite to China through
Surrey Satellites Technology Limited. This is operating as part
of a global disaster management constellation. Discussions on
the sale of a second satellite have begun.
The UK would welcome the Commission setting
out how they might oversee interaction with China on space issues.
9. What is the Government's estimate of Chinese
military expenditure and rate of increase in expenditure? Should
the EU be concerned about this? Will China soon have armed forces
and technological capability to challenge US dominance in the
Asia-Pacific region, as well as in space?
China announced in March 2009 that it will increase
its defence spending in 2009 by nearly 15% to 480.6 billion Yuan
(US$ 70 billion), the 19th double-digit percentage increase in
the past two decades. The White Paper "China's National Defense
in 2008" states that these increases fund (1) improving pay
and conditions for servicemen; (2) compensating for inflation;
(3) "pushing forward the Revolution in Military Affairs"
(ie procuring modern equipment). Due to differing accounting methods
it is difficult to compare international defence expenditure.
Many estimate Chinese spend to be higher than publicly stated
figures, with the 2009 US Department of Defense Annual Report
to Congress "Military Power of the PRC 2009", putting
the actual figure at between US$105 billion and US$150 billion
for 2008 (against a declared figure of about US$60 billion).
As China's defence spending increases, it is in the
interests of all EU member states to encourage China to increase
transparency.
We do not make public estimates of the comparative
strengths of different countries' armed forces.
10. What is the total value and categories
of arms exported from the UK and other EU member states to China,
either directly or indirectly?
Figures on the total value (in Euros) and categories
of arms exported from the UK and other EU Member States are shown
below. These figures are taken from the 8th, 9th and 10th European
Council Annual Reports. According to Operative Provision 8 of
the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports covering the
periods 2005-07, respectively. As stated in each of the annual
reports, the statistics are compiled differently by each Member
State and therefore not all countries have been able to provide
the same information. The value of arms exports shown for each
year is as follows please see the attached relevant annex Q10
for breakdown of individual member state exports:
|
| 2005—€113,242,714 | 2006—€133,899,971
| 2007—€91,557,318
|
|
11. Will the newly adopted Common Position defining Common
Rules Governing the Control of Exports and Military Technology
and Equipment be more effective that the Code of Conduct it replaced
in limiting arms exports to China?
When fully implemented the legally binding Common Position
will replace and build on the previous politically binding EU
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council in 1998.
The key changes introduced by the Common Position are: updated
references to international agreements; clear reference to International
Humanitarian Law in Criterion Two (this is already included in
UK legislation but not covered in all other EU Member States legislation);
language on respect for re-export provisions; explicit coverage
of the risk of diversion to terrorists and of the risk of reverse
engineering or unintended technology transfer.
The Common Position represents a significant advance in the minimum
standards and processes applied by all EU member States. The new
Common Position is legally binding under of the Treaty of European
Union. However, the licensing of defence exports remains at the
national discretion of each Member State.
The previous EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports covered only
the physical export of goods, whereas the new Common Position
extends this coverage to include; licences for trafficking and
brokering, and for the intangible transfer of technology. The
secondary legislation implemented under the UK's Export Control
Act 2002 means that UK practice is already in line with these
and other changes.
The adoption of the Common Position will not materially affect
the UK licensing authorities' assessment of exports to China.
Not only will the applications for licences be subject to assessment
against the Common Position, but the EU Arms embargo also remains
in place. The scope of the embargo is limited to goods that might
be used by the Chinese authorities for internal repression.
12. What are the criteria that the UK believes the EU should
apply to decide whether it should lift its arms embargo on China?
Would the lifting of the embargo improve relations with China?
Should the EU expect something in return?
The EU arms embargo on China has been under review since
2003. The December 2004 European Council Presidency Conclusions
set out the EU's common approach on resolution of the embargo
issue:
"The European Council reaffirmed the political will to
continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo. It invited
the next Presidency to finalise the well-advanced work in order
to allow for a decision. It underlined that the result of any
decision should not be an increase of arms exports from EU Member
States to China, neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms.
In this regard the European Council recalled the importance of
the criteria of the Code of Conduct on arms exports, in particular
criteria regarding human rights, stability and security in the
region and the national security of friendly and allied countries.
The European Council also stressed the importance in this context
of the early adoption of the revised Code of Conduct and the instrument
on measures pertaining to arms exports to post-embargo countries
("Toolbox")."
The Chinese would clearly like to see the embargo lifted,
but sensitivities remain, not only in Europe and with China, but
with other interested parties, notably the United States and Japan.
The broad consensus across the EU is that the time is not yet
right to lift the embargo, but that it should rightly remain under
review.
13. How do you expect the foreign policy of the new administration
in the United States to impact on EU-China relations?
A strong US-China relationship is crucial for the world economy
and for global peace and security. There has been continuity of
US policy towards China throughout successive administrations,
as well as the development of increasingly effective mechanisms
for dialogue and consultation. Secretary of State Clinton's visit
to Beijing and a bilateral between Presidents Obama and Hu in
London, indicate that the US-China relationship is in good health.
Significant announcements by the new US administration, for instance
on climate change and counter-proliferation, will have implications
for China and the EU in the run-up to Copenhagen and the Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review in 2010. The EU remains China's largest trading
partner, as well a key partner for China on climate change cooperation.
14. To what extent does China see the EU as a counter-balance
to the United States; or as a potential partner in building a
multipolar world?
China publicly advocates moving to a multipolar world and strengthening
multilateralism, primarily through the UN. China engages bilaterally
with Member and with the EU through its mission in Brussels across
a range of issues. Following the postponement of the 11th annual
EU-China Summit in December 2008, the February 2009 visit by Premier
Wen Jiabao to several EU capitals and Brussels was described by
China as a "confidence-building" trip to demonstrate
that China remained committed to strengthening relations with
the EU.
15. What is the EU's policy on cross-strait relations between
China and Taiwan, and how successful has it been?
The EU's policy on cross-Strait relations between China and Taiwan
is laid out on page 8 of the Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and
Security Policy in East Asia.[40]
The EU has publicly welcomed recent progress in cross-Strait relations.
We hope that the Chinese Government and Ma Ying-Jeou's administration
will continue to engage in direct dialogue to resolve differences
and strengthen cross-Strait stability, with a view to finding
a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question, acceptable to the
people of both sides of the Strait.
EU policy has been to encourage dialogue and coordinate measures
to encourage stability. Since the May 08 election of Ma Ying-Jeou
dialogue between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan has increased
substantially, with progress so far including the launching of
direct flights and shipping links between Taiwan and the mainland.
16. What is the role of the ASEM process in managing EU-China
relations?
ASEM brings together 43 States across Europe and Asia in
an informal process of dialogue and cooperation. Bilateral relations
between two ASEM parties (in this case the EU and China) are not
raised in formal meetings of the ASEM process. However, the meetings
can provide opportunities for the EU to convene a troika meeting
with China in the margins. China played an important role as the
host of the most recent ASEM Summit in October 2008, and in the
interest of consensus allowed firm statements on issues such as
Burma, Iran and Afghanistan.
17. To what extent do China and the EU have similar approaches
to global and regional governance, including the reform of the
United Nations and the International Financial Institutions, as
well as governance of the global trading system? Do the EU and
China cooperate in the framework of the G20?
As a country with a high and increasing degree of influence on
the world stage China has much to gain from a reformed global
system. China's primary international objectives are to maintain
and open global trading system and secure the resources to maintain
domestic growth. Allied to this is the desire to increase its
influence in global governance, strengthen relationships with
major powers and neighbours, and to ensure regional security.
At the Spring European Council on 19-20 March 2009, European leaders
made a series of concrete proposals in advance of the London Summit
supporting a multilateral initiative on trade finance and the
need to reform the governance of international financial institutions.
They also agreed on the need for a very substantial increase in
the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), including
a new loan of 75 billion Euros from the EU to make sure the IMF
is able support the world's most fragile economies.
China is actively engaged in the G20. It believes it is the
right forum for tackling the current economic crisis and worked
closely with the UK to ensure the London Summit was a success.[41]
China's priorities for the international financial institutions
are more balanced surveillance by the IMF, particularly of the
world's advanced economies; a stronger early-warning function
for the IMF; and governance reform to ensure that voting shares
in the IMF and World Bank reflect the realities of the modern
global economy, and that senior management positions are filled
in a transparent way without nationality bias. China joined the
expanded Financial Stability Forum (FSF, which will become the
Financial Stability Board) shortly before the London Summit.
EU Leaders also supported improved IMF surveillance instruments
in order to strengthen its key role in crisis prevention and governance
reform to ensure that voting shares in the IMF more adequately
reflect relative economic weights in the world economy. The EU
also welcomed the expansion and institutional reinforcement of
the FSF.
China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001 and shares
the EU view on its importance for an effective multilateral rules
based global trading system. China also shares the EU's desire
for an early conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda. China
is one of five countries with which OECD has established an "enhanced
engagement" relationship.
18. To what extent is China trying to build up its influence
in Latin America and the Middle East? To what extent do Chinese
companies and investment funds play a part in this strategy?
China's economic growth is highly dependent upon access to
foreign energy sources. China has been a net importer of oil since
1993, including from the Middle East and Latin America. Given
the relatively short period that China has been a net importer,
it does not have the historical strategic partnership with traditional
exporters that other long term importers have established.
China has made only moderate investment into the Middle East region.
However, due to growing Chinese oil consumption, Arab leaders
are beginning to recognise an increasing interdependence with
China. The China-Arab Cooperation Forum, established in 2004,
aims to forge closer trade links and strengthening cooperation
on international affairs.
Over the last decade China has invested heavily in the Latin
American energy sector, largely through the acquisition of direct
stakes in energy companies (such as a $1.42 billion stake in Ecuadorian
oil and pipelines operations). Allied to this are significant
Chinese investments in energy infrastructure, such as $400 million
in Venezuelan railway and refinery infrastructure, $8 billion
in Argentinean railways and $239 million for the construction
of a natural gas pipeline across Brazil. China published its first
Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in November 2008.
19. Are reports of China conducting cyber warfare and hacking
attacks against public and private targets in EU countries credible?
We are aware of such reports. We do not comment on intelligence
matters. However, we take protection of our critical national
infrastructure extremely seriously. The National Security Secretariat
in the Cabinet Office is leading a cross-departmental project
to develop the UK's approach to cyber security. We will continue
to engage with stakeholders both in industry and internationally,
including within the EU, as this work progresses.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
20. To what extent is the protection of intellectual property
an issue in EU-China relations?
Protection of intellectual property (IP) remains one of the
major concerns for EU businesses active in China, and therefore
is a continuing issue for EU-China relations.[42]
The EU regularly raises IP issues in high-level dialogues with
the Chinese government.
In 2006, the EU identified that IP infringements are expected
to cause the loss of more potential revenue than any other single
non-tariff barrier. It continues to support enforcement capacity
building in China. Recently the EU established the IPR2 project
to work with the Chinese Government to improve the effectiveness
of their IP enforcement.
The Chinese Government has done much to improve intellectual property
rights management, including through development and publication
of a National Intellectual Property Strategy to improve awareness,
utilisation, and protection of IP. These developments have led
to increasing confidence in IP protection in China. However, enforcement
remains a concern.
Does China engage in industrial espionage?
We do not comment on intelligence matters.
THE EU, CHINA
AND AFRICA
21. What is the Chinese view of promoting security and
development in Africa; and how far does this approach correspond
to that promoted by the UK and the EU? What scope is there for
greater cooperation between Africa, China and the EU in questions
of security, stability and the rule of law in Africa?
The 2006 white paper "China's Africa Policy" stated
that its policy was to promote peace and stability, development
and common prosperity. Key stated principles are non-interference
in domestic affairs, mutual trust, respect of sovereignty, political
equality and mutual benefits. China has been a strong supporter
of the MDGs and in particular in pushing developed countries to
meet the commitments they have made in bodies such as the G8 to
increase resources for international development.
China does not engage significantly in donor harmonisation in
Africa, nor link its own conditionality with those of other donors.
China does not publish detailed information on its aid. Chinese
investment in Africa does not come with good governance conditionality
but with a range of conditions related to how loans will be repaid
and concessions that China will be granted as a result of the
investments. This is a different approach to most (although not
all) of the OECD. China does not regard a dialogue on rule of
law and governance as being appropriate within its partnerships
with African countries for reasons of political equality and non-interference.
However, China's position with regards to working with others
to promote development in Africa has been evolving. In recent
years China's EXIM Bank has signed Memoranda of Understanding
with the World Bank, the Asia and the African Development Banks.
In 2007 China also became a donor for the first time to the 15th
IDA replenishment. Its $30 million contribution was relatively
modest (the UK provided £2.1 billion), but it showed China's
acceptance of its global role in dealing with international poverty
reduction. China also contributed $120 million to the 2008 replenishment
of the African Development Fund and shown interest in working
with the African Union.
Despite the differences in approaches to development, the
EU has identified strong shared interests in promoting development
in Africa. At the 10th China-EU Summit held in November 2007,
the EU and China strongly welcomed the idea of trilateral cooperation
which was later endorsed in a communication from the European
Commission. There is huge scope for cooperation which could bring
together strengths from both sides, for example China's expertise
in agriculture and infrastructure and the EU's strengths on institutional
and organisational building.
The EU recognises the importance of China's contributions
to infrastructure, initiatives on health and contributions to
peacekeeping as well as the benefits arising from the growth in
trade and investment between Africa and China. But there are also
concerns. These mostly relate to transparency and an unwillingness
of China to share information with other international partners.
The EU has a strong desire for China to work closely with the
EU and other international partners so that synergies can be explored.
The UK continues to seek ways to increase dialogue and engagement,
especially on the ground, with the Chinese on African issues,
including areas where our views differ, ie security, stability
and the rule of law. The UK similarly supports the EU in these
aims, notably on the recent EU Commission Communication on trilateral
co-operation, which the UK's own approach and information sharing
helped inform.
The EU has been building political support for trilateral
cooperation, which offers the potential to develop synergies between
China's support to Africa and that from the EU. Its Commissioners
for Development and External Relations have included this as a
key agenda item in their discussions with counterparts in China.
This has yielded results. During Premier Wen's visit to Europe
and Foreign Minister Yang's visit to Portugal in January 2008
both issued positive statements about trilateral cooperation.
The EU has sought the endorsement of the African Union to
the "trialogue". A Committee from the AU is now considering
a formal response. In the meantime EU Delegations in African capitals
have been exploring options for cooperation with African governments
and Chinese embassies. There might be options for cooperation
with the EU and possibly the UK stemming out of China's interest
in working with the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa.
The UK continues to support this being a priority for the
EU. On a practical level, trilateral cooperation offers the potential
for China and the EU to learn from each other. It can help build
trust and mutual respect. Importantly it can help avoid political
competition for supporting development in Africa.
22. To what extent is China's relationship with the leaders
of certain African countries, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, an obstacle
to the EU's efforts to promote good governance, the rule of law,
democracy and human rights?
China regards its overall relationship with Africa and its
leaders as important. For some years, their leaders have begun
their annual programme of overseas visits in Africa.
The human rights situation in Zimbabwe deteriorated in 2008 when
elections were characterised by intense violence, torture, abductions
and murder perpetrated by agents of the state. The EU was united
in its condemnation of Mugabe's campaign of violence and disregard
for the democratic process. China, along with Russia, vetoed the
UN Security Council resolution on Zimbabwe in July 2008. However,
it welcomed the Agreement of 15 September 2008: Highlighting Incidences
of Non-Compliance. EU measures on Zimbabwe, including a travel
ban and assets freeze, were expanded in 2008, and further expanded
and renewed in 2009. The EU has also demarched the Zimbabwean
government, including on the abduction of Jestina Mukoko, and
arbitrary farm seizures. Additionally, the EU has highlighted
the deteriorating humanitarian situation, and in 2008 provided
£29 million in humanitarian and food assistance with a similar
amount set for 2009.
China became strategically important to Sudan from the mid-1990s,
when Sudan was largely isolated from the international community.
This presented an opportunity for China in the petroleum sector
and Sudan became the home to China's first overseas oil refinery
and was used as a model for Chinese energy engagement in Africa.
The conflict in Darfur has been the main complicating factor in
China's bilateral relationship with Sudan. Chinese Special Representative
on Darfur, Liu Guijin has publicly stated the need for the Government
of Sudan to do more on Darfur. The Chinese can play a moderating
role with the Government of Sudan, for example in persuading them
to accept the joint AU-UN peacekeeping force.
China has a clear interest in a stable Sudan and we continue
to try to engage with China to encourage it to exert influence
over the Sudanese and to recognise that supporting regimes with
poor political and economic governance damages long term economic
prospects for all of Africa's partners and undermines Africa's
own agenda for sustainable development.
23. What is the extent of China's arms exports to African
countries, and is this a matter of concern to the UK and the EU?
Appendix IV to the white paper "China's National Defense
in 2008" lists arms sales in 2007 to the following African
States: Tanzania, Kenya, Chad, Rwanda and Ghana. However, this
data is not—and does not claim to be—comprehensive.
China has publicly stated that it participates in the normal arms
trade and does not breach UN sanctions. We believe the Chinese
have supplied arms to a number of African countries which we consider
to be "countries of concern" (as identified in the FCO
Annual Report on Human Rights 2008), including both Sudan and
Zimbabwe. Although these exports may not be in breach of UN sanctions,
they have the potential to destabilise already fragile situations.
We consistently encourage the Chinese Government to meet international
norms on arms licensing, including not allowing arms sales that
may undermine the stability of other countries or regions.
ENERGY AND
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
24. What is the EU's policy on cooperation with China on
energy? How has China's growing demand for energy and raw materials
shaped its foreign policy To what extent is there scope for greater
cooperation between the two sides on security of supply and good
practice/transparency in the extractive industries sector?
The commitment of the EU and China to cooperation on energy
issues was underlined and given an institutional structure at
the 8th EU-China Summit in September 2005. In broad terms, the
EU's policy on energy co-operation with China is to intensify
collaboration on energy security with a view to creating a stable,
secure, efficient and clean energy environment and to promoting
open and competitive energy markets.
No Chinese companies have officially endorsed the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI). The Chinese government has also
not endorsed EITI. China's official position is that its companies
will abide by EITI related legislation in countries where such
legislation is in force. The EU is a supporting organisation of
EITI. The EU is keen to promote dialogue with China on EITI to
promote greater transparency. This dialogue should seek to build
on the momentum generated following the 2009 EITI Annual Conference
which has seen EITI's transformation from a start-up initiative
to a global transparency standard.
EU-CHINA COOPERATION
ON THE
ENVIRONMENT AND
S&T
25. What is the scope of the EU's environmental cooperation
with China (excluding climate change)?
The EU has an extensive programme of cooperation with China
on environment and sustainable development issues, both at Member
State and at Commission level. The sector and scope of the projects
varies considerably, with some projects at national level and
others focussed on particular regions. The first table at annex
Q25 (additional information on climate change cooperation is also
attached) sets out the scope, location and level of funding of
current and planned activities.
A policy dialogue between the Commission's Directorate-General
for Environment and China's Ministry for Environmental Protection
provides the broad framework for EU-China environmental cooperation.
Environment policy dialogue, water pollution, air quality and
biodiversity have been singled out as top priorities, but the
joint work plan also covers areas such as chemicals, waste and
industrial accidents. This policy dialogue is underpinned by a
number of major multiannual development and cooperation programmes,
including multi-million Euro programmes in biodiversity, environmental
governance (under negotiation, possibly to be launched at next
EU-China meeting in May), integrated river basin management. In
the water sector, the EU also provides funding support to the
World Bank's watershed rehabilitation projects in the Yangtze
and Pearl River deltas. Finally, the Asia-wide SWITCH grant scheme
which aims to accelerate progress towards sustainable consumption
and production, currently includes five projects in China.
26. What is the scope of the EU's cooperation with China
in the area of Science and Technology, including on the Galileo
project and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
(ITER)?
The ITER project is a major publicly-funded scientific collaboration
among the world's leading fusion programmes, and involves the
EU, China, India, Japan, Russia, Republic of Korea, and the United
States. The ITER Agreement was signed by the seven parties in
November 2006 and is expected to last 35 years. The EU is hosting
ITER and is now committed to its construction and operation.
The ITER Agreement provides that during the construction phase
the EU's EURATOM Framework Programme will contribute 5/11 of costs
(with France as host contributing about 1/11) and each other party,
including China, bearing 1/11. Following the conclusion of the
Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International Fusion
Energy Organization for the Joint Implementation of the ITER Project,
the EU Council on 22 July 2008 adopted directives for the EC to
negotiate Co-operation Agreements on fusion energy research with
specific ITER Parties, including China. The negotiations with
China are still to be launched.
A large Chinese delegation visited the fusion facility at
Culham, Oxfordshire, operated by UKAEA for European scientists,
in November 2008.
China is a partner in the European Space Agency (ESA) and
funded the Orbit Verification segment of the Galileo programme.
China is not an EU Member State so will not be a partner in the
subsequent full development phase (FOC) being funded by the EU
through the Transport Council.
30 April 2009
39
East Asia Policy Guidelines: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/97842.pdf Back
40
East Asia Policy Guidelines: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/97842.pdf Back
41
What the London Summit Achieved: http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/london-summit-outcomes=020409 Back
42
http://www.china-iprhelpdesk.eu/media/docs/Tech_transfer-English.pdf Back
| 
