Memorandum by Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch welcomes the opportunity
to respond to the "Call for Evidence" regarding "The
European Union and China". The European Union (EU) can and
should be more confident in its dealings with China. China needs
the EU as much or more than the EU needs China. The EU should
take greater advantage of the value the Chinese government places
on the relationship to promote not just diplomatic and trade ties
but also respect for internationally recognized human rights and
the rule of law, which fundamentally underpin many of the EU's
core objectives,
EU OBLIGATIONS TO
PROMOTE RIGHTS
IN CHINA
The rights embodied in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights are just that, "universal". No matter
how vigorous China's objections may be from time to time, EU member
states should never hesitate to speak, in private and public,
about human rights problems in China. In this way the EU and its
people are working in common cause with those in China working
to achieve the level of respect for human rights which citizens
of EU states now take for granted, indeed, collectively we have
won the argument, as the Chinese constitution and Chinese law
now use the term "human rights" and the government has
now announced a "national human rights action plan".
All of this provides a strong platform for EU advocacy on problems
such, as workers' rights; protection of the rights to freedom
of speech, association and religion; repression of minority populations;
release of political prisoners; and rejection of the death penalty.
The EU's stated support for these internationally recognized rights
speak for Europe's empathy with those striving for similar protections
around the world.
More than a decade ago, the EU agreed to abandon
scrutiny of China's human rights record at the United Nations
Human Rights Commission. The minimal commitments China offered
to obtain that assurance remain largely unrealized, as the government
has yet to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) or follow through on many other commitments made
at the time.
With the demise of the Human Rights Commission,
the primary venue in which the Chinese government's human rights
record is challenged by EU members is the new Human Rights Council's
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism. In China's first appearance
before the Human Rights Council in February 2009, several EU member
states, and most notably the Czech Republic on behalf of the EU,
raised multiple issues of grave concern, ranging from torture
in police custody to abuses of ethnic minorities in Tibet and
Xinjiang. We appreciate these interventions, but to be effective
they require follow up, and now is the time to do so with the
Chinese government. At present, there is little indication that
the recommendations made through the UPR process will be adopted
or pursued in any meaningful way. As Chinese rights activists
regularly tell us, progress will not happen without sustained
international interest and pressure. China's key partners, such
as the EU, need to use the human rights dialogue process to press
China publicly and privately on its international obligations
and make clear that implementation of Human Rights Council recommendations
is of utmost importance.
The challenge for the EU is to make equally
powerful interventions in all of its interactions with the Chinese
government, particularly in the forums important to the Chinese
government, such as trade discussions. Even if the Chinese government
rejects the EU view, the EU should make human rights an important
and meaningful part of its own message to the Chinese government
outside the established EU-China human rights dialogues (see below)
or the UN framework, and articulate consequences for failing to
alleviate those abuses.
Such discussions will be difficult, but they
need not be confrontational. The Chinese government respects,
though does not welcome, honest dialogue between partner states
on human rights issues, particularly when there is a mutual recognition
that no country has a perfect rights record. It takes advantage
of signs of weakness. The EU can lead these discussions by example
through demonstrating the efforts and progress the EU has made
to comply with international human rights standards both with
regards to civil and political rights as well as economic, social
and cultural rights. Through such interaction, the EU can more
meaningfully position itself as a partner to assist China in meeting
its own human rights challenges, Moreover, implementation of recommendations
made during such discussions will largely be a function of the
EU's willingness to move human rights issues further up on its
political agenda, coupled by regular reminders of expectations
of compliance.
One fruitful strategy may be to identify a few
common human rights goals linked to international standard setting,
ratification of an agreement, or establishment of better enforcement
mechanisms. Topics the Chinese government may find acceptable
could include ratification of the Convention against Enforced
Disappearance, or adoption of a Security Council mechanism on
behalf of women affected by armed conflict. The Chinese government
has shown some support for similar efforts on other issues, including
children in armed conflict, and may therefore be likely to respond
positively to being seen as an international standard-setter.
It does, however, bear mention that China has on some occasions
worked to weaken international norms, such that the EU would have
to be prepared to defend the highest standards.
THE STATE
OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN
THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF
CHINA
The government of the People's Republic of China
has committed itself to strengthening human rights protection,
as embodied by the inclusion in 2004 in the Constitution
of a provision that says that "the State respect and protect
human rights". The government has endeavored to further develop
legal institutions, sought to improve legal protection for workers,
renewed pledges to improve access to education and health care,
supported large poverty-alleviation and basic infrastructure,
implemented national policies to combat HIV-AIDS, and pledged
to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which it signed a decade ago.
But extensive human rights violations, including
sharp limits on the exercise of fundamental freedoms, continue.
These limits are compounded by the fact that the ultimate source
of authority at every level of government is not the government
itself but the Communist Party of China (CPC). The legal system,
including the judiciary, remains explicitly under the "supervision
and guidance" of the Party despite being nominally independent.
Party control is reinforced by the constitutional prohibition
of any action that detracts from the "four cardinal principles",
which include upholding the "leadership of the CPC"
and the "people's democratic dictatorship". These imperatives
bar any direct criticism of the CPC by any individual or organization.
Every year, hundreds of prosecutions for "subversion"
and "separatism" attest to the strict enforcement of
these prohibitions.
In addition to these institutional constraints,
urgent human rights concerns in the People's Republic of China
include: harassment and prosecution of dissidents and human rights
defenders; the use of re-education-through-labor and administrative
detention; deprivation of liberty without court procedures; forced
confessions and torture in the justice system; active and overt
political censorship of media and internet content; executions
and judicial procurement of organ transplants; child labor including
in state schools; abuses against petitioners and other citizens
seeking redress against state institutions; persecution of religious
believers who refuse to join state-controlled churches; large-scale
forced evictions and involuntary resettlements to make way for
infrastructure projects; forced abortions and abuses of family
planning regulations; illegal land seizures by corrupt officials;
discrimination against rural citizens formalized by the household
registration system; and repression of ethnic Tibetans in Tibet
and Uighurs in Xinjiang.
An ongoing failure to rectify these problems
has serious consequences not just for the people of China, but
for the European Union and others. China cannot today be considered
to function according to the rule of law, which compromises its
ability to make and uphold in a predictable fashion legal commitments
in areas including civil and commercial law. China's increasingly
globalized economy has been a boon for its export sector and benefited
consumers in the EU and other import destinations. However, domestic
censorship in China can make it virtually impossible for foreign
governments and their consumers to be aware of—let alone
respond effectively to—public health and product safety
crises which originate in China. Obstacles to justice for ordinary
citizens, and persecution of lawyers and legal activists who take
up sensitive cases, present a grave challenge to the government's
advocated goal of a "harmonious society", triggering
instead a sharp increase in domestic social unrest. And at a time
of dire economic straits, discrimination against already-vulnerable
populations such as ethnic minorities and migrant workers is likely
to increase, further compromising social stability. Each of these
problems makes China a less reliable diplomatic, economic, and
strategic partner, and compromises global efforts to meaningfully
tackle international environmental problems, contagious disease
control and corruption.
THE EFFICACY
AND COHERENCE
OF THE
EU'S EFFORTS
TO PROMOTE
HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CHINA
It has been almost a decade since Human Rights
Watch wrote that we "supported the European Union in its
attempts ... to bring about improvements in human rights in China
through on-going dialogue with Chinese government officials, combined
with rule of law exchanges. However, we continue to believe that
dialogue and exchange programs alone are insufficient, and we
are deeply concerned that the China-EU bilateral dialogue has
become largely a rhetorical shell, lacking in accountability,
transparency, and clear benchmarks for progress". That stance
has been reiterated on the occasion of each dialogue, as benchmarks
have yet to be publicly articulated, and we remain unclear as
to what the EU itself considers progress in the dialogues.
Moreover, while Human Rights Watch appreciates the
EU's efforts to include nongovernmental organizations such as
ours in the human rights dialogue seminars, the reality is that
the EU has allowed the Chinese government to dictate which NGOs
maybe included even in meetings held in Europe. This has forced
those who are invited into an invidious position: participate
in the hopes of having some positive input into the discussion
knowing that we are divided as we do so, or refuse to participate
to protest the exclusion of some groups and have no input at all.
It is unclear to us how hard the EU has pushed back against Chinese
efforts to censor NGO participation.
Even on the occasions when Human Rights Watch
has participated in such forums, it is clear that the discussions
are maximally structured to prevent frank discussions about human
rights conditions inside China. While there is some merit to helping
establish connections between Chinese and European experts in
areas such as labor law and the protections of ethnic minorities,
this should not be a substitute for fact- and case-based discussions
of real and serious abuses. That the organization and management
of these dialogues is now being handed over to an academic network
further suggests that the discussions will be just that: academic
in nature, not a matter of political concern or governmental obligation.
The dialogues have also suffered because they
have not been buttressed by comparable, consistent high-level
political efforts and expressions of concern highlighting the
EU's expectations across the full spectrum of the EU-China relationship.
EU-China summits are given extraordinary levels of political attention
and resources, and diplomats are extremely careful in their choice
of words. On human rights, however, the messages are often mixed.
For example, some EU heads of government have met publicly with
the Dalai Lama; others have abruptly withdrawn invitations for
him to visit. Some have altered their positions on Tibet (though
deny having done so), while others have stood firm and insisted
that Beijing engage in negotiations with Tibetan representatives.
While Human Rights Watch recognizes that that
there maybe differences of opinion between member states on some
of these issues, an inability to generate and display consistency
to Beijing on rights concerns reduces the likelihood of achieving
change. The Chinese government notes and exploits inconsistencies
in order to further undermine efforts at meaningful dialogue on
human rights issues.
Human Rights Watch believes that the Chinese
government not only responds to international pressure, but responds
all the more when countries express concerns jointly and with
one voice. One of the best mechanisms for doing so in the past—the
Berne Process—has become virtually invisible. We strongly
urge that these meetings be convened regularly and publicly, and
that they include input from relevant experts and NGOs.
HOW THE
EU SHOULD DEAL
WITH CHINA
AS A
FOREIGN POLICY
PLAYER GENERALLY
China's role as a major international actor
is now indisputable, and Human Rights Watch has credited the Chinese
government for some of its positive actions, such as contributing
large numbers of peacekeepers to UN peacekeeping missions.
Yet there are many ways in which the model and practice
of Chinese foreign policy crucially undermines international efforts
to defend human rights. First, the Chinese Communist Party's model
of development—rapid economic growth without a commensurate
increase in civil or political rights, alongside general resistance
to international pressure—is hardly a positive example.
Economic development in China has brought a greater degree of
social freedoms, and of course reduced the number of people in
poverty, but the fact remains that it is a government highly repressive
of its critics, often on the grounds that their criticism jeopardizes
state stability and growth, in addition, that rapid growth has
been enabled by gross violations of labor rights, rampant expropriation
by officials of land and other public resources, environmental
devastation, and suppression of public discontent about these
developments. In this sense, the Chinese "model" is
not one rights activists wish to see replicated.
Second, in the context of the United Nations,
Chinese diplomats have become adept at undermining or obstructing
the work of the organization's promotion of human rights. For
example, Chinese officials often block UN Security Council resolutions
that entail targeted sanctions against gross offenders such as
a proposed resolution in January 2007 on Burma and a later
resolution condemning the Burmese junta's September 2007 assault
on thousands of peaceful demonstrators. By obstructing multilateral
efforts against an abusive government or impeding international
investigations into the nature and scope of human rights abuses,
such actions contribute to the misery of those who are already
suffering. However, on at least two issues on which the EU engaged
China at the highest levels-Security Council resolution 1593,
which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal
Court, and on resolutions on the Middle East-China has been willing
to either show support or abstain.
China's actions at the UN Human Rights Council
also demonstrate a concerted effort to roll back structures and
procedures for protecting rights. China was one of several countries
to propose that country mandates and "special procedures"
be abandoned or restricted. It suggested that only governments
should be able to submit statements in the Universal Periodic
Review process. Chinese diplomats have complained that non-governmental
organizations' involvement in the Human Rights Council should
be "controlled". In 2006, China objected to the council
accepting a report on human rights conditions in Darfur on the
grounds that the authors had not actually been inside the country
and therefore its report could not be accurate. That entry into
the country had been denied by precisely the people thought to
be responsible for human rights abuses [and precisely in order
to evade scrutiny) seemed immaterial to China.
Third, while Beijing may have deep philosophical
differences with the EU on the efficacy of conditioning aid, it
has indisputably provided a crucial financial lifeline to countries
with poor human rights records. This has often undermined efforts
made by other international actors, including the EU to use financial
leverage to improve rights. Without steady flows of Chinese aid,
investment, weapons, and political support it is possible that
the governments of Burma's General Than Shwe, Sudan's President
Omar al-Bashir, and Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe, among
others, might already have had to answer for their human rights
crimes before a court of law, be consigned to history or had their
ability to abuse their citizens dramatically limited by a lack
of resources.
Finally, there is growing evidence to suggest
that official and unofficial Chinese investment in developing
economies compromises local labor standards, particularly in large-scale
infrastructure or extractive industry projects. While Human Rights
Watch has not yet conducted research into allegations of paying
subminimum wages, abusive working conditions, or the use of prison
labor (either local Chinese) in such countries, credible evidence
exists, and is consistent with extensively documented poor labor
practices in China. While it is true that the labor conditions
in many of the investment-receiving countries are already poor,
the Chinese government and entrepreneurs appear to have no strategy
or intention of making higher standards a hallmark of their presence.
There are some steps China can take that are
consistent with its current world view which will help victims
of human rights abuses. At a minimum, Beijing should reconsider
its aid strategies. It seems highly unlikely that China will begin
imposing human rights conditions on aid projects, but it can at
least suspend gratuitously inappropriate projects, such as the
new presidential palace for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir,
and reallocate those funds to other projects that would help those
most in need. In the direst circumstances, such as the crackdown
in Burma in September 2007, it should suspend some non-humanitarian
aid to send a political signal. Should it fail to do so, the Chinese
government should recognize that its actions will give others
legitimate grounds to criticize its agenda and question its motives.
Simply being more transparent about aid, particularly in countries
with serious human rights issues, would also be a significant
improvement.
China could also articulate the conditions under
which it will set aside its insistence on sovereignty and non-interference,
particularly with respect to human rights crises. By ratifying
legally binding international human rights treaties China's obligations
are clear.[43]
When in 2005 it affirmed the "responsibility to protect"
at the UN, China agreed that member states are obliged to intervene
when a government fails to protect its own population against
crimes against humanity, genocide, ethnic cleansing and war crimes.
It is not yet clear under what circumstances China will endorse
the doctrine's use—if it is serious, the discussion in China
(and elsewhere) should move on from whether to treat state
sovereignty as an impregnable boundary to how it will join
with other countries to intervene in the most egregious humanitarian
crises when circumstances require. In order for the responsibility
to protect to be implemented, a standby UN force, including civil
police and human rights monitors, that can be quickly mobilized
should be developed. Chinese support for creating such a force
would indicate true international responsibility.
Adopting legislation to hold Chinese companies
to international standards on labor rights, matched by resources
to enforce such regulations, would be a key step forward. Doing
so would demonstrate the Chinese government's commitment to being
a truly positive force in developing economies, possibly leverage
reforms at home, and make it a more equitable international economic
competitor.
Finally, China should be truer to its own rhetoric
that it is a devoted friend of the developing world. It should
see its foreign policy as not just about relations with other
governments, but about helping improve the well-being of the people
of those states. This would earn China the gratitude of people
around the globe. But it will require a policy that accepts that
human beings need civil and political rights as well as economic
development.
Human Rights Watch believes that not only has
the European Union failed to press the Chinese government to take
steps such as these—ones that remain within the confines
of China's general foreign policy philosophy—nor has it
done enough to resist Chinese efforts to block international action
on serious human rights crises, such as Burma, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
and Zimbabwe. Doing so effectively requires vigorous, concerted
diplomacy not just within the EU, but with other like-minded governments.
If the EU remains unwilling to match China's diplomatic resources
on issues such as these, progress will remain elusive.
THE EU ARMS
EMBARGO ON
CHINA
In the wake of the bloody crackdown on prodemocracy
protestors in China in June 1989, the EU imposed an arms embargo.
Some EU member states, such as France, have suggested in recent
years that the arms embargo be lifted, while others insist that
it remain in place. In the two decades since the Tiananmen Square
massacre, the EU has never collectively articulated a set of concrete
benchmarks the Chinese government must meet in order to reverse
the decision, once again eroding a sense of unity and suggesting
to the Chinese government that it need not do anything to address
the Tiananmen legacy.
Those benchmarks could include a serious, transparent,
and impartial investigation into the massacre, accountability
for those who ordered soldiers to open fire on demonstrators,
compensation to victims and family members, release of those still
in prison, and accounting for those who are victims of enforced
disappearance. Establishing these standards would enable a process
of implementation to begin, and even meeting only some of the
benchmarks would be considered progress.
Human Rights Watch believes that this embargo
should remain in place until the reasons for its imposition have
been addressed. These include:
— a general amnesty for all persons imprisoned
for any form of peaceful protest related to the Tiananmen massacre;
— new trials that meet international fair
trial standards, attended by international observers, for all
persons still serving sentences for cognizable criminal offenses
related to the 1989 demonstrations; and
— an independent investigation into the
events surroundingthe massacre and prosecutions of those responsible
for serious human right violations.
We can think of no better way to both demonstrate
the EU's commitment to human rights and to commemorate the 20th
anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre than by putting this topic
at the center of your upcoming summit.
17 April 2009
43 As a member of the United Nations, China is expected
to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. China is
a party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention to Eliminate
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights. It has signed but not ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Back
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