Memorandum by Professor David Shambaugh,
Director, China Policy Program, George Washington University,
Non-resident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program, The
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. USA
PREAMBLE
It is a distinct honor and privilege to be invited
to contribute evidence to the House of Lords and this committee
on the important subject of the EU's relationship with, and policies
towards, the People's Republic of China. As the committee notes
in its call for evidence, Europe's—and Britain's—relations
with China have evolved and developed profoundly over the past
decade, with significant implications for global order as well
as European and Chinese interests. I date the EU's "autonomous"
relationship with China from the mid-1990s—prior to that
time Europe did not really have a relationship with China that
was independent of Cold War dynamics or on a firm independent
foundation. But since then, we have witnessed an extraordinary
expansion of bilateral and multilateral ties between China and
the now 27 member states of the EU; the European Commission,
Council, and Parliament. The unofficial relationships between
EU members with Taiwan (Republic of China) and the Hong Kong and
Macao Special Administrative Regions have also moved forward on
a solid track.
It is a particular privilege for an American to be
invited to give evidence to this Inquiry. My own personal interest
in China-EU and China-UK relations developed during my time teaching
at the University of London's School of Oriental & African
Studies (SOAS) from 1987-96. I published my first study of the
subject during this time.[44]
Since that time my interest in China-Europe relations have further
developed and deepened significantly. This includes having published
many more studies of China-Europe relations.[45]
I wish that more of my American colleagues paid attention to China-Europe
relations, as they hold significant implications for the United
States, but at least there has been an upsurge in transatlantic
discussions (official and unofficial) on China in recent years.
This upsurge was primarily precipitated by the 2004-05 arms
embargo imbroglio, but at least it belatedly refocused attention
on the need for transatlantic dialogue and policy coordination
concerning China. These dialogues have produced several significant
studies in recent years,[46]
which should be read by policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.
Permit me to respond briefly to some of the
excellent questions posed by the committee's inquiry (I am not
competent to respond to all).
CHINA TODAY
QUESTIONS
1. What are the main successes and challenges
of economic, social and political modernization in China, and
how do these shape the context for China's external strategy?
In particular how do development priorities and foreign and security
objectives interact?
ANSWERS
In my view, the main accomplishments of China's
modernization are: becoming the world's third largest economy;
lifting more than 200 million citizens out of "absolute"
poverty and creating a growing middle class; significantly liberalizing
social, cultural, intellectual, and religious life for the vast
majority of citizens; and pluralizing the political system to
provide participatory opportunities for large numbers of citizens.
The principal challenges are to continue to grow the economy and
navigate the current global economic recession; provide employment
for an ever-growing and laid-off workforce; address severe environmental
degradation; provide humane and responsible governance; tackle
corruption; respect human rights; and further pluralize the polity.
Externally, China's foreign policy has been oriented around four
principal goals: (1) maintaining stable relations with other major
powers, particularly the United States; (2) creating a peaceful
environment with China's neighbors around its periphery; (3) securing
access to foreign technology, capital, and markets; and (4) contributing
to global governance while attempting to redress perceived inequities
in the international system. China's external policies are largely
oriented towards furthering its internal development.
2. How does the EU's policy on promoting the
rule of law and human rights, including women's rights, as well
as political pluralism, freedom of expression and civil society
interact with its broader foreign policy objectives on China?
What is the scope and content of the bilateral human rights dialogue
and how well is it working? How successful has the EU been in
encouraging Chinese participation in international conventions
and institutions in this area, such as the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights; and the UN Human Rights Council?
ANSWERS
The EU (including individual member states,
particularly the UK) has done much good work inside and
outside of China to promote the rule of law; promote respect for
human rights; improve capacities in the Chinese legal system;
improve the penal system; educate intellectuals; and enfranchise
civil society. This has been done largely by private sector actors,
although they often are funded by public funds from the European
Union and individual member states. Collectively, European nations
and the EU have done far more than any other country in these
areas. By investing "on the ground" they have had a
substantial impact. I am not in a position to judge how well,
or how poorly, the various EU human rights dialogues with China
are working—but I would observe that securing China's ratification
of, and adherence to, the UN Convention on Civil and Political
Rights should be the Number 1 priority at present.
MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS
QUESTIONS
3. How is the EU—and its Member States—perceived
by China: what are the values, interests, and ambitions held by
China in terms of its European strategy? What priority does China
place on its relations with Europe; and how is this level of priority
shaped, not by what Europe does, but by the positions adopted
by others?
ANSWERS
Concerning Chinese perceptions of Europe see
the chapters by Zhu Liqun and David Shambaugh in China-Europe
Relations: Perceptions, Policies & Prospects.[47]
Chinese understanding of Europe—both at the popular and
expert levels—remains relatively shallow and ill-informed.
European understanding of China is similarly afflicted and public
perceptions of China across Europe (as measured by various public
opinion polls) have deteriorated markedly since 2006. Europe's
expert competence on China remains severely limited—particularly
when compared with the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan,
even India. Europe needs a large and sustained infusion of
funds into building university and think tank training and research
programs on contemporary China! This should be a high and
long-range strategic priority, given the strategic importance
of China to Europe's future.
NATURE OF
THE RELATIONSHIP
QUESTIONS
4. What is the current nature of EU-China
relations in the broader context of political, trade, economic,
environmental, demographic-migratory and social-cultural terms?
What should be the primary objectives of EU policy towards China;
and notably how do Europe's interests in closer interactions with
China on trade, investment, and technology relate to its foreign
and security strategy?
ANSWERS
There are various indicators of the breadth
and depth of China-Europe relations: trade, investment, student
exchanges, science and technology cooperation, diplomatic interchange,
etc. There is no doubt that relations have developed dramatically,
particularly over the past decade. Some of these measures—such
as total trade and the number of Chinese students studying in
EU universities (approximately 190,000)—are quite impressive.
However, there is no doubt that the relationship has encountered
difficult times since 2006—after which the Sino-European
"honeymoon" turned into a real "marriage."
Encountering and managing difficulties are part of any marriage,
as are now being experienced by China and Europe. I expect the
rocky patch to continue, but hopefully an "equilibrium"
may begin to emerge and relations will hopefully stabilize. This
said, the very disunity of the European Union (27 member
governments, parliaments, and publics) will continue to weigh
against establishing a lasting and stable relationship.
CHINA'S
FOREIGN POLICY
PRINCIPLES
QUESTIONS
5. China treats its sovereignty as a fundamental
determinant of its foreign and security policy, with the result
that its general approach to political and civil rights, and its
specific posture on questions such as Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan,
Tibet and Xinjiang have significance in international politics.
How does the EU's position on these questions shape its relations
with China?
ANSWERS
The territories mentioned in the question—Hong
Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang—are all sovereign
parts of China. However, they are all different cases with respect
to the outside world. Governance of Hong Kong and Macao are governed
by the documents of 1997 and 1999 agreed with the UK
and Portugal respectively, as well as domestic legislation of
the People's Republic of China. Tibet and Xinjiang are "Autonomous
Regions" governed entirely by domestic Chinese law and political
authorities, and are seen as highly sensitive entities in China's
relations with other nations. Taiwan (Republic of China) is administered
by local "authorities" and virtually all governments
in the world (except 21), including the European Union, do not
recognize the independent sovereignty of Taiwan. Europe's relations
with these Chinese territories is thus different in each case,
but in all cases they are highly sensitive as China "brooks
no interference" in its "internal affairs."
MANAGING THE
EU-CHINA RELATIONSHIP
QUESTIONS
6. What does the EU have to offer China as
a partner and how can it best influence, and learn from, Chinese
thinking and policy? How successful has the EU's diplomacy towards
China been in attaining its stated objectives, and how could it
be improved? How does the degree of coherence of the EU's policy
impact on the EU's ability to engage and negotiate with China?
How effective are the channels of communication and diplomacy
of the EU in China, including the European Commission delegation
in Beijing, and vice versa?
ANSWERS
The Inquiry asks a number of complicated questions
on this subject. Generally speaking, I would submit the following.
First, China offers multiple opportunities for partnerships with
Europe—on reforming global multilateral institutions and
architectures; addressing climate change; ensuring global financial
stability and growth; providing peacekeeping in unstable states;
controlling the proliferation of nuclear and dangerous technologies
and WMD; and addressing a wide range of "non-traditional
security" challenges (terrorism, organized crime, cyber attacks,
human smuggling, piracy, narcotics, etc.). Second, I give the
European Commission and Council generally high marks for formulating
and articulating, since 1995, a series of well thought-through
policy "Communications". EU member states have, unfortunately,
not kept pace with either a parallel conceptualization or articulation
of policies toward China (an exception being the recent UK policy
statement).[48]
A related problem has been that the Brussels bureaucracy, via
these "Communications," have been out of sinc
with the more skeptical and negative views of China existent across
European publics. The October 2006 Communication was intended
to "bring Brussels back in line" with broader member
state opinion, and it succeeded in doing so—although it
deeply antagonized the Chinese side. Third, the broader incoherence
of supposedly "common" foreign and security policy (CFSP)
across Europe definitely has (negatively) affected how the EU
is perceived in China and how the EU attempts to manage relations
with China. In other words, the sheer diversity of the EU is a
substantial weakness in gaining either China's respect or effectively
negotiating on substantive concerns.
THE INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK
QUESTIONS
7. What is the perspective of different EU
Member States in relations with China; and how do these different
perspectives shape the conduct of European foreign and security
policy? To what extent have the Commission, the Council and the
Member States been prepared to conduct a common strategy? How
close is the European Union to designing a strategy that will
ensure that China regards convergence or compliance with EU objectives
as a significant priority?
ANSWERS
The current institutional framework for the
conduct of relations between the EU and China seem appropriate
and function fairly effectively, and (from what I know) intra-EU
communication among policymakers also functions effectively. The
most glaring problem, in my view, is the general lack of China
competence among officials in Brussels as well as the ministries
of member states (the UK being the exception to the rule)—and
the almost complete lack of input from the non-governmental
expert community to governmental policymakers. While this is routine
in the United States, it is virtually absent in Europe. There
are far from enough officials with professional training in Chinese
affairs and language to manage the relationship. On the academic
side, there is a real dearth of expertise on contemporary Chinese
affairs across the continent. To my knowledge, there is not a
single nongovernmental specialist on Chinese military affairs
or Chinese elite politics in all of Europe, and specialists on
China's economy and Chinese foreign relations can be counted on
one hand. In the Mediterranean and Central European states there
is a virtual absence of contemporary China expertise.
To repeat my major recommendation: (1) there is a
pressing need for a sustained infusion of funds into building
competence in think tanks, universities, and governments on contemporary
Chinese affairs who will feed personnel and expertise into
member governments and the EU in Brussels (note: the same applies
to India), and (2) there need to be established mechanisms for
non-governmental expertise on China to be fed to government policymakers..
Improving this capacity can not be left solely to member
states to fund and develop—there must be a Europe-wide strategic
initiative stimulated by the EU itself. Chinese studies are in
steady decline all across Europe—except in the UK,
where they have rebuilt over the past decade following significant
atrophy during the 1990s and as a result of specific Inquiries
undertaken by the FCO and other bodies. Improving such competence
and expertise will have a direct impact on improving the substance
and execution of policy towards China. If the EU would only put
resources into building contemporary China studies in Europe commensurate
with the resources it has invested in building European studies
in China it would make a big difference!
COHERENCE OF
THE EU'S
POLICY
QUESTIONS
8. What is the perspective of different EU
Member States in relations with China; and how do these different
perspectives shape the conduct of European foreign and security
policy? To what extent have the Commission, the Council and the
Member States been prepared to conduct a common strategy? How
close is the European Union to designing a strategy that will
ensure that China regards convergence or compliance with EU objectives
as a significant priority?
ANSWERS
Perspectives on China vary greatly across member
states. Some (in Central Europe) are quite hostile to China; some
(in the Mediterranean states) are naïve about China; some
(France, Germany, and Netherlands) are quite skeptical of China;
some (UK and Scandinavian states) are much more positive about
China. Only Germany and the UK can be said to have national "strategies"
for managing relations with China, and both have published government
documents to this end. For its part, the European Commission and
Council have done very well, in my view, to fashion and
articulate detailed strategies and policies for dealing with China
since 1995. The "problem" has been that the member states
do not "follow" the strategies and policy guidelines
formulated by the Commission and Council—thus undercutting
the authority of Brussels as well as the substance and wisdom
of EU policies. Thus, compliance with EU objectives is
the real problem. Europe simply must act more coherently
and in concert with (well formulated) policies set in Brussels.
FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY
QUESTIONS
9. What is the level and kind of cooperation
being conducted at present between the EU and China on questions
of foreign and security policy, including non-proliferation; counter-terrorism;
and crisis management and peacekeeping? To what extent does the
technical and scientific cooperation between Europe and China
assist in China's modernisation in areas such as defence and space;
and is the EU confident that it has adequate mechanisms in place
for oversight and regulation of these interactions?
ANSWERS
To my knowledge, mechanisms for China-EU dialogue
and cooperation on foreign and security policy are not many. Of
course, France and the UK regularly interact with China on such
questions within the context of the UN Security Council, while
Germany also plays a role in the "Sextet" concerning
Iran's nuclear program. The UK also has its own bilateral "strategic
dialogue" with Beijing, and some other member states that
have similar ones. In the UK's case, this is carried out between
officials of the two foreign offices, with some military representation.
The European Commission also has, as one of its 22 dialogues
with Beijing, one concerning non-proliferation. There is also
a loose "dialogue" between NATO and China. In addition,
the Chinese military (People's Liberation Army) has a variety
of bilateral exchanges with defense ministries and militaries
of individual member states. In some case (eg UK, Germany) there
are Chinese military officers resident in European staff colleges.
It would be useful to collect pan-European information on member
state's exchanges with the Chinese military, as quite a lot seems
to be going on but it is not well understood. Concerning the Inquiry's
question concerning the whether European technology transfer to
China benefits the modernization of the Chinese military, the
answer is definitely! With respect to the parallel question
as to whether there are adequate safeguards in place to oversee
and regulate these exchanges the answer is no (from an
American perspective).
QUESTIONS
10. How successful has the EU been in persuading
China to increase the transparency of its defence objectives and
military expenditure? What is the state of play regarding exports
of arms made in the EU to China? How effective is the newly adopted
Council Common Position to replace the Code of Conduct on arms
exports in limiting arms exports to China? Should the EU continue
to pursue its stated ambition of lifting the arms embargo on China
imposed in 1989? What is the EU's policy on cross-strait relations
between China and Taiwan, and how successful has the EU been in
encouraging peaceful dialogue and confidence-building between
the two sides?
ANSWERS
The EU has not been very effective in persuading
China to improve its defense transparency, largely because it
has not been an issue on the EU's agenda with China (until perhaps
the past year), but it is definitely an issue worth pursuing—in
tandem with the United States and other Asian nations. Moreover,
Europe has the world's two leading security institutes that publish
such defense data (IISS and SIPRI)—efforts should be made
to have both institutions work with Chinese defense authorities
on questions of transparency and publication of defense data.
With respect to the complicated question of the "arms embargo"
and European arms and defense technology transfer to China, I
would observe the following: (1) while there has been some "leakage"
of defense technologies to China, the ban on end-use weapons transfers
has been respected; (b) the EU should not pursue the stated
intention to lift the "arms embargo" (as this would
jeopardize the security interests of a number of China's neighbors
in Asia (one does not hear them calling for the lifting of the
embargo!) as well as the United States; (3) the Council Common
Position seems an improvement over the Code of Conduct. Finally,
with respect to the Inquiry's questions concerning Taiwan, I believe
that the EU's statements on this question over the past two to
three years have been quite correct and helpful in encouraging
peaceful dialogue between China and Taiwan. Firm European adherence
to the "One China Policy" is mandatory.
QUESTIONS
11. How does the foreign and defence policy
of the United States impact on EU-China relations? To what extent
and with what consequences will the EU-China relationship be determined
by the course of the transatlantic relationship? What is divergent
and convergent about US and European approaches to China? How
do the EU's other partners, notably Japan, India and Russia, view
the development of EU-China relations?
ANSWERS
EU-China relations do not generally impact US-China
relations, which operate on their track. However, should the EU
lift the "arms embargo" and begin to transfer weapons
or defense technologies to China it would definitely negatively
impact US national security interests and would stimulate robust
resistance from Washington (as it did in 2004-05). More broadly,
however, there are two other points to make. First, there are
quite a large number of issues concerning China on which the EU
and United States have common perspectives: human rights, rule
of law, non-proliferation, good governance, IPR enforcement, anti-dumping,
WTO compliance, trade deficit reduction, global financial stability,
energy security, climate change, military transparency, anti-piracy,
maritime security, and many other issues. The convergence
of transatlantic perspectives and policies concerning China far
outweigh any differences. Thus, to this end, there should be enhanced
and more institutionalized transatlantic coordination concerning
these issues. Second, there are an increasing number of issues
in world affairs in which all three parties (Europe, United States,
and China) share similar interests and perspectives—including
on a number of the aforementioned issues. Thus greater trilateral
dialogue and cooperation is called for as well. On some issues,
other nations (Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, perhaps
Russia) should also be brought into these dialogues and multinational
efforts to improve global governance and address global problems.
QUESTIONS
12. To what extent should Europe regionalize
and internationalize its China strategy? Europe and China increasingly
meet in common neighborhoods and in global forums, most obviously
the UN. What is the role of regional multilateralism—for
example, the ASEM process—and institutions of global governance
in promoting the EU's objectives in the China relationship?
ANSWERS
The EU's China policies and relations with the
PRC should be embedded in broader and deeper regional relations
and policies towards the Asian region. It does no good to have
a China policy that is separate from a nation's broader regional
policy. However, to date, the EU has not developed (or at least
has not articulated) a broader Asia strategy. It has been a number
of years (eight?) since the European Commission last published
a "Communication" on Asia, although it has published
a series of such documents on China, India, Japan, and ASEAN.
The Commission needs to put these pieces together within an overall
regional strategy, and update the 2001 "Communication."
As for the question about ASEM: it does not appear to be a particularly
effective institution. Broadly speaking, as noted above in question
11, there is considerable scope for China-EU collaboration on
a wide range of global governance issues in a wide range of multilateral
and regional forums. This includes, for example, on Africa—and
particularly the ODA (aid) policies of China and the EU in Africa.
ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE
CHANGE, AND
ENERGY
QUESTIONS
13. What is the scope of the EU's environmental
cooperation with China, and assisting China on policy mitigating
and adapting to climate change? What is the EU doing to persuade
China to commit to binding targets for reductions in its greenhouse
gas emissions under the post-Kyoto UN framework on climate change?
What is the EU's policy on cooperation with China on energy? How
has China's growing demand for energy and raw materials shaped
its foreign policy, and to what extent is there scope for greater
cooperation between the two sides on security of supply?
ANSWERS
The EU has done much excellent work in China
over the past decade in the area of environmental protection and
raising "green consciousness". The website of the EU
Delegation in Beijing is full of good examples of these EU-funded
projects. This has been a commendable effort. Moving towards Copenhagen
in December, however, the EU needs to raise the level of interaction
on the climate change issue to the highest possible level, preferably
in conjunction with the United States. Energy security is an issue
ripe for greater inter-governmental and non-governmental interaction
with Chinese interlocutors.
EUROPE AND
CHINA'S
STRATEGY FOR
AFRICA
QUESTIONS
14. What is the Chinese view of promoting
security and development in Africa; and how far does this approach
correspond to that promoted by the EU? Can the EU, China and Africa
cooperate to improve the effectiveness of regional development
and security through the trialogue mechanism and UN forums?
ANSWERS
China promotes development in Africa through
a wide range of ODA related programs. China has made a real and
positive difference in Africa in the following areas: public health,
medical clinics, and paramedics; agricultural technology; primary
and secondary school building and teacher training; and the building
of hard infrastructure (roads, dams, bridges, buildings, stadiums,
ports, railroad, etc). These have been commendable efforts—and
they are in areas in which the EU, US, World Bank and other external
donors have been reluctant to invest. China has also undertaken
debt relief and extended a variety of credits, grants, and loans
to African countries. The problems, however, lie in: (1) China's
"no strings attached" aid policies—as these projects
have frequently undercut other donors' efforts to improve domestic
governance in particularly authoritarian African states; and (2)
in the total lack of transparency in China's ODA policies
(worldwide). As China is not a member of the OECD, it does not
comply with or provide data to the OECD's Development Assistance
Committee on its aid activities around the world. The EU, as well
as other donor countries and international bodies such as the
World Bank, all need to engage China directly and robustly on
this issue—so as to better coordinate various donor efforts
and not allow Chinese aid to undercut efforts to improve domestic
governance in recipient nations.
16 April 2009
44 David Shambaugh, China and Europe, 1949-1995
(London: Contemporary China Institute, School of Oriental &
African Studies, 1996). Back
45
See, for example, David Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider and
Zhou Hong (eds), China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies
& Prospects (London: Routledge Press, 2007); David Shambaugh,
"The New Strategic Triangle and U.S. Relations with China,"
in Winfried Jung (ed.), The New Strategic Triangle: China,
Europe and the United States in a Changing International System
(Beijing: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007); David Shambaugh,
"China-Europe Relations Get Complicated," Brookings
Northeast Asia Commentary (May 2007), available at: http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/commentary/shambaugh20070501.htm;
David Shambaugh, "China Policies of the EU and United States:
Strategic Partners and Great Power Relations," and "Is
the Dragon Unarmed: Perspectives on European China Policies,"
Henrich Boell Stiftung, Berlin, available at: http://www.boell.de/de/01_event/5495.html;
http://www.boell.de/de/01_event/5506.html;
David Shambaugh, "European & American Approaches to China:
Different Beds, Same Dreams?" China Perspectives (May-June
2002); David Shambaugh, "Thinking About China," in Simon
Serfaty (ed.), U.S.-German Dialogue on China: Conference Report
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2002); David Shambaugh, "The New Strategic Triangle: American
and European Reactions to China's Rise," The Washington
Quarterly (Summer 2005). Back
46
See for example, David Shambaugh and Gudrun Wacker (eds), Transatlantic
Relations and China: Deepening the Cooperation (Berlin: German
Institute of International and Security Affairs, 2008); Bates
Gill and Gudrun Wacker (eds.), China's Rise: Diverging U.S.-EU
Perceptions and Approaches (Berlin: German Institute of International
and Security Affairs, 2005); Charles Grant and Katinka Barysch,
Can Europe and China Shape a New World Order? (London:
Centre for European Reform, 2008); David Kerr and Liu Fei (eds.),
The International Politics of EU-China Relations (Oxford:
Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 2007); John Fox
and François Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations
(London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). Back
47
See footnote 2. Back
48
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, The UK and China: A Framework
for a Engagement (2008). Back
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