Memorandum by Dr Steve Tsang, Fellow and
University Reader in Politics, St Antony's College, Oxford University
1. In this submission I focus on how the EU
should deal with China's rise, and on contextualizing the basis
for the EU to engage China with a clear understanding of the nature
of the political system now in place in China. I take the view
that the Chinese government's handling of China's rise and its
foreign and security policy is intended to serve the national
interest of China as interpreted by the leadership of the Communist
Party. I start by highlighting the nature of the political system
now in place in China, as this is the key to understanding what
drives the Chinese government's approach to the rest of the world.
NATURE OF
THE CHINESE
POLITICAL SYSTEM
2. The Chinese leadership after the death of
Deng Xiaoping in 1997 has become increasingly confident. It now
seeks and experiments with a development model that is married
to a political system distinctly different from liberal democracy.
Under Hu Jintao the Communist Party is promoting a sense of national
pride that uses terminology borrowed from the Confucian past to
make its development appear `Chinese' without giving up the basic
Leninist nature of the political system. This use of `Confucian'
terms does not imply the restoration of Confucianism in China.
Indeed, the Communist Party's use of `Confucian' terminology is
against the most basic tenor of Confucianism, namely that an individual
or a government must do right in the judgement not of those in
power but of history.
3. As defined by the Communist Party `Chineseness'
is not whether an idea or institution is based on China's tradition
but on what the Party leadership chooses to describe as Chinese.
Leninism is therefore deemed Chinese rather than an import from
Russia (or strictly speaking the Soviet Union). In spite of the
fact that real and significant changes have taken place in the
political arena, the Communist Party still vehemently rejects
democracy. `Chinese democracy' as interpreted and implemented
under the Communist Party does not tolerate any scope for it to
lose power. `Political reform' as used by the Party does not imply
democratization. It means governance reform.
4. Communism effectively ceased being the state
ideology in China sometime between the Tiananmen protests of 1989
and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union in the following two years. Its Leninist political system
has, however, been kept though modified significantly. Since then
the Communist Party has imposed what amounts to a social contract
on the people of China. In a nutshell, the Party delivers stability,
order, rapid growth and general improvement to the living conditions
of the people in return for its continued dominance of government
and politics. The `general improvement in living conditions' includes
not only economic prosperity but a larger scope for individual
freedom and improved government responsiveness to public demands.
5. This new political set up can best be described
as consultative Leninism,[53]
a system that blends together the Leninist disposition to and
instrument of control with innovations from other sources. It
has five defining characteristics:
— The Communist Party is obsessively
focused on staying in power, for which maintaining stability in
the country and pre-emptively eliminating threats to its political
supremacy are deemed essential. For this end any means can be
justified.
— A focus on governance reform both
within the Party and in the state apparatus in order to pre-empt
public demands for democratization. Enhanced governance is considered
essential to make both the consultative and the Leninist elements
work effectively.
— A commitment to enhance the Party's
capacity to elicit, respond to and direct changing public opinions.
The Communist Party propaganda machinery remains the primary instrument
to channel public opinions in the direction the Party leadership
desires.
— A commitment to sustain rapid growth
and economic development by whatever means and, where the party
leadership deems politically expedient, regardless of its previous
ideological commitment to Communism.
— The promotion of a brand of nationalism
that integrates a sense of national pride in a tightly guided
narrative of China's history and its civilization with the greatness
of the People's Republic under the leadership of the Party. The
objective is to indoctrinate Chinese citizens to take a `my government
right or wrong' attitude when foreigners criticize the Chinese
government, the Communist Party or their policies. Underpinning
this brand of nationalism is the narrative that China was the
greatest civilization that became a century long victim of Western
and Japanese imperialism—a state of affair that was put
an end to by the Communist Party. The Party is thus portrayed
as the guardian of China's honour and dignity and the instrument
for restoring China's greatness and its `rightful place' in the
world. Following this line of argument, anyone who publicly opposes
the Party is unpatriotic.
FROM `HARMONIOUS
SOCIETY' TO
`HARMONIOUS WORLD'
6. Given the nature of consultative Leninism
the primary focus of the Communist Party leadership is domestic.
At the top of its political agenda are the mutually reinforcing
requirements to maintain the Party's political dominance, social
and political stability, order and sustained rapid growth. The
shift of focus from Jiang Zemin's concept of the `Three Represents'
to Hu Jintao's `harmonious society' marks the putting of greater
emphasis on the Party maintaining political, social and economic
stability, rather than on the Party broadening its `representativeness
to include the advanced social productive forces, advanced culture,
and the interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese
people'.
7. This focus on stability and order domestically
also implies a general policy of keeping a low profile internationally.
Hence, the adoption of a policy of promoting China's peaceful
rise, which was later revised to make it sound even less confrontational
by renaming it a policy to promote China's peaceful development.
The subsequent adoption of the language of promoting a harmonious
world marks a further move to make China appear even less threatening
to the rest of the world as it rises. Despite the change in presentation,
China's foreign policy remains devoted first and foremost to promote
its `peaceful' rise.
8. In the short to medium term the Chinese government's
commitment to rising peacefully is real, notwithstanding sustained
double digit annual increase in defence spending. This is because
the Chinese government prefers to avoid provoking reactions from
other great powers, particularly the USA, that may pre-empt China's
rise. A peaceful environment in East Asia and resisting international
entanglement are also regarded as essential to sustain rapid growth
domestically.
9. But the Chinese government's commitment needs
to be set against a wider context. This commitment says nothing
about longer-term intentions. The really weighty question is what
will the Chinese government do when it considers China has finally
`risen' or risen sufficiently for it to assert or re-assert China's
`rightful place' in the world. What is China's `rightful place'
in the context of the early 21st century?
10. Also important in this connexion is the
rise of nationalism. Even though the Communist Party and in particular
its propaganda machine has been primarily responsible in promoting
and shaping it, being emotionally driven, the manifestation of
nationalism does not always subject itself to the effective control
of the Party. The judgement of whether and when China has risen
sufficiently to get more assertive over any dispute is open to
debate within China. A major outburst of nationalism over an unexpected
incident, such as over the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
by US aircraft during the Kosovo War or the collision of a Chinese
fighter jet and an American navy EP3 aircraft over Hainan, can
seriously constrain the hands of the Chinese government. Tibet,
Taiwan and relations with Japan are, for examples, other major
issues that can provoke strong nationalist sentiments in China.
11. When nationalism raises its head vehemently,
the consultative Leninist regime is likely to accommodate the
nationalist sentiments and at times tactically put aside its peaceful
rise policy. The government's commitment to the peacefully rising
policy should therefore not be seen as sufficient to pre-empt
it from tactically taking assertive stances on specific matters.
The harassment of USNS Impeccable by five Chinese ships 75 miles
off Hainan Island in March 2009 is such an example. Orchestrating
such an incident shortly before Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi was
scheduled to meet with President Barack Obama in the Whitehouse,
suggests the Chinese government calculated that the Obama Administration
would not allow this incident to put the wider US-China relationship
in jeopardy.
12. The implication is that while the Chinese
government is determined to reassure the world that its rise is
peaceful it will not desist from asserting itself in the international
community when it sees fit. What the Chinese government insists
on is to hold the initiative in its own hands.
13. How China will conduct itself when its government
finally considers that it has `risen' remains unclear. Indeed,
the conditions under which the Chinese government will do so have
not been explained. Since China sees itself as a pre-modern superpower
prior to the Celestial Empire being humbled (or, in Chinese government
approved narrative `humiliated') by British gunboats in the 1840s,
it is reasonable to assume that its leadership will be satisfied
when China is embraced as the pre-eminent power again. Whether
the Chinese leadership at that time will be willing to share this
pre-eminence with another power (notably the USA) cannot be ascertained
with any degree of certainty—not least because we do not
know if and when this will materialize and who will be the top
leaders in China at the time.
ENGAGEMENT
14. The uncertainty above provides a particularly
strong case for the EU (and the rest of the world) to adopt a
policy of engagement with China. The rise of China needs not necessarily
lead to a confrontation between it and the USA or, for that matter,
the EU. Much will depend on how the rise of China is handled by
China and by the rest of the international community.
15. In working out the best way to engage China,
the EU should not lose sight of the reality that China itself
has its own policy of engaging the EU, in order to direct the
EU to adopt policies that the Chinese government sees as positive
and appropriate. Specifically, China's engagement of the EU is
focused on getting the EU to support a multi-polar international
order (against US uni-polar dominance), co-operate with China
in economic and technological developments, and endorse China's
efforts to rise peacefully.
16. Engagement is merely an instrument. So is
confrontation or taking a robust stance. None is inherently superior
to the other. They should be used adroitly to support one's diplomacy.
But diplomacy requires one to adopt a language of engagement and
downplay the applicability of the other companion instruments
in order to advance one's foreign policy objectives effectively.
17. The `rightful place' for China should not
be seen as a static concept that requires a restoration of China's
pre-eminence within the world it could reach—a position
China enjoyed prior to the arrival of the British Empire in East
Asia. In the context of the early 21st century there is no greater
status any power can enjoy than being a veto holding permanent
member of the UN Security Council, and an economic and military
power whose views are, in general terms, taken very seriously
by the rest of the international community. China already enjoys
such a position. So does the USA.
18. The EU should engage China in such a way
that ensures the Chinese accept that it has already secured its
rightful place in the world, and the so called `century of humiliation'
had already been relegated to the dustbin of history for several
generations. China sits prominently at the high table in the international
community and there is no higher podium that any power can aspire
to place itself.
19. China is a rising major military power and
its capabilities will increase. The reality is that the outside
world cannot put a stop to this development. It is more constructive
to think about how to manage this and turn this into a positive
force than try to pre-empt it, as the latter will be counter-productive.
20. A rise of Chinese military power should
cause concern if it is being used or groomed for adventures beyond
its borders. In terms of enhancing its national security or integrity,
China has so far focused primarily on Taiwan. Given the Communist
Party's adherence to a strategic concept known as `the united
front' the Chinese military will stay focused primarily on Taiwan
in the foreseeable future. Until the Taiwan issue is resolved
to China's satisfaction, its strategic doctrine requires it not
to seek a major confrontation elsewhere.
21. The EU should do all it can to help tension
across the Taiwan Strait to be eased. The EU has an interest in
Taiwan having sufficient means to defend itself so that it can
preserve democracy there and decide on its own future in accordance
with the democratically expressed collective will of its people.
The EU also has an interest in ensuring that no government in
Taipei will adopt any policy that will make it impossible for
the Chinese leadership to resist hard-line domestic political
pressure to use force against Taiwan.
22. More generally China should be encouraged
and supported to play a positive role in international affairs,
including the deployment of its armed forces for peaceful or constructive
international missions.
23. China already leads the permanent members
of the Security Council in the number of soldiers it deploys on
peace keeping missions. This should be applauded and supported.
Indeed, China should be encouraged to send the bulk of peacekeeping
force required and take over the UN peace keeping operation in
Darfur. There are indeed many advantages for China to gain in
such a large scale deployment over a very long distance but such
a deployment for peace keeping purposes should not cause alarm.
On the contrary the more the Chinese military establishment is
engaged in peace keeping operations, the more it will think of
operational needs that are not geared purely to fighting and winning
wars.
REALPOLITIK VS
SUPPORTING RIGHTS
24. As the EU engages China it must adhere to
its fundamental values in upholding human rights. However, this
should not imply the EU needs to interfere with China's domestic
affairs. China's own Constitution outlines clearly the rights
to which its citizens are entitled. The EU should work with the
Chinese government, Chinese NGOs and international NGOs to ensure
such constitutional provisions for rights are enforced in China,
on the understanding that China, for its part, is free to monitor
and comment either on its own or in conjunction with INGOs on
human rights protection in the EU in accordance with EU laws.
25. The EU should of course not incite or encourage
Chinese citizens to rise up against the Chinese government, but
it must give moral support to Chinese citizens who seek to exercise
their constitutional rights. This should include Chinese citizens
of all nationalities or ethnic background. For those Chinese citizens
who become prosecuted as a result of asserting their constitutional
rights, the EU should offer asylum to them if necessary.
26. In the cases of Hong Kong and Macau the
two former colonies of two EU member states which are now Special
Administrative Regions (SARs) of the PRC, the EU should take an
active benevolent interest in the implementation of the agreements
between the UK and China over the former and between Portugal
and China over the latter. In light of Chinese sensitivities over
the colonial legacy in the two SARs, it is particularly important
that the EU should take a common approach towards them, in the
protection of human rights and in monitoring the implementation
of the basic laws in these two regions.
27. As to Taiwan the EU should support the consolidation
of democracy there. While the EU should not get involved in China's
dispute with Taiwan over the sovereignty of Taiwan itself, the
EU should insist that whatever solution to be reached must ensure
that the rights of the people of Taiwan and its democratic system
are respected and protected. The right of the people of Taiwan,
who have never been subjected to the jurisdiction of the PRC,
to determine their own future should be upheld as a basic principle,
though the EU should also insist that its support for this principle
does not imply support for the Taiwanese government to take any
measure that will trigger a war across the Taiwan Strait. The
maintenance of peace and security across the Taiwan Strait and
the upholding of democracy and human rights in Taiwan do not need
to be mutually exclusive and it is in the EU's interest to ensure
this remains the case.
CONCLUSIONS
28. Consultative Leninism will not allow China
to embrace liberal democracy or what it represents. Under consultative
Leninism China will not subscribe to the democratic and liberal
values that underpin the EU. While China under the Communist Party
will not be a soul mate of the EU, it should be treated as an
equal partner with shared interest in maintaining and improving
the existing international system.
29. Whether the Communist Party leadership may have
longer term ambitions that are less then benign or not, EU policy
makers should recognize the reality that treating China or any
country as an enemy will make sure it will become one. The more
China is engaged as a full and equal partner in international
affairs, the lesser later generations of Chinese will subscribe
to the nationalistic narrative that portrays China as having been
unfairly treated by the Western world. While this will not remove
or significantly undermine nationalism as the ideology of China
under consultative Leninism, any other means to counter the rise
of Chinese nationalism is likely to be counter-productive.
30. In engaging China the most important principle
is to treat China like any other great power. While it must not
be made to feel discriminated against it must not be accorded
any special advantage either. The only way to persuade a rising
great power to behave as a responsible stakeholder is to treat
it like one. Any rising power that is allowed to claim that it
is special and require others to accord it special treatment will
continue to demand such a privilege, particularly when it deems
itself to have risen sufficiently to assert itself.
17 March 2009
53 A full exposition of the concept of consultative
Leninism is available in Steve Tsang, `Consultative Leninism:
China's New Political Framework', Journal of Contemporary China,
Vol 18, No 62, 2009, to be published later this year. Back
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