Memorandum by Dr Gudrun Wacker, Senior
Fellow, German Institute for International & Security Affairs,
Berlin
MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS
How is the EU—and its Member States—perceived
by China: what are the values, interests, and ambitions held by
China in terms of its European strategy? What priority does China
place on its relations with Europe; and how is this level of priority
shaped, not by what Europe does, but by the positions adopted
by others?
The EU (in contrast to member states) was taken
seriously as an international actor by China for the first time
when negotiations on WTO entry started. In the years after China's
entry into the WTO in 2001, China might have had the expectation
that the EU would also become a relevant international actor politically
and might even become a counterweight to the United States (EU
expansion, Constitutional Treaty, declared "strategic partnership"
with China), but disillusionment set in after 2004-05 (failure
of Constitutional Treaty, identity crisis of the EU). The EU's
inability to deliver on issues like lifting the arms embargo against
China was interpreted in China as caving in to US pressure. The
expectation that the EU would become a partner for China in building
a "multi-polar" world was not met.
The EU has become the biggest trading partner of
China after the expansion and also due to the decline of the US-$
vis-à-vis the Euro, so Europe is an important market.
The European Union is also important for China as a source of
investment and of modern technology (where US exports to China
are more restricted).
In sum, Europe is a central economic partner
for China, but politically the EU is not seen as a unified
actor and therefore the focus here is still on bilateral relations
with individual member states, especially the "big three"
Germany, France and UK. China's strategy here is to "divide
and conquer" (or in Chinese: "use the barbarians to
control the barbarians"), ie to play the EU member states
against each other (example: meetings with the Dalai Lama). Of
course, this strategy only works because the member states allow
it to work. Even in economic terms, member states of the EU compete
with each other for business contracts in China.
A ranking in (political) external relations from
the Chinese perspective would certainly give highest priority
to the United States (not least due to the US position in the
Asia-Pacific region), followed by Japan (economically and politically)
and Russia (especially on the global level—UN Security Council),
then ranking fourth, the EU including its three biggest member
states. Sino-Russian relations have been dependent on the state
of Sino-US relations (and US-Russia relations). The priority given
to the EU also depends to a certain degree on the state of Sino-US
relations. The EU could be further marginalized, if the US upgrades
her relations with China under the new US administration ("G-2",
Strategic and Economic Dialogues).[54]
The ranking above could change as a result of the global financial
and economic crisis, depending on what power shifts the crisis
will bring about. But it is not likely that this would lead to
a higher position for the EU.
NATURE OF
THE RELATIONSHIP
What is the current nature of EU-China relations
in the broader context of political, trade, economic, environmental,
demographic-migratory and social-cultural terms? What should be
the primary objectives of EU policy towards China; and notably
how do Europe's interests in closer interactions with China on
trade, investment, and technology relate to its foreign and security
strategy?
Primary objectives of the EU policy towards
China should be to engage China on global challenges like climate
change, energy security, proliferation, trans-border security
issues like pandemics etc. For all these global issues, China
already is part of the problem, and it is in the EU's interest
that it also becomes part of the solution. Europe should engage
China on all these issues to come to rules-based solutions. Economically
the EU should focus on a level playing field (market access, IPR,
direct and indirect subsidies etc.) with China. But the level
playing field works both ways, so European member states should,
for example, not be afraid of Chinese investment in Europe. If
the EU is applying double standards, it loses credibility and
legitimacy.
THE INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK
What is the current state of the institutional
framework for the conduct of EU-China relations? How well do the
summits, dialogue mechanisms, technical agreements and programmes
meet their aims? What progress is being made in the negotiations
for a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and what is its potential
to provide an effective framework for an increasingly complex
relationship?
There is no lack of institutionalized dialogue
mechanisms (among them more than 20 "sectoral dialogues")
between EU and China and broad technical co-operation. As far
as I am informed, the EU has commissioned an assessment of these
dialogues a few years ago, but the results were not published.
Cooperation/assistance projects funded by the EU were also evaluated,
the results can be found on the website of the OECD (!).[55]
The added value of holding so many "bureaucratized"
dialogues is far from clear (maybe some of these formats should
be taken to a higher political level, others should be dropped
altogether).
The newly introduced "High Level Economic and
Trade Mechanism" (modelled after the US Strategic Economic
Dialogue) could be helpful because it brings different government
institutions on both sides together, but it also reflects difficulties
that stem from the peculiar setting of the EU: Who, for example
can negotiate currency issues and the exchange rate Euro-Renminbi,
if not all member states of the EU are members of the Euro-zone?
The annual summit meetings are of course important
to build trust in the long-term orientation or the partnership.
However, the setting (Troika) is difficult to handle (this is
not China-specific, of course): Each Presidency wants to introduce
something special and new into the EU-China partnership, but then
there might not always be substantial follow-up, so that many
issues remain nice words in the Joint Statements but no more.
The EU should be less ambitious in bringing more/new topics in,
but should be more consistent in following up and implementation.
As for the negotiations on the new PCA, only
the Commission can say where they really stand at present. The
mandate of the Commission (decided by the Council) for the negotiations
has not been published. But China will have problems to agree
to some of the "standard clauses" (eg on human rights).
Moreover China will insist on clauses on Taiwan, and maybe now
also Tibet. This will (or should) pose a problem for the EU.
The more fundamental question is: Do we really
need such an agreement? What is the added value (compared to the
agreements already in existence)? But now that the train has left
the station, nobody will question the necessity or feasibility
anymore. Again, an assessment of the implications of the PCA (based
on PCAs with other countries) has been produced for the Commission,
but not published (as far as I know).
COHERENCE OF
THE EU'S
POLICY
What is the perspective of different EU Member
States in relations with China; and how do these different perspectives
shape the conduct of European foreign and security policy? To
what extent have the Commission, the Council and the Member States
been prepared to conduct a common strategy? How close is the European
Union to designing a strategy that will ensure that China regards
convergence or compliance with EU objectives as a significant
priority?
It is hard to detect the willingness of Commission,
Council and Member States to really subscribe to a common strategy
with respect to China, even on paper, not to mention in implementation.
Good examples were the two Commission papers on economic and on
political relations with China published in 2006 and the
"Council Conclusions" on these two documents: The Council
conclusions in essence modified substantially almost everything
in the Commission papers (for example on the arms embargo). The
Member States are either not willing or not able to formulate
their interests and priorities with respect to China. Instead,
national reflexes prevail.
A small step forward were the Guidelines on East
Asian Security that were initiated by the UK in 2005 and
finally published in December 2007,[56]
since they provide a frame of reference for statements of the
Council or the respective Presidency. So the EU can react faster
on events and developments in East Asia.
FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY
How successful has the EU been in persuading China
to increase the transparency of its defence objectives and military
expenditure? What is the state of play regarding exports of arms
made in the EU to China? How effective is the newly adopted Council
Common Position to replace the Code of Conduct on arms exports
in limiting arms exports to China? Should the EU continue to pursue
its stated ambition of lifting the arms embargo on China imposed
in 1989? What is the EU's policy on cross-strait relations between
China and Taiwan, and how successful has the EU been in encouraging
peaceful dialogue and confidence-building between the two sides?
One should not overestimate the ability of the
EU (or any other external actors) to influence China on anything
that concerns China's perceived core national interests. As for
transparency on defence objectives and military expenditure, the
progress that China has made (by, for example, publishing bi-annual
White Papers on Defence), other external actors (US, but also
neighbouring states, especially ASEAN) also play a role. Nevertheless,
the EU (and MS) should be consistent in trying to convince China
that more transparency is in her own interest.
Since the Common Position on the Code of Conduct
on arms transfers was only decided in December 2008, it is too
early to see what the practical impact on arms exports will be.
Even with the Common Position, decisions ultimately rest with
the national governments which then report to the EU. One problem
could be that defence companies in countries that have stricter
laws on arms exports will complain that they are disadvantaged
by their national laws. If this would then lead to a softening
of national legislation, it could have negative implications.
In addition to that, the so-called Tool Box for post-embargo countries
does not seem to be part of the Common Position. This could either
mean that there is resistance from individual member states against
the provisions of the Tool Box or it could mean that since no
member states presently plans to bring up lifting the arms embargo
against China, there was no need to deal with the Tool Box, either.
The EU declared at its summit in 2005 that it
will work towards lifting the arms embargo. Adopting the Common
Position was one necessary step. However, the lifting might have
real implications, but it sure has (very strong) symbolical dimensions.
The US, Japan and Taiwan are unlikely to be convinced that the
Common Position is enough to restrict arms exports from European
countries to China, so they will certainly protest against any
attempt to bring the embargo up again, no matter what it would
mean in reality to lift an embargo (which has never been legally
binding). From China's perspective, the embargo is an obstacle
in the partnership with the EU.
The EU member states should sit down and discuss
under what conditions they would be willing to lift the arms embargo
(some conditions were mentioned in the Commission paper 2006,
but this passage was practically neutralized by the Council's
Conclusions). If such conditions can be agreed on, the EU should
stick to them. The wavering and constant mind changes only add
to the impression on the Chinese side that the EU is not to be
taken seriously.
How does the foreign and defence policy of the
United States impact on EU-China relations? To what extent and
with what consequences will the EU-China relationship be determined
by the course of the transatlantic relationship? What is divergent
and convergent about US and European approaches to China? How
do the EU's other partners, notably Japan, India and Russia, view
the development of EU-China relations?
Part of this question has been addressed above.
The major difference between the US and European approaches to
China derive from the fact that the US has strategic interests
in the Asia-Pacific region, a strong military presence, alliances
and commitments (like the Taiwan Relations Act), and the EU (or
its member states) has none of that. EU-China relations are still
mainly driven by economic and not strategic interests. The US
is taking China's perceived rise and the ongoing global power
shift more seriously than the EU. The US is not only a trans-Atlantic
power, but also a trans-Pacific one, while the EU plays no role
as a military power in the Asia-Pacific.
The US therefore doesn't see Europe as a relevant
actor in East Asia. The only time that the US became interested
in Europe's activities in Asia was when the EU made plans to lift
the arms embargo against China, because this was seen as a move
against US interests. Beyond this issue, it is hard for the EU
to attract sustained interest of the US in a dialogue on China
and/or East Asia.
10 April 2009
54 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary:
"Statement on Bilateral Meeting With President Hu of China",
1 April 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-On-Bilateral-Meeting-With-President-Hu-Of-China/. Back
55
European Commission, Evaluation of the European Commission's Co-operation
and Partnership with the People's Republic of China. Country Level
Evaluation. Final Synthesis Report, April 2007, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/51/37274405.pdf
(last access 10 April 2009). Back
56
"Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East
Asia", http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/97842.pdf
(last access 10 April 2009). Back
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