some default text...
European Defence Capabilities: lessons from the past, signposts for the future - European Union Committee Contents


Chapter 3: the state of play

36.  We asked our witnesses how they thought the CSDP had developed since 1999 and found a mixed picture on defence budgets, capability development, the deployment of missions and operations, and the establishment of multilateral Battlegroups.

Capabilities, deployments and budgets

37.  We heard concerns about the numbers of troops that were in fact able to be deployed, compared with the number theoretically available, and that there was overcapacity in equipment. General Syrén told us that Europe had some 1.7 million people in uniform of which only around 4%—66,000—were deployed. He thought that from 2014, when most of the troops in Afghanistan had been withdrawn, only half that number might be deployed, if the political will existed.[36] He also believed that overcapacity was a problem: the EU had, for example 27 headquarters with different logistical concepts, around 20 military colleges, and four types of combat aircraft (the Joint Strike Fighter, Eurofighter, Rafale and Gripen) under development by EU Members.[37]

38.  Nick Witney, a defence expert and former head of the EDA, echoed these sentiments, citing slightly different figures, and painted a gloomy picture of EU Member State capabilities and defence expenditure. He said that the record of Member States in meeting their own agreed capability targets had been "consistently dismal". Europe was responsible for around one third of global defence expenditure outside the US and had 1.6 million military personnel, far in excess of the US or Russia[38]. Member States did not lack resources, but remained "determined to spend their national defence budgets in accordance with national priorities rather than in the collective interest." Resources were wasted on non-deployable forces, "almost three quarters of the whole in 2009", obsolescent equipment and duplication. Paying for such high numbers of personnel came at the expense of research and technology spending. Europe therefore lacked the capabilities to participate in military action and had become reliant on the US to an "overwhelming" degree.[39]

BOX 2

Deployability

EU national troops are said to be "not deployable" when they are unsuited for action in EU missions. This could be for several reasons:

- they may be conscripts (though this number is decreasing in EU countries). Unlike professionals who enlist for several years, conscripts usually receive only a few months training, which is not enough to enable them to take part in risky expeditionary operations far from home;

- volunteers may lack the (mostly English) language skills necessary for participation in operational missions, whether under EU or NATO command;

- equipment may not have been sufficiently upgraded to take part in operations away from EU territory, which is where all recent military missions have taken place. For example, EU countries have many attack and transport helicopters but too few were suitable to withstand Afghanistan's environmental and man-made risks such as sand and small arms fire;

- increased specialisation in discrete tasks, either by choice or by default, (when certain categories of weapons are eliminated to save money). This results in countries lacking entire categories of weapons. For example, only a few NATO countries have the supersonic aircraft, precision munitions and pilots trained in air-to-ground attacks, which were required for the war in Libya. Other countries could not deploy there as they lacked the equipment, either because they never had it, or they had abandoned it.

39.  Dr Bastian Giegerich, Bundeswehr Institute for Social Sciences and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), quoting statistics from the EDA and IISS, said that land forces available for sustainable deployments by EU Member States had decreased from 125,000 in 2008 to 106,000 in 2010. Active duty forces deployed on crisis management operations by EU Member States had fallen from 3.7% (68,000 troops) in 2006 to 2.9% (49,000) in 2011. He said that the number deployed on operations was decreasing faster than the total number of active service personnel, not because demand for military crisis operations was lessening, but for supply-side reasons: intervention fatigue; perception that the threat was indirect; and structural underfunding of the armed forces, magnified by the economic crisis, which placed long-term modernisation under strain.[40]

40.  Nick Pickard, Head of Security Policy Department, FCO, commented that, in an effort to ensure that defence spending was a sufficiently high priority in some Member States, the UK had set an example with its own defence spending and with cooperative models, such as the UK-France treaties. It had tried to create political incentives for effective defence spending in capabilities which had been identified collectively as necessary; too much was still being spent on unnecessary capabilities such as large heavy armoured vehicles.[41] Professor Menon also thought that, even after the current cuts, European defence spending would be sufficient if used in the right way. The problems were how the money was spent, and how willing States were to deploy their troops; rationalisation was the issue, not increased defence spending. A wide variation existed among Member States: CSDP had led to some countries, such as Sweden and Poland, increasing their defence spending. In the domestic political debate, Sweden's Ministry of Defence had used the CSDP and the need to show the Swedes as good Europeans and to work with the Europeans as a "legitimising badge" to revolutionise Swedish defence policy. By contrast, the CSDP had had no effect on capability development in Spain and Italy.[42]

Source: European Defence Agency, Defence Data: EDA participating Member States in 2010, Brussels; 07/03/2012, Maria Leonor Pires, Statistics Officer.

Source: European Defence Agency, Defence Data: EDA participating Member States in 2010, Brussels; 07/03/2012, Maria Leonor Pires, Statistics Officer.

41.  Sir Peter Ricketts thought that there was a risk that countries which were able and willing to step up would bear a disproportionate share of the defence burden. These tended to be the UK and France and some smaller countries which had recently been willing to perform front line tasks in Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya.[43] Professor Chalmers, did not think that the burden of operations outside Europe would increasingly fall on the UK and France, but that they would continue to be the core of and provide the bulk of European contributions to such operations. He had been struck by the fact that countries, such as Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia and Portugal, had contributed to operations in Afghanistan where they had no historic connections.[44]

42.  Our witnesses cited different reasons for the lack of commitment to defence capabilities. The Minister cited lack of political will.[45] Edgar Buckley attributed it to the priority given to social over defence spending, due to lack of perception of immediate threat; and different views amongst Member States about the importance of developing EU defence institutions, including the UK's view of the restricted role of the EDA and opposition to an EU Operational Headquarters (see Chapters 4 and 5). The Libya campaign had undermined confidence in EU institutions and European political solidarity, and leading EU military powers did not believe major crises could be tackled through EU mechanisms.[46] Nick Witney believed that defence reform was a problem. Defence establishments were risk-averse; defence expenditure was committed far ahead; and defence was a highly complex business. Job protection in marginal constituencies, especially when money was tight, also determined wasteful defence expenditure.[47]

43.  The key challenge for European capability is not just the level of defence expenditure, but its effectiveness. It is particularly important to increase the proportion of those in uniform who can be deployed.

The UK's position

44.  Government witnesses stressed that NATO was the cornerstone of defence for the UK, and for Europe. The Minister said that the 2% of GDP as the minimum NATO requirement had been a key consideration as the Government approached the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). He thought that the CSDP could play a complementary role through its unique set of stabilisation tools and in promoting further capability development. He saw its purpose as being "to act where NATO cannot act." However, many Member States pursued policies with which the UK could not agree, particularly in institutional debates.[48] Sir Peter Ricketts reiterated that the UK had ensured in the spending round that there were adequate resources for defence and wider security. He believed that it was hard to foresee an increase in defence spending by EU Member States given the current economic problems. [49]

45.  We heard high praise from Ambassador Nicholas Burns for the UK's role, and a deal of criticism from others, reflecting their different perspectives. Ambassador Burns told us that the US relied on the strength of the UK and hoped that its defence cuts would allow the UK to retain its capacity for expeditionary warfare and peacekeeping.[50]

46.  Edgar Buckley thought it had been obvious since the early 1990s that the US focus would turn from Europe, but the UK had opposed efforts to construct capable CSDP institutions.[51] Nick Witney was critical of the UK's failure to give leadership in Europe on defence, and its commitment to European defence efforts had diminished. UK defence ministers had "self-righteously stood alone" in blocking moves towards greater European cooperation, for example on increasing the EDA budget or setting up an EU operational headquarters. It had lost the goodwill created with the EU Member States from the former Soviet bloc which the UK had helped to prepare for NATO membership in the period after St Malo. A readiness to join in would have "reaped disproportionate benefits" in helping other Europeans to improve their defence capabilities, benefiting NATO as well as the EU.[52] Dr Bastian Giegerich noted that neither NATO nor CSDP had seemed to play much of a role in the run up to the UK's 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.[53]

The UK-French treaties

47.  The UK and France are the two major European military players. These two countries share a global approach, a fulfilled commitment to NATO's defence budget targets and a willingness to deploy forces. In November 2010 they signed a Defence Cooperation Treaty; a subordinate treaty relating to a joint nuclear facility; a letter of intent signed by Defence Ministers; and a package of joint defence initiatives. This co-operation was intended to improve collective defence capability through UK and French forces working more closely together, contributing to more capable and effective forces, and ultimately improving the collective capability of NATO and European defence.[54]

48.  The Minister told us that the treaties were a good example of coordination, which should improve the capability and effectiveness of UK and French forces, benefiting both NATO and the EU, and which he hoped European partners would imitate.[55] Sir Peter Ricketts reminded us that one of the treaties, set to last for 50 years, dealt with sharing sensitive military nuclear capabilities.[56] Alison Stevenson, Head of NATO and Europe Policy Department, MOD, told us that the reason the UK had formed the partnership with France was because "it is a similarly capable nation with high spending on defence … prepared to deploy its forces."[57] Edgar Buckley thought that UK-French cooperation was unlikely to lead to higher military capabilities, given the severe resource squeeze in both countries, but it would "assist in mitigating the worst effects of military decline which would otherwise take place".[58]

49.  There were differing views on whether the treaties would be seen as a model. Sir Peter Ricketts did view them as a model for other nations, but noted that cooperation should not be exclusive, leaving other EU nations feeling that they could not take part.[59] Dr Bastian Giegerich thought that the agreement was unlikely to serve as a model for wider multinational cooperation, though it might spark similar "minilateral" efforts among others.[60]

50.  We also found a variety of opinions on the reaction to the treaties by other EU Member States. The Minister thought that they had taken continental partners by surprise, and "put a few noses out of joint, in particular the Italians and Germans."[61] However, Dr Christian Moelling, of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), told us that the UK-French agreement was not perceived by the Germans as a pressing issue and they did not feel they had to engage in it.[62] Sir Peter Ricketts also told us that he was not aware that the Germans had been offended by the treaties, at least at government level. The UK would welcome cooperation by the Germans, Italians, Spaniards or others.[63] Alison Stevenson, MOD, told us that the UK was also working with Germany through a "structured dialogue" on possible future collaboration.[64] Nick Pickard, FCO, added that the UK had made clear to the Germans that the purpose of any collaboration was to achieve practical, effective results, not to collaborate for purely political reasons.[65] The UK had made the same points to the Italians, with whom the UK had strong defence industrial links.[66] Etienne de Durand thought that the UK-French agreement was currently "the only important game in town." If this cooperation succeeded, Germany would follow.[67] Sir Brian Burridge, Finmeccanica UK, thought that the treaties could look to others like a "closed shop," which could be detrimental.[68]

51.  Professor Menon attributed different motives to the two sides: Dr Fox, the British Defence Secretary at the time of the signature, had made clear the UK's preference for the bilateral treaties over doing business through Brussels. On the other hand, policymakers in Paris would say that the treaties were a means of drawing the British into the CSDP.[69] Nick Witney thought that some Europeans concluded that the UK had wanted to hobble wider European cooperation by taking France out of the equation. There had been little encouragement that Franco-British bilateral cooperation would be opened to third parties.[70] Edgar Buckley also thought that the UK-French treaty was regarded with suspicion by other leading Member States, such as Germany and Italy, which had recently signed a letter of intent, fearing that British-French cooperation could disadvantage their companies.[71] Dr Bastian Giegerich thought that full implementation of the UK-French treaties would represent "a significant step towards more effective defence cooperation", but that there was widespread scepticism amongst other Member States about the ability of the UK and France to achieve this.[72]

52.  Our American witnesses, Ambassador Burns, Dr Dana Allin, International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Xenia Dormandy, Chatham House, welcomed the treaties. For Ambassador Burns, the UK and France retained military forces that were among the strongest in the world, with the capacity to deploy, act and sustain their forces globally and who were critical to UN peacekeeping, fighting wars and deterrence.[73] This contrasted with the lack of strength in Italy, Spain and Germany from a military perspective.[74] From the NATO point of view, Major General Heinrich Brauss, Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Policy and Planning, considered the new contract between the UK and France as a role model for multilateral cooperation between small groups of nations with a view to developing and sustaining key capabilities, particularly with a view to the new, emerging challenges, such as cyber defence.[75] At a practical level, Madame Arnould, EDA Chief Executive, particularly approved of the example of the work taken up by the British and French from the EDA on maritime mine countermeasures.[76]

53.  We welcome the UK-French defence treaties and cooperation which provide lessons for how the sharing of sovereignty can be successfully managed. Other similar combinations of nations could emerge which could act as a core for the development of effective European defence.

54.  The UK and France lead Europe in defence in terms of range of capability, budgets, equipment, ability to deploy, and scale. If other EU or NATO states do not contribute more to European defence the UK and France will bear an increasingly large and disproportionate burden within Europe. We believe the current division of responsibility is unsustainable and, if uncorrected, could lead to growing friction between Member States.

The German position

55.  We asked about the German position on European defence, which witnesses uniformly found disappointing. Dr Moelling told us that Germany spent only 1.5% of GDP on defence.[77] Ambassador Burns was particularly critical, arguing that Germany should make a greater commitment to collective defence and modernisation of its own military forces. In Afghanistan, Germany had initially refused to deploy its troops to combat areas and use them for combat purposes, which had been a "bitter disappointment" for US commanders and civilians.[78] He thought Germany should be able to field an army, air force, and navy that could stand separately but, because of weak defence budgets and a lack of commitment from its political leaders to a modern defence establishment, it had become a drag on NATO.[79] Other American witnesses expressed similar frustrations over the German position, especially its role in Afghanistan and on its stance over Libya, although Germany had been helpful in "backfilling" during the Libyan campaign, keeping US bases functional.[80] Etienne de Durand also commented on the problem of German political will, which affected Germany's ability to deploy its troops without caveats. The political culture was different and he did not think Germany would move quickly in the direction of collective defence.[81]

56.  Dr Moelling explained the German perspective. In terms of territorial defence, Germany would always be with its allies, but it might not always be if the question was one of protecting strategic interests around the globe using military force. To convince German public opinion of the need for military action, it would always be necessary to make a good case. The German armed forces were fully-fledged militarily and had demonstrated their ability to fight in all operations in Afghanistan. However, the political perspective was different. An armed forces reform was underway whose outcome was difficult to determine, especially as elections were due in 2013. Overall, the budget level was likely to remain the same. He posed the question: if Germany spent 2% of its GDP, or €50 billion, on defence, would others feel threatened? Dr Moelling thought that it was not possible to tell if the German position over Libya was likely to be repeated in future and he recommended engaging with Germany in a constructive manner and explaining that their worldwide economic interests did not stand alone but would inevitably be accompanied by security interests.[82]

57.  Germany is Europe's economic powerhouse. But in the military area, it does not fulfil its potential despite a large defence budget in absolute terms. It is a precondition that Germany becomes a more active participant in European defence matters, able to engage on similar terms to the UK and France, if the EU is to have an effective security and defence policy. NATO would benefit equally.

Missions and operations

58.  The majority of the EU's missions so far have been civilian ones, or a combination of civilian and military. Of the current 13 missions and operations, only 3 are military (see Box below). Nick Pickard described two types of EU military contribution: the case where a largely civilian operation required military logistic support or protection in order to operate effectively or sustain itself and where the EU's civilian and military tools were brought together. The other was a purely military operation where the US or NATO did not want to engage[83] (see paras 76 to 78 below.) General Syrén rated the EU's military missions as a success and believed that in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the EU had prevented genocide. In Somalia, as a result of the EU's current training mission, 1,800 trainers or soldiers were making a difference to the situation in Mogadishu. For an operation to be successful, he said it should be in place quickly, have a clear aim, end date and handover.[84] Pierre Vimont added that in an operation with a military dimension, those operating on the ground should be given operational flexibility.[85]

BOX 3

EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations[86]

Current missions and operations (3 military, 10 civilian):

Military

- EUFOR Althea, Bosnia-Herzegovina (since December 2004)

- EUNAVFOR Naval Force Atalanta, anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia (since December 2008)

- EUTM Training Mission Somalia, based in Uganda (since April 2010)

Civilian

- EUPM (Police Mission) Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 2003)

- EUSEC (Security Sector Reform Mission) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), (since June 2005)

- EUJUST LEX (Justice Sector Mission) Iraq (since July 2005)

- EUBAM (Border Assistance Mission) Ukraine/Moldova (since November 2005)

- EUBAM RAFAH (Border Assistance Mission) Occupied Palestinian territories (since November 2005)

- EUPOL COPPS (Police Mission) Occupied Palestinian territories (since January 2006)

- EUPOL (Police Mission) Afghanistan (since June 2007)

- EUPOL (Police Mission) DRC (since July 2007)

- EULEX (Rule of Law Mission) Kosovo (since February 2008)

- EUMM (Monitoring Mission) Georgia (since October 2008)

Past EU Missions and Operations:

Military

- Operation Concordia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (2003)

- Artemis, DRC (2003)

- EUFOR, DRC (2006)

- EUFOR Chad (2008-09)

Civilian

- EUPOL PROXIMA (Police Mission) FYROM (2004-05)

- EUJUST THEMIS (Rule of Law Mission) Georgia (2004-05)

- EU AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission) Indonesia (2005-06)

- EU support for AMIS (African Union Mission to Sudan, Darfur) (2005-06)

- EUPOL (Police Mission) Kinshasa DRC (2005-07)

- EUPAT (Police Advisory Team) FYROM (2006)

- EUSSR (Security Sector Reform Mission) Guinea Bissau (2008-10)

59.  Walter Stevens, Director, CMPD, told us that what determined whether a mission was military or civilian was the nature of the activity. A military mission would mostly involve ships or "boots on the ground." Civilian missions were funded from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, while military missions were funded by the contributing Member States, or by the 2004 Athena mechanism which provided reimbursement of certain costs (see Box 4 below). The successful EUSEC mission in the DRC advising the Congolese authorities how to reform their army, was a civilian mission paid for from the CFSP budget, but carried out by military means: it was headed by a Portuguese general and all the members were military.[87] Robert Cooper, EEAS, commented that the use of military personnel was expensive and sometimes inappropriate, when a gendarmerie-style force, for example, would be preferable.[88] We were also told that the Germans were unhappy with missions funded from common costs as they paid disproportionately for CSDP missions which were calculated on the basis of GDP (see para 71 below).[89]

60.  Lieutenant General Ton van Osch, Director-General of the EU Military Staff, told us of other budget complications which the EU's comprehensive approach should be used to solve. The EU's action in the Horn of Africa consisted of an anti-piracy military mission at sea, training for soldiers on land and participation in regional maritime capacity building. Navies could undertake part of the maritime training, but defence budgets could not be used to buy the ships which were needed for use in training with a simulator, which would be funded from a development budget. Coordination such as this in the EU's comprehensive approach would determine the success of an EU military mission. In the same way, the EU's ability to combine agreements with regional countries to put suspected pirates on trial helped to make the naval anti-piracy operation (Atalanta) successful.[90]

61.  A recurring theme from our witnesses was the inability of Member States to meet their own ambitions or plans. Walter Stevens told us that, as crisis management concepts were developed, discussions with Member States on what they could offer, and what was important to them, revealed that "there is a huge gap between a theoretical solution of a crisis ... and what is realistically possible." The current budgetary problems for all states meant that it was increasingly difficult to find sufficient capacity for existing missions, let alone new ones.[91] Pierre Vimont said it was necessary to solve the contradiction between launching new missions which Member States seemed to want, and the reality of getting the resources for existing operations.[92] As an illustration, the Minister told us that, at the time of the September 2011 Defence Ministers' meeting, only 1,200 of the 2,200 troops had been delivered for Operation Althea (Bosnia), and Operation Atalanta (anti-piracy) was short of a ship. The EU mission in Uganda training soldiers for Somalia could not deliver a single medical officer across the EU to care for the trainers.[93] He thought that CSDP missions needed better integrated planning, with clear targets, defined benefits, outcomes and exit strategies.[94]

62.  The EU's track record of under-resourcing civilian missions must not be repeated in the military field. If the EU is to undertake military missions it must be on the basis that they will be resourced on a scale that is commensurate to the need. CSDP must be able to deliver when it is needed on a scale that is appropriate.

BOX 4

ATHENA mechanism

The Athena mechanism, established in 2004, is a permanent mechanism to administer the financing of the 'common costs' of EU operations with military or defence implications. Common costs are defined as:

- Headquarters implementation and running costs

- Incremental costs for supporting the force as a whole (infrastructure to enable the deployment to take place; EU signs and flags etc; medical services; satellite imagery)

- Incremental costs of EU use of assets belonging to NATO or another third party.

The Council can also authorise some additional costs—such as transporting troops to and from theatre, or the cost of a multinational task force headquarters—to be met through the Athena mechanism. The Council

decides on common funding for military operations undertaken by the EU in support of a third state or organisation on a case-by-case basis.

Three active EU military operations are currently funded through the Athena mechanism: EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUNAVFOR

ATALANTA to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, and the EU Training Mission in Somalia.

With the exception of Denmark (which has opted out of the CSDP on military matters), Member States contribute to Athena in proportion to the size of their economy—contributions are calculated according to a Gross National Income scale and varies from year to year. The total common cost of the operations funded by Athena for 2011 was €34.7 million, of which the UK share was €4.9 million. The equivalent figure for France was approximately €5.8m, and for Germany, approximately €7.2m.

Those costs which do not come under the definition of common costs are borne by the Member States participating in the mission, under the principle that "costs lie where they fall". It was calculated in 2006 that common costs accounted for less than 10% of the total cost of an EU military mission.

Battlegroups

63.  EU Battlegroups are a relatively new concept for pairs of battalion-sized forces (1,500 troops) with combined arms, on standby on a rotational basis and capable of being launched in an operation "within 5 days of approval by the Council in response to a crisis or to an urgent request by the UN, to undertake simultaneously two battlegroup-size operations sustainable for a maximal period of 120 days. Forces should be on the ground no later than 10 days after the decision to launch the operation"[95]. The first Battlegroups were formed at full operating capacity in 2007. They have never been deployed.

64.  Nick Pickard (FCO) told us that the Battlegroup concept was based on a 2003 EU operation in the DRC (Artemis) which had been put into place rapidly.[96] Alison Stevenson (MOD) explained that the concept was also to improve the capability of Member States. Battlegroups could be formed of troops of one nation, but should ideally come from a number of states. Two Battlegroups would always be on standby. The UK supported them as it believed that they drove activity to make Member States contribute more to CSDP and to transform their capabilities. The UK also believed in pairing a militarily capable nation with a nation striving to improve its capabilities.[97] This gave the potential for several different nations to achieve interoperability.[98]

65.  We asked what use Battlegroups served, given that they had not been deployed. Professor Menon gave a pessimistic view and believed they were sometimes "fictional". He cited as examples German unwillingness to deploy following a UN request in 2008 for assistance in Darfur, Sudan, though he acknowledged that Germany's participation in a new Battlegroup consisting of the "Weimar Triangle" countries, was a positive sign.[99] He also claimed that, despite British Government assertions to the contrary, their Battlegroup had in fact not been available, because it was composed of troops returning from Iraq and preparing to go to Afghanistan.[100] The Minister, however, denied this when we put it to him, and said that UK Battlegroups had been available to deploy in 2005, 2008 and 2010.[101] Etienne de Durand was also critical: while Battlegroups could be good for force generation and useful for some countries, they were too small to be useable, there was no political agreement to use them and they had been created to hide the failure of the Headline Goals, which had never been met.[102] Professor Menon also pointed out that the more Member States there were in a Battlegroup, the more legitimate it looked politically, but larger numbers meant greater potential difficulties in deciding on deployment.[103]

66.  We sought information on the kind of situation in which witnesses could envisage deployment of a Battlegroup. Lieutenant General van Osch told us that the EU had made preparations for a military operation (EUFOR Libya) to support an eventual UN humanitarian operation in Libya, had this been requested by the UN. The potential task of clearing, repairing and running a harbour or airport for access for aid would have been ideal for a Battlegroup. He had seen three other occasions when Battlegroups could have been used. They had not been deployed, because of political problems, and he could not comment further as the questions had arisen "within a prudent planning phase."[104] We were also told by General Syrén that the air element of the Nordic Battlegroup had been used as a surveillance force in the Libya operation.[105] Other places where they could have been used were to help to calm the situation during elections in Kinshasa in 2006 or in South Sudan in 2010.[106] Professor Chalmers thought deployment could be possible following a request from the UN to stabilise the situation in a future emergency. It might, however, involve a rearrangement of troops, and not necessarily the precise Battlegroups on standby.[107]

67.  Walter Stevens told us that the CMPD was examining how Battlegroups, or elements of them, could be used. One possibility was as an "over-the-horizon" force, to support missions and operations, but this was not easy for Member States. Command and control of the troops were the preserve of the States which formed the Battlegroup, but to support an EU operation they would need to come under the commander of that operation.[108] Another problem identified by Nick Pickard was the narrow parameters for Battlegroups which meant that the specific scenario did not occur very often.[109]

68.  We asked our witnesses how well prepared the Battlegroups were for deployment, should the occasion arise. General Syrén told us that the Battlegroups varied, but they were in line with the basic concept, were "good enough" and, in his view, useable. The MOD explained that it was difficult to be specific about how much training was undertaken by individual Battlegroups, and different Battlegroups undertook different types of training. The EU did not lay down standards and Battlegroups were self-certifying, in contrast to NATO where standards were agreed and certification was an external process. Laying down standards might be a disincentive for some Member States to contribute.[110] However, Alison Stevenson believed that countries on the Battlegroup roster were properly trained and equipped for whatever they might be asked to do; Battlegroups on the roster for the second half of 2011, for example, (see Table 1 below) were capable of deployment, but political will would be needed.[111]

69.  We enquired about the other purported purpose of Battlegroups and whether their formation had in fact led to improvements in capabilities. Sir Peter Ricketts believed that their formation had been a driver for increased capacity; peer pressure persuaded Member States to form Battlegroups, to join the rotation and be prepared to deploy them.[112] Lieutenant General van Osch also believed that Battlegroups increased the military capabilities of countries; the higher probability that they would be used and the fact that they would be inspected from outside created pressure on them to do well. Many colleagues with no previous experience of expeditionary missions had been pressurised into developing this capability by being forced through the Battlegroup model.[113] Professor Chalmers noted that the Battlegroup concept had its greatest purchase on smaller states which would not otherwise plan for deployments of this size, adding to their capabilities.[114] Walter Stevens commented that Battlegroups were sometimes uneven in quality, but they pulled up those Member States who were lagging behind. There was advantage also in the involvement in Battlegroups of non-EU partner countries, such as Ukraine.[115]

70.  Several witnesses referred to the excellence of the Nordic Battlegroup, led by Sweden. General Syrén, who had been Swedish Chief of Defence at the time of its formation, told us that he had taken the opportunity to use the Battlegroup as a tool to transform the Swedish armed forces. This had led to a different personnel manning system, abolition of the conscription system, and changes to the hitherto slow procurement process. Instead of waiting for a threat, the Swedes were ready to "go out there and do something."[116] Dr Moelling also thought that the Germans aimed to use their Battlegroup as a driver to develop their own capability and to modernise. They had also learnt to cooperate better in Europe.[117]

71.  General Syrén criticised the funding system for Battlegroups, which meant that some Member States were reluctant both to organise them, which was expensive, and subsequently to use them. Work was in progress on this problem.[118] Walter Stevens pointed out that the high cost of transport was also a problem, and there were currently two or three gaps in the Battlegroup roster. The suggestion to use more of the CFSP budget to compensate part of the costs (allowances, part of the salaries and equipment) was difficult to envisage within the current regulations. Proposals to introduce common costs had created serious problems for Member States, in particular the UK and Germany whose costs would increase.[119] Professor Menon said that the allocation of common costs on a GDP scale meant that Germany could pay more for deployments than participating countries, when it did not deploy itself (see para 59 and Box 4 above on the ATHENA mechanism).[120] Edgar Buckley thought that it was time to review the issue of costs lying where they fell though common funding could cause problems for the UK.[121]

72.  In a development since we heard the evidence from Walter Stevens, the Minister told us that the EU had reviewed the Athena mechanism for common funding, including costs for Battlegroup strategic lift. He said that a Council Decision, while protecting the UK's position on any permanent expansion of the mechanism, had agreed an extension of the mechanism until December 2013 on a contingency basis, to meet Battlegroup deployment costs from common funds. The purpose was to encourage nations to fill slots on the roster and to enable Battlegroups to go into action, but it would not fund the capability itself. The UK was not prepared to extend common funding further because it would find itself paying twice—for its independent requirement and other nations' requirements as well.[122]

73.  Battlegroups were intended as the hard edge of the EU's CSDP, particularly in the crisis management role. If they are to perform this function they must be operationally deployable, made up of national contingents that are capable of working well together, enjoy stability in terms of combinations of Member States, and be tested and audited for readiness, as is NATO practice.

74.  When circumstances next arise which would justify the deployment of an EU Battlegroup, the decision should be taken to deploy. Failure to do so will seriously weaken the credibility of CSDP.

TABLE 1

EU Battlegroup roster from Initial Operating Capability (IOC) to Full Operating Capability (FOC)[123]
Semester Member States (& Third States) Battlegroup Lead Nation Preferred OHQ / Force HQ

IOC 2005-1
FranceFrance  
UK UK 

2005-2
Italy Italy 
    

2006-1
Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal Spain 
Germany, France Germany 
2006-2
France, Germany, Belgium FranceFrance
    

FOC 2007-1
France, BelgiumFrance France
Germany, Netherlands, Finland GermanyGermany

2007-2
Italy, Hungary, Slovenia ItalyItaly
Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus GreeceGreece

2008-1
Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia SwedenSweden
Spain, France, Germany, Portugal Spain 

2008-2
Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg GermanyFrance
UK UKUK

2009-1
Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal Italy 
    

2009-2
France, Belgium France 
Czech Republic, Slovakia Czech Republic 

2010-1
Poland, Germany, Latvia, Slovakia, Lithuania Poland 
UK, Netherlands UK 

2010-2
Italy, Romania, Turkey ItalyItaly
Spain, France, Portugal SpainFrance

2011-1
Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Austria, Lithuania NetherlandsGermany
Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Ireland SwedenUK

2011-2
Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, Ukraine GreeceGreece
Portugal, Spain, France, Italy PortugalFrance

2012-1
France, Belgium, Luxembourg FranceFrance
vacant   

2012-2
Italy, Slovenia, Hungary ItalyItaly
Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ireland GermanyGermany

2013-1
Poland, Germany, France PolandFrance
vacant   

2013-2
UK, Sweden[124], Latvia, Lithuania UKUK
vacant   

2014-1
Greece, Bulgaria[125], Romania, Cyprus Greece 
Sweden[126], Finland[127] Sweden 

2014-2
Belgium[128], Netherlands[129], Germany, Luxembourg, Spain Belgium 
Spain[130], Italy Spain 

2015-1
vacant   
vacant   

2015-2
France, Belgium[131] FranceFrance
vacant   

The EU-NATO relationship

75.  We asked our witnesses about the relationship between the EU and NATO, given that they share substantially the same membership and the same problems over capabilities.[132] Professor Menon said that the two organisations suffered from the same problem: they could not force Member States to do things they did not want to.[133]

FIGURE 3

The EU and NATO Membership


76.  We asked particularly if the two organisations had reached an agreement on a division of roles. Our witnesses were quite clear that NATO was the organisation of choice if a large-scale military operation was envisaged in which the US wished to be involved, such as the Libyan operation.[134] Etienne de Durand told us that most European nations were more comfortable using NATO for "hard defence" and combat missions than they were using CSDP.[135] If the US did not wish to lead or be involved, European nations could take the lead, using NATO facilities, as had happened in the Libya campaign (but see paras 80-81 below). For smaller operations, such as the anti-piracy operation, the EU might need to operate on its own.

77.  Nick Pickard thought that Europe had shown progress over the last 10 years in its military response to those problems where the US did not want to play a leadership role. In Bosnia and the Balkans it had taken a year and a half for Europeans to agree to take military action. In the case of Libya it had taken weeks.[136] A number of witnesses saw a niche role for EU operations in geographical areas where NATO involvement was not welcome, or not appropriate, for political reasons. Sir Peter Ricketts believed that the appearance of NATO in Africa would probably be sensitive; an EU-flagged deployment would be more acceptable.[137] Xenia Dormandy thought that NATO would not have been able to accomplish the action the EU had taken in Georgia; this type of political constraint was recognised in the US.[138] Alison Stevenson pointed out that EU operations could also include third parties which would not be possible in an organisation which included the Americans.[139]

78.  Our witnesses also thought that the EU, with its comprehensive approach, including development assistance or security sector training, could tackle problems by providing for the overall requirements of the situation in a way that NATO could not. Sir Peter Ricketts told us that the CSDP's strength lay in operating smaller scale, complex interventions where a mix of political weight, economic know-how, development and sometimes a military capacity were needed—this was the "right niche" for the EU. He cited the examples of police training in the Balkans, border security advice in Georgia and training in Uganda of military officers for Somalia.[140]

79.  We asked our witnesses about cooperation between the EU and NATO, and the operation of the 2003 Berlin Plus arrangement, which provides for the use of NATO assets and capabilities in support of an EU-led military operation (see Box 5 below). The Minister thought that improvement was needed in EU-NATO cooperation and coherence and, in particular, in ensuring that the EU's pooling and sharing and NATO smart defence initiatives were complementary (see Chapter 5); they should focus on the development of deployable and interoperable capabilities.[141] Alison Stevenson told us that the UK Government tried to be "institution blind" on these initiatives and approached them from the perspective of which capabilities the UK wished to develop and where was the best forum in which to develop them—individually, bilaterally or with NATO or the EU. The UK Government was trying to ensure that the planning processes of both organisations were more coherent and that duplication was avoided.[142]

BOX 5

The Berlin Plus Arrangements

The "Berlin Plus" agreement

The Berlin Plus agreement refers to a December 2002 package of agreements between the EU and NATO, which were based on an undertaking at NATO's 1999 Washington summit that the Alliance would make its collective assets and capabilities available to the EU. These arrangements allow EU access to NATO's planning capacity, NATO European command options and the use of NATO assets and capabilities:

The two organisations agreed on mutual consultation arrangements for efficient decision-making in the event of a crisis which would involve the EU's Political and Security Committee and NATO's North Atlantic Council, and the EU and NATO Military Committees as well as the High Representative and NATO Secretary General. They also concluded an agreement on the security of information.

Under the "Berlin Plus" agreement:

1) NATO guarantees EU access to NATO planning. At the exploratory stage, this may involve a NATO contribution to the work carried out by the EU Military Staff on the definition of options (known as "military strategic options"). Subsequently, should the operation take place with use of NATO assets and capabilities, NATO provides the operational planning required.

2) The EU may request that NATO makes available a NATO European command option for an EU-led military operation. In this case, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) is the primary candidate for the position of EU Operation Commander. He will remain at Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Europe (SHAPE) where he establishes the EU Operational Headquarters. The remaining command elements determined by the EU (such as the EU Force Commander and EU Force Headquarters deployed in theatre or the EU Component Commands) may either be provided by NATO or by EU Member States.

3) The EU may request the use of NATO assets and capabilities. To this end, NATO has established a list of assets and capabilities that NATO would, most likely, decide to make available to the EU.

80.  Several witnesses told us about the difficulties caused by a dispute between Turkey and Cyprus (see Box 6 below). General Syrén told us that the dispute blocked the Berlin Plus arrangement which only operated formally for the mission in Bosnia, where it worked well, but he doubted whether it would be possible to duplicate the arrangement for any other operation.[143] Robert Cooper described the Turkey-Cyprus dispute as "stupid". In the field in Kosovo, ways had been found around the absence of a formal agreement, but in Afghanistan it had been life-threatening.[144] Alison Stevenson pointed out that the dispute made progress difficult in the 2003 NATO-EU Capability Group, which tried to ensure coherence between the two organisations. Nick Pickard described how deep the "political bugbear" of the Turkey-Cyprus issue was for all concerned. The governments of Turkey and Cyprus ranked the issue above some of the advances which could otherwise have been made, demonstrating the priority they attributed to it. However, meetings did take place at working group and policy director level. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen and the EU High Representative, Baroness Ashton, were working together much more effectively than in the past. Walter Stevens, Director, CMPD, told us that he regularly met high level NATO officials to discuss pooling and sharing and talks were going well.[145] Nick Pickard also thought that, despite the problems between Turkey and Cyprus, attempts should be made to strengthen relations between the EU and NATO, not least because acting separately risked people's lives in theatres where the EU and NATO were operating together.[146] General Syrén also told us that, at a conference arranged by NATO in 2011, with keynote speakers from the EU Military Committee, the EDA and NATO, the messages had been very similar.[147]

BOX 6

Problems caused by the Turkey-Cyprus dispute

Although the Berlin Plus exists to give the EU access to assets owned by NATO, a political stand-off between Turkey and Cyprus currently prevents the two organisations working together as originally envisaged. The main blockage on the NATO side has been caused by Turkey which sought increased participation in CSDP by the non-EU European NATO Allies as a condition of its agreement, and as part of its campaign for EU membership. It also wanted assurance that, if Cyprus acceded to the EU as a divided island, the Greek Cypriots would not be able to use CSDP against their Turkish neighbours in the north. (Cyprus subsequently joined the EU in 2004). When the arrangement was set up in December 2002, the EU decided that the Berlin Plus arrangements would apply only to those EU Member States that were NATO Allies or members of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme (at the time, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. Malta subsequently joined, in 2008). NATO's North Atlantic Council took a similar decision, but Turkey insisted on excluding Malta and Cyprus from the Berlin Plus arrangements and also from wider aspects of EU-NATO strategic cooperation.

The position now is that Cyprus blocks Turkey's engagement with the EU and Turkey blocks Cyprus's engagement with NATO. The EU accepts that Cyprus cannot participate in EU-led operations with access to NATO assets and capabilities under Berlin Plus. Some Member States contest its exclusion from EU-NATO aspects of capability development, which is also a Berlin Plus issue, as discrimination against a Member State. These Member States refuse to conduct wider EU-NATO business which excludes Cyprus, and the Turks refuse to do so with Cyprus. Papers released by the NATO staffs to the EU Military Staff cannot be circulated to all 27 Member States and certain partners find it unacceptable for them to be circulated excluding Cyprus. Formal joint meetings of the two organisations cannot take place except to discuss existing Berlin Plus operations (effectively Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was launched with the agreement of Cyprus in 2004 soon after Cyprus joined the EU.)[148]

81.  Professor Menon thought the degree of influence wielded by Cyprus over the CSDP was "absurd." Little pressure was placed on Cyprus by other Member States, and this could be ratcheted up.[149] We asked our American witnesses whether the US could influence the parties. Xenia Dormandy told us that the US now had little leverage over Turkey; other Turkey-related issues took precedence in US national interests and Turkish foreign policy was becoming more autonomous. Moreover, the EU "has not given us much to work with."[150] Ambassador Burns thought both governments should be asked to be flexible.[151]

82.  NATO is still the only credible defence community capable of the territorial defence of Europe, and of engaging in those conflicts that are complex, medium or large scale, or require sophisticated operations. It is essential that the US continues to participate in the defence of Europe through NATO.

83.  Europe has security issues which are, however, more appropriately handled operationally by the EU than by NATO. These will include humanitarian missions, mixed civilian and military operations, geographical areas such as parts of Africa where United States or NATO involvement may not be appropriate, and peacekeeping. In the medium term the EU should concentrate on these classes of operation, and ensure that they are delivered successfully.

84.  In terms of military capability, what is good for the EU is good for NATO. There is no fundamental contradiction or competition. Military expenditure and capability are determined by individual sovereign states. 21 nations are members of both the EU and NATO. If those nations improve their military capability both organisations benefit, but most of all Europe as a whole, together with the United States, itself will benefit.

85.  Arguments about how military capability in Europe is delivered, through NATO, EU, bi-laterally, or multi-laterally, should not distract from the important task of increasing the military capability of the whole. The important issue is that Europe pulls its weight in its security and defence interests.

86.  UK Governments have been reluctant to commit to EU defence. They tend towards an approach that suggests that more EU means less NATO. In our view, more EU capability also means more NATO capability, but the tasks of each should be clearly defined. We believe that the current balance of tasks between NATO and the EU is a sensible one.

87.  Since the reintegration of France into NATO's military structures the UK and France have near identical interests in EU defence and security and, given their dominance in this area, should together take a lead.

88.  We emphasise the need for a proper relationship between the EU and NATO. It is essential that the difficulties caused by the Turkey-Cyprus dispute for EU-NATO coordination should be resolved. We do not underestimate the difficulties of tackling intransigent attitudes on both sides of the dispute, but it not only sours the whole area of European security and defence, it also puts the lives of personnel in the field at risk. EU Member States and their NATO allies must put additional pressure on both countries to allow the problem to be resolved, and the Berlin Plus arrangement must be available for future operations.

The defence industry

89.  We asked our witnesses about the importance of industry to the development of defence capabilities in Europe, and whether a European defence industry existed. Sir Brian Burridge, Finmeccanica UK, told us that a European defence industry did exist, because there was a European defence market, and because Member States believed that it gave them operational sovereignty over their military capabilities. However, the nature of the business was global. Bill Giles, BAE Systems (Brussels), added that, because the US rules on technology transfer were strict, it was easier to find transnational synergies in Europe. We were told, however, that neither the EU nor NATO had a defence industrial policy as such. Bill Giles thought that the EU was trying, through the EDA and the Commission, to develop a sense of industrial purpose in order to secure the retention and development of technologies within Europe. This would reduce dependency on technologies from elsewhere to a reasonable or minimised level.[152]

90.  Alvin Wilby, Thales UK, told us that the UK also had an industrial base, which was made up of the UK components of a number of large, global companies.[153] Rear Admiral Rees Ward, UK Aerospace, Defence, Security and Space Industries (ADS), said that all the major defence industry players were located in the UK, attracted by its operational sovereignty, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and jobs situations, and the unique openness of its markets. According to Sir Brian Burridge, this body of knowledge gave the UK strategic value.[154]

91.  Rear Admiral Ward pointed out that governments were the sole procurer of large-scale capabilities and that industry therefore depended on government investment.[155] Dr Moelling thought that, if defence budget cuts continued, the defence industry would leave Europe in five to 10 years time as European market shares would shrink and the industry, as a global player, would seek places where they could make more money. The industry would also cut research and technology. The danger was that, when the European economy recovered, the technology would no longer exist.[156] Sir Brian Burridge thought, however, that, provided industry could export out of Europe, the decline in European defence budgets need not be the end for the industry there.[157]

92.  Professor Menon commented that, from a national defence perspective, relying entirely on foreign sources of equipment posed certain operational risks, both in the short term in ensuring supplies during operations, and in the long term in being able to develop new technologies. The UK needed to remain near the front of the curve in developing new defence technologies. He believed however that it would be too expensive to be completely self-reliant in defence technology and he recommended talking to major defence companies represented in the UK, though he warned against believing that defence companies could be steered in a particular direction. They would, rightly in his opinion, be ruled by the market.[158]

93.  Pierre Vimont warned that, if Europe did not join together to form a strong military industry, its competitors would forge ahead. Despite the limited success of the A400M aircraft, it was important to continue with such projects.[159] We also heard evidence that money could be saved by collaboration. The Belgians and Dutch had approached industry together on logistic support and achieved better prices.[160] Edgar Buckley thought that defence industry companies could consolidate and reduce over-capacity in the industry. This would also need positive government engagement, which had been recognised in the UK-French treaty.[161]

94.  Dr Moelling told us that, traditionally, nations had not cooperated in defence industrial matters for a number of reasons, including jobs and taxes. This inhibited effectiveness.[162] Etienne de Durand said that French-German-British cooperation at a bilateral or trilateral level had worked cost-effectively in the 1970s and products, such as Jaguar, had sold successfully. Currently cooperation was more difficult because of the increase in members, and the need for each country's national industry to share in a programme. Either Member States should return to collaboration between small groups of countries, or the EDA should rationalise collaboration at a European level. This would involve all Member States sacrificing parts of their national industrial base. The UK and France had most to lose, and the Germans would not be enthusiastic. He believed that, for industrial cooperation to work, it was no longer possible to adopt a top-down approach in which countries embarked on a specific programme for political reasons.[163] Sir Brian Burridge believed, however, that "work share" was beginning to change as the market became smaller.[164]

95.  We asked about the apparent contradiction following from the CSDP aim of building a defence industrial base: strengthening European companies could lead to cost increases, giving governments access to less, rather than more, defence capability. Sir Brian Burridge countered that CSDP would provide a competitive marketplace and consequently better value for money for Member States, but only if a benchmark for defence spending was set for Member States; those resources must be used to modernise European armed forces, many of which were still conscript-based and static; and political will to deploy must exist. That had to be the driver for obtaining value for money from defence acquisition, without which operational focus would be lacking. The work of the EDA and some of the capability development programmes might focus industrial consortia on the type of military capability that nations needed.[165] Bill Giles cited the example of the Eurofighter Typhoon transnational programme, which had worked well within Europe in terms of information exchanges and the generation of intellectual property. There was more potential for collaborative programmes such as these but there were difficulties. The challenge was to make the EU Member States perform collectively in a more effective way.[166]

96.  Our witnesses commented on the optimum number for a successful outcome in collaborative projects. Sir Peter Ricketts pointed out that there were advantages in having many different partners sharing the risks and burdens of new equipment programmes, but this created more scope for delay and an increase in costs. A balance was needed.[167] Rear Admiral Rees Ward thought the optimum number depended on the size of the programme and the ability of participating nations to produce the R&D funding. Two participants tended to be easier but this was costly for them. Sir Brian Burridge thought a larger number potentially caused more difficulties as each partner came with its own priority, potentially causing more difficulties, but unit costs would be lower if more were ordered.[168]

97.  We asked about interoperability and operational compatibility, which seemed to be key to EU—and NATO—Member States working together. Sir Brian Burridge said that, following past experience in collaborative ventures, the defence industry was now able to design basic projects in a way that participating nations could retain their own "development paths without having to leave the project."[169] It was, however, important to ensure that, if nations ordered different versions of a product, they were compatible, especially in electronics and software. The Royal Air Force had, for example, obtained 98% availability from their Typhoon aircraft operating out of Italian airbases during the Libyan operations because the support system was compatible.[170]

98.  We asked about the performance of the EDA (see also paras 25 to 27 above) in rationalising capacity in the EU. Madame Arnould told us that the function of the EDA in the industrial market was key. It was not a procurement agency and could not harmonise the requirements, but through its work on priorities and specification it could support a more consistent definition of requirements.[171] Bill Giles believed that the EDA had a difficult job. Without its own budget, it depended entirely on the will of Member States and their interest in collaborating. It had produced no substantial programme in its six years, which was not surprising, given that defence procurement was a "long game." The UK had participated very little in some of the programmes but groups of Member States were running a number of projects in technologically important areas. Important work for military and civil security was underway between the EDA and the Commission on "flying unmanned aerial systems in desegregated airspace" and on collaborative work on chemical, biological and nuclear defence.

99.  Sir Brian Burridge told us that the EDA was seen as the agent to take pooling and sharing forward, in particular on "high-end capability" such as smart munitions, air-to-air refuelling and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Other areas on which it had worked were pragmatic capabilities for use in Afghanistan, such as counter-IED[172] and the organisation of field hospitals. This was the right direction of travel for the EDA.[173] Bill Giles described the EU Procurement Directive (para 27) as a radical change and an opportunity for industry to compete and for governments to get value for money, though it was too early to tell what the effects would be.

100.  The Minister told us that the Government had planned to withdraw from the EDA, believing that it was not in the interests of the taxpayer. However, in part because of the UK-French treaty, they had decided to see first whether the EDA could produce practical capability-enhancing projects. The helicopter initiative, training helicopter crews, and the maritime surveillance project, MARSUR, were encouraging.[174] He stressed that the UK Treasury would insist that, when capabilities were developed with others, they represented value for money and were interoperable.[175]

101.  It is fundamental that Europe maintains a defence industry on which it can rely. Furthermore, we see a strong and efficient European defence sector as a guarantor of competition in global markets, a foundation for research, and source of highly skilled jobs all of which will enhance European security and prosperity.


36   QQ 167, 175 Back

37   Q 167 Back

38   The United States have 1.4 million military personnel, Russia has 1 million. Back

39   Witney Back

40   Giegerich Back

41   Q 69 Back

42   QQ 98, 100 Back

43   Q 12 Back

44   Q 100 Back

45   Q 350 Back

46   Buckley Back

47   Witney Back

48   QQ 345, 348, 351 Back

49   Q 22 Back

50   Q 281 Back

51   Buckley Back

52   Witney Back

53   Giegerich Back

54   MOD press release 2 November 2010,

www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/UkfranceDefenceCooperationTreatyAnnounced.htm  Back

55   Q 345 Back

56   Q 33 Back

57   Q 43 Back

58   Buckley, also Burridge Q 330 Back

59   Q 33, also Stevenson Q 35, Back

60   Giegerich Back

61   QQ 358, 360 Back

62   Q 301 Back

63   Q 33 Back

64   QQ 43, 45 Back

65   Q 46 Back

66   Q 53 Back

67   QQ 309, 312 Back

68   Q 330 Back

69   Q 109 Back

70   Witney Back

71   Buckley Back

72   Giegerich Back

73   QQ 81,82, 87, 271, 272 Back

74   QQ 273, 277 - 279 Back

75   Q 235 Back

76   Q 217 Back

77   Q 301 Back

78   Q 275 Back

79   Q 281 Back

80   Allin and Dormandy QQ 81, 82, also Menon Q 100 Back

81   Q 304 Back

82   QQ 293, 299 - 304, 309  Back

83   Q 40 Back

84   QQ 157,158, 162, see also Cooper Q 118 Back

85   Q 189 Back

86   http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?lang=en  Back

87   QQ 133, 134 Back

88   Q 125 Back

89   Menon Q 100 Back

90   Q 227 Back

91   Q 133 Back

92   Q 195, also Menon Q 104 Back

93   Q 349 Back

94   QQ 345, 348, 351 Back

95   EU Factsheet, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups Back

96   Q 58 Back

97   Q 54 Back

98   Q 55 Back

99   The so-called Weimar Triangle (or Weimar Three) is a grouping of Germany, France and Poland who have agreed to cooperate on a number of subjects.  Back

100   QQ 100, 112 Back

101   Q 362 Back

102   Q 310 Back

103   QQ 111, 112 Back

104   Q 229 Back

105   Q 165.MOD officials have subsequently expanded on the General's point, advising us that these were expeditionary air assets which were included in the Nordic EU Battlegroup package at the time. Back

106   Q 165 Back

107   Q 112 Back

108   QQ 135, 136 Back

109   Q 263 Back

110   MOD written evidence Back

111   QQ 56,57 Back

112   Q 9 Back

113   Q 229 Back

114   Q 112 Back

115   Q 141 Back

116   Q 163, also Menon Q 98, Chalmers Q 112, Arnould QQ 212, 213  Back

117   Q 310 Back

118   Q 163 Back

119   QQ 139, 141 Back

120   Q 100 Back

121   Buckley Back

122   QQ 350, 351, 364 Back

123   Table provided by the MOD. Back

124   Participation pending political decision. Back

125   Participation pending political decision. Back

126   Participation pending political decision Back

127   Participation pending political decision Back

128   Belgium confirmed based on current EU Battlegroup terms, conditions and contributions. Back

129   Participation pending political decision Back

130   Spain-Italy Amphibious Force SIAF EU Battlegroup. Back

131   Participation pending political decision. Back

132   The shared membership is Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom. Members of the EU who are not members of NATO are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden. Members of NATO who are not also members of the EU are Albania, Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the United States. Back

133   Q 106 Back

134   Howarth 346 Back

135   Q 295 Back

136   Q 69 Back

137   Q 10, See also Pickard QQ 39, 40 Back

138   Q 80 Back

139   Q 41, See also Dormandy Q 80 Back

140   Q 7 Back

141   Q345 Back

142   QQ 42, 44 Back

143   QQ 172, 173 Back

144   QQ 126, 127 Back

145   Q 135 Back

146   QQ 42, 44, 368 Back

147   Q 169 Back

148   Information provided by MOD officials. Back

149   Q 106 Back

150   Q 84 Back

151   Q 286 Back

152   Q 337 Back

153   QQ 314, 315 Back

154   Q 316 Back

155   Q 320 Back

156   Q 296 Back

157   Q 320 Back

158   QQ 111, 103 Back

159   Q 194 Back

160   Van Osch, Q 232 Back

161   Buckley Back

162   Q 306 Back

163   Q 307, also Chalmers Q 53 Back

164   Q 334 Back

165   Q 318 Back

166   Q 319, also Wilby Q 321 Back

167   Q 15 Back

168   Q 332 Back

169   QQ 326 - 327 Back

170   QQ 321, 322 Back

171   Q 216 Back

172   Improvised explosive devices Back

173   Q 323 Back

174   Q 354 Back

175   Q 359 Back


 
previous page contents next page


© Parliamentary copyright 2012