Chapter 3: the state of play |
36. We asked our witnesses how they thought the
CSDP had developed since 1999 and found a mixed picture on defence
budgets, capability development, the deployment of missions and
operations, and the establishment of multilateral Battlegroups.
Capabilities, deployments and
37. We heard concerns about the numbers of troops
that were in fact able to be deployed, compared with the number
theoretically available, and that there was overcapacity in equipment.
General Syrén told us that Europe had some 1.7 million
people in uniform of which only around 4%66,000were
deployed. He thought that from 2014, when most of the troops in
Afghanistan had been withdrawn, only half that number might be
deployed, if the political will existed.
He also believed that overcapacity was a problem: the EU had,
for example 27 headquarters with different logistical concepts,
around 20 military colleges, and four types of combat aircraft
(the Joint Strike Fighter, Eurofighter, Rafale and Gripen) under
development by EU Members.
38. Nick Witney, a defence expert and former
head of the EDA, echoed these sentiments, citing slightly different
figures, and painted a gloomy picture of EU Member State capabilities
and defence expenditure. He said that the record of Member States
in meeting their own agreed capability targets had been "consistently
dismal". Europe was responsible for around one third of global
defence expenditure outside the US and had 1.6 million military
personnel, far in excess of the US or Russia.
Member States did not lack resources, but remained "determined
to spend their national defence budgets in accordance with national
priorities rather than in the collective interest." Resources
were wasted on non-deployable forces, "almost three quarters
of the whole in 2009", obsolescent equipment and duplication.
Paying for such high numbers of personnel came at the expense
of research and technology spending. Europe therefore lacked the
capabilities to participate in military action and had become
reliant on the US to an "overwhelming" degree.
EU national troops are said to be "not deployable"
when they are unsuited for action in EU missions. This could be
for several reasons:
- they may be conscripts (though this number is decreasing
in EU countries). Unlike professionals who enlist for several
years, conscripts usually receive only a few months training,
which is not enough to enable them to take part in risky expeditionary
operations far from home;
- volunteers may lack the (mostly English) language
skills necessary for participation in operational missions, whether
under EU or NATO command;
- equipment may not have been sufficiently upgraded
to take part in operations away from EU territory, which is where
all recent military missions have taken place. For example, EU
countries have many attack and transport helicopters but too few
were suitable to withstand Afghanistan's environmental and man-made
risks such as sand and small arms fire;
- increased specialisation in discrete tasks, either
by choice or by default, (when certain categories of weapons are
eliminated to save money). This results in countries lacking entire
categories of weapons. For example, only a few NATO countries
have the supersonic aircraft, precision munitions and pilots trained
in air-to-ground attacks, which were required for the war in Libya.
Other countries could not deploy there as they lacked the equipment,
either because they never had it, or they had abandoned it.
39. Dr Bastian Giegerich, Bundeswehr Institute
for Social Sciences and International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS), quoting statistics from the EDA and IISS, said
that land forces available for sustainable deployments by EU Member
States had decreased from 125,000 in 2008 to 106,000 in 2010.
Active duty forces deployed on crisis management operations by
EU Member States had fallen from 3.7% (68,000 troops) in 2006
to 2.9% (49,000) in 2011. He said that the number deployed on
operations was decreasing faster than the total number of active
service personnel, not because demand for military crisis operations
was lessening, but for supply-side reasons: intervention fatigue;
perception that the threat was indirect; and structural underfunding
of the armed forces, magnified by the economic crisis, which placed
long-term modernisation under strain.
40. Nick Pickard, Head of Security Policy Department,
FCO, commented that, in an effort to ensure that defence spending
was a sufficiently high priority in some Member States, the UK
had set an example with its own defence spending and with cooperative
models, such as the UK-France treaties. It had tried to create
political incentives for effective defence spending in capabilities
which had been identified collectively as necessary; too much
was still being spent on unnecessary capabilities such as large
heavy armoured vehicles.
Professor Menon also thought that, even after the current
cuts, European defence spending would be sufficient if used in
the right way. The problems were how the money was spent, and
how willing States were to deploy their troops; rationalisation
was the issue, not increased defence spending. A wide variation
existed among Member States: CSDP had led to some countries, such
as Sweden and Poland, increasing their defence spending. In the
domestic political debate, Sweden's Ministry of Defence had used
the CSDP and the need to show the Swedes as good Europeans and
to work with the Europeans as a "legitimising badge"
to revolutionise Swedish defence policy. By contrast, the CSDP
had had no effect on capability development in Spain and Italy.
Source: European Defence Agency, Defence Data:
EDA participating Member States in 2010, Brussels; 07/03/2012,
Maria Leonor Pires, Statistics Officer.
Source: European Defence Agency, Defence Data:
EDA participating Member States in 2010, Brussels; 07/03/2012,
Maria Leonor Pires, Statistics Officer.
41. Sir Peter Ricketts thought that there
was a risk that countries which were able and willing to step
up would bear a disproportionate share of the defence burden.
These tended to be the UK and France and some smaller countries
which had recently been willing to perform front line tasks in
Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya.
Professor Chalmers, did not think that the burden of operations
outside Europe would increasingly fall on the UK and France, but
that they would continue to be the core of and provide the bulk
of European contributions to such operations. He had been struck
by the fact that countries, such as Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Portugal, had contributed to operations in Afghanistan where
they had no historic connections.
42. Our witnesses cited different reasons for
the lack of commitment to defence capabilities. The Minister cited
lack of political will.
Edgar Buckley attributed it to the priority given to social over
defence spending, due to lack of perception of immediate threat;
and different views amongst Member States about the importance
of developing EU defence institutions, including the UK's view
of the restricted role of the EDA and opposition to an EU Operational
Headquarters (see Chapters 4 and 5). The Libya campaign had undermined
confidence in EU institutions and European political solidarity,
and leading EU military powers did not believe major crises could
be tackled through EU mechanisms.
Nick Witney believed that defence reform was a problem. Defence
establishments were risk-averse; defence expenditure was committed
far ahead; and defence was a highly complex business. Job protection
in marginal constituencies, especially when money was tight, also
determined wasteful defence expenditure.
43. The key challenge for European capability
is not just the level of defence expenditure, but its effectiveness.
It is particularly important to increase the proportion of those
in uniform who can be deployed.
The UK's position
44. Government witnesses stressed that NATO was
the cornerstone of defence for the UK, and for Europe. The Minister
said that the 2% of GDP as the minimum NATO requirement had been
a key consideration as the Government approached the Strategic
Defence and Security Review (SDSR). He thought that the CSDP could
play a complementary role through its unique set of stabilisation
tools and in promoting further capability development. He saw
its purpose as being "to act where NATO cannot act."
However, many Member States pursued policies with which the UK
could not agree, particularly in institutional debates.
Sir Peter Ricketts reiterated that the UK had ensured in
the spending round that there were adequate resources for defence
and wider security. He believed that it was hard to foresee an
increase in defence spending by EU Member States given the current
economic problems. 
45. We heard high praise from Ambassador Nicholas
Burns for the UK's role, and a deal of criticism from others,
reflecting their different perspectives. Ambassador Burns told
us that the US relied on the strength of the UK and hoped that
its defence cuts would allow the UK to retain its capacity for
expeditionary warfare and peacekeeping.
46. Edgar Buckley thought it had been obvious
since the early 1990s that the US focus would turn from Europe,
but the UK had opposed efforts to construct capable CSDP institutions.
Nick Witney was critical of the UK's failure to give leadership
in Europe on defence, and its commitment to European defence efforts
had diminished. UK defence ministers had "self-righteously
stood alone" in blocking moves towards greater European cooperation,
for example on increasing the EDA budget or setting up an EU operational
headquarters. It had lost the goodwill created with the EU Member
States from the former Soviet bloc which the UK had helped to
prepare for NATO membership in the period after St Malo. A readiness
to join in would have "reaped disproportionate benefits"
in helping other Europeans to improve their defence capabilities,
benefiting NATO as well as the EU.
Dr Bastian Giegerich noted that neither NATO nor CSDP had
seemed to play much of a role in the run up to the UK's 2010 Strategic
Defence and Security Review.
The UK-French treaties
47. The UK and France are the two major European
military players. These two countries share a global approach,
a fulfilled commitment to NATO's defence budget targets and a
willingness to deploy forces. In November 2010 they signed a Defence
Cooperation Treaty; a subordinate treaty relating to a joint nuclear
facility; a letter of intent signed by Defence Ministers; and
a package of joint defence initiatives. This co-operation was
intended to improve collective defence capability through UK and
French forces working more closely together, contributing to more
capable and effective forces, and ultimately improving the collective
capability of NATO and European defence.
48. The Minister told us that the treaties were
a good example of coordination, which should improve the capability
and effectiveness of UK and French forces, benefiting both NATO
and the EU, and which he hoped European partners would imitate.
Sir Peter Ricketts reminded us that one of the treaties,
set to last for 50 years, dealt with sharing sensitive military
Alison Stevenson, Head of NATO and Europe Policy Department, MOD,
told us that the reason the UK had formed the partnership with
France was because "it is a similarly capable nation with
high spending on defence
prepared to deploy its forces."
Edgar Buckley thought that UK-French cooperation was unlikely
to lead to higher military capabilities, given the severe resource
squeeze in both countries, but it would "assist in mitigating
the worst effects of military decline which would otherwise take
49. There were differing views on whether the
treaties would be seen as a model. Sir Peter Ricketts did
view them as a model for other nations, but noted that cooperation
should not be exclusive, leaving other EU nations feeling that
they could not take part.
Dr Bastian Giegerich thought that the agreement was unlikely
to serve as a model for wider multinational cooperation, though
it might spark similar "minilateral" efforts among others.
50. We also found a variety of opinions on the
reaction to the treaties by other EU Member States. The Minister
thought that they had taken continental partners by surprise,
and "put a few noses out of joint, in particular the Italians
However, Dr Christian Moelling, of the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs (SWP), told us that the UK-French
agreement was not perceived by the Germans as a pressing issue
and they did not feel they had to engage in it.
Sir Peter Ricketts also told us that he was not aware that
the Germans had been offended by the treaties, at least at government
level. The UK would welcome cooperation by the Germans, Italians,
Spaniards or others.
Alison Stevenson, MOD, told us that the UK was also working with
Germany through a "structured dialogue" on possible
Nick Pickard, FCO, added that the UK had made clear to the Germans
that the purpose of any collaboration was to achieve practical,
effective results, not to collaborate for purely political reasons.
The UK had made the same points to the Italians, with whom the
UK had strong defence industrial links.
Etienne de Durand thought that the UK-French agreement was currently
"the only important game in town." If this cooperation
succeeded, Germany would follow.
Sir Brian Burridge, Finmeccanica UK, thought that the treaties
could look to others like a "closed shop," which could
51. Professor Menon attributed different
motives to the two sides: Dr Fox, the British Defence Secretary
at the time of the signature, had made clear the UK's preference
for the bilateral treaties over doing business through Brussels.
On the other hand, policymakers in Paris would say that the treaties
were a means of drawing the British into the CSDP.
Nick Witney thought that some Europeans concluded that the UK
had wanted to hobble wider European cooperation by taking France
out of the equation. There had been little encouragement that
Franco-British bilateral cooperation would be opened to third
parties. Edgar Buckley
also thought that the UK-French treaty was regarded with suspicion
by other leading Member States, such as Germany and Italy, which
had recently signed a letter of intent, fearing that British-French
cooperation could disadvantage their companies.
Dr Bastian Giegerich thought that full implementation
of the UK-French treaties would represent "a significant
step towards more effective defence cooperation", but that
there was widespread scepticism amongst other Member States about
the ability of the UK and France to achieve this.
52. Our American witnesses, Ambassador Burns,
Dr Dana Allin, International Institute for Strategic Studies,
and Xenia Dormandy, Chatham House, welcomed the treaties. For
Ambassador Burns, the UK and France retained military forces that
were among the strongest in the world, with the capacity to deploy,
act and sustain their forces globally and who were critical to
UN peacekeeping, fighting wars and deterrence.
This contrasted with the lack of strength in Italy, Spain and
Germany from a military perspective.
From the NATO point of view, Major General Heinrich Brauss, Deputy
Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Policy and Planning, considered
the new contract between the UK and France as a role model for
multilateral cooperation between small groups of nations with
a view to developing and sustaining key capabilities, particularly
with a view to the new, emerging challenges, such as cyber defence.
At a practical level, Madame Arnould, EDA Chief Executive, particularly
approved of the example of the work taken up by the British and
French from the EDA on maritime mine countermeasures.
53. We welcome the UK-French defence treaties
and cooperation which provide lessons for how the sharing of sovereignty
can be successfully managed. Other similar combinations of nations
could emerge which could act as a core for the development of
effective European defence.
54. The UK and France lead Europe in defence
in terms of range of capability, budgets, equipment, ability to
deploy, and scale. If other EU or NATO states do not contribute
more to European defence the UK and France will bear an increasingly
large and disproportionate burden within Europe. We believe the
current division of responsibility is unsustainable and, if uncorrected,
could lead to growing friction between Member States.
The German position
55. We asked about the German position on European
defence, which witnesses uniformly found disappointing. Dr Moelling
told us that Germany spent only 1.5% of GDP on defence.
Ambassador Burns was particularly critical, arguing that Germany
should make a greater commitment to collective defence and modernisation
of its own military forces. In Afghanistan, Germany had initially
refused to deploy its troops to combat areas and use them for
combat purposes, which had been a "bitter disappointment"
for US commanders and civilians.
He thought Germany should be able to field an army, air force,
and navy that could stand separately but, because of weak defence
budgets and a lack of commitment from its political leaders to
a modern defence establishment, it had become a drag on NATO.
Other American witnesses expressed similar frustrations over the
German position, especially its role in Afghanistan and on its
stance over Libya, although Germany had been helpful in "backfilling"
during the Libyan campaign, keeping US bases functional.
Etienne de Durand also commented on the problem of German political
will, which affected Germany's ability to deploy its troops without
caveats. The political culture was different and he did not think
Germany would move quickly in the direction of collective defence.
56. Dr Moelling explained the German perspective.
In terms of territorial defence, Germany would always be with
its allies, but it might not always be if the question was one
of protecting strategic interests around the globe using military
force. To convince German public opinion of the need for military
action, it would always be necessary to make a good case. The
German armed forces were fully-fledged militarily and had demonstrated
their ability to fight in all operations in Afghanistan. However,
the political perspective was different. An armed forces reform
was underway whose outcome was difficult to determine, especially
as elections were due in 2013. Overall, the budget level was likely
to remain the same. He posed the question: if Germany spent 2%
of its GDP, or 50 billion, on defence, would others feel
threatened? Dr Moelling thought that it was not possible
to tell if the German position over Libya was likely to be repeated
in future and he recommended engaging with Germany in a constructive
manner and explaining that their worldwide economic interests
did not stand alone but would inevitably be accompanied by security
57. Germany is Europe's economic powerhouse.
But in the military area, it does not fulfil its potential despite
a large defence budget in absolute terms. It is a precondition
that Germany becomes a more active participant in European defence
matters, able to engage on similar terms to the UK and France,
if the EU is to have an effective security and defence policy.
NATO would benefit equally.
Missions and operations
58. The majority of the EU's missions so far
have been civilian ones, or a combination of civilian and military.
Of the current 13 missions and operations, only 3 are military
(see Box below). Nick Pickard described two types of EU military
contribution: the case where a largely civilian operation required
military logistic support or protection in order to operate effectively
or sustain itself and where the EU's civilian and military tools
were brought together. The other was a purely military operation
where the US or NATO did not want to engage
(see paras 76 to 78 below.) General Syrén rated the EU's
military missions as a success and believed that in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), the EU had prevented genocide. In Somalia,
as a result of the EU's current training mission, 1,800 trainers
or soldiers were making a difference to the situation in Mogadishu.
For an operation to be successful, he said it should be in place
quickly, have a clear aim, end date and handover.
Pierre Vimont added that in an operation with a military dimension,
those operating on the ground should be given operational flexibility.
EU Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP) missions and operations
Current missions and operations
(3 military, 10 civilian):
- EUFOR Althea, Bosnia-Herzegovina (since December
- EUNAVFOR Naval Force Atalanta, anti-piracy operation
off the coast of Somalia (since December 2008)
- EUTM Training Mission Somalia, based in Uganda
(since April 2010)
- EUPM (Police Mission) Bosnia and Herzegovina (since
- EUSEC (Security Sector Reform Mission) Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), (since June 2005)
- EUJUST LEX (Justice Sector Mission) Iraq (since
- EUBAM (Border Assistance Mission) Ukraine/Moldova
(since November 2005)
- EUBAM RAFAH (Border Assistance Mission) Occupied
Palestinian territories (since November 2005)
- EUPOL COPPS (Police Mission) Occupied Palestinian
territories (since January 2006)
- EUPOL (Police Mission) Afghanistan (since June
- EUPOL (Police Mission) DRC (since July 2007)
- EULEX (Rule of Law Mission) Kosovo (since February
- EUMM (Monitoring Mission) Georgia (since October
Past EU Missions and Operations:
- Operation Concordia, Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM) (2003)
- Artemis, DRC (2003)
- EUFOR, DRC (2006)
- EUFOR Chad (2008-09)
- EUPOL PROXIMA (Police Mission) FYROM (2004-05)
- EUJUST THEMIS (Rule of Law Mission) Georgia (2004-05)
- EU AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission) Indonesia (2005-06)
- EU support for AMIS (African Union Mission to Sudan,
- EUPOL (Police Mission) Kinshasa DRC (2005-07)
- EUPAT (Police Advisory Team) FYROM (2006)
- EUSSR (Security Sector Reform Mission) Guinea Bissau
59. Walter Stevens, Director, CMPD, told us that
what determined whether a mission was military or civilian was
the nature of the activity. A military mission would mostly involve
ships or "boots on the ground." Civilian missions were
funded from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget,
while military missions were funded by the contributing Member
States, or by the 2004 Athena mechanism which provided reimbursement
of certain costs (see Box 4 below). The successful EUSEC mission
in the DRC advising the Congolese authorities how to reform their
army, was a civilian mission paid for from the CFSP budget, but
carried out by military means: it was headed by a Portuguese general
and all the members were military.
Robert Cooper, EEAS, commented that the use of military personnel
was expensive and sometimes inappropriate, when a gendarmerie-style
force, for example, would be preferable.
We were also told that the Germans were unhappy with missions
funded from common costs as they paid disproportionately for CSDP
missions which were calculated on the basis of GDP (see para 71
60. Lieutenant General Ton van Osch, Director-General
of the EU Military Staff, told us of other budget complications
which the EU's comprehensive approach should be used to solve.
The EU's action in the Horn of Africa consisted of an anti-piracy
military mission at sea, training for soldiers on land and participation
in regional maritime capacity building. Navies could undertake
part of the maritime training, but defence budgets could not be
used to buy the ships which were needed for use in training with
a simulator, which would be funded from a development budget.
Coordination such as this in the EU's comprehensive approach would
determine the success of an EU military mission. In the same way,
the EU's ability to combine agreements with regional countries
to put suspected pirates on trial helped to make the naval anti-piracy
operation (Atalanta) successful.
61. A recurring theme from our witnesses was
the inability of Member States to meet their own ambitions or
plans. Walter Stevens told us that, as crisis management concepts
were developed, discussions with Member States on what they could
offer, and what was important to them, revealed that "there
is a huge gap between a theoretical solution of a crisis ... and
what is realistically possible." The current budgetary problems
for all states meant that it was increasingly difficult to find
sufficient capacity for existing missions, let alone new ones.
Pierre Vimont said it was necessary to solve the contradiction
between launching new missions which Member States seemed to want,
and the reality of getting the resources for existing operations.
As an illustration, the Minister told us that, at the time of
the September 2011 Defence Ministers' meeting, only 1,200 of the
2,200 troops had been delivered for Operation Althea (Bosnia),
and Operation Atalanta (anti-piracy) was short of a ship. The
EU mission in Uganda training soldiers for Somalia could not deliver
a single medical officer across the EU to care for the trainers.
He thought that CSDP missions needed better integrated planning,
with clear targets, defined benefits, outcomes and exit strategies.
62. The EU's track record of under-resourcing
civilian missions must not be repeated in the military field.
If the EU is to undertake military missions it must be on the
basis that they will be resourced on a scale that is commensurate
to the need. CSDP must be able to deliver when it is needed on
a scale that is appropriate.
The Athena mechanism, established in 2004, is a permanent
mechanism to administer the financing of the 'common costs' of
EU operations with military or defence implications. Common costs
are defined as:
- Headquarters implementation and running costs
- Incremental costs for supporting the force as a
whole (infrastructure to enable the deployment to take place;
EU signs and flags etc; medical services; satellite imagery)
- Incremental costs of EU use of assets belonging
to NATO or another third party.
The Council can also authorise some additional costssuch
as transporting troops to and from theatre, or the cost of a multinational
task force headquartersto be met through the Athena mechanism.
decides on common funding for military operations
undertaken by the EU in support of a third state or organisation
on a case-by-case basis.
Three active EU military operations are currently
funded through the Athena mechanism: EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and
ATALANTA to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia,
and the EU Training Mission in Somalia.
With the exception of Denmark (which has opted out
of the CSDP on military matters), Member States contribute to
Athena in proportion to the size of their economycontributions
are calculated according to a Gross National Income scale and
varies from year to year. The total common cost of the operations
funded by Athena for 2011 was 34.7 million, of which the
UK share was 4.9 million. The equivalent figure for France
was approximately 5.8m, and for Germany, approximately 7.2m.
Those costs which do not come under the definition
of common costs are borne by the Member States participating in
the mission, under the principle that "costs lie where they
fall". It was calculated in 2006 that common costs accounted
for less than 10% of the total cost of an EU military mission.
63. EU Battlegroups are a relatively new concept
for pairs of battalion-sized forces (1,500 troops) with combined
arms, on standby on a rotational basis and capable of being launched
in an operation "within 5 days of approval by the Council
in response to a crisis or to an urgent request by the UN, to
undertake simultaneously two battlegroup-size operations sustainable
for a maximal period of 120 days. Forces should be on the ground
no later than 10 days after the decision to launch the operation".
The first Battlegroups were formed at full operating capacity
in 2007. They have never been deployed.
64. Nick Pickard (FCO) told us that the Battlegroup
concept was based on a 2003 EU operation in the DRC (Artemis)
which had been put into place rapidly.
Alison Stevenson (MOD) explained that the concept was also to
improve the capability of Member States. Battlegroups could be
formed of troops of one nation, but should ideally come from a
number of states. Two Battlegroups would always be on standby.
The UK supported them as it believed that they drove activity
to make Member States contribute more to CSDP and to transform
their capabilities. The UK also believed in pairing a militarily
capable nation with a nation striving to improve its capabilities.
This gave the potential for several different nations to achieve
65. We asked what use Battlegroups served, given
that they had not been deployed. Professor Menon gave a pessimistic
view and believed they were sometimes "fictional". He
cited as examples German unwillingness to deploy following a UN
request in 2008 for assistance in Darfur, Sudan, though he acknowledged
that Germany's participation in a new Battlegroup consisting of
the "Weimar Triangle" countries, was a positive sign.
He also claimed that, despite British Government assertions to
the contrary, their Battlegroup had in fact not been available,
because it was composed of troops returning from Iraq and preparing
to go to Afghanistan.
The Minister, however, denied this when we put it to him, and
said that UK Battlegroups had been available to deploy in 2005,
2008 and 2010.
Etienne de Durand was also critical: while Battlegroups could
be good for force generation and useful for some countries, they
were too small to be useable, there was no political agreement
to use them and they had been created to hide the failure of the
Headline Goals, which had never been met.
Professor Menon also pointed out that the more Member States
there were in a Battlegroup, the more legitimate it looked politically,
but larger numbers meant greater potential difficulties in deciding
66. We sought information on the kind of situation
in which witnesses could envisage deployment of a Battlegroup.
Lieutenant General van Osch told us that the EU had made preparations
for a military operation (EUFOR Libya) to support an eventual
UN humanitarian operation in Libya, had this been requested by
the UN. The potential task of clearing, repairing and running
a harbour or airport for access for aid would have been ideal
for a Battlegroup. He had seen three other occasions when Battlegroups
could have been used. They had not been deployed, because of political
problems, and he could not comment further as the questions had
arisen "within a prudent planning phase."
We were also told by General Syrén that the air element
of the Nordic Battlegroup had been used as a surveillance force
in the Libya operation.
Other places where they could have been used were to help to calm
the situation during elections in Kinshasa in 2006 or in South
Sudan in 2010.
Professor Chalmers thought deployment could be possible following
a request from the UN to stabilise the situation in a future emergency.
It might, however, involve a rearrangement of troops, and not
necessarily the precise Battlegroups on standby.
67. Walter Stevens told us that the CMPD was
examining how Battlegroups, or elements of them, could be used.
One possibility was as an "over-the-horizon" force,
to support missions and operations, but this was not easy for
Member States. Command and control of the troops were the preserve
of the States which formed the Battlegroup, but to support an
EU operation they would need to come under the commander of that
problem identified by Nick Pickard was the narrow parameters for
Battlegroups which meant that the specific scenario did not occur
68. We asked our witnesses how well prepared
the Battlegroups were for deployment, should the occasion arise.
General Syrén told us that the Battlegroups varied, but
they were in line with the basic concept, were "good enough"
and, in his view, useable. The MOD explained that it was difficult
to be specific about how much training was undertaken by individual
Battlegroups, and different Battlegroups undertook different types
of training. The EU did not lay down standards and Battlegroups
were self-certifying, in contrast to NATO where standards were
agreed and certification was an external process. Laying down
standards might be a disincentive for some Member States to contribute.
However, Alison Stevenson believed that countries on the Battlegroup
roster were properly trained and equipped for whatever they might
be asked to do; Battlegroups on the roster for the second half
of 2011, for example, (see Table 1 below) were capable of deployment,
but political will would be needed.
69. We enquired about the other purported purpose
of Battlegroups and whether their formation had in fact led to
improvements in capabilities. Sir Peter Ricketts believed
that their formation had been a driver for increased capacity;
peer pressure persuaded Member States to form Battlegroups, to
join the rotation and be prepared to deploy them.
Lieutenant General van Osch also believed that Battlegroups increased
the military capabilities of countries; the higher probability
that they would be used and the fact that they would be inspected
from outside created pressure on them to do well. Many colleagues
with no previous experience of expeditionary missions had been
pressurised into developing this capability by being forced through
the Battlegroup model.
Professor Chalmers noted that the Battlegroup concept had
its greatest purchase on smaller states which would not otherwise
plan for deployments of this size, adding to their capabilities.
Walter Stevens commented that Battlegroups were sometimes uneven
in quality, but they pulled up those Member States who were lagging
behind. There was advantage also in the involvement in Battlegroups
of non-EU partner countries, such as Ukraine.
70. Several witnesses referred to the excellence
of the Nordic Battlegroup, led by Sweden. General Syrén,
who had been Swedish Chief of Defence at the time of its formation,
told us that he had taken the opportunity to use the Battlegroup
as a tool to transform the Swedish armed forces. This had led
to a different personnel manning system, abolition of the conscription
system, and changes to the hitherto slow procurement process.
Instead of waiting for a threat, the Swedes were ready to "go
out there and do something."
Dr Moelling also thought that the Germans aimed to use their
Battlegroup as a driver to develop their own capability and to
modernise. They had also learnt to cooperate better in Europe.
71. General Syrén criticised the funding
system for Battlegroups, which meant that some Member States were
reluctant both to organise them, which was expensive, and subsequently
to use them. Work was in progress on this problem.
Walter Stevens pointed out that the high cost of transport was
also a problem, and there were currently two or three gaps in
the Battlegroup roster. The suggestion to use more of the CFSP
budget to compensate part of the costs (allowances, part of the
salaries and equipment) was difficult to envisage within the current
regulations. Proposals to introduce common costs had created serious
problems for Member States, in particular the UK and Germany whose
costs would increase.
Professor Menon said that the allocation of common costs
on a GDP scale meant that Germany could pay more for deployments
than participating countries, when it did not deploy itself (see
para 59 and Box 4 above on the ATHENA mechanism).
Edgar Buckley thought that it was time to review the issue of
costs lying where they fell though common funding could cause
problems for the UK.
72. In a development since we heard the evidence
from Walter Stevens, the Minister told us that the EU had reviewed
the Athena mechanism for common funding, including costs for Battlegroup
strategic lift. He said that a Council Decision, while protecting
the UK's position on any permanent expansion of the mechanism,
had agreed an extension of the mechanism until December 2013 on
a contingency basis, to meet Battlegroup deployment costs from
common funds. The purpose was to encourage nations to fill slots
on the roster and to enable Battlegroups to go into action, but
it would not fund the capability itself. The UK was not prepared
to extend common funding further because it would find itself
paying twicefor its independent requirement and other nations'
requirements as well.
73. Battlegroups were intended as the hard
edge of the EU's CSDP, particularly in the crisis management role.
If they are to perform this function they must be operationally
deployable, made up of national contingents that are capable of
working well together, enjoy stability in terms of combinations
of Member States, and be tested and audited for readiness, as
is NATO practice.
74. When circumstances next arise which would
justify the deployment of an EU Battlegroup, the decision should
be taken to deploy. Failure to do so will seriously weaken the
credibility of CSDP.
EU Battlegroup roster from Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) to Full Operating Capability (FOC)
||Member States (& Third States)
||Battlegroup Lead Nation
||Preferred OHQ / Force HQ
|Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal
|France, Germany, Belgium
|Germany, Netherlands, Finland
|Italy, Hungary, Slovenia
|Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus
|Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia
|Spain, France, Germany, Portugal
|Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg
|Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal
|Czech Republic, Slovakia
|Poland, Germany, Latvia, Slovakia, Lithuania
|Italy, Romania, Turkey
|Spain, France, Portugal
|Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Austria, Lithuania
|Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Ireland
|Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, Ukraine
|Portugal, Spain, France, Italy
|France, Belgium, Luxembourg
|Italy, Slovenia, Hungary
|Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ireland
|Poland, Germany, France
|UK, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania
|Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus
|Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain
The EU-NATO relationship
75. We asked our witnesses about the relationship between
the EU and NATO, given that they share substantially the same
membership and the same problems over capabilities.
Professor Menon said that the two organisations suffered
from the same problem: they could not force Member States to do
things they did not want to.
The EU and NATO Membership
76. We asked particularly if the two organisations had reached
an agreement on a division of roles. Our witnesses were quite
clear that NATO was the organisation of choice if a large-scale
military operation was envisaged in which the US wished to be
involved, such as the Libyan operation.
Etienne de Durand told us that most European nations were more
comfortable using NATO for "hard defence" and combat
missions than they were using CSDP.
If the US did not wish to lead or be involved, European nations
could take the lead, using NATO facilities, as had happened in
the Libya campaign (but see paras 80-81 below). For smaller operations,
such as the anti-piracy operation, the EU might need to operate
on its own.
77. Nick Pickard thought that Europe had shown
progress over the last 10 years in its military response to those
problems where the US did not want to play a leadership role.
In Bosnia and the Balkans it had taken a year and a half for Europeans
to agree to take military action. In the case of Libya it had
taken weeks. A
number of witnesses saw a niche role for EU operations in geographical
areas where NATO involvement was not welcome, or not appropriate,
for political reasons. Sir Peter Ricketts believed that the
appearance of NATO in Africa would probably be sensitive; an EU-flagged
deployment would be more acceptable.
Xenia Dormandy thought that NATO would not have been able to accomplish
the action the EU had taken in Georgia; this type of political
constraint was recognised in the US.
Alison Stevenson pointed out that EU operations could also include
third parties which would not be possible in an organisation which
included the Americans.
78. Our witnesses also thought that the EU, with
its comprehensive approach, including development assistance or
security sector training, could tackle problems by providing for
the overall requirements of the situation in a way that NATO could
not. Sir Peter Ricketts told us that the CSDP's strength
lay in operating smaller scale, complex interventions where a
mix of political weight, economic know-how, development and sometimes
a military capacity were neededthis was the "right
niche" for the EU. He cited the examples of police training
in the Balkans, border security advice in Georgia and training
in Uganda of military officers for Somalia.
79. We asked our witnesses about cooperation
between the EU and NATO, and the operation of the 2003 Berlin
Plus arrangement, which provides for the use of NATO assets and
capabilities in support of an EU-led military operation (see Box
5 below). The Minister thought that improvement was needed in
EU-NATO cooperation and coherence and, in particular, in ensuring
that the EU's pooling and sharing and NATO smart defence initiatives
were complementary (see Chapter 5); they should focus on the development
of deployable and interoperable capabilities.
Alison Stevenson told us that the UK Government tried to
be "institution blind" on these initiatives and approached
them from the perspective of which capabilities the UK wished
to develop and where was the best forum in which to develop themindividually,
bilaterally or with NATO or the EU. The UK Government was trying
to ensure that the planning processes of both organisations were
more coherent and that duplication was avoided.
The Berlin Plus Arrangements
The "Berlin Plus" agreement
The Berlin Plus agreement refers to a December 2002
package of agreements between the EU and NATO, which were based
on an undertaking at NATO's 1999 Washington summit that the Alliance
would make its collective assets and capabilities available to
the EU. These arrangements allow EU access to NATO's planning
capacity, NATO European command options and the use of NATO assets
The two organisations agreed on mutual consultation
arrangements for efficient decision-making in the event of a crisis
which would involve the EU's Political and Security Committee
and NATO's North Atlantic Council, and the EU and NATO Military
Committees as well as the High Representative and NATO Secretary
General. They also concluded an agreement on the security of information.
Under the "Berlin Plus" agreement:
1) NATO guarantees EU access to NATO planning. At
the exploratory stage, this may involve a NATO contribution to
the work carried out by the EU Military Staff on the definition
of options (known as "military strategic options").
Subsequently, should the operation take place with use of NATO
assets and capabilities, NATO provides the operational planning
2) The EU may request that NATO makes available a
NATO European command option for an EU-led military operation.
In this case, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR)
is the primary candidate for the position of EU Operation Commander.
He will remain at Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Europe (SHAPE)
where he establishes the EU Operational Headquarters. The remaining
command elements determined by the EU (such as the EU Force Commander
and EU Force Headquarters deployed in theatre or the EU Component
Commands) may either be provided by NATO or by EU Member States.
3) The EU may request the use of NATO assets and
capabilities. To this end, NATO has established a list of assets
and capabilities that NATO would, most likely, decide to make
available to the EU.
80. Several witnesses told us about the difficulties
caused by a dispute between Turkey and Cyprus (see Box 6 below).
General Syrén told us that the dispute blocked the Berlin
Plus arrangement which only operated formally for the mission
in Bosnia, where it worked well, but he doubted whether it would
be possible to duplicate the arrangement for any other operation.
Robert Cooper described the Turkey-Cyprus dispute as "stupid".
In the field in Kosovo, ways had been found around the absence
of a formal agreement, but in Afghanistan it had been life-threatening.
Alison Stevenson pointed out that the dispute made progress difficult
in the 2003 NATO-EU Capability Group, which tried to ensure coherence
between the two organisations. Nick Pickard described how deep
the "political bugbear" of the Turkey-Cyprus issue was
for all concerned. The governments of Turkey and Cyprus ranked
the issue above some of the advances which could otherwise have
been made, demonstrating the priority they attributed to it. However,
meetings did take place at working group and policy director level.
NATO Secretary General Rasmussen and the EU High Representative,
Baroness Ashton, were working together much more effectively than
in the past. Walter Stevens, Director, CMPD, told us that he regularly
met high level NATO officials to discuss pooling and sharing and
talks were going well.
Nick Pickard also thought that, despite the problems between Turkey
and Cyprus, attempts should be made to strengthen relations between
the EU and NATO, not least because acting separately risked people's
lives in theatres where the EU and NATO were operating together.
General Syrén also told us that, at a conference arranged
by NATO in 2011, with keynote speakers from the EU Military Committee,
the EDA and NATO, the messages had been very similar.
Problems caused by the Turkey-Cyprus dispute
Although the Berlin Plus exists to give the EU access
to assets owned by NATO, a political stand-off between Turkey
and Cyprus currently prevents the two organisations working together
as originally envisaged. The main blockage on the NATO side has
been caused by Turkey which sought increased participation in
CSDP by the non-EU European NATO Allies as a condition of its
agreement, and as part of its campaign for EU membership. It also
wanted assurance that, if Cyprus acceded to the EU as a divided
island, the Greek Cypriots would not be able to use CSDP against
their Turkish neighbours in the north. (Cyprus subsequently joined
the EU in 2004). When the arrangement was set up in December 2002,
the EU decided that the Berlin Plus arrangements would apply only
to those EU Member States that were NATO Allies or members of
NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme (at the time, Austria,
Finland, Ireland and Sweden. Malta subsequently joined, in 2008).
NATO's North Atlantic Council took a similar decision, but Turkey
insisted on excluding Malta and Cyprus from the Berlin Plus arrangements
and also from wider aspects of EU-NATO strategic cooperation.
The position now is that Cyprus blocks Turkey's engagement
with the EU and Turkey blocks Cyprus's engagement with NATO. The
EU accepts that Cyprus cannot participate in EU-led operations
with access to NATO assets and capabilities under Berlin Plus.
Some Member States contest its exclusion from EU-NATO aspects
of capability development, which is also a Berlin Plus issue,
as discrimination against a Member State. These Member States
refuse to conduct wider EU-NATO business which excludes Cyprus,
and the Turks refuse to do so with Cyprus. Papers released by
the NATO staffs to the EU Military Staff cannot be circulated
to all 27 Member States and certain partners find it unacceptable
for them to be circulated excluding Cyprus. Formal joint meetings
of the two organisations cannot take place except to discuss existing
Berlin Plus operations (effectively Operation Althea in Bosnia
and Herzegovina which was launched with the agreement of Cyprus
in 2004 soon after Cyprus joined the EU.)
81. Professor Menon thought the degree of
influence wielded by Cyprus over the CSDP was "absurd."
Little pressure was placed on Cyprus by other Member States, and
this could be ratcheted up.
We asked our American witnesses whether the US could influence
the parties. Xenia Dormandy told us that the US now had little
leverage over Turkey; other Turkey-related issues took precedence
in US national interests and Turkish foreign policy was becoming
more autonomous. Moreover, the EU "has not given us much
to work with."
Ambassador Burns thought both governments should be asked to be
82. NATO is still the only credible defence
community capable of the territorial defence of Europe, and of
engaging in those conflicts that are complex, medium or large
scale, or require sophisticated operations. It is essential that
the US continues to participate in the defence of Europe through
83. Europe has security issues which are,
however, more appropriately handled operationally by the EU than
by NATO. These will include humanitarian missions, mixed civilian
and military operations, geographical areas such as parts of Africa
where United States or NATO involvement may not be appropriate,
and peacekeeping. In the medium term the EU should concentrate
on these classes of operation, and ensure that they are delivered
84. In terms of military capability, what
is good for the EU is good for NATO. There is no fundamental contradiction
or competition. Military expenditure and capability are determined
by individual sovereign states. 21 nations are members of both
the EU and NATO. If those nations improve their military capability
both organisations benefit, but most of all Europe as a whole,
together with the United States, itself will benefit.
85. Arguments about how military capability
in Europe is delivered, through NATO, EU, bi-laterally, or multi-laterally,
should not distract from the important task of increasing the
military capability of the whole. The important issue is that
Europe pulls its weight in its security and defence interests.
86. UK Governments have been reluctant to
commit to EU defence. They tend towards an approach that suggests
that more EU means less NATO. In our view, more EU capability
also means more NATO capability, but the tasks of each should
be clearly defined. We believe that the current balance of tasks
between NATO and the EU is a sensible one.
87. Since the reintegration of France into
NATO's military structures the UK and France have near identical
interests in EU defence and security and, given their dominance
in this area, should together take a lead.
88. We emphasise the need for a proper relationship
between the EU and NATO. It is essential that the difficulties
caused by the Turkey-Cyprus dispute for EU-NATO coordination should
be resolved. We do not underestimate the difficulties of tackling
intransigent attitudes on both sides of the dispute, but it not
only sours the whole area of European security and defence, it
also puts the lives of personnel in the field at risk. EU Member
States and their NATO allies must put additional pressure on both
countries to allow the problem to be resolved, and the Berlin
Plus arrangement must be available for future operations.
The defence industry
89. We asked our witnesses about the importance
of industry to the development of defence capabilities in Europe,
and whether a European defence industry existed. Sir Brian
Burridge, Finmeccanica UK, told us that a European defence industry
did exist, because there was a European defence market, and because
Member States believed that it gave them operational sovereignty
over their military capabilities. However, the nature of the business
was global. Bill Giles, BAE Systems (Brussels), added that, because
the US rules on technology transfer were strict, it was easier
to find transnational synergies in Europe. We were told, however,
that neither the EU nor NATO had a defence industrial policy as
such. Bill Giles thought that the EU was trying, through the EDA
and the Commission, to develop a sense of industrial purpose in
order to secure the retention and development of technologies
within Europe. This would reduce dependency on technologies from
elsewhere to a reasonable or minimised level.
90. Alvin Wilby, Thales UK, told us that the
UK also had an industrial base, which was made up of the UK components
of a number of large, global companies.
Rear Admiral Rees Ward, UK Aerospace, Defence, Security and Space
Industries (ADS), said that all the major defence industry players
were located in the UK, attracted by its operational sovereignty,
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and jobs situations, and the
unique openness of its markets. According to Sir Brian Burridge,
this body of knowledge gave the UK strategic value.
91. Rear Admiral Ward pointed out that governments
were the sole procurer of large-scale capabilities and that industry
therefore depended on government investment.
Dr Moelling thought that, if defence budget cuts continued,
the defence industry would leave Europe in five to 10 years time
as European market shares would shrink and the industry, as a
global player, would seek places where they could make more money.
The industry would also cut research and technology. The danger
was that, when the European economy recovered, the technology
would no longer exist.
Sir Brian Burridge thought, however, that, provided industry
could export out of Europe, the decline in European defence budgets
need not be the end for the industry there.
92. Professor Menon commented that, from
a national defence perspective, relying entirely on foreign sources
of equipment posed certain operational risks, both in the short
term in ensuring supplies during operations, and in the long term
in being able to develop new technologies. The UK needed to remain
near the front of the curve in developing new defence technologies.
He believed however that it would be too expensive to be completely
self-reliant in defence technology and he recommended talking
to major defence companies represented in the UK, though he warned
against believing that defence companies could be steered in a
particular direction. They would, rightly in his opinion, be ruled
by the market.
93. Pierre Vimont warned that, if Europe did
not join together to form a strong military industry, its competitors
would forge ahead. Despite the limited success of the A400M aircraft,
it was important to continue with such projects.
We also heard evidence that money could be saved by collaboration.
The Belgians and Dutch had approached industry together on logistic
support and achieved better prices.
Edgar Buckley thought that defence industry companies could consolidate
and reduce over-capacity in the industry. This would also need
positive government engagement, which had been recognised in the
94. Dr Moelling told us that, traditionally,
nations had not cooperated in defence industrial matters for a
number of reasons, including jobs and taxes. This inhibited effectiveness.
Etienne de Durand said that French-German-British cooperation
at a bilateral or trilateral level had worked cost-effectively
in the 1970s and products, such as Jaguar, had sold successfully.
Currently cooperation was more difficult because of the increase
in members, and the need for each country's national industry
to share in a programme. Either Member States should return to
collaboration between small groups of countries, or the EDA should
rationalise collaboration at a European level. This would involve
all Member States sacrificing parts of their national industrial
base. The UK and France had most to lose, and the Germans would
not be enthusiastic. He believed that, for industrial cooperation
to work, it was no longer possible to adopt a top-down approach
in which countries embarked on a specific programme for political
reasons. Sir Brian
Burridge believed, however, that "work share" was beginning
to change as the market became smaller.
95. We asked about the apparent contradiction
following from the CSDP aim of building a defence industrial base:
strengthening European companies could lead to cost increases,
giving governments access to less, rather than more, defence capability.
Sir Brian Burridge countered that CSDP would provide a competitive
marketplace and consequently better value for money for Member
States, but only if a benchmark for defence spending was set for
Member States; those resources must be used to modernise European
armed forces, many of which were still conscript-based and static;
and political will to deploy must exist. That had to be the driver
for obtaining value for money from defence acquisition, without
which operational focus would be lacking. The work of the EDA
and some of the capability development programmes might focus
industrial consortia on the type of military capability that nations
needed. Bill Giles
cited the example of the Eurofighter Typhoon transnational programme,
which had worked well within Europe in terms of information exchanges
and the generation of intellectual property. There was more potential
for collaborative programmes such as these but there were difficulties.
The challenge was to make the EU Member States perform collectively
in a more effective way.
96. Our witnesses commented on the optimum number
for a successful outcome in collaborative projects. Sir Peter
Ricketts pointed out that there were advantages in having many
different partners sharing the risks and burdens of new equipment
programmes, but this created more scope for delay and an increase
in costs. A balance was needed.
Rear Admiral Rees Ward thought the optimum number depended on
the size of the programme and the ability of participating nations
to produce the R&D funding. Two participants tended to be
easier but this was costly for them. Sir Brian Burridge thought
a larger number potentially caused more difficulties as each partner
came with its own priority, potentially causing more difficulties,
but unit costs would be lower if more were ordered.
97. We asked about interoperability and operational
compatibility, which seemed to be key to EUand NATOMember
States working together. Sir Brian Burridge said that, following
past experience in collaborative ventures, the defence industry
was now able to design basic projects in a way that participating
nations could retain their own "development paths without
having to leave the project."
It was, however, important to ensure that, if nations ordered
different versions of a product, they were compatible, especially
in electronics and software. The Royal Air Force had, for example,
obtained 98% availability from their Typhoon aircraft operating
out of Italian airbases during the Libyan operations because the
support system was compatible.
98. We asked about the performance of the EDA
(see also paras 25 to 27 above) in rationalising capacity in the
EU. Madame Arnould told us that the function of the EDA in the
industrial market was key. It was not a procurement agency and
could not harmonise the requirements, but through its work on
priorities and specification it could support a more consistent
definition of requirements.
Bill Giles believed that the EDA had a difficult job. Without
its own budget, it depended entirely on the will of Member States
and their interest in collaborating. It had produced no substantial
programme in its six years, which was not surprising, given that
defence procurement was a "long game." The UK had participated
very little in some of the programmes but groups of Member States
were running a number of projects in technologically important
areas. Important work for military and civil security was underway
between the EDA and the Commission on "flying unmanned aerial
systems in desegregated airspace" and on collaborative work
on chemical, biological and nuclear defence.
99. Sir Brian Burridge told us that the
EDA was seen as the agent to take pooling and sharing forward,
in particular on "high-end capability" such as smart
munitions, air-to-air refuelling and Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (ISR). Other areas on which it had worked were
pragmatic capabilities for use in Afghanistan, such as counter-IED
and the organisation of field hospitals. This was the right direction
of travel for the EDA.
Bill Giles described the EU Procurement Directive (para 27) as
a radical change and an opportunity for industry to compete and
for governments to get value for money, though it was too early
to tell what the effects would be.
100. The Minister told us that the Government
had planned to withdraw from the EDA, believing that it was not
in the interests of the taxpayer. However, in part because of
the UK-French treaty, they had decided to see first whether the
EDA could produce practical capability-enhancing projects. The
helicopter initiative, training helicopter crews, and the maritime
surveillance project, MARSUR, were encouraging.
He stressed that the UK Treasury would insist that, when
capabilities were developed with others, they represented value
for money and were interoperable.
101. It is fundamental that Europe maintains
a defence industry on which it can rely. Furthermore, we see a
strong and efficient European defence sector as a guarantor of
competition in global markets, a foundation for research, and
source of highly skilled jobs all of which will enhance European
security and prosperity.
36 QQ 167, 175 Back
Q 167 Back
The United States have 1.4 million military personnel, Russia
has 1 million. Back
Q 69 Back
QQ 98, 100 Back
Q 12 Back
Q 100 Back
Q 350 Back
QQ 345, 348, 351 Back
Q 22 Back
Q 281 Back
MOD press release 2 November 2010,
Q 345 Back
Q 33 Back
Q 43 Back
Buckley, also Burridge Q 330 Back
Q 33, also Stevenson Q 35, Back
QQ 358, 360 Back
Q 301 Back
Q 33 Back
QQ 43, 45 Back
Q 46 Back
Q 53 Back
QQ 309, 312 Back
Q 330 Back
Q 109 Back
QQ 81,82, 87, 271, 272 Back
QQ 273, 277 - 279 Back
Q 235 Back
Q 217 Back
Q 301 Back
Q 275 Back
Q 281 Back
Allin and Dormandy QQ 81, 82, also Menon Q 100 Back
Q 304 Back
QQ 293, 299 - 304, 309 Back
Q 40 Back
QQ 157,158, 162, see also Cooper Q 118 Back
Q 189 Back
QQ 133, 134 Back
Q 125 Back
Menon Q 100 Back
Q 227 Back
Q 133 Back
Q 195, also Menon Q 104 Back
Q 349 Back
QQ 345, 348, 351 Back
EU Factsheet, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups Back
Q 58 Back
Q 54 Back
Q 55 Back
The so-called Weimar Triangle (or Weimar Three) is a grouping
of Germany, France and Poland who have agreed to cooperate on
a number of subjects. Back
QQ 100, 112 Back
Q 362 Back
Q 310 Back
QQ 111, 112 Back
Q 229 Back
Q 165.MOD officials have subsequently expanded on the General's
point, advising us that these were expeditionary air assets which
were included in the Nordic EU Battlegroup package at the time. Back
Q 165 Back
Q 112 Back
QQ 135, 136 Back
Q 263 Back
MOD written evidence Back
QQ 56,57 Back
Q 9 Back
Q 229 Back
Q 112 Back
Q 141 Back
Q 163, also Menon Q 98, Chalmers Q 112, Arnould QQ 212, 213 Back
Q 310 Back
Q 163 Back
QQ 139, 141 Back
Q 100 Back
QQ 350, 351, 364 Back
Table provided by the MOD. Back
Participation pending political decision. Back
Participation pending political decision. Back
Participation pending political decision Back
Participation pending political decision Back
Belgium confirmed based on current EU Battlegroup terms, conditions
and contributions. Back
Participation pending political decision Back
Spain-Italy Amphibious Force SIAF EU Battlegroup. Back
Participation pending political decision. Back
The shared membership is Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom. Members of the EU who are not
members of NATO are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta,
Sweden. Members of NATO who are not also members of the EU are
Albania, Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the United
Q 106 Back
Howarth 346 Back
Q 295 Back
Q 69 Back
Q 10, See also Pickard QQ 39, 40 Back
Q 80 Back
Q 41, See also Dormandy Q 80 Back
Q 7 Back
QQ 42, 44 Back
QQ 172, 173 Back
QQ 126, 127 Back
Q 135 Back
QQ 42, 44, 368 Back
Q 169 Back
Information provided by MOD officials. Back
Q 106 Back
Q 84 Back
Q 286 Back
Q 337 Back
QQ 314, 315 Back
Q 316 Back
Q 320 Back
Q 296 Back
Q 320 Back
QQ 111, 103 Back
Q 194 Back
Van Osch, Q 232 Back
Q 306 Back
Q 307, also Chalmers Q 53 Back
Q 334 Back
Q 318 Back
Q 319, also Wilby Q 321 Back
Q 15 Back
Q 332 Back
QQ 326 - 327 Back
QQ 321, 322 Back
Q 216 Back
Improvised explosive devices Back
Q 323 Back
Q 354 Back
Q 359 Back