House of Lords - Nuclear Research and Development Capabilities

Nuclear Research and Development Capabilities - Science and Technology Committee Contents

CHAPTER 5: Are the UK's current R&D capabilities and associated expertise sufficient to keep the nuclear energy options open?

87. In this chapter we consider what R&D capabilities and associated expertise we need, both now and in the future, to enable the UK to act as an intelligent customer and to meet the regulatory requirements for the safe and secure supply of nuclear energy. We look first at the needs of the existing fleet and the new build programme (representing 12-16 GW of capacity) out to 2050 and then consider the implications of an extended nuclear programme (representing up to 38 GW of capacity) over this period. In examining these issues, we have drawn on extensive work which has already been undertaken, including the ERP report, the EPSRC/STFC review, and reports by the NIA,[152] NNL[153] and the Royal Academy of Engineering.[154]

Meeting our current commitments: R&D capabilities and associated expertise to meet the needs of the existing fleet and a new build programme of 12-16 GW up to 2050 and beyond

88. The existing fleet and new build programme require long-term R&D capabilities and associated expertise to enable:

the safe running of the current fleet and life extension options;
the safe operation of the new fleet for 60 years or more;
decommissioning and waste management of legacy and new build waste, including spent fuel;
continuation of the UK's reprocessing commitments up to 2018; and
implementation of the UK's geological disposal plans.

89. With regard to the existing fleet, the UK needs R&D capabilities and associated expertise to meet the challenges of ageing reactors and to assess how long they can be run safely and efficiently. Dame Sue Ion commented that, for a 12-16 GW nuclear fleet, "the R&D investment and scope is probably adequate at today's level".[155] This view is supported by the ERP report, the EPSRC/STFC review and by the Government who told us that they were "satisfied that there are the right capabilities and infrastructure to deliver the objectives [to meet the UK's current and future needs for a safe and secure supply of nuclear energy]".[156]

90. The Chief Executive of the EPSRC, Professor David Delpy, supported this position: "The simple answer to your question is that I think that we have quite a well balanced portfolio of research funded by the research councils and other agencies. The overall capability for the UK at its current level of nuclear power is adequate ... I believe that since the Government announced the decision about further growth and investment in nuclear power, that investment has enabled us to provide the skilled manpower that we certainly need in the initial stages. The rapid growth in the funding from us and the energy programme will enable the UK to meet its current demands".[157] Professor Adrian Smith, Director General for Knowledge and Innovation at BIS, and the Minister for Universities and Science shared that view.[158]

91. The ERP report, however, highlighted two important caveats to this assessment. The first relates to the age profile of the expert nuclear workforce (considered immediately below) and the second concerns the presence of gaps in the research base (considered in paragraphs 101 to 104 below).

AN AGEING WORKFORCE

92. The UK's nuclear capability is vulnerable because it is dependent on an ageing workforce which is thinly spread with little depth in many areas due to a lack of investment in the last few decades (as discussed in paragraphs 10 to 35 above). NNL told us: "most of our experts are of the older age, so, 45 plus. In the next five years we will lose 93 of our staff … Many of those are experts who could be classed as both national and international experts".[159] This is perhaps the reason for Professor Delpy's comment that the research base will be able to provide the skilled manpower only for the "initial stages" of the nuclear programme and not in the longer term. Dr Weightman also told us that the capabilities were only "sufficient for now" and that "when we look towards the future and look at our demographics, as a regulator, as an industry and perhaps as a nation, we need to have a basis for the future as well". He went on: "we are living off our past capability; our reputation is built on some of our past capability, and our ability to operate internationally is built on that as well. We have people available who have international reputations, but they grew up in a system that had a wide research base."[160] In terms of responding to international incidents and protecting citizens wherever they are in the world, he said: "we need the capability to understand the technologies around the world ... and the ability to develop world-class people for the future so that we can still look after our own facilities properly but also act as a world leader where we can".[161]

93. Professor Laurence Williams, of the University of Central Lancashire and the Government Chief Nuclear Inspector from 1998 to 2005, also expressed concern about the UK's ability to sustain its R&D capability and associated expertise in the longer term: "if we do not do something about it we will not have it available in 20 years' time";[162] and the Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA), Professor Sir John Beddington, agreed. He told us that "to deal with the Japanese disaster in Fukushima, I was calling on people who were very senior in their organisations, who had worked in the nuclear industry for a very substantial time". He had "real concerns" that if some sort of problem like Fukushima occurred in Europe, the UK may not have "people with the experience of the industry" to contribute in the future.[163] Given that the nuclear sector is reliant on the research base, not only for research but also for training and the supply of a steady flow of graduates to join the workforce, and that it can take years to produce suitably qualified and experienced personnel (SQEP) in the field with industry experience, we find this particularly worrying (see paragraphs 118 to 130 below).

R&D CAPABILITY AND ASSOCIATED EXPERTISE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIC TO THE NEW BUILD PLANS

94. The reactor designs incorporated into the UK's current new build programme involve buying in mature technologies which have been demonstrated to be safe and secure. It is argued, therefore, by, for example, Westinghouse Electric Company, that the new reactors will not require significant basic R&D to allow them to be built and operated in the UK.[164] Other witnesses, however, argued that a significant number of R&D needs, linked to the safe operation of the reactors, remained. Professor Sherry, for example, said that "the building of the PWRs is just the beginning. ... [they] have to operate and be maintained for 60 years",[165] and there was still a need for research to understand the effects of radiation on materials within the new reactor designs, over the length of their operation.[166] The Cambridge Nuclear Energy Centre referred to the R&D capabilities and associated expertise required to look at reducing costs, life extension, alternative fuel systems, passive systems development and more robust fuels.[167] Professor Andrew Taylor, Director of ISIS, the pulsed neutron and muon source at the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory in Oxfordshire, told us that such research would require more nuclear engineers in the UK: "This is not about understanding the nucleus; we understand that rather well. Doing engineering with nuclear materials is the area that we need to address".[168]

95. Professor Williams questioned also whether the UK had "got the research and development to understand the safety implications of new fuel designs, not only in terms of operation but in how they respond under fault conditions". In his view, the UK needs the research capability "to undertake the monitoring—for example, of steel samples to understand how the steel in the reactors is changing in relation to extended use".[169] Other witnesses also referred to gaps in R&D capabilities for health and safety research.[170] Dame Sue Ion, for example, said that the UK was "lacking in numbers in those with in depth expertise born of many years involvement in BWR systems and LWR systems more generally. What we have is concentrated in a relatively small number of individuals either already retired or at the upper end of their working careers."[171]

96. According to Serco Energy, the current capabilities, although adequate, were at a minimum level:

"With current trends, the UK will just be able to procure and licence Generation III reactors intelligently. ... the current UK R&D capabilities ... have reduced significantly over the past few years. Many experienced staff have retired, or are reaching retirement ... The laboratories and test rigs have declined at least as rapidly and have not been effectively replaced by access to facilities in other countries". [172]

97. Mr Ric Parker from Rolls Royce and others felt that more needed to be done.[173] He told us that although recent efforts to increase R&D efforts were a big improvement on a few years ago—with a considerable increase in effort in the universities and in the UK generally—there were still some major gaps. He went on: "We do not want to get ourselves to a position where our skill base gets so low in the UK that we are totally reliant on China or India for our support and the safety of our reactors, going forward."[174]

98. The Government told us, however, that because nuclear is a mature technology and the UK does not have reactor vendors, they were not sponsoring research into Generation III technology.[175] It was, they said, for the operators and vendors to do the research necessary to prove it was safe to the satisfaction of the regulators and to improve it in whatever way they believe to be appropriate.[176] This seems to us to be indicative of a lack of understanding about why we need sufficient R&D capabilities and associated expertise in the UK. As Dame Sue Ion said, "the opinion that, because you are buying something that is already developed, you do not need to do any R&D at all" is flawed; "all the rest of the world ... is buying the self-same systems and yet they do not absent themselves from R&D on those systems. You require a nationally competent workforce ... and regulator".[177] Professor Williams made a similar point: "You have to understand the technology that you are actually operating; you cannot just abdicate that to a third party ... You have to take responsibility. That means that, in the United Kingdom, the nuclear inspectors who will be available in 2050 probably have not even been born yet. We need to think about a sustainable system ... to ensure that we can produce well-trained, well-educated scientists and engineers and other disciplines to underpin this demanding technology".[178]As Dame Sue Ion pointed out, this does not happen in a vacuum: "you get the skills base to service both the utilities and the vendors, ... and the regulators, by building the expertise and the skills pipeline and by having a sensible R&D programme that services today's systems as well as tomorrow's".[179]

99. We do not believe that the UK has sufficient R&D capabilities and associated expertise to be able to cope with the current nuclear programme up to 2050, let alone a significantly extended programme. This is because the UK's current R&D capability is, to a significant extent, based upon an ageing pool of experts built on past investments in R&D. This means that in a few years' time, there will be crucial gaps in capabilities.

100. A new stream of experts will need to be generated in the near future if the UK is to retain sufficient capabilities to be an intelligent customer and regulator in the future up to 2050. It takes years to develop a significant cadre of suitably trained experts with industry experience and the sector is reliant on the research base to train these experts. Sufficient investment in the research base will therefore be necessary in order to make up for the lack of investment in the last two decades.

101. The evidence we received demonstrates a significant difference of opinion between, on the one hand, the Secretary of State and some senior Government officials who appear to believe that no action is required to sustain the nuclear research base and, on the other hand, other stakeholders, including the GCSA and DECC CSA, who argue that serious action is required. The Government's view that the need for R&D capabilities and associated expertise in the future will be met without Government intervention is troublingly complacent. (We make recommendations about how to ensure that such R&D capabilities and associated expertise are maintained in the future in paragraphs 131 to 143 below.)

Additional gaps in research capabilities

FACILITIES FOR STUDYING IRRADIATED MATERIALS

102. Serco Energy suggested that international vendors planning to build nuclear plants in the UK would also require significant assistance from UK R&D facilities, not for fundamental design, but for detailed or site-specific investigations or to underpin the claims made in the safety cases[180] for these reactors.[181] Professor Williams agreed that the UK needed "facilities not only to produce fuels that might be needed for extended use in reactors but also to have the ability to do … post-irradiation examination ..."—unfortunately, "gradually over the years the United Kingdom's facilities have declined".[182] (We make recommendations about filling this gap in capabilities in paragraphs 174 to 185 below.)

LEGACY AND EXISTING SYSTEMS WASTE

103. We also need R&D capabilities and associated expertise to enable us to deal with the large quantity of legacy waste generated from the existing fleet.[183] According to the NDA, "there are sufficient R&D capabilities in place from the NDA estate and other technology suppliers in the UK and internationally to ensure the current safe delivery of our mission".[184] Professor MacKay agreed.[185] Some witnesses, however, suggested that there were gaps. Dame Sue Ion told us, for example, that: "significant additional work must be sponsored to underpin work to disposition the UK's plutonium stocks, to pave the way for a geological repository and to develop waste forms and processes to deal with the UK's historic legacy and existing systems".[186] Serco Energy, NNL and others shared this view, and stressed that significant geological research would be required for the disposal programme.[187]

104. We put the discrepancy between the views of the research community and those of the Government to Professor William Lee, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM). He suggested that the Government's assessment was based on meeting their immediate needs and that, although R&D capabilities and associated expertise were adequate to meet the present requirements for the "treatment, packaging, storage and transport of radioactive waste" (save for the need for facilities to examine highly active radioactive materials (see paragraphs 167-178 below)), they were not adequate for the longer-term requirements of, for example, "geological disposal, both from the facilities perspective and … from skills".[188] NNL also told us that longer-term R&D programmes were needed in the UK in order to maintain R&D capabilities and associated expertise in these areas.[189] (We discuss these issues further in paragraphs 186 to 191 below.)

Meeting the needs of an extended nuclear programme: R&D capabilities and associated expertise required for up to 38 GW of nuclear energy capacity up to 2050 and beyond

105. A 38 GW capacity is a higher but realistic nuclear future for the UK, where it is projected that nuclear energy could account for the supply of approximately 45-49% of the UK's electricity (see Box 2 on page 27). There was widespread agreement amongst our witnesses (and a view shared by the ERP report and the EPSRC/STFC review) that, regardless of the technologies deployed, a nuclear energy capacity of around 38 GW would require a significant increase in nuclear R&D capabilities and associated expertise in the future.[190]

106. Both the RCUK review and the ERP report suggest that, if nuclear were to be a significantly higher component of the energy portfolio in the future, fuel recycling would have to be considered, alongside the likely deployment of Generation IV in the post 2040 era (as discussed in paragraphs 47 to 49 and Box 3 on page 28). This would, according to Dame Sue Ion, require "a rethink of the Government's policy of once-through and dispose" with the need for closed fuel cycles and "an R&D programme in advanced system development including recycling of nuclear fuel".[191] This would be necessary for two reasons: first, the volume of waste produced from a once-through cycle would present substantial challenges to geological disposal; and, secondly, there would potentially be difficulties in accessing future supplies of uranium resources, given that a once-through cycle requires considerably higher quantities of fuel and the uncertainties surrounding the size of the global supplies of, and demand, for uranium in the future.[192]

107. However, many witnesses, including the Government, took the view that up to 2050, the majority of nuclear electricity supply, regardless of the quantity, is likely to be through Generation III nuclear plant rather than Generation IV (because of the relatively early stage of development of Generation IV technology) and that uranium would not be a limiting resource over this period (see paragraphs 47 to 49 and Box 3 on page 28). They argued therefore that R&D capabilities and associated expertise in advanced reactor systems and fuel recycling need not be a primary consideration up to the middle of the century.

108. We believe that this argument for not supporting R&D on Generation IV technologies or advanced fuel recycling is fundamentally flawed. First, regardless of the technology used, fuel recycling R&D capabilities and associated expertise for the higher capacity scenarios would still be required due to the sheer volume of fuel involved. For this reason, the ETI has recommended that the UK should focus R&D efforts not only on addressing the critical cost drivers of the manufacturing supply chain capacity for Generation III, but also on the uranium supply capacity and fuel processing to mitigate any issues that may affect the Generation III plant.[193] Secondly, within the next 30 to 40 years, the UK may start procuring Generation IV reactors as their use grows globally, irrespective of whether the UK is in the lead in the development of this technology. Given that this is a viable future option, albeit uncertain, it would be "prudent", as Professor Fitzpatrick told us, to begin investing now in "the knowledge and skills base that will support the development, analysis, purchase and operation" of such reactors in the future.[194] Professor Williams also argued that:

"the United Kingdom needs to be involved, not only to fashion and influence the various options for the different reactor designs that will potentially be available to us in 20 years' time, but also to ensure that there is a strong understanding of safety and an increasing understanding of security as well [which] can have a significant impact on the design of a plant".[195]

109. The ONR and others also stressed the need for the UK to be involved in programmes developing future technologies to be able to understand and regulate such technologies in the future.[196] Dr Weightman told us "from a regulatory perspective, I would want to be able to keep knowledge and experience and keep my people up to speed with developing technologies, so that not only can we understand them but we can also influence them to ensure that safety is built in from the start"; he also said that this would be beneficial in terms of providing expert advice to the "60 new nations that want to get involved in nuclear power"[197] who came to the UK "for assistance in developing nuclear technologies and the nuclear regulatory approach".[198]

110. Furthermore, as Dr Adrian Simper, Director of Strategy and Technology at the NDA and others stated: "Generation IV … supports the development of experience and expertise that will better support ... the proposed new build fleet".[199] The EPSRC/STFC review suggested also that the best way to maintain teaching capacity was to continue to support research and development in universities in cutting-edge areas such as Generation IV technology and advanced fuel cycles.[200]

111. However, the Government told us that, given that the preferred option is to buy in the technology from outside, the UK was, in their view, sufficiently involved in Generation IV activities through the Euratom Programme and the research councils. Mark Higson, Chief Executive of the OND at DECC, said: "the Government is sensibly positioned ... to continue to take a view about whether and in what timeframe these technologies are likely to become deployable"; in his view, "if Generation IV was required to build a very large nuclear programme ... there would be time for that to be phased in … there is a stage when it is important to keep a watching brief on technologies. I think there is another stage when it is important to make more significant investments if you want to get commercial advantage".[201]

112. But this misses the point. It takes years to build these capabilities and Mr Higson's answer fails to address the concern that the Government should be involved in Generation IV R&D now if they are to be able to act as an intelligent customer and regulator in the future. Serco Energy expressed this concern in the following way:

"Generation IV technologies generally push the physics and engineering conditions of existing plant to higher levels, [in that] Generation IV designs generally have higher temperatures, higher pressures, more corrosive environments, and generally more materials challenges than exist in today's plants. Currently, the UK has minimal participation in these developments and so will have no expertise in them when it comes to adoption of the designs. With the current position of little engagement, the UK would be in the position of being an unintelligent customer and an uninformed regulator and a large amount of R&D would be required to endorse the technology."[202]

113. Although, in recent years, the research councils have increased their funding for R&D and associated expertise relevant to Generation IV, Dame Sue Ion and others felt that "Government attention to these issues has been, and continues to be, woefully inadequate". She went on: "the Government [have] … completely absented [themselves] from any responsibility and left it all to the market as far as next generation technologies are concerned, terminating any meaningful R&D investment in reactor systems and associated fuel cycles pre-2004".[203]

114. Professor MacKay appeared to have a more considered and far-sighted view than that of the Government:

"I think there is widespread agreement around Europe and the world that, to keep options open, energy research should always adopt a considerably wider approach than the energy policy of any particular day. Even if UK nuclear power were to be provided by Generation II and III reactors only for the next 40 years, there is still a case for supporting Generation IV research because it is a very good way to spin out other benefits. It is a way to develop and retain experts and educators who can serve the role of advisers and inspectors and who have expertise in other countries' reactors, so that when accidents occur in other countries we can give good advice to the Foreign Office. All of those roles: educators, advisers, inspectors and teachers, are needed by a Generation III programme today, so I think there are compelling arguments for involvement in advanced research along the lines of the Generation IV programme."[204]

115. We welcome Professor MacKay's comments and share the view that, if the UK is to keep the option of an increased nuclear energy capacity open in the future, the UK must be more actively involved in Generation IV R&D to gain "a seat at the table". This will enable the UK to act as intelligent customer and regulator, and also to contribute to the training and maintenance of the research base needed for both Generation III and IV reactor technologies. (We consider ways of improving the UK's involvement in Generation IV research in Chapter 6, paragraphs 163 to 173 below).

Fuel recycling and reprocessing

116. Not only will fuel recycling and reprocessing R&D capabilities and associated expertise be required in relation to Generation III and IV technologies, they will also be needed to deal with the UK's plutonium stockpile should the Government decide to reuse it, in the future, for example, as MOX fuel in a conventional LWR or as metallic fuel in a fast reactor (which also uses plutonium as the fuel and so provides an alternative to a new MOX plant).[205] Dame Sue Ion and others warned however that, although the UK was seen as having "internationally competitive resources in reprocessing and advanced recycling technologies",[206] they were at risk of being lost in the near future. Professor Graham Fairhall of NNL agreed: "In terms of the capabilities, we are particularly vulnerable in the back-end of the fuel cycle, the reprocessing side, as we go forward".[207] Given that the UK may stop reprocessing in the near future, he went on, "if we do not rejoin Generation IV programmes or do not get involved in advanced fuel cycle work, then my belief is we will start to lose our reprocessing technical capability completely".[208] Professor MacKay also took the view that current levels of research in this area were not adequate to keep the option of reprocessing open for the future.[209] He suggested that participation in Generation IV programmes or in advanced fuel cycle research would help to maintain capabilities in reprocessing.[210] The ONR told us that the Government will need to engage with "international partners with research expertise" in order to strengthen UK capability in this area if they do decide to continue reprocessing at some stage in the future.[211]

117. We find it astonishing that there are currently no plans to maintain the UK's fuel recycling and reprocessing R&D capabilities and associated expertise, given that they will be required in most future scenarios up to 2050 and beyond. (We address this issue in paragraphs 141 to 143. Who should be responsible for maintaining such capabilities is considered further in Chapter 7, paragraphs 209 to 220).

SKILLS PROVISION

118. The research base not only provides knowledge for the nuclear industry and regulator but also provides training and skilled people to work in these areas. The sector is reliant on the research base mainly for the production of graduates and postgraduates from Masters and PhD courses. EDF Energy told us that "the industry … has a continuing need for a number of people with the specialist technical skills needed to support the industry and traditionally many of these specialists have been recruited from universities offering postgraduate research where these critical nuclear skills are maintained and developed".[212] Whilst we have not considered the skills needs of the sector comprehensively, a number of issues were raised during the inquiry which we believe warrant further attention.

119. In a report entitled Next Generation—Skills for New Build Nuclear (March 2011)("the Cogent report"), Cogent, the UK's industry skills body for nuclear and other businesses set out the workforce needs of the nuclear sector to 2025 on the basis of 16 GW of new build capacity. Because of the ageing profile of the current workforce, in particular the highly skilled and more experienced parts of the workforce (where 70% will retire by 2025), Cogent estimate that the nuclear industry will require in the order of 1,000 new graduates a year up to 2025 (including Science Technology Engineering and Maths (STEM) graduates and others).[213] They also identified capacity issues with regard to the supply of apprentices, scientists and engineers, including a shortage of STEM graduates and apprentices being attracted to, and retained by, the industry. When we asked why this workforce could not be sourced from other countries, Mr Ric Parker from Rolls Royce told us that, given the current global nuclear renaissance, the global competition for this workforce was fierce—the company AREVA, were, for example, looking for 1,600 new engineers—"if we are not careful, the pot in the UK will be drained".[214]

120. The EPSRC/STFC review looked at the requirements for an increase to 30 GW capacity by 2030. Under this scenario, they anticipated that the requirement for skilled, knowledgeable personnel across the whole spectrum of top-end skills in the civil nuclear industry would increase markedly, requiring a great deal more nuclear engineering R&D and more courses in nuclear science and technology at undergraduate and postgraduate level. Professor Williams has also conducted some analysis of the future needs of the regulator (see paragraph 128). We found, however, that apart from this work, little has been done to assess requirements for a skilled workforce up to 2050 in the event of a significantly increased nuclear contribution to the energy portfolio or to meet the current requirements beyond 2025.

GRADUATES

121. When we asked Professor Delpy of the EPSRC whether the research base could provide the graduates required by the nuclear sector in the future, he commented: "I do not think that you can separate the question of the supply of scientists and engineers trained in the nuclear area from the general question of the supply of STEM graduates. The energy industries in general require a range of STEM skills, and probably only a small percentage of their need is people specifically trained in some of the specialities of nuclear energy".[215] In his view, there was not a sufficient number of STEM gradates coming in overall "who would want to go into that area as opposed to many of the other growth areas in energy, including the renewables, such as offshore wind and marine".[216] Science and engineering graduates are increasing in number according to Higher Education Statistics Agency figures, but they are sought after in the economy generally and engineering graduates in particular are in shorter supply.[217]

122. In addition to the need to encourage uptake of STEM subjects at A-level and degree level, the EPSRC/STFC review argued that there was also a need for "a significant uplift in training provision at a number of levels to support the new build programme including graduates having gained an appreciation of nuclear issues relevant to their mainstream science and engineering degree".[218] The Cogent report recommends that, in order to help resolve the supply issue, industry and the Government should expand support for foundation degree courses in nuclear topics (which will then provide a route into higher degree courses).[219] We were pleased to hear therefore that increased funding has been provided for such courses to-date and would urge the Government to accelerate work with industry and academia to increase this support in line with the needs of the sector in the future.

POSTGRADUATES

123. The EPSRC/STFC review also noted a need for more training provision at Masters and doctoral levels, recommending that the funding councils should work collaboratively to ensure an adequate supply of relevant Masters and PhD programmes. Professor Delpy thought that the current supply of postgraduates was "adequate ... but ... not generous".[220] The EPSRC has funded a number of doctoral programmes in recent years in anticipation of the new build programme,[221] including a joint Doctoral Training Centre at the Universities of Manchester and Sheffield, considered to provide an exemplar internationally. Professor Neil Hyatt, Royal Academy of Engineering and NDA Research Chair in Radioactive Waste Management at the University of Sheffield, felt, however, that more could be done and that consideration should be given to expanding this capability.[222] Others shared this view.[223]

124. When we asked Professor Delpy whether the current research base could meet the demands of a 30 GW fleet, he replied that "the number of training courses that we have currently [for a supply of skilled nuclear engineers, with a smaller number of physicists] would probably not be able to meet that requirement. However, one can switch that on relatively quickly—it requires a four-year or five-year lead time".[224]

125. We question Professor Delpy's optimism: if the Government are not giving sufficient attention to maintaining the R&D capabilities and associated expertise required in the future, we will not have the international experts in the research base to teach these courses and may not therefore be able to acquire these experts as quickly as suggested. We have been struck by the lack of attention that seems to have been given to this issue by Cogent and others, compared to the need for graduates at first degree level. No assessment appears to have been made of the overall number of Masters or PhD students currently studying nuclear engineering subjects or of the number required to support either the current new build plans or an extended programme up to 2050.[225] This is particularly worrying given that, according to the Institute of Physics, there is currently a lack of funding for MSc courses in nuclear technology (physics and engineering) due to the withdrawal of funding following the spending review,[226]a concern also raised in the EPSRC/STFC review.

126. According to Professor Williams, "there is need for a more detailed analysis of the skills needed to deliver effective nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear safeguards" which "should include the needs of all organisations including, Government departments, the nuclear licensees for all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the supply chain and the nuclear regulators".[227] We understand that Cogent is now conducting further work to understand the skills needs of the sector and we look forward to the outcome of their work.

127. As part of their ongoing work, we recommend that Cogent should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the current provision of undergraduate, Masters and PhD courses relevant to the nuclear sector to determine whether they are sufficient to meet the future needs of the research community, the regulator and industry for both the current plans for new build and an extended programme up to 2050.

REGULATORY NEEDS

128. Building on the Cogent findings, Professor Williams looked at the nuclear safety and security skills needs for the current new build plans for the regulator and provided figures for the skills needs up to 2050.[228] Professor Williams' assessment was that, to meet the regulator's needs, an estimated 60 additional graduate-level regulatory staff would be required up to 2050 in addition to the current 280 staff. He estimated that the demand for regulators would increase by an additional 70 to 210 graduate-level staff[229] up to 2050 for a significantly increased nuclear programme. Dr Weightman suggested that these figures underestimated demand and that the ONR "have had for a long time a problem with recruiting nuclear inspectors".[230] Given that the regulator needed world-class people to provide challenge to industry, recruitment was mainly from industry or senior academics, not at the graduate level.[231] In effect therefore the regulator is reliant on a healthy research base within industry and academia to train up a sufficient number of graduates to be the senior level inspectors for the future.

129. Since May 2008, the ONR have recruited 95 nuclear safety inspectors, increasing the total from 158 to 228, having lost 20 people to retirement. In the immediate future, the ONR has 77 vacancies to fill to meet the needs of the new build programme.[232] Highlighting the problem of the ageing workforce (see paragraphs 92 to 101 above), Dr Weightman observed that over 50% of the ONR's "higher level, superintending inspectors and principal inspectors, are aged 57 or over".[233]

130. The ONR's ability to recruit the additional expert staff to-date has been the result of interim arrangements on pay, which, Dr Weightman told us, "[would] stop this coming autumn".[234] There is a risk therefore that ONR may lose ground again, although the ONR reassured us that: "it was always the intention to seek continuation of special reward arrangements for nuclear specialists, if there was a business need, beyond this autumn. These are now under active consideration and it is hoped that a helpful agreement can be arrived at shortly".[235] Dr Weightman said that to allow the ONR the "flexibility" to pay their inspectors the going rate, to compete in the global market in the longer term, the ONR "need to get into a position that the Government have decided on" to convert the organisation to "a totally independent ... statutory corporation".[236] At present, DECC are planning to convert the ONR to an independent statutory corporation, through primary legislation to be introduced into Parliament for consideration in 2012. We return to this issue in paragraph 199 below.

152 Securing Investment in Nuclear in the Context of Low-Carbon Generation, NIA and KPMG, 2010. Back

153 UK Nuclear Horizon:, An independent assessment by the UK National Nuclear Laboratory, NNL, March 2011 Back

154 Generating the Future: UK Energy Systems fit for 2050, Royal Academy of Engineering , 2010. Back

155 NRD 29 Back

156 Ibid. Back

157 Q 176 Back

158 QQ 177, 365 Back

159 Q 337 Back

160 Q 475 Back

161 Q 476 Back

162 QQ 413,414 Back

163 Q 90 Back