Nuclear Research and Development Capabilities - Science and Technology Committee Contents


CHAPTER 6: Keeping the Nuclear Energy Options Open

How to maintain R&D capabilities and associated expertise to keep the options for different nuclear futures open

131.  In this chapter we consider what action needs to be taken to ensure that the UK's R&D capabilities and associated expertise are sufficient to enable a range of nuclear options to be kept open for the future.

R&D Programmes and Roadmaps

THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL R&D ROADMAP

132.  Several witnesses, including Dame Sue Ion, argued that a national programme of research was necessary—regardless of what the future may be—in order to "attract bright young people" into the field.[237] Professor Cowley expressed a similar view. He told us (in response to Mr Higson's comments quoted in paragraph 111), the Government's position to maintain a "watching brief" on Generation IV research was not adequate as "no bright young person is going to want to watch".[238] Without a meaningful programme now, according to Dame Sue Ion, the "internationally recognisable experts borne of the history of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s" will not be around to guide and inform that programme and to mentor the young people who join the sector.[239]

133.  In terms of the research base, the international energy research review conducted by the EPSRC[240] warned that, without a focused strategic R&D agenda in nuclear fission, there was a distinct possibility that the "human products" of these schemes will seek work abroad where there are more opportunities, given that, as Professor Joyce, Head of Engineering at Lancaster University, told us, at present there are "very few career opportunities [or clear career paths] for post-docs to pursue an academic career in nuclear energy research".[241]

134.  When we asked whether the current R&D programmes were adequate to provide such a draw, Professor Fitzpatrick of the Open University, said: "the programmes of research that have been initiated in the last seven years have been welcome and necessary but there needs to be urgent recognition that the research base needs to be broadened and deepened to provide a sustainable R&D base as well as a supply of skilled engineers and scientists to a growing high-technology industry".[242] This view was supported by Dr Simper of the NDA, and others who said that it was vital that R&D should be carried out into "all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle from reactor design, enrichment, fuel fabrication, spent fuel management and waste management, ... [to] generate ... national expertise and experience [to allow] us to refresh our regulatory abilities".[243]

135.  A large number of organisations fund or conduct nuclear R&D, each with their individual remits and each with an R&D programme to meet their individual needs. But, although the GCSA, Professor Sir John Beddington, acknowledged that the NDA were "doing some excellent work" and "the research councils have increased their spend substantially on nuclear fission", he said that he did not "feel comfortable that [this activity was] all joined up in an overall policy to take it forward and actually meet our R&D needs".[244] Several witnesses, for example Professor Joyce, suggested that there was currently "insufficient co-ordination and no one single body" responsible for the "oversight" of R&D capabilities and associated expertise which is evident from the significant gaps in research capabilities that we identified in key areas (see paragraphs 76 and 102 to 117).[245] Dr Weightman agreed that there was a need to take a more "co-ordinated approach" and "strategic view" and said that there was "a wider issue about applied research, more long-term strategic research and the need to underpin the UK's capability";[246] there was also a need for "everybody to co-operate and contribute, and not to leave it to some other body".[247] Others also commented that current R&D programmes were primarily focused on requirements relating to existing plant or on short-term commercial interests, with little attention being given to longer-term research or translational research necessary to underpin the UK's future energy needs. [248]

136.  As a result, witnesses were almost unanimous in their support for a Government-led, long-term national R&D roadmap to improve co-ordination, set national priorities, fill gaps in research and attract the brightest and best into the sector—with the overall aim of maintaining necessary R&D capabilities and associated expertise.[249] It was also suggested by Mr Allen of the TSB that encouraging private sector investment in longer-term nuclear R&D required such a roadmap from the Government to "clearly articulate its future priorities, providing a framework that allows the funding agencies in particular to work with industry to actually join up the TRL[s] [Technology Readiness Levels]... from basic through to applied research".[250] This was necessary because "at present, academia and industry are uncertain about the future of nuclear research funding and so are somewhat unwilling to commit to long term plans that are needed to develop products and services for Gen III and Gen IV technologies".[251] EDF Energy confirmed that they would "support a UK R&D strategy [or roadmap] that was based on developing long term R&D collaborations that offered economic and strategic benefits ... to its activities throughout the EDF Group".[252] The call for a nuclear R&D roadmap is not unique to this report, organisations including the TSB,[253] NNL,[254] Rolls Royce,[255] the Royal Society[256] and the ERP[257] have all called for a roadmap. Despite this, the Government have not, so far, taken any action.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CALL FOR A NATIONAL ROADMAP

137.  To provide some direction and to encourage the Government to come forward with such a roadmap, NNL and others are developing their own roadmap (following the ERP report), looking at the implications of a 12 GW and 38 GW future for R&D over the period to 2050. The Government said that they welcomed this work but that it would be "premature to comment further on specific requirements when [it] is still to be completed".[258] Whilst we understand the Government's response, we see no reason why they cannot commit to the need for a Government-led R&D roadmap in principle.

138.  We asked the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, about this issue. He acknowledged that "embarking on a new generation of nuclear reactors ... will involve real commitment on research and development" and a need for "a considerable programme of replenishing our human skills as well as our R&D skills if this is to go forward".[259] He appeared not, however, to recognise that this would require a Government-led R&D roadmap.[260]

DEVELOPING A NATIONAL ROADMAP

139.  Many witnesses, such as Mr Spence from EDF Energy, suggested that DECC should lead the development of a roadmap, through either the OND or the Low Carbon Innovation Group.[261] Many others, including AMEC, thought that NNL was well placed to provide the necessary strategic oversight and co-ordination for Government.[262] Mr Ric Parker from Rolls Royce and other industry representatives emphasised the importance of including industry in the process,[263] referring to successful roadmapping exercises such as the "the Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team, which … came out with a strong roadmap and strategy for UK research in aerospace" and the Space Innovation and Growth Team which "gave a clear steer to Government and industry of what was needed and generated considerable interest in Government".[264] EDF Energy suggested that:

"a next step would be for the Government to bring together the key organisations who can help them determine and then implement a UK nuclear R&D strategy as part of the infrastructure necessary to support its role in delivering a low carbon future and to enable the UK to exploit this significant area of national competence".[265]

140.  Mr Ric Parker from Rolls Royce suggested further that a joint industry and government body should be set up for nuclear "so that we get a common understanding between industry, Government and the universities ... of exactly what is needed, by when and what the role for the UK is going to be in that".[266] He went on to suggest that industry and the Government "have to study the options together" to "jointly arrive at the route map, at a clear statement of the needs of the UK and a clear understanding of the possibilities for growth in this area".[267]

141.  If the Government intend to keep options for nuclear energy open for the future, this is unlikely to be achieved if the present haphazard arrangement for the support of nuclear training and research continues. A number of different organisations include some aspects of nuclear research within their responsibilities. But which elements they support is determined by their own criteria and judged against other (in some cases non-nuclear) priorities. There is no individual or group charged with the responsibility for ensuring that the UK has a coherent programme that meets national needs. We are in no doubt therefore that there is a need for a long-term national nuclear R&D roadmap to:

  • improve co-ordination of R&D and associated expertise and ensure that research on strategically important and vulnerable areas, such as Generation IV technologies and advanced fuel recycling and reprocessing, is covered within a national R&D nuclear programme;
  • ensure that the UK maintains a healthy research base to attract people into the field to maintain capabilities for the future;
  • provide clarity and attract potential international collaborators (this issue is discussed further in paragraphs 155 to 162 below); and
  • provide industry with sufficient clarity to encourage them to invest in R&D and associated expertise in the UK.

142.  We recommend that, as part of its long-term nuclear energy strategy, DECC should lead the development and implementation of a long-term R&D roadmap in collaboration with industry, academia, NNL and the Culham Centre for Fusion Energy (CCFE) to ensure that the UK has adequate R&D capabilities and the associated expertise to keep a range of nuclear energy options open up to 2050 and beyond.

143.  We recommend further that the Government should establish a body (which we suggest may be called the Nuclear R&D Board: "the Board") with both advisory and executive functions.

(a) Composition

The Board should be made up of experts drawn from the Government, industry and academia. It should have an independent, expert, authoritative chairman who commands the respect of the public and industry, and members which include non-executive members. The members should be appointed through the Appointments Commission.

(b) Status

The Board should, at the earliest opportunity, be established as a statutory Non-Departmental Public Body accountable to the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change. Pending the legislation needed to bring this recommendation into effect, the Government should, as an interim measure and without delay, establish the Board as an Executive Agency within DECC.

(c) Purpose

The purpose of the Board would be to:

  • advise DECC on the development and implementation of the nuclear R&D roadmap and the Government's nuclear energy strategy;
  • monitor, and report on, progress by DECC with regard to the development and implementation of the roadmap and the strategy;
  • advise the Government, industry and academia on involving UK researchers in national and international collaborations and, where appropriate, facilitating such involvement;
  • examine what mechanisms are needed to signal to the international research community that the UK is a credible and willing partner for international collaborations;
  • maintain a strategic overview of nuclear R&D (including research facilities) and related training, and where appropriate, facilitate the co-ordination of activities within the research community;
  • establish a clear link between fundamental and applied research through to commercial exploitation for the benefit of the UK;
  • identify R&D areas of strategic importance that are either missing or vulnerable and, where necessary, commission research to complement the current R&D activities; and
  • facilitate public engagement activities on the use of nuclear technologies.

(d) Reporting

The Board should report annually to the Secretary of State on its assessment of DECC's progress with regard to the development and implementation of the roadmap and the strategy, and other activities. The Secretary of State should be required to lay the Board's annual report before Parliament.

(e) Funding

The Board should be given a modest amount of new funding (not drawn from BIS's science and research budget) to carry out its activities. It should also have the power to attract money from industry and elsewhere. (We consider sources for this funding in paragraphs 144 to 153 below.)

FUNDING FOR RESEARCH

144.  Many witnesses, for example Professor Fitzpatrick, suggested that, given the importance of nuclear fission to the short- and medium-term generation of energy in the UK, the level of funding provided for nuclear fission research (£6.5m a year from the research councils and £4.5m from Euratom) was low compared with other areas of research on energy (such as nuclear fusion which receives £94m a year (£34m from UK funding and £60m from Euratom)[268] and compared with other OECD countries (see paragraph 34). For example, the UK's spend on nuclear fission of around 4 % of the total energy research budget is considerably lower than the US which spends around 7% or, at the higher end, France at almost 50%.[269] Professor Howarth from NNL commented that:

"At the moment, compared with other nations we are outgunned by a factor of 10 in terms of our investment in fission nuclear by Germany, Italy, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Holland, Norway—which does not even have a civil nuclear programme—Sweden and Switzerland. I will not even give you the figures for Japan, South Korea, China, America and France. It is orders of magnitude."[270]

145.  Dame Sue Ion also told us that, at present, the only UK public funding mechanisms for nuclear fission research were "coming from the research councils or the NDA [£11m a year on decommissioning and waste research]"; and that the "actual monies deployed on advanced nuclear systems and the fuel cycles that go with them are in the single millions" with "no remit in next-generation systems or in sustaining advanced fuel cycle technology for a reprocessing mission". She noted that NNL received no funding from Government for such work[271] and that "other countries [were] not trimming back their investment in advanced system and fuel cycle R&D"; in fact, she said, they were doing "quite the reverse".[272]

146.  The Dalton Institute said that the "UK is fairly exceptional amongst nuclear countries in no longer having a directly funded nuclear research programme".[273] The Cambridge Nuclear Energy Centre pointed out also that "other countries are providing increased funds for nuclear R&D," for example, the US had recently added $120million a year to their programme and France recently announced an additional €1billion for new demonstrators for advanced reactors.[274]

147.  Representatives of industry suggested that the Government should be providing public funding for nuclear research on advanced systems, beyond that provided by the research councils, in order—according to Mr Keith Parker of the NIA—to "give credibility to the UK's position within … international fora, … as well as evidence of a government commitment to the work that is going on internationally".[275] As Professor Sir Adrian Smith of BIS pointed out: "in this particular arena and given the international dimension, the scale of the investments is in a different place from the kind of conversations that we were having about moving stuff around between the TSB and the research councils ... the scale of the investment here is of a different order".[276]

148.  We are not however talking about a return to the £100s of millions spent on nuclear fission research in the past or about diverting funds from other areas of research within BIS's science and research budget. We are talking about a modest investment of the order of £10s of millions from other sources. NNL estimate that, based upon previous involvement when the UK was actively involved in Generation IV programmes, a modest investment "of the order of between £10 million and £20 million a year" would be enough for the UK to participate meaningfully in international research activities. Rolls Royce also thought that the spend required would be in the £10s of millions stating that an R&D roadmap that encouraged the exploitation of the UK's strengths in R&D would "require significant investment (likely value in the £10s M/yr)."[277] However, the detail of this investment was not provided.

149.  Given the expenditure outlined in this report to support the commissioning of the Phase 3 laboratory at Sellafield (£20 million), and for a programme of research in Generation IV technologies to take part in international collaborations (£10-20 million a year), as well as other research activities required (outlined in paragraphs 102 to 117, and 163 to 205), we estimate that an investment in the region of £20-50 million a year would be sufficient. In Rolls Royce's opinion, "failure to invest leaves UK industry as a poorly placed commodity supplier in a competitive international market place".[278] The TSB review also concluded that in order for the UK to maintain its nuclear industry heritage and status, as well as benefit from the global nuclear renaissance, public sector investment in R&D and technology development was essential and justified.[279]

150.  When questioned about the level of funding for nuclear research, the Secretary of State said, referring to the CSR: "we have had to have an eye-watering settlement overall and every single penny that is spent on one thing has had to come off something else".[280] A proposal to spend more on nuclear fission R&D capabilities and associated expertise would have to be off-set with "suggestions for spending less on something else". We recognise that the current climate of financial stringency has meant that some tough decisions have had to be made about the balance of funding for research. This does not however obviate the need to ensure that the Government's declared policies are underpinned by the required R&D capabilities and associated expertise to deliver them. If the Government really are committed to meeting greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets and to the current new build programme for nuclear, they need to ensure that these plans are backed up with sufficient funding to maintain R&D capabilities and associated expertise in the UK, as other countries have done.

151.  Professor Fairhall argued also that, if the Government wanted the UK to benefit commercially from nuclear R&D, they needed to be involved in international research programmes and to put forward funding to encourage industry to do the same: "Without the ability to get involved in those programmes up front, we will sit here and watch the rest of Europe and other parts of the world do this ... For every other country that is involved in these types of programmes, the Government have a remit to fund a certain amount of this work. I believe if you had a programme, you would probably find that industry would co-fund it as well."[281] Government are investing in high-value and specialist manufacturing to promote growth and innovation and devoting £1.4 billion to the Regional Growth Fund to help to achieve this. We believe that the nuclear industry is a potential growth area that the Government should be supporting further.

152.  We recommend that the Government should discuss with the relevant stakeholders what additional funding is required to implement the R&D roadmap. This funding might come from a combination of stakeholder contributions or the reallocation of funding from other sources (for example, reallocation of around 1% of the £2.8 billion allocated to decommissioning and clean up each year). This should not come from the BIS science and research budget. Spending a few £10s of millions a year on R&D would help to develop technologies which give rise to much less nuclear waste, and would help to find better ways of dealing with the waste we already have.

What should be in such a roadmap?

153.  We received a range of evidence about some key components of a national nuclear R&D roadmap. The first one concerns UK participation in international research programmes.

PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PROGRAMMES

154.  Several witnesses described the benefits of international co-operation. They include:

  • leveraging and maintaining national capabilities and expertise;
  • influencing international research agendas;
  • access to key international facilities and expertise;
  • harmonisation of international research efforts;
  • networking and access to markets for exploitation; and
  • access to international research results and relevant data.[282]

International collaboration on research is, witnesses told us, important to maintain R&D capabilities and associated expertise because of the increasingly global nature of nuclear research and the scale of effort required. Collaboration with international experts refreshes and broadens the domestic research agenda, helping to ensure that the national focus remains internationally competitive. For this reason, we believe that it is essential for the UK to be involved in international research collaborations (see paragraph 35 above).

155.  According to Dame Sue Ion, there are three essential elements for effective participation in international research programmes:

"You need people who are experts and who are recognised as credible experts to contribute. You need to have meaningful projects on which you have decided to focus—you cannot do everything or be all things to all men. That is why the roadmap is important because then you can start to choose where the UK might play ... And you have to have facilities that your people can work in and where you can attract international players".[283]

156.  This view was supported by many witnesses who reiterated the importance of including in an R&D roadmap investment in dedicated UK facilities which would add value in specific areas of need internationally (see paragraphs 173 to 184 below).[284] Denis Flory, Deputy Director General and Head of the Nuclear Safety and Security Department, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), suggested that this was particularly true for safety research and the need to have a "strong nuclear safety research base in your own country".[285] Dr Weightman agreed.[286]

157.  The UK research base is involved in a number of international programmes of nuclear research, including the Euratom Programme through individual university participation (see paragraph 35). Several witnesses, however, suggested that the UK was not sufficiently involved and lacked a strategy for involvement.[287] Dame Sue Ion noted that most countries "maintain some involvement in the international R&D scene deliberately and in a focused way to help underpin their government's policy";[288] and that a "modest commitment of £10 million a year would gain the UK access to programmes and projects amounting to £1-2 billion".[289] NNL, Westinghouse Electric Company and Engineering the Future supported this view.[290]

158.  Although the UK has considerable strengths in a number of areas (see paragraphs 20 to 22), we were told that the UK research base was perceived internationally as weak because of a lack of clear leadership from Government on nuclear policy or R&D; and that this perception was exacerbated by the recent decision to withdraw from membership of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and a decision to withdraw from active membership of GIF in 2006 (see paragraph 162 to 172 and Box 4).[291] As a result, according to the RCUK, UK activity is underestimated and opportunities for UK academics to engage in wider international activities are limited.[292] Mr Keith Parker of the NIA told us that, when trying to promote UK nuclear interests abroad, there was a "perception that we no longer have the capability or the industry". He gave the following example: "I recall that at my first meeting in China with the China National Nuclear Corporation we were asked, 'What are you doing here?' We were not regarded as a serious player; ... We did not have the credibility that other countries perhaps had".[293]

159.  We found the Secretary of State's response to this perception of weakness to be again somewhat complacent. In his view: "By virtue of having new nuclear within the energy mix for 16 GW of new plant, we are going to be the world leader in investment, apart from China. That size of the market and the skills associated with that and the intelligent or well-informed customer aspects mean that we are very firmly going to have a place at the table."[294] The evidence we received about the international perception of the UK suggests otherwise. Professor Fitzpatrick, for example, told us: "If we are to be able to make a convincing case that we should be filling one of the seats at the table, then that needs us to look very critically at our activities to make sure that what we offer is world-leading in terms of facilities—and not just nuclear facilities but some of the other science and engineering facilities such as our neutron sources and synchrotron X-ray sources, which can significantly contribute to research on nuclear generation technologies."[295] In his opinion, "The UK needs to redevelop an identity as a leader in nuclear research in order to gain a position as a partner of choice for research collaborations".[296] In order to promote the UK's strengths in R&D internationally and to encourage participation in international activities, the UK needed, in his view, a national lead to represent the capability at international meetings.[297]

160.  Westinghouse Electric Company also argued that "other countries tend to have a more strategic approach to [how they deliver R&D provision] and often establish their own national laboratories" to lead it internationally. In their view, the UK may become "excluded or marginalised" from international collaborations by not having such an organisation.[298] (We discuss the need for a national lead and the role of NNL further in Chapter 7.)

161.  We recommend that, in order to improve the international perception of the UK's research base, as part of the development of an R&D roadmap, the proposed Nuclear R&D Board should outline a strategic approach to the UK's involvement in international collaborations (through programmes such as Euratom) to ensure that the UK has sufficient expertise, national programmes and facilities to be seen as an attractive and credible partner for research collaborations.

INVOLVEMENT IN RESEARCH ON FUTURE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES

162.  A range of future nuclear technologies are being developed globally, including six reactor designs under the umbrella of GIF.[299] Whilst we acknowledge the importance of all these other technologies, we focus in this section on Generation IV technologies.

The Government's approach to involvement in Generation IV

163.  We have already drawn attention to evidence suggesting that UK involvement in Generation IV technologies research is inadequate (see paragraphs 105 to 115).[300] When we put this point to the Government, they said that, in their view, sufficient efforts to "maintain awareness of and involvement in developments on advanced reactor designs" were being made through Euratom and the research councils, and they referred to a recent increase in funding by the research councils intended "to ensure that the UK can innovate in appropriate areas of Gen IV technologies, be able to identify advantageous opportunities in the UK and to be able to inform stakeholders what market opportunities may emerge".[301]

164.  Other witnesses, however, suggested that there was currently a lack of strategic approach to maintaining capabilities in this area of research.[302] Such an approach was needed, Dame Sue Ion argued, because of the "long timescale of Generation IV work" which was "[outside] the remit of the TSB and probably the [Technology Innovation Centres] TICs". It was also "beyond the planning horizons and plans of companies in the private sector".[303]

Generation IV Forum (GIF)

165.  Given the scale of effort and funding required globally to develop these technologies, activities relating to Generation IV technologies are mainly through international programmes such as GIF and require active research to take place nationally in order to participate (see Box 4).[304] In 2006, the Government withdrew from active membership of GIF however. According to Professor MacKay, the decision was made for financial reasons—"money was tight".[305]

BOX 4

The Generation IV International Forum

GIF is a co-operative international endeavour organised to carry out the R&D needed to establish the feasibility and performance capabilities of the next generation nuclear energy systems.

GIF has 13 members which were signatories to its founding document, the GIF Charter. Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, Korea, South Africa, the UK and the United States signed the GIF Charter in July 2001. Subsequently, it was signed by Switzerland in 2002, Euratom in 2003, and China and Russia, both in 2006.

All GIF members are signatories to the GIF Charter. Ten members have since signed or acceded to a Framework Agreement which establishes system and project organisational levels for further co-operation on R&D (active members). Non-active members are those among the nine founding members which have not acceded to the Framework Agreement.[306]

The UK signed the Agreement in 2005 but withdrew in 2006, reportedly because active GIF membership was based on an intention to pursue the development of one or more of the Generation IV reactor designs and the UK ceased to have an active research programme in next generation technologies at that time. The UK was involved in three reactor design research programmes. The funding for research into these systems was provided by BNFL until 2006, supplemented by UK participation in the EU's Framework programmes, and by funding from the EPSRC for underpinning science within the KNOO programme. When this funding stopped the UK ceased to be an active member.[307]

166.  Several witnesses expressed concern at the Government's decision and called for active membership to be reinstated as soon as possible.[308] Given the Government's response that the UK had adequate involvement in the forum through membership of Euratom,[309] we asked Mr Bernard Bigot of the Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA) in France why active participation in GIF, rather than through Euratom, was necessary to maintain R&D capabilities and associated expertise in the UK. He said that "If you are not so sure that the EURATOM policy would cover all your concerns, and you wish to be able to concretely participate in the debate and influence the joint working programme, I would recommend [active membership]".[310] Dr Simon Webster, Head of Unit Fission at the DG for Research of the European Commission, also warned that without active membership of GIF, the "UK was less able to direct where the programme is going." and that participation through Euratom was "severely limited in what it can do in advanced nuclear systems because they require unanimity in the EU Council to get programmes passed, and unanimity in Europe on advanced nuclear technology is very very difficult".[311] It also precluded UK involvement in discussions, meaning that the UK would not be in a position to benefit commercially from the development of these technologies or the intellectual property generated when they take off.[312] Commenting in a personal capacity, Dr Webster warned that "the UK will always be limited by what Euratom can support in this field, which is currently quite limited and may well even decrease in the future as a result of the need to have unanimous EU Member State support for the content of Euratom Framework Programmes".[313]

167.  Professor Howarth of NNL said that other countries saw benefit in individual membership in terms of "training and the development of capability ... [and] wanting to understand where nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technology is going". According to NNL, membership through Euratom was "not adding any benefit to the UK".[314] Commenting on the programme Professor Fairhall, also of NNL, said:

"an organisation can join a programme and then it gets allocated to be part of Generation IV. Just because an organisation is involved in that programme and can get access to the results of that programme, it cannot get access to the whole of the Generation IV programme. As an organisation, if we are not involved in a programme we cannot get sight of the results that take place, so the Government cannot get results that come out. If you are a member of Generation IV as an independent country then you can shape the programme, you can decide which you want to be involved in and you can get results from the collaboration."[315]

168.  AMEC and others told us that, from an industry perspective, active membership was crucial to "win work in the global marketplace" as well as providing a "vital industrial training route".[316]

169.  The arguments for UK active involvement in GIF are, we believe, strong. But it requires a clear R&D programme of engagement within the UK and also the availability of facilities.[317] Mr Keith Parker of the NIA said that the "Government should be paving the way for the involvement of British academics and British industry" in such programmes.[318] The University of Central Lancashire suggested that the Government should provide a lead and set the priorities for research into future technologies, with a contribution from industry where there were potential co-benefits.[319] Bearing in mind limited budgets, Professor Joyce also suggested that the focus should be on R&D "on a small handful of technical priorities [on future technologies and] commit[ment] to own[ing] a particular aspect of the Gen IV design challenge".[320]

170.  Given the weight of evidence against the Government's decision to withdraw from active membership of GIF, we asked Professor MacKay for his view. His answer was encouraging: "I have listened carefully to the evidence from the experts that says this is a pressing matter and the decision should be revisited as early as possible within the next three years, so I will be raising it within DECC before the next Spending Review".[321] We hope that the Secretary of State will take into consideration these concerns, in conjunction with the conclusions from the TINA for nuclear (see paragraph 56).

171.  We recommend that, as part of the development of a nuclear R&D roadmap, the Government should consider what level of engagement in future technologies is necessary at both the national and international level to enable the UK to maintain sufficient capabilities within this area of research, focusing on strategic areas of UK strength.

172.  We recommend also that the Government reinstates UK active membership of GIF at the earliest opportunity.

RESEARCH FACILITIES

173.  A key consideration in developing a nuclear R&D roadmap is whether the UK has sufficient research facilities to ensure the next generation of nuclear experts and the nuclear innovation needed by the UK. Although the research councils have increased their funding for nuclear fission research and also the number of courses available for students, these steps have not, according to Dr Simper and others, been accompanied by increased provision for facilities to enable "hands-on development and experience leading to ideas that can then be picked up by commercial organisations". The decline in UK nuclear laboratories over the last two decades (see paragraph 12 and Figure 2 above) has led therefore to a situation where the UK has "no significant post irradiation examination capability and no hot cells for highly active research".[322] Professor Delpy agreed that this was a problem.[323]

Hot facilities

174.  Several witnesses, including the Government, referred to a lack of key facilities in the UK for research involving the handling of higher active waste (known as "hot facilities") to enable post-irradiation examination. These facilities are required, according to Sellafield Ltd, to address "both new nuclear build challenges and to deal with known historic issues, such as [plutonium] disposition ... environmentally sensitive immobilisation, and innovative solutions for deep geological disposal".[324] Many other witnesses agreed.[325] Professor Delpy, for example, thought that lack of access to hot facilities was "probably one of the most constraining things in terms of doing research on nuclear materials" in the UK,[326] although he also told us:

"With the National Nuclear Laboratory, we have recently made a £1.6 million investment to support analytical equipment in the central laboratory—the hot laboratory. The University of Manchester and the NDA have invested in the new Dalton Cumbria facility, which is a £20 million investment. We have begun to tackle this. We have access to international facilities through some of our international networks—India and the facilities in Karlsruhe, for example. We are also talking to the Norwegians about access to their test reactor. We are dealing with the acute shortage."[327]

Why do we need facilities to handle highly active material in the UK?

175.  We asked whether access to non-UK hot facilities would meet the UK's needs, because, as EDF Energy pointed out, "facilities like test reactors, hot cells, advanced manufacturing and computational modelling are expensive and decisions within the UK on providing for this type of R&D must take into account the availability of such facilities worldwide, the UK industry's requirements, and the strategic significance of the work undertaken".[328] RCUK thought not and, as a result, "academic research is limited" causing "difficulties in training the next generation of nuclear researchers".[329] Furthermore, as we have already noted in paragraphs 148 to 150, maintaining world-leading facilities in the UK is necessary to enable the UK "to take part in international collaborations on Gen IV".[330]

176.  At present, radioactive facilities (above low levels of radioactivity) for undertaking civil nuclear R&D are limited mainly to those operated by NNL at the Central Laboratory, owned by the NDA, at the Sellafield site. These facilities are only partially commissioned. Whilst there are plans to commission the Phase 2 "alpha R&D laboratories" (see Appendix 5),[331] in addition to £1.6 million funding of analytical equipment by EPSRC and others,[332] there are no agreed plans to commission the Phase 3[333] laboratory required for research on highly irradiated materials (for example, to understand the long-term behaviour of materials within the reactor pressure vessel or high level waste packages).[334] According to NNL and others, if the facilities were fully commissioned, they would be "world leading" and an "integral part of a network of laboratories within Europe to undertake international collaborative programmes".[335]

177.  We asked Mr Bigot if he thought there would be sufficient call internationally for hot facilities at NNL. He thought that they "could be of real interest" but cautioned that there was a need for a "global vision" of what research could be done in UK facilities or in French facilities with "some programming of the work to be done jointly".[336] In France, some of the national equipment (such as the hot laboratories and research reactors) was over 40 years old and, as a result, France was considering the issue of renewal of facilities and in the process of introducing new nuclear research reactors. [337]

178.  During our visit to Sellafield, we were told that NNL was in discussions with the international research community about developing a business case to commission facilities. They estimated that it would cost about £20 million to commission the Phase 3 laboratory. However they have struggled to make the business case because, under current financial arrangements, they have to demonstrate the value of the facility in terms of meeting NDA objectives rather than the benefit to the wider research community. They have not therefore considered the value more generally in maintaining R&D capabilities and associated expertise to underpin the UK's energy policies. Given that the NDA's remit only covers the UK's decommissioning and waste management responsibilities and they will have access to the newly refurbished Windscale Laboratory[338] which will enable a limited amount of research on the study of irradiated materials, the cost of the facilities could never be justified for the NDA alone. Professor Howarth found this exasperating:

"You cannot build an economic case where the NDA can show, in pounds, that it is of benefit to them to commission it. They would love to commission it for the benefit of UK plc internationally, but when they look at the NDA's remit, they cannot make the economic case to commission it. What we need to do is treat it as a national strategic asset that would benefit the UK in taking a leading position internationally in terms of the low-carbon economy, fuel cycle technology, safeguarding nuclear material, etc."[339]

179.  Sellafield Ltd also told us that the current "lack of strategic long term R&D programmes has made it impossible to produce a robust business case for commissioning ... [the Phase 3] facilities."[340] Furthermore, we are aware that even funding to keep the facilities ticking over in "care and maintenance" mode may be withdrawn from April 2012 if a business case cannot be found, meaning that the facilities will be "moth-balled".[341]

180.  All stakeholders, including the Government, agree that access to facilities that can handle highly active materials is needed to train the next generation of researchers and that lack of access is a constraint on research. It is also widely acknowledged that their existence would benefit the UK in terms of providing a resource for international research collaboration. We find it perplexing therefore that NNL has not been able to take into account these wider benefits when formulating a business case to commission the facilities.

181.  We recommend that the proposed Nuclear R&D Board should work with DECC, NNL, the NDA, BIS, the research councils and relevant industry groups to develop a business case to commission the Phase 3 laboratory at NNL as a national research facility for studying irradiated materials, taking into account its wider value to the nuclear sector and to the research community for research and, in particular, its contribution to training the next generation of experts and increasing the attractiveness of the UK as a destination for international research collaboration.

Research reactor facilities

182.  Several witnesses drew our attention to the need for better access to research reactor or test reactor facilities in the UK (see paragraphs 231 to 234) and the need to establish a programme to develop a small-scale research reactor to provide "practical experience for graduate and post-graduate work in nuclear technology, allow ongoing research into ... nuclear [materials], allow the production of radio-isotopes and provide a general research capability for irradiation".[342] It is not however clear whether access to these sorts of facilities abroad might be adequate to meet UK needs or, alternatively, whether the UK should invest in the development of UK-based facilities.[343] This issue should be considered within the nuclear R&D roadmap.

183.  We welcome the current efforts by NNL to ascertain the international market for the Phase 3 laboratory. More generally, given how costly nuclear research facilities are to build and maintain, it is essential that the UK should be looking for opportunities to share UK facilities internationally and also to collaborate internationally to gain access to nuclear facilities abroad.

184.  France is in the process of renewing its research reactors. Within the R&D roadmap, the proposed Nuclear R&D Board should investigate further the potential for access to research reactor and other nuclear research facilities abroad, within a globally co-ordinated programme of research collaborations.

LEGACY AND EXISTING SYSTEMS WASTE

185.  The NDA is a significant funder of research into decommissioning and waste management and maintains R&D capabilities and associated expertise primarily by "plac[ing] work into the technical community".[344] They also fund PhD studentships, bursaries and sponsorship and work with the National Skills Academy for Nuclear to "ensure a broader approach to skills maintenance". Additional R&D is needed however to underpin work on the disposition of the UK's plutonium stocks and to pave the way for a geological repository (see paragraphs 103 to 104).

186.  At present the NDA commissions NNL to carry out work on the storage of plutonium and NNL also carries out some of its own work on plutonium disposition. However, NNL told us that, although there were "plans to actively commission alpha R&D laboratories to support programmes covering plutonium management in the UK", there were only "limited R&D programmes" in the areas of the disposition of civil plutonium and uranium, the management of irradiated nuclear fuel and deep geological disposal of radioactive waste.[345]

187.  The NDA acknowledged that "as the geological disposal programme evolves a number of UK specific capabilities will need to be developed".[346] Both Professor MacKay and the NDA assured us that the NDA has set aside adequate funds to cover this future work.[347] We were given no information however about how such R&D capabilities and associated expertise would be maintained through a long-term R&D programme.

188.  The research councils also fund fundamental research on radioactive waste to underpin their activities. The NDA told us that whilst they support the R&D "necessary for delivering [their] mission much of it depends on the results of previous fundamental nuclear research". They argued that little fundamental nuclear research had been carried out in the UK in recent times and that there was a risk that the capability to carry out such research would be lost.[348] Professor Lee of CoRWM agreed: "A lot of what is being done with the research councils at the moment is guided by linking with the NDA on managed calls. Much less is fundamental and independent R&D".[349] Professor Peter Styles, Professor in Applied and Environmental Geophysics at Keele University, told us that very little NERC funding was going into this area.[350] NERC's current research spend appears to be fairly limited: £4 million over 2009-2013.[351] A recent programme will extend this by £5 million. We note, however, that the focus of the programme will be effects on the environment rather than the direct challenges of developing a geological disposal site (see paragraph 28).[352]

189.  Whilst we are, to some extent, reassured that the NDA has made provision in its forward programme for the future research needs relating to radioactive waste disposal, we are concerned by the evidence which suggests that there is a lack of longer-term research programmes focused on addressing the disposal of radioactive waste and the plutonium stockpile and also by the apparent lack of fundamental research on the management of radioactive waste. We recommend that the NDA, NERC and other relevant funders ensure that sufficient R&D capabilities and associated expertise are maintained over the longer term to manage legacy and existing systems waste.

190.  As part of these efforts, we suggest that:

  • the NDA develops a long-term research programme outlining how they will ensure that there are adequate R&D capabilities and associated expertise to meet their future needs for geological disposal and the disposition of the UK's plutonium stockpile;
  • the research councils, particularly NERC, works with the NDA to ensure that sufficient fundamental research on radioactive waste management and disposal is commissioned to maintain R&D capabilities and associated expertise in this field and to ensure that research efforts are effectively co-ordinated across the research councils; and
  • RCUK commissions an independent review of the UK's R&D capabilities and associated expertise in radioactive waste management and disposal.

NUCLEAR SAFETY RESEARCH CAPABILITIES

191.  The UK has internationally recognised expertise in nuclear safety. This expertise was called upon when Dr Weightman was invited to lead the IAEA's fact finding mission to Japan. Post-Fukushima, there will be a growing demand to increase efforts on health and safety research. This is therefore an area where the UK could provide international leadership. The Secretary of State acknowledged this: a "key part of our objectives [is] ... to be in a position where our nuclear inspections and our nuclear safety are absolutely world class".[353] In Dr Weightman's view, such expertise would be invaluable for providing expert advice to the new nations that want to get involved in nuclear power.[354]

192.  However, a number of concerns have been raised about current arrangements within the ONR with regard to the co-ordination of safety research and, in particular, about a lack of independent advice to guide the work of the ONR. Professor Williams, the Government Chief Nuclear Inspector from 1998 to 2005, explained:

"In the United Kingdom, we have a strong nuclear safety research capability. It was initially managed by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and was handed over to the Health and Safety Commission when the authority changed. The Health and Safety Commission had its own research committee and there was a subgroup of the Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, which later became NuSAC [the Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee], which oversaw nuclear safety research and how it related to the needs of the industry. It also worked with the industry ... This committee, reporting through to the Health and Safety Commission, and working with the industry, ensured that throughout the United Kingdom there was a sufficient research programme to underpin safety—for the industry and the regulator. Sadly, over the years, that has declined. Now there is not a nuclear safety advisory committee and as far as I know there is therefore no research committee. Therefore, we are at risk of losing our capability of being able to understand our nuclear safety research and to commission that research."[355]

The Nuclear Research Index

193.  Formerly, NuSAC contributed to the development of the Nuclear Research Index (NRI) which helped to identify research needs and co-ordinate research activities across industry and the regulator as required, placing a levy on industry to commission work of generic need that was not covered by industry activities. We asked the ONR about the NRI. They said that it was still "produced annually by the [ONR] to support the UK reactor nuclear safety research programme" and involved consultation with nuclear site licensees on the content of the "technical area strategies" and the "addition of new issues requiring research". Publication of the 2011 NRI (in September 2011) had been delayed because of a review by ONR of the process by which it was produced.[356] The 2011 ONR had not however taken on the lessons from the review.

194.  When we asked Dr Weightman about this issue, he told us that he hoped to "take a strategic overview of the totality of research and capability across the UK from a safety regulatory point of view to ensure that we in the UK are able not only to respond to the needs directly from the UK industry but also to provide advice to the UK Government in circumstances where there are significant incidents overseas".[357] We were reassured to hear that this strategic view would encompass research of relevance to Sellafield and any future new build programme, which is excluded from the current NRI and that such an approach would be taken in the formulation of the 2012 NRI.[358] Dr Weightman went on to say that "one issue that we need as regulators to get a better grip on is how much the industry in the UK spends, the way in which it looks at the areas that it looks at and whether there are any gaps from our perspective". He said that this would be covered within the planned strategic overview.[359]

195.  The UK has an excellent record and international reputation in nuclear safety and security. Given international recognition that safety and security are key areas of research activity in the future, post-Fukushima, this presents a significant opportunity for the UK to re-establish its reputation for nuclear research excellence internationally. We look forward to the publication of the revised 2012 NRI which will outline a more strategic view of the UK's research needs in this area. This research strategy should be integrated into the national nuclear R&D roadmap which should set out how the UK will maintain its international reputation for nuclear safety expertise.

The Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee

196.  NuSAC was set up to "advise the HSE on matters, regarding nuclear safety policy and its implementation at nuclear installations" and "on the adequacy and balance of HSE's nuclear safety research programme". Its term of office expired on 31 October 2008[360] however and the HSE Board has deferred its decision on future arrangements for independent technical advice on nuclear safety pending various reviews on the future of nuclear regulation. Future advisory committees would, we were told by the ONR, take into consideration the new structure of the organisation following the creation of the ONR as an independent body and the appointment of the ONR's new Board. [361]

197.  We asked Dr Weightman about NuSAC. He said that once the ONR was set up as a statutory corporation, he would seek to reinstate an advisory committee similar to the group which was established to advise him on the interim and final reports on the implications of Fukushima for the UK.[362] This model would involve openness and transparency and the ability to take a strategic approach, with people who would challenge and provide the best technical advice.[363] Whilst we were reassured to hear that this was the case, we are troubled that NuSAC has been in abeyance for four years. The ONR subsequently told us also that it was not necessary to wait for them to be set up as a statutory corporation "to establish such advisory machinery it considers appropriate".[364] Given the already lengthy delay, we recommend that the ONR should not wait until it has been set up as a statutory corporation to establish a reformulated NuSAC, but should do so as soon as possible. The advisory committee should provide independent and transparent advice and external challenge to the ONR's work for both the Chief Nuclear Inspector and the Secretary of State.

198.  As we have noted (see paragraph 130), the Government are seeking to change the status of the ONR to a statutory corporation. The earliest this will take effect is April 2013. The decision to make the ONR an independent body had already been delayed by a number of years and we fear that any further delay could be detrimental to the current nuclear new build programme if, as a result, the public do not have confidence in the independence of the regulator's advice. For this reason also we urge the Government to ensure that there is no further delay in converting the ONR to a statutory corporation and that in the meantime it is able to continue under the existing arrangements that are in place (for example the interim arrangements on pay discussed in paragraph 130).

Research requirements post-Fukushima

199.  Whilst we do not have a full analysis of the impact of the Fukushima incident on UK research needs or how the UK should contribute to the large international research challenges that it presents, a number of issues were raised of relevance to this inquiry.

200.  As a result of the nuclear incident at Fukushima, Professor Tatsujiro Suzuki, Vice-Chair of the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission, said that Japan was facing "many technical challenges" and was shifting its R&D towards meeting the needs of the clean-up.[365] Inevitably, the incident has had significant implications for the international nuclear community. We asked witnesses how the international research community could contribute to meeting the challenges posed by Fukushima to improve the safety of nuclear facilities worldwide. Mr Flory of the IAEA said that there was "a need to understand better the behaviour of fuel under severe accident conditions" and that internationally "we still know quite little" about these problems which, he said, would require "dedicated research reactors ... [and] in-depth research programmes". There was also a need for in-depth research programmes on how to decontaminate land.[366]

201.  In terms of the national safety research programme, Professor Williams said that in the UK "there is a need for a better understanding of the external hazards that our plants are designed to respond to and the combination of effects … to look at whether we understand the robustness of our emergency core-cooling and residual heat-removal systems, especially in relation to fuel ponds". In his view, "the whole issue of spent-fuel management needs to be looked at, especially in relation to how much fuel you can store on-site," and emergency planning in extreme situations of severe accident management.[367] Horizon Power also suggested that there was a gap in regard to generic research into seismic hazards in the UK.[368]

202.  Dr Weightman told us that in Japan "the extent of a tsunami associated with an earthquake was underestimated, which meant that the research basis for that particular hazard was not solid". In his view, the UK had a better view of the possible consequences of natural hazards, although he recognised that it was important to keep abreast of certain issues such as understanding the impacts that climate change may have on events such as flooding.[369] He also recognised that there were other areas where further research was required to understand the phenomena better in terms of the way that certain reactors would respond to severe conditions. This was not just about reactor technology but also about spent fuel safety and the safety of the fuel cycle, how we can deal with legacy issues and how we keep abreast of new technologies.[370] When we asked Dr Weightman if the research needs identified post-Fukushima would be incorporated into the 2012 NRI, we were reassured to hear that the ONR would be considering how to "expand into these other areas as well".[371] We look forward to seeing how the ONR will take the R&D needs identified as a result of the Fukushima incident (including those identified in Dr Weightman's interim and final reports)[372] into consideration and how the UK's contribution to meeting them will be reflected in the 2012 NRI.

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

203.  The social dimensions of nuclear power should, in our view, be a key component of an R&D roadmap. Professor Nick Pidgeon of the Understanding Risk Research Group at Cardiff University told us: "Given the history of this industry it would be a mistake to overlook the very many social science questions which will bear upon any new build nuclear programme and associated nuclear waste issues".[373] Professor Pidgeon noted that although "the UK is recognised as a world leader in the social studies of science and technology,"[374] for the past 10 years, there has been relatively little detailed focus on the question of nuclear energy.[375] He acknowledged that work had progressed with research programmes to "understand the politics and dynamics of nuclear waste"[376] and that a major RCUK Energy Programme network (InCLUSEV)[377] was also "building capacity in equity and energy issues, with a work-stream dedicated to equity in the nuclear fuel cycle". He was critical however of the research councils' past and present energy research programmes for "not mapping out more clearly the roles that the social sciences might play", calling for a "more considered approach in drawing the full range of social science challenges into the emerging nuclear energy research landscape".[378] Professor Sherry also told us that, in the UK, research on nuclear has "not been strong on … public understanding and public appreciation of the risks associated with nuclear." He went on: "The whole area of social science ... around introducing nuclear power or the recycle of fuel ... is one where I would urge for more focus to come in. Given public opinion following the Fukushima incident, a number of us were involved in telephone phone-ins where very basic questions were causing very high anxiety".[379]

204.  We recommend that research on the societal and ethical dimensions of the use of nuclear energy in the UK should be an integral part of the nuclear R&D roadmap.


237   Q 53 and 64, NRD 07, 16, 18, 19, 23, 32, 37, 39, 45, 51 Back

238   Q 64 Back

239   Q 65 Back

240   Report of the International Panel for the 2010 RCUK Review of Energy, op. cit. Back

241   NRD 39 Back

242   NRD 44 Back

243   NRD 43 Back

244   Q 74 Back

245   NRD 39 and 05, 07, 09, 14, 16, 18, 19, 23, 27, 30, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 50, 51  Back

246   Q 490 Back

247   Q 491 Back

248   NRD 04, 05, 14, 23, 24, 28, 30, 39, 40 Back

249   NRD 07, 16, 18, 19, 23, 27, 32, 39, 45, 51 Back

250   Q 111 Back

251   NRD 27 Back

252   NRD 49 Back

253   NRD 27 Back

254   NRD 07 Back

255   NRD 37 Back

256   Fuel cycle stewardship in a nuclear renaissance, op. cit. Back

257   Nuclear Fission, op. cit. Back

258   NRD 21 Back

259   Q 450 Back

260   Q 454 Back

261   QQ 111, 141, 246, 287 Back

262   NRD 05,27, 23, 30, 28, 07,30 Back

263   QQ 129, 242 Back

264   QQ 121, 142 Back

265   NRD 49 Back

266   Q 142 Back

267   Ibid. Back

268   NRD 44, 33, 61; Q 54 Back

269   NRD 43 Back

270   Q 341 Back

271   Q 55 Back

272   NRD 29 Back

273   NRD 09 Back

274   NRD 31 Back

275   QQ 234 and 236 Back

276   Q 243 Back

277   NRD 37 Back

278   NRD 37 Back

279   NRD 27 Back

280   Q 456 Back

281   Q 331 Back

282   NRD 07, 22, 32, 33, 39, 41, 44, 45, 50; QQ 282, 342-344 Back

283   Q 59 Back

284   NRD 05, 14, 38, 40, 36, 51, 39, 10  Back

285   QQ 398, 404 Back

286   Q 474 Back

287   NRD 09, 17, 48, 50 Back

288   Q 63 Back

289   NRD 29 Back

290   NRD 07, 32, 50 Back

291   NRD 33, 39, 40, 43, 45, 40, 50; Q 163 Back

292   NRD 33 Back

293   Q 238 Back

294   Q 461 Back

295   Q 59 Back

296   NRD 44 Back

297   Ibid. Back

298   NRD32 Back

299   NRD 1, 25, 38, 39, 46 Back

300   NRD 43 Back

301   NRD 21 Back

302   NRD 4, 8, 13, 29, 43, 44, 49 Back

303   NRD 29 Back

304   NRD 14, 16, 22, 32, 39, 41, 44, 47, 50 Back

305   Q 79 Back

306   Generation IV Website: http://www.gen-4.org/index.html Back

307   Generation-IV nuclear power: A review of the state of the science, Adram T and Ion S, Energy policy, 36 (2008), pp 4323-4330. Back

308   NRD 07, 22, 30, 38, 40, 41, 43, 49 Back

309   NRD 21 Back

310   Q 360 Back

311   QQ 154-160 Back

312   Q 172 Back

313   NRD 53 Back

314   Q 344 Back

315   Q 345 Back

316   NRD 41 Back

317   Q 360 Back

318   Q 237 Back

319   NRD 30 Back

320   NRD 39 Back

321   Q 79 Back

322   NRD 43 Back

323   Q 192 Back

324   NRD 23 Back

325   NRD 17, 24, 25, 33, 34, 36, 43, 44, 48 Back

326   Q 192 Back

327   Q 192 Back

328   NRD 49 Back

329   NRD 33 Back

330   Q 59, NRD 29, 50 Back

331   Phase 2 facilities support programmes covering plutonium management in the UK. Back

332   NRD 33 Back

333   The Phase3 laboratory at the Sellafield site refers to the facility that is able to handle gamma-radiation from higher active materials to allow research on irradiated materials to take place. Back

334   NRD 07 Back

335   NRD 07, and 29, 50, 59 Back

336   Q 358 Back

337   Q 356 Back

338   The Windscale Laboratory at Sellafield is also a post-irradiation examination facility (see Appendix 5). Back

339   Q 347 Back

340   NRD 23 Back

341   See Appendix 5. Back

342   NRD 43 Back

343   NRD 22, 31, 36, 39, 43, 44, 50 Back

344   Q 263 Back

345   NRD 07 Back

346   NRD 19 Back

347   QQ 92, 267 Back

348   NRD 19 Back

349   Q 275 Back

350   QQ 263, 270, 273, 282 Back

351   NRD 66 Back

352   NRD 66 Back

353   Q 457 Back

354   Q 486 Back

355   Q 398 Back

356   NRD 67 Back

357   Q 469 Back

358   Q 470 Back

359   Q 483 Back

360   HSE website: http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/iacs/nusac/ Back

361   NRD 67 Back

362   Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami: the Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry: Interim Report, HM Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations, ONR, (May 2011), and Final Report (October 2011).  Back

363   Q 493 Back

364   NRD 69  Back

365   Q 393  Back

366   Q 394 Back

367   Q 395 Back

368   NRD 02 Back

369   Q 466 Back

370   QQ 466, 467 Back

371   Q 469 Back

372   Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami: the Implications for the UK Nuclear Industry, Interim Report, HM Chief Inspector f Nuclear Installations, ONR, May 2011, and final report October 2011.  Back

373   NRD 55 Back

374   Ibid. Back

375   Ibid. Back

376   http://www.thewasteoftheworld.org/ Back

377   http://incluesev.kcl.ac.uk/ Back

378   NRD 55 Back

379   Q 62 Back


 
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