House of Lords - Nuclear Research and Development Capabilities

Nuclear Research and Development Capabilities - Science and Technology Committee Contents

Chapter 7: Roles and responsibilities

205. A range of bodies are involved in nuclear R&D, each with different responsibilities. In this chapter we consider whether the distribution of responsibilities is effective—or could be improved.

Departmental responsibilities for nuclear R&D

206. There appears to us to be some confusion within Government about the different responsibilities of BIS and DECC with regard to UK nuclear R&D capabilities and associated expertise. David Willetts MP, Minister for Universities and Science in BIS, told us that "DECC is ... the lead on ensuring that we get the civil nuclear capacity that we have identified the country needs"[380] and that "it also has responsibilities for nuclear decommissioning and Gen IV's role in future energy policy";[381] whereas "BIS ... leads on maximising the opportunity of industry in the UK to benefit from a resurgent global civil nuclear market" and has "overall responsibility for research and the industrial policy at the end of research, notably through the TSB".[382] Professor Sir John Beddington, GCSA, told us that the responsibilities for ensuring there were adequate R&D capabilities and associated expertise were spread across Government, including himself: "I have responsibility for ensuring the research capability is adequate to meet long-term policy demands. Obviously, those responsibilities are distributed across DECC, BIS arguably, and the research councils".[383]

207. This diffusion of responsibilities has, in our view, led to BIS and DECC tending to look to the other to tackle gaps in R&D capabilities and associated expertise. We note, for example, that both departments identified the problem of lack of hot facilities but that neither proposed any action to address this issue. Given the evidence of the apparent confusion about the role of DECC, for the avoidance of doubt, we recommend that DECC should be designated as the lead department in developing a national nuclear policy and R&D roadmap, outlining what R&D capabilities and associated expertise are necessary to support its policies.

Responsibilities for advanced fuel recycling and reprocessing

208. Although the UK is currently considered to have world leading capabilities in reprocessing and advanced fuel recycling (based mainly at the Sellafield site), they are not adequate to keep the nuclear options open for the future (see paragraphs 116 to 117).

209. Dame Sue Ion highlighted the immediacy of the risk that the UK might lose these capabilities, stressing that it was important to understand that "within the next year decisions will be made [by the NDA] about nuclear infrastructure and investment particularly at Sellafield on reprocessing" and it was, she said, "vital these decisions are made in the context of an ongoing nuclear programme likely to involve a reprocessing scenario for the UK".[384]

210. The NDA confirmed that at the end of the current contracts in 2018, the Thorp reprocessing plant at Sellafield will close down, reflecting the "state of the asset and the market for reprocessing". They argued that the "significant capital investment needed to produce a new generation of reprocessing plants" was "not justified on commercial grounds" given their remit.[385] In August 2011, the NDA also reached a decision to close their Sellafield MOX Fuel Plant (SMP) at the earliest practical opportunity, in light of the impact of the Fukushima incident on their sole Japanese client's immediate requirements for MOX fuel.

211. In these circumstances, it appears unlikely that the limited support that the NDA currently gives to NNL and others to maintain some R&D capabilities in reprocessing will continue.[386] It is also not clear what will happen to the expertise maintained within the Thorp and SMP sites at NDA. This is, we believe, a particular concern, given that the Government is currently consulting on the policy options for dealing with the UK plutonium stockpile, including possible re-use as MOX fuel. According to the NDA, fast reactor capability and advanced separation technology for reprocessing spent fuel were areas where the UK had previously maintained strong R&D capability and associated expertise but that, due to the NDA's remit, they no longer maintained this in line with its mission.[387] This raises the question: who is maintaining these capabilities?

212. There is currently no single body with responsibility for maintaining R&D capabilities and associated expertise in advanced fuel recycling or reprocessing. Given the importance of maintaining these capabilities if nuclear energy options are to remain available in the future we find this unacceptable. (We discuss this in paragraphs 213 to 222 below.)

The role of the NDA

213. The NDA is a Non-Departmental Public Body. It was created under the Energy Act 2004 ("the 2004 Act"). Its objective is "to ensure that the historic civil public sector nuclear legacy sites are decommissioned safely, securely, cost effectively and in ways that protect the environment" and "to scrutinise the site decommissioning plans of EDF Energy for their existing UK nuclear fleet". It is also the body "responsible for implementing geological disposal of higher activity radioactive waste ... [and] for delivering the Low Level Radioactive Waste Strategy for the whole of the UK's nuclear industry".[388] As regards R&D capabilities and associated expertise, the NDA said: "we are required [under the 2004 Act] to promote and, where necessary, carry out research in relation to our primary function of decommissioning and clean-up", and "as part of this, we are required to operate existing commercial activities and meet current contracts, using revenues generated to offset spend on decommissioning".[389] The NDA's MOX plant contract, for example, contributed to offsetting spend on decommissioning. The NDA is not however responsible for seeking wider commercial opportunities for the UK.

214. Some witnesses suggested that, given the long-term need to maintain capabilities in fuel recycling and reprocessing, the NDA's remit should be changed to reflect the UK's wider nuclear energy policy.[390] Dame Sue Ion, for example, said that the NDA "ought to be looking at how to maintain recycling expertise and facilities to undertake an ongoing recycling mission; at how to accommodate a much increased inventory of spent fuel in a 38+ GW nuclear energy park and at the possibility of Generation IV systems being deployed before 2050".[391] Professor MacKay pointed out that the NDA's remit was "coupled" to that of NNL: "If the NDA's remit were expanded from just cleaning up the nuclear legacy to maintaining recycling expertise, preparing for possible future recycling challenges arising from a new nuclear fleet, then maybe they would start commissioning NNL to do a load of work with their excellent facilities".[392] Others, including AMEC, went further and suggested that the NDA's remit should be extended to provide commercial services worldwide for decommissioning, spent fuel storage and geological disposal.[393]

215. Other witnesses suggested that the NDA's remit should be narrowed to exclude responsibilities for handling spent fuel.[394] According to the Cambridge Nuclear Energy Centre, "DECC should reconsider whether the management of special nuclear materials over-complicates the responsibilities of the NDA. This includes commercial reprocessing of spent fuel, MOX fuel fabrication and management of the plutonium fuel stocks". In their view, "DECC should consider whether a more focused organisation could better provide focus and leadership in fuel management while operating through contracts with Sellafield Ltd and others".[395] The University of Central Lancashire was also of the view that "The use of the nation's plutonium stockpile, and the depleted and reprocessed uranium are clearly part of the wider debate on reactor types and fuel specification, and outside the remit of the NDA".[396]

216. The NDA and many others, including the Government, believed that their current focus on dealing with legacy waste was appropriate and should not be extended.[397] We do not find this surprising given the considerable challenges that dealing with the legacy waste will involve. Dr Simper, Director of Strategy at the NDA, told us that

"whatever you believe about the future of nuclear power, I think there is general agreement that cleaning up the legacy is a good and responsible thing to do. Because of that focus, we do not believe that a wholesale broadening of our accountabilities is appropriate ... There are a number of things that the evidence submitted posits should be done. In many cases, the NDA clearly has the ability to do those things, but it does not necessarily follow that because they should be done and the NDA could do them, that NDA should in fact do them. There may be other ways of meeting those needs."[398]

217. Professor Sir David King, of the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, thought that the issue was not about changing the remit of the NDA (which would still have to deal with the proportion of the plutonium stockpile considered to be "waste") but about the need for "an overarching body that takes the big view" on whether the plutonium was waste or fuel before it was sent to NDA: "the important thing is not to simply say that this is all waste".[399] As it stands however the NDA owns significant amounts of uranium and plutonium and is accountable for its "safe management" regardless of whether it is waste.[400]

218. There is an urgent need to deal with the clean-up of legacy waste. In these circumstances we have come to the conclusion that the NDA's remit should not be changed. But the difficult decision remains as to who should be responsible for maintaining R&D capabilities and associated expertise in the areas of advanced fuel recycling and reprocessing (that would support a long-term energy policy), given that the NDA currently owns the majority of relevant assets and nuclear infrastructure but the NDA's remit constrains their use by the wider research community (see paragraphs 233 to 234).

219. We recommend that the Government, in consultation with the proposed Nuclear R&D Board, should consider which body should be given responsibility for maintaining R&D capabilities and associated expertise in advanced fuel recycling and reprocessing and, if none of the current bodies is considered to be appropriate, they should consider whether a new one should be established. The Government should also work with the NDA to improve access to its facilities and expertise for research. (We discuss this further in paragraphs 233 to 234.)

NEW BUILD WASTES

220. Some witnesses suggested that the NDA's remit should be reviewed so as to ensure full alignment with the current new build programme (given, for example, the shared need for disposal facilities for both new build and legacy waste and the need to maintain the skills base in order to deliver the disposal programme).[401]

221. The evidence we received indicated some confusion about the NDA's responsibilities for research on new build waste. Professor Lee, for example, told us that:

"from a CoRWM perspective, we feel that the responsibility for new build waste should fall with the NDA. We do not think it is appropriate for the Government to rely so heavily on the NDA and the potential new build operators to make arrangements between themselves to do the R&D on long-term management of new build spent fuels. As we know, the Government has responsibility to ensure that effective arrangements are in place for management of new build waste. Part of this responsibility is to ensure that the NDA and the potential new build operators must do sufficient R&D."[402]

222. EDF Energy argued that "the UK strategy should recognise that it is not sensible to develop separate R&D strategies for 'legacy' and 'new build' since in many areas the same work will be relevant to both".[403] The Environment Agency suggested that the NDA's Radioactive Waste Management Directorate (RWMD) R&D programme should "take account of spent fuel from any new nuclear power stations, following on from the disposability advice that NDA RWMD is currently providing for station designs".[404] The NDA acknowledged that its responsibilities for new build waste were unclear: "there are ... a number of areas where NDA does feel a little constrained for example in regard to the arrangements for the provision of ... spent fuel management services for new nuclear build, where opportunities probably exist, but the NDA operating model makes these a little harder to access".[405] We recommend therefore that the Government should clarify the NDA's responsibilities for dealing with new build waste and for commissioning and co-ordinating research and maintaining R&D capabilities and associated expertise in respect of new build waste.

Providing a national lead for nuclear research

223. Several witnesses, including EDF Energy, told us that many countries with successful nuclear programmes had one or more centres of excellence to lead their nuclear programme both nationally and internationally (see paragraph 160).[406]

224. The Dalton Institute argued that centres of excellence were necessary because "nuclear R&D facilities require tremendous infrastructure costs to build, commission and operate".[407] Globally, there has been a trend to reduce the number of facilities and focus collaborative programmes into fewer facilities. For this reason, in their view, "the UK nuclear R&D capability should be grown around centres of excellence that demonstrate the capability to establish key skills and facilities, enable facilities access, and provide clear pathways to impact".[408] They also suggested that "there is a growing awareness that to maximise research impact a clear link needs to be established between fundamental research, technology development, and the launch of new technologies. Without this link, universities [were] unlikely to 'push' research through to deployment, and industry [was] unlikely to invest to 'pull' technology forward".[409] Dr Daryl Landeg, the Chief Scientist at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, agreed.[410] Mr Allen from the TSB also noted the need for "support and connectivity across the whole R&D supply chain, from basic to applied into commercialisation" to support the translation of research.[411]

225. RCUK said that at present "research council funding is centred around centres of excellence with support from a wider group of universities. Almost all of the research council portfolio is made up of projects involving more than one institution and the university sector collaborates on a range of training activities." This "networking" was considered, in their view, to be a "key strength of the UK" as it "will build an internationally recognised UK research capability".[412]

226. The Dalton Institute agreed that the nuclear capability in some key UK universities had been strengthened over the last decade through initiatives including the BNFL University Research Alliances, the EDF Energy University research partnerships and the more recent Rolls-Royce Nuclear University Technology Centres. They also noted that "the EPSRC Keeping the Nuclear Option Open consortium provided the opportunity for a wider engagement of UK academia in nuclear research through collaboration with these recognised centres of excellence". However, they and others took the view that, because of the weak international perception of the UK's nuclear R&D, this was not enough to provide the necessary international leadership.[413]

227. Professor Cowley from the CCFE agreed. He commented that, at present, there was a need for a lead centre, such as the previous UKAEA[414] with the "mandate to be the repository of the technical knowledge and the supplier of advice ... It cannot just exist in multiple places simultaneously."[415] Mr Allen agreed that "historically, the UK did have a reputation of being able to [join up the research through to market] in the days of the UKAEA and CEGB. Now it is only partially realised in the areas where we still have strengths". But in terms of new build out to 2050 this was not "in place at the moment".[416]

228. It was suggested by a number of witnesses, including Professor Sir John Beddington, that a consortium approach would be most appropriate to provide such a lead, combining both the applied capabilities within NNL with the expertise within universities:

"The way that we had originally envisaged the Nuclear Centre of Excellence, which was going to be co-hosted by NNL but would involve university partnerships—in particular, Imperial College and Manchester—was an excellent idea[417]... We now need to think about how we substitute that."[418]

NNL

229. Professor Cowley and many others suggested that NNL could fulfil this leading role, given that it has internationally recognised facilities for nuclear research and expertise in many areas, as well as connections to both academia and industry.[419] Professor Howarth, Chief Executive of NNL, told us:

"the National Nuclear Laboratory can take a lead role, effectively, in co-ordinating that work. We would bring the universities with us and we would also bring with us the industrial supply chain within the UK in this area as well and support those. We would effectively be in a position where we could spearhead and you would have this push-pull relationship between Government and the National Laboratory. That is what happens in other countries."[420]

230. Mr Bigot explained to us that the national lead on nuclear research was often the national nuclear laboratory because, of their "expertise and capability to have in the long term a longstanding relationship with ... other countr[ies]" which extends beyond short-term political cycles.[421] He suggested that the UK should set up an "agency" to work on the Government's nuclear policy. It would provide a mechanism for capitalising on the experience and expertise in the UK and enable discussions with similar agencies abroad (such as CEA) about ways of sharing experience and reducing costs.[422] Professor Howarth supported this proposal on the grounds that:

"in other countries, where, for example, the Government wish to take a strong international position associated with a low-carbon economy ... [their] credibility on the international stage comes from the research and work that it is doing, ... and is backed up by the national laboratory. … internationally, the other national laboratories are seen as very strong centres of excellence within the countries and internationally."[423]

231. In these cases, however, the laboratory, as Westinghouse told us, often "have a remit more focused on fundamental science, supported by government funding" and therefore acts as a recognised national centre of excellence for nuclear research in both basic and applied research. When we asked NNL whether they intended to develop a programme of basic research, they told us that they did not. In their view, basic research "needs to live within academia" with NNL being responsible for applied R&D and the translation of research (see paragraph 242). It would appear therefore that the national laboratory model may not be directly applicable to the UK at the present time as the NNL is not directly comparable to other national laboratories that fulfil this role. If NNL were to become a national lead, it would have to have extensive collaborations with the academic community. We have a number of concerns however about the difficulties involved in collaborating with NNL or gaining access to its facilities.

232. Whereas the CEA has 1,400 PhD students across their portfolio of work,[424] when we visited NNL we were disappointed to find very few students or academics (about 20-30) working at the facilities.[425] Several witnesses, including Professor Fitzpatrick, also felt that NNL activities did not compare well to other national laboratories "in terms of scale or scope of activity" even though it has unique and leading capability and competence in certain fields, and that it had a poor profile in terms of published work.[426] Professor Fitzpatrick told us that, for this reason, "in its present form [NNL] cannot provide the research support for the development of future nuclear technologies nor act as a focus for such activity. As a research facility, it serves the existing nuclear industry, but it is not a national facility, such as those operated by the Science and Technology Facilities Council, that is easily accessible by University researchers".[427] (We discuss the constraints on NNL's remit further in paragraphs 239 to 253.)

233. The Universities of Bristol and Oxford and others said that access to facilities at NNL for handling active materials was difficult and prohibitively expensive for academics.[428] Professor Roger Cashmore, Chair of the CCFE, also said that there was a need to move away from full economic costing to encourage the use of NNL's expertise and facilities.[429] Several witnesses, including CoRWM, argued that "NNL remains at a commercial disadvantage compared with its overseas competitors".[430] It is far easier for researchers from the UK to access overseas facilities than it is to access those at NNL, for a fraction of the cost. Sellafield Ltd told us that:

"US funding arrangements allow academics to use the national laboratory HA [higher active] facilities at virtually no cost to their university, and this leads to spin off developments which can be launched to market. This mix of Government, academia and industry working together maximises networking and learning across the whole sector, leading to innovation benefits for US Government projects".[431]

234. NNL and the University of Manchester have developed processes to ensure academic access to these facilities.[432] However, for other universities, it is still very difficult and there is a need, in our view, for NNL to improve access further to encourage collaborations with academia. NNL's remit also restricts its ability to carry out work collaboratively with academia that is not of direct commercial value. (We discuss this further in paragraphs 239 to 253.)

THE CULHAM CENTRE FOR FUSION ENERGY (CCFE)

235. Several witnesses, including Professor Sir David King, of the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, suggested that the CCFE may be a better lead, given that it is an internationally recognised centre of excellence for nuclear research and has capabilities of relevance to the development of Generation IV technologies.[433] The CEA, for example, is responsible for both fusion and fission research, given the significant cross-over in research in these areas or relevance to advanced nuclear technologies. Professor Keith Mason, Chief Executive of the STFC told us that "there is a lot of capability that is being developed around the fusion programme, but [it] is equally applicable to Gen IV".[434] Dr Taylor of ISIS also suggested that, because of the UK's internationally recognised expertise in fusion, "we would be a very attractive partner in those areas where we have been pursuing research on the fusion agenda".[435]

236. The UK Atomic Energy Authority also noted the significant cross-over in expertise: "CCFE is a repository of knowledge, research expertise, and nuclear skills. This capital has been nurtured for the fusion programme but also offers crucial capabilities for the UK to grow an advanced Generation IV fission programme, as we think it should." They explained: "Engineering synergies between fusion and fission include materials, structural integrity, heat transfer and the remote handling needed to maintain and refurbish reactors" and "fusion development would benefit from the training of a new generation of nuclear engineers. And in turn, fission could benefit from engineering expertise nurtured in the UK fusion programme. This expertise will be required in the design of both future fusion and fission power plants".[436] The CCFE also currently collaborates with Oxford University and French experts in fission materials research.[437]

237. Culham does not however have a remit to undertake work to meet the UK's national nuclear fission energy R&D needs and it is not clear from the evidence we received if it has sufficient facilities links with the main universities, with nuclear fission expertise in the UK or with industry.

238. Although the weight of evidence favoured a national centre of excellence to act as a national lead for research, it appears that, at present, there is no single body with the necessary breadth of capabilities to fulfil this role. It is for this reason that we have proposed (in paragraph 143) that many of the functions of a national centre of excellence should be subsumed into the remit for the proposed Nuclear R&D Board. As the major nuclear research organisations in the UK will be represented on the Board, collectively they will have available to them the expertise and capabilities to carry out many of these functions. For those functions that it is not able to fulfil, it will also be able to advise Government on how to take them forward—in particular, to examine mechanisms to ensure that the UK is able to take a central role in international nuclear research collaborations and signal to the international research community that the UK is a credible and willing partner for such collaborations.

The role of NNL

239. Given our conclusion above, and the key role that NNL will play within the Board, we considered whether the role of NNL should be reviewed.

CURRENT ROLE

240. The Government describes the objective of NNL as follows: "to become a centre of expertise in applied nuclear research and development, serving primarily the needs of legacy nuclear waste clean-up, and to play a key role as a world class provider of science based technology solutions and research services". They acknowledged that "there is a need to safeguard the skills and capabilities within NNL that are fundamental to the NDA's mission and on a demand basis support wider government nuclear policy development and implementation".[438]

241. NNL is a private limited company in which DECC holds all the shares through a holding company, NNL Holdings Ltd run by the Management Contractor SBM, a consortium consisting of Serco, Battelle and the University of Manchester. NNL competes with private sector providers for research contracts, charged on a full commercial basis, with no government support or subsidy.

242. According to the Government, NNL fulfils its R&D remit appropriately.[439] Mr Higson of the ONR told us that NNL had "a very important role in maintaining the skills base in the United Kingdom" and that, in the Government's opinion, "that is best maintained, particularly for the longer term, by NNL operating in effect on a commercial-based model".[440] NNL however disagreed. In their view, their remit was too heavily focused on the legacy waste management programme and should be broadened to include the following:

(1) appropriate stewardship of the UK's strategic nuclear skills, capabilities and knowledge especially in nuclear fuel cycle technology:

to meet R&D needs on legacy clean-up;
to support current nuclear operations; and
to meet the UK's climate change commitments and energy supply security;

(2) acting as technical advisor to the Government on civil nuclear fission energy and subsequently lead national strategic R&D programmes and activities;

(3) becoming a world class centre of expertise in applied R&D supporting public and private sector customers in the UK and internationally across the nuclear fuel cycle; and

(4) maintaining NNL's sound financial footing with income from commercial and other sources as appropriate, developing its customer base and optimising the use of its facilities.[441]

243. Several witnesses were critical of NNL's solely commercial status and lack of government funding. They commented, in particular, that as a result, its work was too focused on the short-term needs of customers rather than conducting research of national need.[442] Many of the revised objectives would, in our view, enable NNL to broaden its remit to provide a valuable contribution to the Nuclear R&D Board.

244. NNL told us that they have "the technical capabilities to undertake R&D across all areas in the nuclear fuel cycle", but that maintaining these capabilities in the future would require "longer term R&D programmes across the technology chain with NNL leading Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 3-6 but integrating academic research and industry longer-term needs" (see Figure 3 and 4 on pages 19 and 20). They envisaged that the programmes should cover strategic areas such as "plutonium disposition and fuel cycle options" and would need to "utilise the world class radioactive facilities at its laboratories that have yet to be fully commissioned".[443]

245. At present, although NNL has a remit to maintain R&D capabilities and associated expertise in these strategic areas of relevance to the NDA's remit, it has not been given a block grant to do so[444] and does not have "an R&D remit on behalf of Government" to carry out a programme of research of national need to maintain such capabilities.[445] NNL, and many others, took the view that NNL was best placed to take the lead on translational research for the UK.[446] Commenting on this Professor Howarth said:

"the key aspect here is that we as a country require a cadre of subject matter experts in a whole range of disciplines to support all our nuclear activities ... [with] a close link between academia and industry. They need to understand working in an academic sense and the fundamental principles associated with a bottom-up understanding of nuclear operations. They also need to have a proper understanding of the industrial context of those operations. That translation happens through a national laboratory. That is a role that the National Laboratory plays, joining those two ends together, and in the facilities that we operate—unique, critical, state-of-the-art facilities—that help to translate that research through" (see paragraphs 229 to 232).[447]

246. Dame Sue Ion said that she failed to see "how you can maintain a skills base in advanced systems and even in today's systems unless you have money to help you to do that".[448] She advocated giving NNL "some form of funding to particularly maintain a skills base in systems work".[449] At present NNL uses its own funding for a minimal (£1 million) internal R&D programme for long-term research of national importance (including plutonium disposition). The rest of its profit is returned to the HM Treasury to offset losses incurred by the business prior to April 2009[450] (save that an arrangement was reached recently to use some of this money to fund the commissioning of part of the Phase 2 laboratory and the Windscale laboratory).[451]

247. When we asked Professor MacKay if he thought that DECC should be giving funding to NNL, he said that the arguments for doing so were "strong".[452] Providing NNL with a modest sum of money to fund strategic research of national need not, in our view interfere with its ability to generate money through commercial contracts, as other national laboratories do. It would, however, allow it to carry out R&D of national strategic need that is not commercially viable, which at present it is not able to do.

COMPARISONS WITH OTHER NATIONAL LABORATORIES

248. The role of NNL is in stark contrast to the role of national laboratories in other countries.[453] NNL told us that "all international national laboratories have some direct funding to undertake strategic R&D programmes of national interest often with a remit to supplement government funding though third-party contracts for R&D ... Most national laboratories are advisers to their governments and other national stakeholders and provide a degree of R&D co-ordination. … the nature of NNL's funding means that the focus is on addressing short-term customer needs rather than longer-term strategic requirements."[454] At present NNL provides advice to Government on an ad hoc basis, recently providing staff to advise Government on the Fukushima incident. However it does not receive funding in recognition of this important role.[455]

249. It would seem therefore that, despite its best efforts, excellent facilities and expertise in a number of areas, constraints on its remit and funding mechanisms mean that NNL is a national laboratory in name only.

250. We recommend that the Government extend the remit of NNL to enable it to carry out a programme of applied long-term R&D of national strategic need, under the direction of the proposed nuclear R&D Board, in order to maintain capabilities in vulnerable areas for which no body currently has responsibility for (such as advanced fuel recycling and reprocessing and deep geological disposal) and to maintain the breadth of R&D capabilities and associated expertise needed to meet the UK's future energy policies.

CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT

251. NNL's current contract is for "three plus one plus one" years. They are now in year three of that period with no clear plan of what will happen in the coming years. According to Professor Howarth, this contrasts with "other national laboratories in the UK, like the National Physical Laboratory" which "have long-term time horizons of 10 years plus".[456] This short-term contractual arrangement impacts on the ability of NNL to attract the sort of investment which would enable it to maintain important national capabilities which are not of immediate commercial value. For example, the University of Central Lancashire told us that industry was reluctant to invest in the facilities for Phase 3 partly because of the absence of a Government policy or strategy on nuclear.[457]

252. Speaking on behalf of NNL's managing contractors, Professor Howarth told us that the companies would themselves invest in the Phase 3 facilities if NNL's contract were extended to allow it to consider longer-term assets. In order to do this, the contractors would like to see:

"a long-term time horizon for the NNL … to attract the best individuals to work at the National Nuclear Laboratory to keep this UK capability alive … [and] in order to support the UK national strategy in nuclear".[458]

253. The Government should extend the length of NNL's contract to allow it to invest, and attract investment, in the infrastructure and expertise required to support longer-term research objectives.

380 Q 383 Back

381 Q 375 Back

382 Q 384 Back

383 Q 70 Back

384 NRD 29 Back

385 Q 257 Back

386 NRD 19 Back

387 NRD 19 Back

388 NRD 19 Back

389 Ibid. Back

390 NRD 09, 29, 50 Back

391 NRD 29 Back