Chapter 8: The need for an integrated
policy approach to maintaining nuclear R&D capabilities and
associated expertise
254. A number of witnesses highlighted the need
for Government energy policy to be based on an holistic view of
the nuclear fuel cycle, taking into account not only priorities
to meet the low-carbon economy targets and energy security objectives
(including decommissioning and waste management and disposal)
but also the commercial opportunities that the fuel cycle provide,
as well as security and non-proliferation and defence policies.[459]
Post-Fukushima, there have also been calls for the better integration
of nuclear safety with nuclear security policies.[460]
Professor Sir David King, of the Smith School of Enterprise and
the Environment, for example, referred to the need for a "fully
integrated policy" to address the questions:
"What does the long-term pathway for civil nuclear
power generation in the UK look like and what are the drivers
going to be? ... What are the commercial ways of optimising Britain's
nuclear assets? ... How can we address non-proliferation issues
regarding the fuel cycle and the risk of fissile material being
diverted for nuclear weapons? [and] What are the environmental
impacts and opportunities for developing a long-term approach
to nuclear, particularly in terms of reducing carbon dioxide emissions
... ?"[461]
255. Responsibilities for nuclear energy production
and decommissioning and waste management, nuclear safety, non-proliferation
and security, and for exploiting the commercial potential from
the nuclear R&D capabilities and associated expertise in the
UK are split between DECC, the Department for Work and Pensions
(DWP), MoD and BIS respectively. Whilst we have not been able
to examine the need for an integrated policy approach in detail
or the impact that such an approach would have on assessing R&D
capabilities, we would like to draw attention to two examples
that emerged from the evidence which suggest that at present there
is insufficient cross-departmental working or integrated thinking
in the development of policy areas of relevance to nuclear or
consideration of the overlapping R&D requirements for these
policies. The first is the decision, subsequently reversed, to
withdraw from membership of the NEA; and the second is the Government's
failure to adopt an integrated approach to considering the value
of the UK's reprocessing and advanced fuel recycling capabilities
at Sellafield (as discussed in paragraphs 208 to 219).
THE NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY (NEA)
256. The NEA assists member countries in "maintaining
and further developing, through international co-operation, the
scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe,
environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes".[462]
In 2010, the Government signalled an intention to withdraw from
membership of the NEA at the end of 2011.[463]
This decision was reportedly viewed with "incredulity"[464]
by other countries, given the UK's commitment to nuclear safety
and non-proliferation on the international stage. We asked some
of our witnesses about the decision. Serco Energy told us that
membership of the NEA was important "to provide access to
modelling codes ... and nuclear data",[465]
for which, Dame Sue Ion told us, "there are multiple users
and beneficiaries".[466]
Dame Sue said that "when the decision was taken there was
insufficient understanding as to the value of membership of NEA
... and the extent to which the database was used across multiple
sectors in the UK".[467]
We were reassured to hear therefore that the Government has now
come to an arrangement to continue the UK's membership of the
NEA.[468]
REPROCESSING AND ADVANCED FUEL RECYCLING
257. The UK is considered to have "internationally
competitive resources" in reprocessing and advanced recycling
capabilities.[469]
In March 2011, the Smith Institute of Enterprise and the Environment
at the University of Oxford produced a report entitled A low
carbon nuclear future. The report suggested that the commercial
opportunities for the UK in pursuing nuclear fuel recycling alongside
the new build programme were potentially significant—(£10
billion)—and could also lead to the creation of 45,000 new
high-tech jobs over the next 20-30 years.[470]
Doing so would also reduce the UK's volume of radioactive waste
and significantly reduce the risk of proliferation. Although there
are differences in opinion about the commercial viability of providing
reprocessing and fuel recycling services globally, it is generally
agreed that reusing the UK's plutonium stockpile would be a cheaper
option than treating it as waste.[471]
258. Professor Sir David King said that:
"there is a massive legacy for the Government
to deal with. A Government investment programme is required to
manage that properly and in good time. ... whereas we could treat
the plutonium as an £8 billion legacy waste problem, the
alternative is to treat the plutonium as a fuel and minimise the
cost to the public purse going forward ... We ... have a very
big stockpile up in Cumbria, so it is the biggest opportunity
for us. But we also have 60,000 tonnes of uranium. There is 100
tonnes of plutonium and a good amount of uranium. We need to optimise
how we use that as we move forward."[472]
259. At present, the Government is consulting
on options to deal with the UK's plutonium stockpile. The preferred
option is to continue recycling spent fuel and to procure a MOX
plant to convert it into MOX fuel and to burn it in nuclear reactors,
as Sir David suggests (although there are other fuel-based options).
But, as already mentioned, because of the NDA's remit for decommissioning
and waste management of legacy waste, and of the absence of a
global market for the UK's uranium or plutonium, NDA have decided
to cease operating the UK's only reprocessing plant, Thorp, in
2018. In August 2011, they also announced that they would cease
operations at SMP immediately (see paragraphs 208 to 219 above).
260. Given that these capabilities may be required
to deal with the plutonium stockpile in the future, are required
to keep the option of a significantly increased nuclear contribution
open and may be of significant commercial value to the UK, this
seems to be a short-sighted approach to dealing with these capabilities.
We would also question whether, in the long term, the Government's
continued support for once-through fuel cycle technologies is
compatible with their commitment to reduce the proliferation risk
from nuclear material and to reduce waste in the long-term.
261. We recommend that responsibility for
co-ordinating overlapping nuclear R&D capability requirements
across Government should be assigned to the proposed Nuclear R&D
Board to ensure that the UK's nuclear R&D capabilities and
associated expertise match the UK's requirements across different
policy areas in the long term.
459 Q 319 Back
460
Time for an Integrated Approach to Nuclear Risk Management,
Governance and Safety/Security/Emergency Arrangements, The
World Institute for Nuclear Security, May 2011. Back
461
Q 307 Back
462
NRD 47 Back
463
NRD 70 Back
464
NRD 43, Q 61 Back
465
NRD 22 Back
466
NRD 29 Back
467
Q 61 Back
468
NRD 70 Back
469
NRD 13, 05, 39, 50; A Review of the UK's Nuclear R&D Capability
op. cit. Back
470
NRD 14, 29 Back
471
Q 144 Back
472
Q 302 Back
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