| SUMMARY
Ministers are by convention constitutionally responsible
to Parliament for all the actions of their civil servants, and
civil servants are accountable to ministers. In recent times,
however, with the development of new forms of parliamentary scrutiny,
select committees have increasingly held civil servants directly
to account; and ministers have on occasion tended to distance
themselves from failures in government, stating that the errors
were made by civil servants.
In this report on the accountability of civil servants,
we make the following recommendations—
- The convention of individual ministerial responsibility
remains essential for enabling Parliament to hold the executive
properly to account. Whilst the convention can be supplemented
by other accountability mechanisms, these should not dilute ministers'
constitutional responsibility to Parliament.
- The Osmotherly rules, which provide guidance
to civil servants on relations with select committees, in no way
have the effect of imposing restrictions on the activities of
select committees. It is for Parliament to determine how it scrutinises
the executive.
- However, in view of the importance of the rules
in guiding civil servants in their dealings with select committees,
we recommend that future revisions of the rules should be published
in draft to enable scrutiny by Parliament and its select committees.
- It is essential that civil servants provide ministers
with candid and fearless advice, including on the constitutionality
of proposed actions. Ultimately ministers are free to reject that
advice; they should accept the political consequences of doing
so.
- A select committee should be able to request
access to relevant policy advice given by civil servants to ministers,
on the rare occasions where it considers it essential to its examination
of an issue; ministers should consider such requests on their
merits; and the decision on whether to disclose the advice should
be taken consistent with the tests in the Freedom of Information
Act 2000.
- Where select committees wish to criticise named
civil servants, they should be free to do so, though this power
should be exercised judiciously; the disciplining of civil servants
must remain an internal matter for government departments.
- Where a select committee asks to take evidence
from a named civil servant, ministers should only reject the request
in exceptional circumstances.
- Any changes to the process for appointing permanent
secretaries and temporary civil servants should protect the principle
of appointment on merit, on the basis of fair and open competition.
The process should also ensure that those appointed as civil servants
possess the attributes of integrity, honesty, objectivity and
impartiality.
- There should be a presumption that major projects
will be led by the same senior civil servant from beginning to
end. Many high-profile failings of government in recent years
have been on long-term projects or procurement; this change will
enhance the ability of Parliament to hold the executive to account
for such projects.
- Former post-holders should give evidence to select
committees when requested on projects or policies on which they
used to work.
- Ministers must not use the existence of an arm's-length
body to avoid their constitutional responsibilities to Parliament:
the accountability mechanisms of arm's-length bodies are a supplement
to, not a replacement for, ministerial responsibility.
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