APPENDIX 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE
The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution,
chaired by Baroness Jay, is announcing today an inquiry into the
accountability of civil servants. The Committee invites interested
organisations and individuals to submit written evidence as part
of the inquiry. The Committee intends to focus on those in the
home civil service.
Written evidence is sought by Friday 8 June 2012.
Public hearings are expected to be held in May, June and July.
The Committee aims to report to the House, with recommendations,
before the end of the year. The report will receive a response
from the Government and may be debated in the House.
Under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act
2010 (CRAG), the civil service has for the first time been placed
on a statutory basis. The Act enshrines the four civil service
attributes of integrity, honesty, impartiality and objectivity,
and requires the publication of codes of conduct for civil servants
and for special advisers.
The accountability of the government to Parliament
is governed by the convention of individual ministerial responsibility.
Under this convention, civil servants are responsible to ministers,
and ministers in turn are responsible to Parliament.[146]
The rationale behind this arrangement is to protect the impartiality
and anonymity of civil servants. However, the convention does
not prevent civil servants giving evidence to parliamentary select
committees on their minister's behalf. The government's position
on the relationship between the civil service and select committees
is contained in the document Departmental Evidence and Response
to Select Committees (known as the "Osmotherly Rules").[147]
These are, and always have been, drafted by and for the executive,
without parliamentary input or express approval.
This convention has become subject to a number of
criticisms, generally on the grounds that it is no longer an effective
means of holding the government fully to account, and that it
does not adequately reflect the distribution of power and responsibility
between ministers, civil servants and special advisers. Proposals
for reform of the system of civil service accountability have
included calls for civil servants to be held directly accountable
to Parliament (via select committees), and suggestions that ministers
should become involved in senior civil service appointments.
As well as these general concerns, specific constitutional
issues arise in the case of non-ministerial departments: government
departments where, due to the nature of the work being undertaken
by the department, it is not desirable for the department to be
overseen by a minister directly.[148]
Each non-ministerial department has a "sponsoring" minister,
who is accountable to Parliament for its actions. However, questions
exist over the effectiveness, and desirability, of ministers being
held accountable for the actions of bodies over which they have
limited control and information.
The Committee would also welcome evidence on the
status of special advisers. Special advisers occupy an unusual
place in the civil service. Technically civil servants, they are
exempt from the usual requirement of impartiality, objectivity,
and appointment on merit, and as such are appointed to provide
ministers with advice and support with regard to the political
(and party political) aspects of government. Though prohibited
from managing civil servants, the code of conduct for special
advisers does allow them to communicate the minister's views and
work priorities, and to request that permanent civil servants
prepare and provide information and data. The influence of special
advisers in government, and the mechanisms (or lack of them) for
holding special advisers accountable for their work, are also
of central interest to the Committee.
The Committee would welcome written submissions on
the accountability of civil servants and related issues. Questions
the Committee will consider include:
Overview
Does the convention of individual ministerial responsibility
remain the most appropriate and effective means of holding the
government to account?
If the current model of individual ministerial responsibility
is no longer appropriate, what should replace it?
Do the civil servants' and special advisers' codes
of conduct require amendment?
To what extent should the content of the civil servants'
and special advisers' codes of conduct be set down in statute?
If so, how might CRAG be amended to achieve this?
The accountability of civil servants to ministers
To what extent has the expansion of government activity,
and the increasingly fractured nature of the state, weakened the
ability of ministers to account for their civil servants?
What, if any, influence should ministers be able
to exercise over home civil service appointments? What are the
constitutional benefits and risks of allowing such influence?
Are there any particular civil service posts to which special
considerations apply?
To what extent does the home civil service act as
a constitutional check on the actions of ministers? How does this
check operate? Is a constitutional check on ministers by civil
servants appropriate?
If such a "check" function exists, to what
extent does it distort the operation of individual ministerial
responsibility? What are the implications of this distortion?
The accountability of civil servants to Parliament
In what circumstances, if any, is it appropriate
for civil servants to be held directly accountable to Parliament?
Would direct accountability risk the politicisation
of the home civil service?
If so, is civil service politicisation always and
necessarily something to be avoided? In what circumstances should
it be permitted, and what would be the benefits of politicisation?
Where civil servants should be held directly accountable
to Parliament, is there a case for (enhanced) parliamentary involvement
in their appointment?
Is there a case for redrafting the Osmotherly Rules?
If so, what, if any, involvement should Parliament have in the
process?
The accountability of non-ministerial departments
Are the current accountability mechanisms for non-ministerial
departments effective? If not, how should they be altered?
Where should the balance lie between accountability
and operational independence? Is this balance correctly struck
at present?
Do the boards of non-ministerial departments provide
adequate oversight of, and accountability for, their departments?
If not, how should this model be altered?
The accountability of special advisers
What is the level of influence exercised by special
advisers, both in theory and in real terms?
What are the current accountability mechanisms for
special advisers, and
are these appropriate to the level of influence they
possess?
Is there a case for increasing the accountability
of special advisers to Parliament? How should any such accountability
mechanism operate in practice?
International perspectives
How do other countries with Westminster-style parliaments
hold their executives to account? What lessons can be learned
from these international comparators?
You need not address all these questions. The Committee
would also welcome any other views of which stakeholders think
the Committee should be aware.
146 A more detailed discussion of individual ministerial
responsibility can be found in the Constitution Committee's 22nd
Report of Session 2010-12, Health and Social Care Bill: Follow-Up,
in appendix 1, available online here: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201012/ldselect/ldconst/240/24004.htm Back
147
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/guide-deptal-evidence-and-response-to-select-committees.pdf Back
148
Examples include HM Revenue and Customs, the UK Statistics Authority,
and the Office of Fair Trading. Back
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