The EU’s External Action Service

Report

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Evidence is published online at www.parliament.uk/hleuc and available for inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 7219 5314)

References in footnotes to the Report are as follows:
Q refers to a question in oral evidence.
Witness names without a question reference refer to written evidence.
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty created the European External Action Service (EEAS) to support the work of the newly created post of High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP). This report assesses developments in the two years since the formal launch of the EEAS in January 2011, and makes recommendations which are intended to contribute to the HR/VP’s review of the Service in mid-2013.

In their first two years, the HR/VP and the EEAS understandably focussed on establishing the Service, and unifying the different elements of the EU’s external policies (the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the external relations activities which remained with the Commission, such as trade and development). They also had to bring together staff from the Commission, the Council and the diplomatic services of the 27 Member States. At the same time, the EEAS encountered uncertainties about what Member States wanted it to do, and was faced with the immediate challenge of the Arab Spring.

The EEAS has been successful in a number of areas, notably in the development of a “comprehensive approach” to certain countries and regions, such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, where it brought together all the instruments available to the EU. The HR/VP, with the EEAS, also established a leading position in the negotiations with Iran, calmed the relations between Serbia and Kosovo and brought Member States to agreement on sanctions on Syria. There have also been advantages in the continuity created, compared with the previous system under which the Member State holding the rotating presidency of the Council played a key role.

However, we found remaining challenges, including the need to overcome the difficulties in the relations between the EEAS and the Commission. We recommend more rigorous use of the Vice-Presidency role of the HR/VP to enhance coherence, and working towards unified reporting structures for both budgets and personnel. The EEAS should also make every effort to find and build common ground to enable Member States to agree united positions as, despite agreement on most foreign policy areas, Member States are not united on some key issues. Thus far, the EEAS appears to have brought no significant benefit to the EU’s handling of trade and development issues. Another area where improvement is still needed is crisis management.

Despite its efforts, the EEAS has not managed to deliver budget neutrality, but we consider that this should now be obtainable. The EEAS should look particularly at prioritising its work more effectively. The location of EEAS delegations should also be considered, to establish whether they support the EU’s priorities, whether they are needed in their current format and strength, or whether alternative arrangements could be made to achieve savings and avoid duplication. This could involve co-location with Member State missions and sharing services. Consideration should also be given to reducing the salaries of officials at the higher end of the scale. The review should also consider the wish of some Member States for the delegations to perform a consular role; if this is decided, those states should pay individually or collectively for this service.
We believe that the UK Government should look anew, and constructively, at ways in which the EEAS could be used to its advantage in terms of saving costs or increasing influence. We consider that it is also in their interests that high quality UK diplomats should work in the EEAS, and be assured that they will not be disadvantaged when they return to their UK careers.

Overall, we consider that, in the long term, there is much to be gained by better use of Europe’s diplomatic resources globally, whether based around collections of Member States or the EEAS. The EEAS should promptly correct the remaining organisational problems so that its systems run smoothly. Having done this, the Service should focus on delivering results.

Member States should clarify what they want the EEAS to do. The HR/VP’s review should help the Service to add value to the effectiveness of EU external polices through the use of diplomatic skills and knowledge in traditional Commission tasks. This should include improved collection, use and dissemination of political intelligence; better coordination of the use of the EU’s different instruments within a particular region; and using the combined leverage of the EU to the advantage of all 27 Member States.
The EU’s External Action Service

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. The European External Action Service (EEAS), launched in January 2011, was one of the most important institutional innovations brought about by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The creation of the EEAS formed part of a re-organisation of the external action of the European Union (EU), which also involved the creation of the posts of President of the European Council and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP). The system of the six-monthly rotating presidency was retained, but its role was diminished.

2. Article 27 of the TEU specifies that the role of the EEAS is to assist the HR/VP in fulfilling their mandate. The Treaty sets out this mandate as being:
   - to “conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy”, including making proposals and implementing policy agreed by the Council;
   - to perform the same role for the common security and defence policy;
   - to “preside over the Foreign Affairs Council”;
   - to “be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission”; and
   - to “ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action”.

3. The TEU, the TFEU, and a subsequent Council Decision outlined how the new Service was to operate. The aim of budget neutrality for the new Service was specified.

4. It is now two years since the EEAS was launched. A structure has been created, with a central direction in Brussels and 141 EU delegations around the world. The aim of this report is to contribute to the review of the EEAS which the HR/VP is to conduct in mid 2013. We must acknowledge that, with evidence from barely two years of such a challenging innovation inside the EU, this can only be a preliminary assessment; but we feel that its importance alone justifies it.

5. During our inquiry, we heard that the EEAS was created to resolve the unsatisfactory nature of the previous system, which had caused uncertainty on the part of third countries as to who was representing the EU in any week or month. The functions of collective representation were also determined by the capacity of the national diplomatic service that happened to be holding the six-monthly rotating presidency office at any one time, and therefore

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1 The Treaty made various changes to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In this report, the term “Lisbon Treaty” is used as a shorthand to refer to the combined provisions of the TEU and TFEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty.
3 Council Decision 2010/427 26 July 2010
4 Council Decision 2010/427
5 The number fluctuates as Delegations are opened and others closed.
varied in quality. In Chapter 2 of this report (paragraphs 10–85) we examine how the new institutions have evolved and whether they represent an improvement over the previous structure. In Chapter 3 we consider the achievements of the new Service (paragraphs 86–100), and the remaining challenges (paragraphs 101–145). We look particularly at whether the EEAS has contributed to coherence and consistency in the development and implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and whether it has added value to the EU’s external action. In Chapter 4 we consider the views of the EU Member States (paragraphs 146–165).

6. It was a major challenge to establish the HR/VP post and form the EEAS while they simultaneously had to begin their work. The first HR/VP, appointed in 2009, was Baroness Ashton of Upholland. By combining the two old posts of the Council’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (formerly occupied by Javier Solana), and Commissioner for External Affairs, (previously held by Benita Ferrero Waldner), the new HR/VP post gave Baroness Ashton of Upholland a leadership role over both the CFSP (an intergovernmental process directed by the Council) and the Commission’s external relations functions. However, the Lisbon Treaty left a number policy areas relating to external affairs under the direct responsibility of the Commission—trade, development, neighbourhood policy, enlargement, and climate change. The Lisbon Treaty also lacked clarity about how the EEAS would function.

7. In January 2010, before the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had 136 representations around the world, staffed by Commission officials, to transact Commission business, mostly trade (for which the EU has exclusive competence), and for development and humanitarian aid (where competences are shared with the individual Member States). With the formation of the EEAS, these representations became EU delegations. Their staff were recruited from the diplomatic services of the Member States, (to represent one third of all staff by the time the EEAS reached full capacity), and from permanent officials of the Union, who were to represent at least 60% of all EEAS staff at Administrative (AD) level. The challenge was to recruit the appropriate staff and form them into a united service with one corporate culture, both in Brussels and in the field.

8. This inquiry was conducted between November 2012 and March 2013 by the EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs, whose members are listed in Appendix 1. Those from whom we took evidence are listed in Appendix 2. We are grateful to them all.

9. We make this report to the House for debate.
CHAPTER 2: THE NEW ORGANISATION

Setting up the EEAS

10. The EEAS was established outside the normal EU institutions. In Treaty terms, it does not have the same formal status as an EU institution such as the Commission, the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament. However, it does have a clear and well established legal basis, as it is referred to in a provision introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, further amplified by a Council Decision. It is treated in every respect as if it were an institution. According to Patrick Child (Managing Director for Finance and Administration, EEAS), this meant that its staff were governed by the same principles and loyalties as any other EU officials working for any of the other institutions. Professor Richard Whitman (University of Kent) thought that the free-floating position within the EU institutional architecture gave the EEAS a distinctive voice on foreign policy issues, though it presented a challenge by reopening dividing lines between those running different areas of the EU’s external policy. He commented that the timing of the Arab Spring had been unlucky for the EEAS, as it had faced a new political test while it was still a young institution.

11. We heard from witnesses that problems had arisen because of the lack of clarity in the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions for the EEAS, compounded by the absence of a clear view among the EU’s Member States about what they wanted the Service to do. Professor Whitman likened the “formidable task” given to Baroness Ashton of setting up the EEAS to constructing a piece of self-assembly furniture without knowing what was to be constructed and without instructions. Elmar Brok MEP (Chairman of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, AFET) told us that the EEAS, and the post of HR/VP, had been aimed at achieving synergy and saving money, but that Member States themselves needed to develop greater political will so that decision-making and implementation of decisions could be expedited.

12. A number of witnesses emphasised that the EEAS was still a young institution and, in its first two years, attention had inevitably focussed on establishing its structure and institutions. Hugo Shorter (Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Head of Europe Directorate-External) believed that, while the EEAS was not perfect, it had been established effectively to undertake the tasks it had been set and was now focussing on

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11 Article 27, TEU; and Council Decision 2010/427, respectively.
12 Q 176
13 Q 27
14 Q 29
15 Professor Whitman Q 32 and written evidence, also Graham Avery, LSE Q 2, Dr Hylke Dijkstra, Oxford University paragraphs 6, 8, EPC paragraph 1
16 Q 29
17 Q 229
18 Arnaud Danjean MEP Q 231, Sir Graham Watson MEP Q 231, Dr Charles Tannock MEP Q 231, Sir Robert Atkins MEP Q 231, Dr Cornelius Adebahr DGAP paragraph 4.8, Brussels and Europe Liberal Democrats (BELD)
19 See written evidence by Dr Hylke Dijkstra, paragraphs 1–10, for background to the formation of the EEAS.
key foreign policy issues, rather than managerial matters.\textsuperscript{20} David Spence (London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE) thought that the setting up of the EEAS had been a slow process, but that matters were now improving.\textsuperscript{21} The EEAS told us that the Service was still a work in progress, and that the creation of a corporate culture took time. More time was also needed for the EEAS “to reach full cruising speed” and for cooperation with Member States and other EU institutions to be consolidated. The EEAS had set up coordination arrangements and structures but also depended on the “political commitment and consensus between Member States and other institutional stakeholders.” The EEAS had worked on communicating the EU’s policies and values through communiqués and meetings and through the work of its Strategic Communications Division.\textsuperscript{22}

13. We recognise that the EEAS is still a young Service. In its first two years the EEAS had to create a new service and structure in order to become fully operational, but it should now put that period behind it and focus on delivering results. This is extremely important, since it is essential that the EEAS delivers added value to the EU’s external action. There were differences of view amongst our witnesses on the extent to which the EEAS had done so up until now.

14. The EEAS should not, however, seek to project its own foreign policy. The Common and Foreign Security Policy should remain under the control of the Member States.

The High Representative role

15. We heard that there were advantages to combining the three roles of High Representative, Commission Vice-President, and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council in one person. There was now a single interlocutor for third countries, who in the past had not always been sure which of the posts was responsible for what.\textsuperscript{23} Edward Burke (University of St Andrews and the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, FRIDE) thought that it created opportunities for integrating the institutions.\textsuperscript{24} For David Spence, the new post meant that the HR/VP was closer to the basis of EU financial power through her relations with Member States. In her role as Vice-President of the Commission, she had Commission staff who reported directly to her and she was in a position to be well informed on a wide range of subjects, such as climate change and development and humanitarian aid. Professional expertise through the various departments was available in a way that had not been possible for her predecessor.\textsuperscript{25}

16. Edward Burke believed that, in some areas of the EU’s external relations, the HR/VP had less power than that enjoyed by the former Commissioner for external relations; some assets had been retained by the Commission, for example the international climate negotiation unit. Currently, the influence of the HR/VP and the EEAS on the Commission on foreign policy matters

\textsuperscript{20} Q 2
\textsuperscript{21} Q 66
\textsuperscript{22} EEAS, see also Elmar Brok MEP AFET Q 229
\textsuperscript{23} Richard Corbett, Office of President of the European Council Q 199
\textsuperscript{24} Q 27
\textsuperscript{25} Q 59
was based more on collegial cooperation than executive authority. He suggested that the Commission Vice-President side of the HR/VP post should be strengthened to increase the post holder’s ability to handle subjects in the Commission area of the portfolio and avoid delays in the implementation in foreign policy. The problem was compounded by the fact that meetings of the group of external relations commissioners had been less frequent since the establishment of the EEAS.\textsuperscript{26} Elmar Brok MEP also believed that the HR/VP should “draw more upon her role as Vice-President of the Commission.”\textsuperscript{27}

17. We heard praise from witnesses for the way in which Baroness Ashton had fulfilled the post. The Minister for Europe, the Rt Hon David Lidington MP, thought that “a fair amount of credit from a British perspective is due for the way in which Baroness Ashton has conducted herself in the office.” She had seen her role as being “the public voice and central coordinator of unanimously agreed foreign policy positions.”\textsuperscript{28} Hugo Shorter thought that she had, on the whole, “navigated a sensible path through the competing interests of 27 Member States and different EU institutions”.\textsuperscript{29} For Graham Avery (St. Antony’s College, Oxford University), the existence of three leading roles—the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the HR/VP—created the potential for friction, which had thus far been avoided because of the personalities involved.\textsuperscript{30} Mats Persson (Open Europe) thought that Baroness Ashton had managed to balance her role carefully between doing too much (and becoming an EU Foreign Minister) and too little (reducing her role to that of her predecessor) and that the role now had a higher profile than that of the former Council High Representative.\textsuperscript{31}

18. We also heard some criticism of the way in which the role had been performed. Ambassador Aska Skaisgiryté Liauškienė (Lithuanian Ambassador to the UK) looked for a stronger lead from the HR/VP in setting priorities, giving strategic direction, streamlining the political dialogue with international partners and building a record of policy success.\textsuperscript{32} Arnaud Danjean MEP (Chairman of the European Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence, SEDE) also thought that the HR/VP, as well as the Member States, could play a greater leadership role, taking ownership of some initiatives. He maintained that Javier Solana had had fewer powers, prerogatives and staff and less money but had taken initiatives, regardless of what the Member States thought. Véronique de Keyser MEP agreed that Javier Solana had had a greater political profile than Baroness Ashton, who, in her view, had been a good diplomat, rather than a politician.\textsuperscript{33} Dr Hylke Dijkstra (Oxford University) described the performance of the HR/VP as “underwhelming,” and believed that she should “try to get ahead of the Member States by taking initiatives and by showing leadership.”\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{26} QQ 27, 42, Burke paragraph 6, also Spence Q 77, Professor Steven Blockmans (CEPS and Amsterdam University) paragraph 2
\textsuperscript{27} Q 229
\textsuperscript{28} Q 261, also Véronique de Keyser MEP, Q 231
\textsuperscript{29} Q 3
\textsuperscript{30} Q 4
\textsuperscript{31} Q 66
\textsuperscript{32} Q 108
\textsuperscript{33} Q 231, see also Sir Graham Watson MEP Q 231
\textsuperscript{34} Dijkstra WE paragraphs 11–14
19. **We agree that the triple-hatted High Representative/Vice-President position brings many advantages for the coherence of the EU’s external relations. However, it does also bring a number of problems which make it difficult for the incumbent to undertake the role effectively.**

*The deputies question*

20. A number of witnesses commented that the HR/VP was overloaded, especially in view of the travel involved, and raised the question of deputies. David Spence said that there had been no proper study of the requirements of the job. Ambassador Miroslav Vlachovsky (Slovakian Ambassador to the UK) told us that his government believed that it would be an advantage for the HR/VP to have a deputy as she “cannot be in two or three places at once.” Graham Avery thought that deputies were needed as the work of chairing of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) in particular, detracted from the HR/VP’s ability to take CFSP initiatives.

21. We asked who currently substituted for the HR/VP when, for example, diary commitments prevented her from attending a meeting. Pierre Vimont (Executive Secretary General, EEAS) told us that the Lisbon Treaty and Council Decision had made no provision for a deputy and no agreement had been reached between the Member States during the original negotiations, and it had been left aside. He reported that when the HR/VP was unable to accept an invitation to speak to the European Parliament she asked a minister from the rotating presidency or a commissioner to replace her. However, appointing a commissioner formally as a deputy would raise sensitivities about status for Member States. The HR/VP could not be substituted by a civil servant, such as himself or another member of the Corporate Board—the Deputy Secretary General/Political Director, Deputy Secretary General, or Chief Operating Officer. Pedro Serrano (Principal Adviser on Foreign Affairs, Cabinet of the President of the European Council) told us that, at high-level bilateral international meetings, the EEAS could sometimes be represented by the EEAS Executive Secretary General, but his ability to intervene would be restricted as the meetings were political. Ambassador Skaisgiryte Liauskiene thought that a deputy at the political level should be considered, although she was clear that the creation of two-tier commissioners, or junior commissioners, should be avoided; the question was “very sensitive” for Lithuania. The status of the deputy should be “very carefully considered.” If ministers from Member States were called on to deputise, this should not be at the last minute, as had happened in the case of a Lithuanian minister.

22. Elmar Brok MEP thought that using foreign ministers from the country of the rotating presidency to act as deputies was useful for the political aspects of the HR/VP’s work, including speaking to the European Parliament following an FAC. He thought that EU Special Representatives (EUSRs)

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35 Q 59
36 Q 100
37 QQ 6, 24, see also BELD
38 QQ 180–184
39 QQ 201, 202
40 Q 100
could also be used (see paragraphs 74–77). Dr Charles Tannock MEP cited the example of a recent European Parliament meeting in Strasbourg when the Irish Minister for Europe had spoken in the foreign affairs debate on Mali, Syria and Iraq. In his view, using the ministers of Member States, or the relevant commissioner, was a model that worked. The Minister for Europe expressed himself as “pretty dubious” about the proposal for deputies: provisions already existed for the HR/VP to appoint deputies to cover meetings if needed.

23. **The triple-hatted HR/VP role has led to overload, especially given the inevitable amount of travel involved. We believe that serious consideration should be given to a whole range of possible solutions to this problem during the two year review of the EEAS and when appointments are made to the new Commission and the High Representative post in 2014.**

24. **The Commission Vice-Presidency role of the High Representative should be used more rigorously to ensure that there is greater liaison between the policies managed by the Commission and those offered by the EEAS, and thereby enhance coherence in the EU’s external relations.**

**The budget**

25. The overall aim for the EEAS is that it should be “guided by the principle of cost-efficiency aiming towards budget neutrality.” However, in its first two years the EEAS has requested and received an increase in its budget, (see Box 1). The HR/VP has argued that “insufficient provision has been made for the needs of the EEAS as an autonomous body in financial and administrative terms … the Service is struggling to meet even minimum standards in terms of activity based management and financial programming, personnel policy, security and IT.” The lack of adequate budgetary provisions was a “structural deficit that will need to be addressed over time.” In written evidence the EEAS argued that the baseline budget of 2011 failed to reflect accurately the true operating costs of the EEAS which, in addition, had faced unavoidable start-up costs, including the need to provide sufficient posts for the recruitment of national diplomats to meet the one third target requested by Member States. At the same time new priorities and new delegations had been needed to respond to the Arab Spring. Pierre Vimont explained that, when the EEAS was set up, staff were transferred from the Council and the Commission, but the necessary financial resources had not always been transferred with them. Consequently, even without

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41 Q 231
42 Q 231
43 Q 264
45 Report by the High Representative/Vice President to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 22 December 2011
46 EEAS
increasing staff levels, the EEAS had not from the outset had the resources
due to it. That had been “one of our main problems.”

BOX 1

EEAS Institutional Budget

Council Decision 2010/427 established the EEAS as a *sui generis* service. Financial Regulation 2010/1081 sets out that the EEAS is to be treated as an institution for the purposes of financial regulation. It has its own budgetary authority and can implement its own administrative spend. The EEAS is to be guided by the “principle of cost efficiency aiming towards budget neutrality.”

The Commission has legal primacy over setting the EEAS’s institutional budget and management of operational expenditures including operational appropriations implemented by the Heads of Delegations. The HR/VP is the authorising officer for the EEAS budget. The EEAS’s institutional funding comes out of the administrative tranche of the EU budget.

Within EU delegations, operational budgets remain the responsibility of the Commission. The Commission is authorised to sub-delegate its powers of budget implementation of operational expenditure to Heads of Delegations. Heads of Delegations are nominated as authorising officers able to sign-off the operational budget. Heads of Delegation are responsible to the Commission for the management of the operational budget but remain responsible to the EEAS for the administrative expenditures. In accordance with the Financial Regulation, Heads of Delegation have to submit an annual activity report as authorising officers of the EEAS budget and, in parallel, an annual report as authorising officers of the funds of the Commission.

The EEAS budget is set annually as part of the general EU budgetary procedure. In setting its budget, the EEAS draws up estimates of its revenue and expenditure, after consulting the relevant Commission departments, and submits it to the Commission before 1 July every year. The Commission draws up the draft budget for the EEAS which may contain different figures to those provided by the EEAS, and also drafts a working document of administrative and operational expenditures and a breakdown of staff posts. This is presented to the budgetary authority (the European Parliament and the Council) for approval.

The budget for the EEAS in 2011 was €464m divided between €184m in headquarters and €280m in delegations. This budget was transferred over from the administrative budgets of the Commission and the Council Secretariat. The Commission’s budget was increased by €9.4m in 2010 specifically to pay for 100 extra EEAS posts. For 2012, the EEAS requested, and received, a 5.3% (€27m) increase bringing the budget up to €489m split between €190m for headquarters and €299m for delegations.

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47 Q 191


For 2013, the budget has been set at €509m, of which €313m will be spent on the delegations and €196 within headquarters.\textsuperscript{50} Appropriations for missions and representations, which had been cut in 2012 by 10% and 5% respectively, have been frozen.\textsuperscript{51} The EEAS budget represents 0.6% of the total EU administrative budget and 0.4% of the total EU budget.\textsuperscript{52}

26. Pierre Vimont explained that financial processes and procedures were complicated. One legal problem for the Commission was that the EEAS was an administration, and not a fully fledged institution of the Union, and therefore did not have the legal status required to deal with the operational and financial resources that it managed. In addition, each service inside the Commission had retained a direct link with its representatives around the world.\textsuperscript{53}

27. We enquired where savings could be made to reach the objective of budget neutrality\textsuperscript{54} and heard that the EEAS has already made savings of 10% in travel budgets and 5% in representation costs.\textsuperscript{55} In written evidence the EEAS told us that the difficult budgetary environment for national diplomatic services had been a stimulus for thinking on cooperation and pooling of resources with Member States, in particular where national authorities were forced to reduce their diplomatic network. This had included sharing of political reporting, mutual support in organising high-level visits and co-location of EU delegations and national embassies. The EEAS was “very open to closer cooperation with Member States, in particular where concentrating resources at EU level can produce considerable net savings in national budgets.”\textsuperscript{56}

28. We heard that the Lisbon Treaty had charged the EEAS with managing the Council machinery in Brussels and for taking over the tasks of the rotating presidencies in third countries, which had previously been provided and resourced by Member States, whose tasks had consequently been reduced. Two reviews had identified resources for the additional work which could be taken from areas of lower priority or duplication, and a “significant number of posts” had been identified for transfer from headquarters services to work in delegations. A senior management structure corresponding to the needs of the organisation, which was now more autonomous and independent of the Commission and the Council secretariat, had led to an increase of fewer than 10 senior positions.\textsuperscript{57} David Spence told us that, in his view, the HR/VP, in refusing to request more money, had “accepted a self-denying ordinance.”\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{50} EU’s General budget for the financial year 2013 and information provided by the EEAS
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{ibid.}
\textsuperscript{52} Information from the EEAS and Q 269
\textsuperscript{53} Q 168
\textsuperscript{54} Under Council Decision 2010/427 and the Amending Financial Regulation the EEAS must be guided by “the principle of cost efficiency aiming towards budget neutrality” (Financial Regulation, Preamble 5). This effectively means that the EEAS has to manage its institution and network of Delegations with existing resources taken from the Heading V (Administrative Budget) and there is no extra money allocated to the EU for these purposes.
\textsuperscript{55} Vimont Q 191, EEAS
\textsuperscript{56} EEAS
\textsuperscript{57} Child, QQ 191, 194
\textsuperscript{58} Q 67
29. The UK position has from the outset been that the EEAS should be “budget neutral”, as outlined in the Regulation and Council Decision. The Minister for Europe told us that economy and value for money needed to be addressed more energetically, even though the EEAS budget was small in relative terms. It was impossible to justify increases in the EEAS budget when the FCO was cutting back. He particularly criticised the EEAS’s increased spending on buildings and associated costs at delegations, in security at the Brussels headquarters and on contract staff.59 Hugo Shorter added that the UK Government believed that the EEAS’s approach to budgetary issues went “beyond the Council Decision wording that it should commit to cost efficiency, aiming towards budget neutrality.” The UK had opposed the large budget increases the EEAS had requested for 2012 and thought it should and could achieve its objectives without the increase. The UK had had to accept an increase in the EEAS budget, which had been decided by a qualified majority vote, but the increase had formed part of an overall cut in the EU’s administrative spending. The UK had also opposed the 5.7% budget increase which had been requested for 2013.60

30. We asked about the level of EEAS salaries and how they compared with equivalent salaries in Member States. Patrick Child told us that the level of salaries was framed by staff regulations, which applied to all EU institutions and which were decided by the Council of Ministers based on proposals from the Commission. Comparison with national services was difficult as salary levels varied between Member States: some former ambassadors from Member States had been disappointed to discover the level of remuneration at the EEAS senior level, compared with their previous packages. He believed that, if the financial and accommodation packages of the average EEAS Head of Delegation or diplomat were compared with the UK system or that of another large Member State, there would not be a significant difference.61

31. The Minister for Europe told us that, in general, the staff of EU institutions were “considerably better paid and pay much less tax than their UK civil service equivalents.” The 11 EU Special Representatives were funded from the CFSP budget at AD 16 level on the salary scale, but the UK believed that AD 14 would be sufficient.62 He explained that the EEAS had chosen the high level of remuneration in order to attract influential figures for these positions, though, in reality, most EUSRs were civil servants from the Member States or EU institutions, and only three of the 11 were former ministers. EU staff paid a “Community Tax” and a “Special Levy” on their salaries on a progressive scale. The top rate for the former was 45%, “but the vast majority of staff pay considerably less than this and the lowest grades pay nothing.” The Special Levy (up till January 2013, now under renegotiation) was an amount up to 5.5% and was applied on a progressive scale. He said that, in reality “only the top earners paid the full amount, with the average payment nearer to 1.9%.”63 The EEAS took the benchmark for overseas accommodation allowances from those used for staff from international organisations, such as the World Bank, whereas those of

59 QQ 269, 274
60 Q 6. Since this evidence was taken the EEAS budget for 2013 has been agreed: see Box 1.
61 QQ 192, 193
62 The salary scales for EEAS officials are set out in Appendix 5. Some allowances are also included.
63 Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Member States were more appropriate. 64 Hugo Shorter told us that the UK was seeking a review of the salaries of EUSRs, which were “extraordinarily high”—many were higher than the UN Secretary-General’s salary—but there was no unanimity among Member States on reducing them. 65

32. Mats Persson opposed any increase in the EEAS budget and thought it should prioritise better, moving resources from back to front office and from expenditure on running costs to achievement on the ground. Some EEAS staff were paid “a ridiculous amount of money” which could be reduced. 66 Dr Charles Tannock MEP also told us that “there is plenty of fat that can be cut.” 67 On the other hand, some witnesses felt that the EEAS was being asked to do more than was possible with its allocated budget. Edward Burke said that, if the Service was to remain budget-neutral, its tasks should be reduced. 68 Ambassador Wlachovský thought the EEAS needed sufficient budgetary support, but care needed to be taken on how that budget was organised, in view of the current austerity conditions. 69

33. We recognise the problem of setting up a new service and the additional investment that has been required, and that efforts have been made to restrain the budget and abide by the injunction to achieve budget neutrality. However, budget neutrality has not been achieved. We recommend that, while the EU Member States have to observe budgetary restraints, there should be zero real growth in the EEAS budget.

34. We fully agree with the intention of the EEAS to continue cooperation with Member States to identify where resources can be shared to achieve savings in national budgets. The aim should be to provide benefits for all Member States. Achievement in this area should become a key indicator of performance by the EEAS.

35. We have heard evidence that salaries are overgenerous in comparison with Member State diplomatic norms. It is very difficult to substantiate this because of the difficulties of establishing comparable grades, but we recommend that the general principle should be that salaries are broadly comparable with those of the larger Member States for officials in equivalent diplomatic service positions. This is especially important while many Member States face particularly severe budgetary constraints.

36. We recognise that EEAS salaries are based on Commission staff regulations and that, if they are reduced, this may lead to the loss of good staff to other EU institutions. However, the appropriate way to resolve this would be to reduce the higher-level salaries within the institutions across the board, or to recruit a larger proportion of staff from national diplomatic services.

37. The EU, and hence also the EEAS, have a very wide range of potential interests spread across the entire globe. The prioritisation of aims

64 Q 274
65 Q 270
66 QQ 68, 78
67 Q 231
68 Q 30, also Whitman Q 30
69 Q 105, also Ambassador Jarc, Q 105
and objectives must be a core part of the review of the EEAS, but it must also take account of the need to adapt to unforeseen circumstances and situations.

The new delegations

Location

38. The EEAS currently has 141 delegations around the world. In some places, such as Geneva and Addis Ababa, where international organisations are located, it has two. The Service employs some 1,922 staff in the Delegations. Other EU offices also exist, such as trade promotion offices in Asia, which are not institutionally part of the administration of the EEAS, but are part of the EU presence and are supervised by the EEAS delegation. A network of assistance offices under the EU’s humanitarian wing, ECHO (the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection), cooperate closely with the EEAS delegations but also have direct links with the headquarters Commission services responsible for humanitarian assistance. It was argued that this separation is necessary in order for the EU’s humanitarian work to maintain sufficient independence from the EU’s political action.  

39. The EEAS told us that the broad geographic coverage of the network of delegations reflected the global footprint of the EU and had “strong support from Member States”, in particular from those whose national diplomatic resources were more limited. This point was confirmed by the Ambassadors to the UK of Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia (see paragraphs 157 and 158). Pierre Vimont told us that the network was regularly reviewed to take account of the reality of the international scene. Two Delegations had been closed (Suriname and New Caledonia) as new ones had been established. In Libya, a Delegation had been opened in Benghazi, and in Burma the EEAS presence had been upgraded to a full Delegation. In January 2013, the HR/VP also announced the opening of a Delegation in the United Arab Emirates.  

40. Professor Whitman thought that the EEAS would not necessarily have chosen to place delegations where they were currently located if it had started with a blank sheet of paper; the system was not wasteful, but duplication existed between the diplomatic infrastructure of Member States and the EU. He wondered whether regional hubs with antennae could be useful. Graham Avery regarded the delegations as the most important part of the EEAS. He believed that the EU’s representation was working well, and that the suspicion of some Member States that the delegations would try to usurp the functions of Member States had not materialised.

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70 Information from the EEAS. See also paragraph 64  
71 Child Q 178  
72 EEAS paragraph 12  
73 Q 101  
74 Q 177  
75 Information from the EEAS  
76 QQ 32, 49  
77 Q 4
41. Roberto Gualtieri MEP thought that the delegations were “starting to prove their added value” and to be “the real places where we have a single place for the Union.” MatsPersson advocated greater focus on where the EEAS could add value and thought that it should close delegations where it could not. He cited Peru as a post which, in his view, added little value. By contrast the EU had the most leverage in its own neighbourhood, for example in the Balkans, and in countries where democritisation was underway, such as in Burma. The Minister for Europe did not necessarily see the political need for large-scale EU-level representation in the Caribbean and South Pacific. Nigel Farage MEP (UK Independence Party) thought that the size and cost of the delegations was unjustified and that their number constituted “outrageous profligacy” at a time when the UK Government had needed to curtail its diplomatic staff.

Operation and roles

42. As case studies, the Committee considered two of the 141 delegations in detail. Due to time constraints, we were not able to visit delegations on the ground, and therefore sought evidence via video-conference.

43. First, we spoke to Gary Quince (Head of the EEAS Delegation to the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa (see Box 2) and EU Special Representative to the AU). He said that the working relationship between the Delegation and the AU, which he visited several times a week, was close. The Delegation had an input into the early stages of the AU’s thinking on the development of policies and operations, including assisting the AU with military, political input and financial support as they developed their campaign against the Lord’s Resistance Army. His Delegation also offered support to individual Member States who were not represented to the AU on the ground in Addis Ababa. He had also assisted the Ambassador of Croatia (a candidate state) on logistics and by arranging appointments for his recent visit.

Box 2

EU Delegation to the African Union, Addis Ababa

The EU Delegation to the African Union is one of two EEAS Delegations in Addis Ababa; the other is the Delegation to Ethiopia. The Delegation to the AU was set up in January 2008, pre-dating the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the EEAS, and following the Africa/EU summit in December 2007, which set up the EU/Africa Partnership and the joint EU/Africa Strategy. Following the Lisbon Treaty the Delegation became part of the EEAS. The AU is one of only eight non-state entities to which the EEAS sends a permanent Delegation. Along with the United States, the EU is the only body with a specific Delegation to the African Union.

78 Q 231
79 Q 68
80 Q 269
81 UKIP paragraph 7
82 Q 133
83 ibid.
84 QQ 124, 125
Gary Quince is the current Head of Delegation and combines the role with that of European Union Special Representative to the AU. He is also accredited to the UN Economic Commission for Africa. The Delegation currently has 43 staff, divided between the EEAS (16 staff), EUSR (13) and the Commission (15). This includes support staff recruited locally. The administrative budget is €1.3 million and the EUSR budget is €680,000.

The purpose of the Delegation is to support the EU’s efforts to build a peaceful, democratic and prosperous Africa. This involves promoting peace and security; human rights and governance; sustainable growth, regional integration and trade; and investment in education, health and food security. The Commission staff manage the Delegation’s development cooperation and the financial support given to the AU.

Second, we spoke to the UK Ambassador to Brazil, Alan Charlton, to seek his views on how the EEAS Delegation in that country handled relations with Brazil, one of the EU’s strategic partners. He told us that the establishment of the EEAS had increased the level of interaction between Brazil and the EU. The EEAS organised annual summits with the Brazilians. The 2013 summit would be attended by the Brazilian President and the Presidents of the European Council and of the Commission, which illustrated how seriously Brazil took its relationship with the EU. The HR/VP had visited Brazil, as had other commissioners dealing with key areas, such as human rights, energy and climate change. The Brazilians had recently appointed a senior ambassador to the EU, which was a further sign of strengthening relations. The Ambassador said that the EEAS might wish to be more active in ensuring that the Brazilians understood action which the EU was taking on key political issues, such as Iran. It also played a role in ensuring that correct information was communicated on the eurozone crisis. At a personal level, he did not, however, currently “see [the EEAS] as being central to my daily life.”

The Ambassador thought it was too early to say for certain whether the EEAS would make a significant difference to the coherence of the EU’s policy in Brazil, but so far it had not. Locating the trade and political officers together in the Delegation had helped, but officials dealing with trade work still reported to the Commission, as this was a Commission competence, rather than to the EEAS. The EEAS needed to ensure that it focussed on the right things, and the review was the opportunity to ensure this. He hoped that improved coherence would lead to greater effectiveness and efficiency over time.
Box 3

EEAS Delegation to Brazil

Brazil has been one of the EU’s strategic partners since 2007, with the adoption of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership.

The Delegation, which is based in Brasilia, organises annual EU-Brazil summits to discuss a range of issues, and in recent years over 20 bilateral dialogues have been initiated, in areas as varied as climate change, financial services, science and technology, human rights and education. The 5th EU-Brazil Summit in October 2011 agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation and dialogues, establishing a new common plan of action for the next three years.93 The latest summit took place in Brasilia in January 2013.

The current Head of Delegation is Ana Paula Zacarias. There are currently 47 members of staff within the Delegation, of whom 17 are EEAS officials and 30 are Commission staff.

The Delegation’s mandate includes promoting political and economic relations between the EU and Brazil; monitoring the implementation of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership; keeping the Brazilian public informed about the EU and defending specific EU polices; and participating in the implementation of the EU’s assistance programmes.

46. The EEAS delegations have taken over from the rotating presidencies the coordination of the activities of Member States in third countries, and the chairmanship of the meetings of national representatives in those countries. Pierre Vimont said that the EEAS Delegation in Washington had become the natural focal point for coordination for the 27 different missions; the American administration preferred to give one briefing for all 27 rather than separate briefings for each. For Member States, the EEAS delegations facilitated and gave more weight to their joint démarches.94 Gary Quince also stressed the importance of his Delegation’s coordination and chairmanship roles. He sent reports compiled by his Delegation to all of the EEAS delegations in Africa, and copied the relevant ones to the Member State embassies in Addis Ababa.95

Cost savings and co-location

47. We asked about the opportunities for saving costs by joint working with Member State embassies. Pierre Vimont said that, in the face of the financial and budgetary crisis, most Member States were interested in working together to reduce costs. He cited the situation in Japan where the Member States’ embassies had accepted the EEAS Delegation’s proposal to produce only one daily press review for all 27 to save costs. Other joint working was under consideration, for example on translation, hotels and accommodation.96

48. We asked about other opportunities for savings by co-locating EEAS delegations with those of Member States, or sharing work. Nicholas Westcott (Managing Director, Africa, EEAS) told us that co-location took place in a

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93 Delegation website
94 Q 167
95 QQ 125, 131
96 Q 167, see also Blockmans paragraph 4
number of places in Africa, for example in Juba, South Sudan and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where it had been a success. Efforts were being made to extend this practice, in Ghana and in Abuja, Nigeria, where the EEAS shared a compound with two Member States, enabling them to share basic facilities and large conference rooms.97 Gary Quince said that the two Delegations in Addis Ababa—to Ethiopia and to the AU—were examining the possibilities for co-locating in order to share and thus reduce common costs and staffing. Currently only IT and staff for informatics services and security were shared because of the physical distance between the two Delegations.98

49. The Minister for Europe also favoured co-location and cited two examples. The Spanish had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the EEAS to establish an embassy inside the EU Delegation in Yemen, for which the EEAS would charge Spain. A Luxembourg mission was to be allowed within the EU Delegation to Ethiopia. A system already existed whereby the nationals of unrepresented Member States could obtain help from the mission of another Member State present in the country.99 David Spence described the model of the Belgian-run Schengen House in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Schengen visas were jointly processed for the EU countries (and four non-Member States) participating in the Schengen border scheme.100

Management and budgets

50. We were told that line management and budget-handling in the delegations were shared between EEAS and Commission, and that this caused difficulties about who managed the budgets and who should send instructions to whom.101 Patrick Child explained that in the EEAS delegations there were “dual financial circuits.” Heads of Delegation were responsible in two ways for expenditure in the delegation. They were responsible for the administrative budget of their delegations, for which they were accountable to the HR/VP. Where they were sub-delegated as authorising officers, they also had specific responsibilities for the management and supervision of external assistance programmes, for which they were accountable to the Commission, which remained ultimately responsible for that spending.102

51. Under the staff regulations and financial regulation, the Head of Delegation has authority over administrative and operational expenditure (provided he or she has sub-delegated budgetary authority), and to instruct Commission staff in delegations and to convene meetings, (though the Commission has legal responsibility for the funds).103 Pierre Vimont told us that, as was the

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97 QQ 240, 241, also Dr Tannock Q 231
98 Q 138
99 Q 272
100 Q 63. The Schengen system provides for a common visa system for participating countries, and free movement between these countries. The participating countries are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland (not a European Union Member State), Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein (not a European Union Member State), Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway (not a European Union Member State), Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland (not a European Union Member State).
101 Shorter Q 5
102 Q 176
103 James Morrison (Cabinet of HR/VP) QQ 168, 169
case for bilateral ambassadors, the Heads of Delegation struggled to control the group of people in the delegation who retained a direct link with different services inside the Commission.\footnote{Q 168} Performance appraisals of Commission officials are signed off by the Commission in Brussels, although the information in the reports comes from the Head of Delegation.\footnote{Westcott, Q 251} Gary Quince told us that he was the line manager for everyone who worked in his Delegation; they all operated under his responsibility, whether they were EEAS, Commission or EUSR officials. However, he was not the reporting officer for the Commission staff.\footnote{Q 132} Professor Steven Blockmans (Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and University of Amsterdam) thought that the split between the EEAS and Commission staff in the delegations should be overcome by strengthening the authority of the Heads of Delegation, and allowing them to delegate more responsibilities, simplifying reporting lines and ending the “separation of financial circuits.”\footnote{Blockmans paragraph 3}

52. Professor Elena Korosteleva (University of Kent) has studied Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, three of the Eastern Partnership\footnote{The EU’s Eastern Partnership countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, with which the EU wishes to engage. Links with these countries include trade, gradual visa liberalisation, and measures to tackle illegal immigration. The Partnership also aims to promote democracy and good governance, strengthen energy security, promote sector reform and environment protection, encourage people to people contacts, support economic and social development and offer additional funding for projects to reduce socio-economic imbalances and increase stability. www.eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm} countries. She had observed that the EEAS could be beneficial both as a global force and for overcoming divisions in government and institutions, but thought that a number of management problems needed to be addressed to achieve coherence and continuity in competences at the lower levels of the EEAS, especially in delegations. She also advocated a clearer delineation of roles and responsibilities in relation to Member States and efforts to engage with host countries. Structural reform was needed to replace divided structures, loyalties and competences by “collective service to the common good.”\footnote{Korosteleva}

53. In the vast majority of cases delegations have been inherited from the previous system of Commission representations. The location of delegations should not be driven by history but be subject to regular and rigorous review to assess their current usefulness for the EU’s overall priorities, leading, if necessary, to closures.

54. Member States differ in their preferences for delegations, but they should take responsibility for the collective decision on their location. Where a delegation closure is decided, a lead Member State with an Embassy or High Commission in the third country should provide a focus for EU work, if necessary with supplementary personnel and funding resources from the EU. Clearly, this should be at a significantly lower cost.

55. We consider that Commission business such as trade and development can benefit from being set in a political context, which can be provided by the EEAS. However, in cases where a delegation’s
work is limited to these issues, we do not believe that there is a need to establish or continue a resident EEAS presence. Trade or development offices should be used instead, and political reporting should be handled by a mix of visiting EEAS political officers, connected to the relevant desk in Brussels, and a lead Member State in the area.

56. There are already instances where Member States share diplomatic premises in third countries with each other or with the EEAS. The HR/VP should look in the review at how this practice could be taken further for mutual benefit. Where two EEAS delegations exist, they should be amalgamated as soon as is feasible.

57. In countries where there are no EEAS delegations, the coordination role they perform for information exchange and crisis management should continue to be undertaken by the Member State holding the rotating presidency or, in their absence, by a nominated Member State appropriate to that location. This would place an additional resource burden on larger Member States, for which they should receive financial compensation from the EEAS.

58. Reporting lines from the delegations are complex, with Commission staff working in the delegations reporting both to the Commission and to the Head of the EEAS Delegation. Appraisals for Commission staff in delegations are currently written in Brussels. The Head of Delegation must have responsibility for appraising Commission staff within the mission and reporting lines should be clear.

59. The budget arrangements in delegations are complicated, as separate accounts are prepared for EEAS and Commission expenditure. There should be one set of budgets and accounts for delegations, with the potential for saving on accounting and administrative expenditure. The Heads of Delegation should have complete authority, including management and accounting responsibilities, over all internal and external expenditure, with one set of accounts reported to the EEAS.

Consular services

60. We found that one of the areas of greatest difference between Member States concerned the role of the EEAS in consular assistance in third countries. Since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, an EU citizen has been entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, with the service being undertaken by another Member State embassy if the Member State has no local representation. The EEAS does not currently provide consular services to EU citizens, although the Council Decision allows the EEAS to support the Member States in providing consular "protection". Ambassador Iztok Jarc (Slovenian Ambassador to the UK) told us that Slovenia would like EEAS delegations to have a consular role because, for citizens, consular work was visible and important. The Ambassadors of Lithuania and Slovakia agreed that this should be an EU

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110 Vimont, Q 99
111 Council Decision 2010/427, Article 5 (10)
112 Q 107
Ambassador Skaisgiryté Liauškienė explained that, under the current system, countries without representation on the ground asked another country to represent them, as a favour. If the role was undertaken by the EU, it was no longer a favour: “we are all contributing ... We provide the EEAS with our diplomats and our budgets—so please give something back.”

Hugo Shorter told us that the UK opposed the proposal; apart from giving consular assistance in crises, the EU did not have the relevant expertise. The Minister for Europe was also clear that the role of the EEAS was to supplement and coordinate the activity of Member States; the HR/VP had said that it would be difficult to achieve on a resource-neutral basis; and logistically, it would be difficult to act for some Member States and not others. David Spence suggested, as a possible solution, that consular assistance could take the form of an agency, from which the larger states could also benefit if they so wished.

Pierre Vimont told us that the EEAS was approaching the issue of consular services cautiously: the EEAS had no expertise on the issues and no competence to undertake the legal acts involved. If Member States asked for the service, the possible consequences could be studied; the EEAS would need the necessary financial and human resources, and agreement from all 27 Member States, before any action could be taken. In his view, assistance would need to be limited to individual citizens from unrepresented countries, and to crisis management, where coordination and a focal point were needed. This had happened naturally, for example, after the tsunami in Japan where the EEAS Delegation had calmed the situation by organising meetings and coordinating the action of European embassies.

Our evidence shows that many smaller Member States would find a consular role for EEAS delegations particularly useful. This has a number of implications, not least cost, as there is currently no such expertise in the delegations. The review should seriously consider the possibility of the EEAS operating in this area for States which wish to delegate some consular functions to the EEAS. However, those Member States which wish to be assisted in this way should meet the costs individually or collectively of setting up and operating the service.

Staffing

A number of witnesses told us about early problems involved in bringing together the three new staffing components prescribed in the Council Decision: Commission staff, Council personnel and diplomats on secondment from Member States, in particular relations between Commission and EEAS staff. In February 2013, the EEAS had 3,400 staff, divided into Brussels staff (1,478) and delegation staff (1,922, including

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113 Q 107
114 Q 107
115 QQ16, 23
116 Q 272, also Avery Q 24
117 Q 68
118 QQ 188–190, also Avery Q 24
119 Article 6 of Council Decision 2010/427 of 26 July 2010
The delegations also comprise Commission personnel (3,514) in addition to the 1,922 EEAS staff, making 5,436 staff in the delegations altogether. Some 28% of the EEAS come from national diplomatic services (around 26% in headquarters and 40% in the delegations). Graham Avery said that Commission officials who had entered the EEAS suffered from confusion, lack of prospects and low morale, which had been a handicap to the development of a collective identity in the new organisation. He attributed this, however, to teething problems. David Spence also maintained that no-one had planned how to ensure that officials from different backgrounds worked together to produce an esprit de corps.

65. We asked about the impact of bringing Member State diplomats into the Service, in particular to those delegations where the main work was handled by the Commission. Gary Quince told us that in Addis Ababa the integration of Member States’ diplomats had been seamless and had enriched and added value to the Delegation. Graham Avery pointed out, however, that the Commission officials in the new Service were not diplomats and that some of them had been disappointed that senior posts were going to diplomats from Member States, and had therefore left the Service.

66. We asked about the quality of staffing. Hugo Shorter told us that competition for posts in the EEAS was stiff as it was seen as an interesting organisation to join. UK candidates were sometimes in competition with more senior candidates from other Member State diplomatic services. The selection process was rigorous and based on merit and those chosen were “up to expectation”. Alan Charlton said that, in his view, officials working on trade in the Delegation in Brasilia were “pretty impressive”, though this had not changed since the establishment of the EEAS. Ambassador Skaisgiryté Liauškienë told us that the Lithuanians had some 20 officials working in the EEAS, which was satisfactory, though the number of seconded diplomats was fewer, the majority of them being in the divisions dealing with the eastern neighbourhood where they could add value to policy development. Dr Simon Duke (European Institute of Public Administration) commented that all the Member States except Cyprus were now represented at Head or Deputy Head of Delegation level. The Minister for Europe suggested that greater flexibility would benefit the EEAS, by moving people, abolishing posts, making poor performers redundant and recruiting outsiders mid-career.

67. A number of witnesses suggested that more training of EEAS officials was needed. Pedro Serrano pointed out that diplomats from Member States had to learn about the EU, and that working for the EU was different from representing one’s own national government. Personnel with Commission
The need for training was echoed by Professor Whitman. He said that the EEAS had no training strategy and training tended to focus on the AD (administrative) staff, but that locally employed agents, who constituted a third of the staff in delegations, also needed training, though in different areas. Their jobs had also changed fundamentally. He identified languages and regional competences as “crucial issues” in training. Dr Duke told us that some training was already offered, but the budget was small and had been reduced. He suggested that E-learning and blended learning could be used for distant delegations.

We investigated whether Member States were prepared to release their best candidates and whether they facilitated their diplomats’ return to their service of origin. Edward Burke questioned whether Member States would be willing to spare their more specialised diplomats, for example Mandarin or Arabic speakers. Pierre Vimont told us that it was too early to see how the return of diplomats to their national diplomatic services was working, but that most of the secretaries general of Member States had told him that the EEAS had some of their best diplomats and wished them to return because of the experience gained. Ambassador Jarc acknowledged that diplomats returning to Slovenia would contribute their broader knowledge and experience to the national service. Ambassador Wlachovsky raised the problem of the possible brain drain from the national diplomatic services if the initial four-year secondment was renewed for an additional four years. Conversely, GGI commented that Member States seconded high quality staff to AD posts, but the EU lost the institutional memory when they returned to national diplomatic services.

Alan Charlton told us that it was important for the EEAS to recruit “the right kind of people and to ensure good succession planning.” In Brasilia there had been a gap on human rights work in the EEAS Delegation: the EEAS should ensure that it was “getting the right people and not suffering from gaps in key positions.” The human resource side was important to ensure that the EEAS functioned successfully in future. Edward Burke believed that a long-term diplomatic capability should be developed, rather than reliance on secondments from foreign ministries whose budgets were

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130 Q 216, also Avery Q 8, Duke paragraphs 1–5
131 Q 27, also Whitman Q 28, see also EPC WE paragraph 2
132 Q 50
133 Duke, paragraphs 1–5, see also Adebahr, paragraph 9
134 Q 32
135 Q 197
136 Q 103
137 Q 104, see also Dijkstra paragraph 9
138 Global Governance Institute
139 Charlton, QQ 144–148, 152, 156, also Whitman Q 48
being cut and who might be unwilling to give up resources to the EEAS. By contrast, Dr Duke suggested that the use of Seconded National Experts (SNE) should be considered, as these were paid for by Member States and were cost-free to the EEAS. In written evidence, the European Policy Centre suggested that members of the EEAS might be rotated to Member State foreign ministries, and not just vice versa.

71. **There is still work to be done in uniting the three staff components from the Council Secretariat, Commission and Member State diplomatic services. Heads of Delegation need to pay continued attention to the development of a corporate spirit in their delegations.**

72. **We recommend that greater attention should be given to the planning and delivery of training for EEAS staff, including in the operations of the EU for staff from national diplomatic services, in political work for those coming from the Commission, and in languages where relevant. In particular, the EEAS needs more Arabic speakers if it is to capitalise on the consequences of the Arab Spring. A larger training budget will probably be required, which should be financed from savings elsewhere within the EEAS.**

73. **We strongly agree with the idea of seconding EEAS staff into Member State ministries. A two-way flow would be healthy and help to achieve the cohesion in the EEAS.**

**Special Representatives**

74. The HR/VP recommends the names of EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) for approval by the Council. The EUSRs report directly to her but are outside the EEAS institutional structure. Their appointments are approved directly by the Council. There are currently 10 EUSRs, for Afghanistan, the African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, Kosovo, the Middle East Peace Process, the South Caucasus and Georgia, the Southern Mediterranean Region and Sudan. Four EUSRs are double-hatted as Heads of Delegation: to the AU, in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Committee is familiar with the work of the EUSRs from its scrutiny of their appointments and mandates.

75. Gary Quince, double-hatted as EUSR for the AU and Head of EEAS Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa, told us that more weight was given by the AU to his role as EUSR than to the Head of Delegation role and it was important that he was seen to be appointed by the Council as well as by the EEAS. His responsibilities covered peace and security, human rights and governance, sustainable growth, regional integration and trade and investment in people, and he also worked with other African multilateral institutions. Dr Cornelius Adebahr (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, DGAP) considered that the EUSRs constituted “an established and successful instrument of European foreign policy”. However, he argued that they needed to be better integrated into the new structures.

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140 Q 32  
141 EPC paragraph 20  
142 Quince Q 125  
143 Q 125  
144 Adebahr paragraph 2, also Blockmans paragraph 3
argued that the fact that the EUSRs reported to the High Representative, but did not fall within the EEAS, had led to parallel lines of reporting and confusion about who was in charge.\footnote{Q 43}

76. The EU’s Special Representatives in general fulfil a productive and effective role. They play a particularly important part where the issues involved are cross-border, regional or thematic. They should, however, be more fully integrated into the EEAS structure and their salaries rigorously reviewed (see our earlier recommendation).

77. The relationship between the EU Special Representatives and the Heads of Delegation should be clarified, as should the chain of command of the Special Representatives.

Accountability and relations with Parliaments

78. Heads of Delegation appointed by the HR/VP are expected to appear at the European Parliament to make statements and answer questions on their work.\footnote{Serrano, Q 222} In addition, the HR/VP is required to submit an annual report on EEAS staff and a working document on the budget to the European Parliament. In 2011 she also had to submit a report on other areas.\footnote{Council Decision 427/2010, Articles 5, 6, 9, 13} Graham Avery told us that, in some ways, this went further than the oversight that the UK Parliament had of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He believed that it was important that Baroness Ashton had ensured that the EEAS had good relations with the EP.\footnote{Q 4} Dr Charles Tannock MEP pointed out that the EP’s AFET Committee had also acquired superior powers to almost all Member State parliaments because “confirmation hearings”\footnote{While reference was made in the evidence to “confirmation hearings,” the meetings between the EUSRs and Heads of Delegation and Members of the European Parliament consist of an exchange of views after their appointment. The European Parliament does not have the right of veto on these posts.} were required for all EUSRs, and most of the Head of Delegation diplomatic appointments.\footnote{Q 231} Elmar Brok MEP pointed out that the EP did not want to run foreign policy, which was an executive responsibility, but it did want the right of parliamentary control, which included “the final weapon, the budget weapon” and ratification of the EU’s international agreements.\footnote{Q 232} Edward Burke thought that it was to their credit that the HR/VP and senior EEAS officials had spent “a considerable amount of time” briefing Member State parliamentarians, as envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty, though the meetings tended to be formulaic.\footnote{Burke paragraph 9}

79. Mats Persson told us that the best way to ensure accountability was the presence in the EEAS of diplomats seconded from Member States. He also thought that the Service should have links to Member States’ parliaments and specifically their foreign affairs committees. Member States had the responsibility to ensure that they engaged at a parliamentary level with EEAS officials. He did not think that the European Parliament was the most...
effective democratic scrutiniser of the EEAS. Mr Persson did not believe that the EEAS had ever exceeded its mandate in taking a unilateral initiative, although the Commission had done so. He saw the EEAS as a counter-force to “constant attempts” by the Commission to increase its power. If the Member States were divided on an issue, “the EEAS is pushed aside”, as had happened over Libya and Syria. Edward Burke suggested that a greater number of EEAS reports should be made available to national parliaments, as a systematic exchange of information was desirable and feasible. The EEAS could more routinely send unclassified versions of mission and delegation reports to the responsible parliamentary committee in each Member State.

80. Dr Federica Bicchi (London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE) listed four forms of accountability: first, to the European Parliament and national parliaments, where there had been an improvement over the previous pre-Lisbon Treaty situation. This varied according to the different degrees of national parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, and their parliamentary procedures. Second, to its equivalent foreign affairs ministries in the 27 Member States, which monitored the EEAS, and where relations had also improved. Third, accountability to experts (whose attention had, however, been diverted by the euro area crisis) and lastly, to the general public.

81. David Spence pointed to a further form of accountability: the “usual channels” remained, through which Member States could express their views in formulating policy—the Committee of Permanent Representatives in Brussels (COREPER); the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the working groups. Mr Spence was clear that the EEAS “cannot and should not make policy.” He was not aware of any example of EEAS or Commission officials exceeding their mandates. He thought that making the EEAS accountable to national legislatures would be “a recipe for permanent paralysis.” The European Parliament and its committees supervised the EEAS’s budget, although he considered that this could be done better. If national parliaments wished to be involved, it would be better done via contacts with the European Parliament.

82. We asked whether the Heads of Delegations would be expected to report to the Council. Pierre Vimont told us that the ambassadors on the Political and Security Committee could ask a Head of Delegation to report to them orally. The European Parliament was also eager to hear visiting Delegation Heads. EEAS delegations would pass written reports to the EEAS headquarters, which would then forward them to Member States.

83. The HR/VP submits an annual report to the European Parliament on the EEAS staffing and budget. Given the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, she should also submit it formally to national parliaments.
84. The EEAS should be required to respond to national parliaments if they raise matters following submission of the report. As it is clearly impractical for the HR/VP to attend each Member State parliament or chamber, a suitable cost and resource effective method needs to be found to achieve this.

85. This re-balancing is particularly important as currently the European Parliament has far more influence over the HR/VP and the EEAS due to its ability to control budgets, scrutinise activity directly, and call them to account. The scrutiny role of the European Parliament should not go beyond its current level, as foreign policy is primarily inter-governmental and scrutiny should therefore be performed at the national parliamentary level.
CHAPTER 3: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

Achievements

86. A key question for the Committee was to identify the extent of added value which the EEAS brought to the diplomatic efforts of individual Member States. The Committee also considered the related question of “value for money”. Hugo Shorter pointed out that it was difficult for any foreign service to measure success or failure quantitatively. Graham Avery asked how the value could be assessed, for example, of the united European voice on Syria. A number of witnesses told us that there were advantages in doing things collectively, or where the EEAS had something different to offer.

The comprehensive approach; the Horn of Africa and the Sahel

87. Witnesses referred particularly to the formulation and implementation of the EU’s comprehensive approach in areas in crisis as a field where the EEAS had been successful. The aim under this approach is to bring together all the EU’s instruments in one joined-up policy to further its aims. The EEAS told us that, alongside “the considerable challenge of setting up the Service,” the main challenge for the Service had been promoting this comprehensive approach.

88. We explored whether the comprehensive approach had contributed to coherence in the EU’s external relations. The prime example cited by witnesses was the Horn of Africa, where we were told that the EU had combined the various CFSP instruments: crisis management, the anti-piracy Operation Atalanta, deployment of training missions, projects for training the naval forces of the countries in the region, a more coherent deployment of the EU’s development cooperation instruments and using the EU’s political influence in a more intelligent way. The Minister for Europe said that, under the previous system, the instruments and missions would have been available, but there would have been no institutional arrangement to ensure that they were coordinated.

89. A further example of the comprehensive approach has been the EU’s activity in the Sahel region of North Africa. Nicholas Westcott commented that, in Mali, the EU was also working with a Member State (France) and others in a coordinated effort, combining the EEAS’s political power, the Commission’s financial fire power, and action by Member States. The Minister for Europe also raised the EU’s response to the Arab Spring, where the EEAS had drafted a renewed southern neighbourhood policy, which reflected British priorities, emphasising conditionality and the need to pull the EU’s instruments together in a package, though conditionality had not yet been

160 Q 6
161 Shorter Q 6, Avery Q 6
162 EEAS
163 Serrano Q 207
164 Q 263, also Shorter Q 21
165 Q 248
166 “Conditionality” is the term used to denote the conditions, relating to human rights, governance and the rule of law, which the EU inserts into its aid and other agreements with third countries. It has now been named “mutual accountability.”
taken forward with sufficient rigour or energy.\textsuperscript{167} Gary Quince told us that his Delegation in Addis Ababa was also working in other areas where the EEAS had been able to bring a range of policy and financial instruments to bear as a package, including political, development, humanitarian, military and security elements\textsuperscript{168} (see paragraphs 141 to 145 on crisis management).

90. Hugo Shorter considered that the EEAS provided useful coordination on the ground of the different EU instruments. The Head of Delegation also coordinated development programmes and political engagement in third countries in a way that Member State embassies could not do because they were running their own programmes.\textsuperscript{169} Nicholas Westcott told us that, during the Mali crisis, the EU Delegation had the best network of contacts, including in the north, because of its development programmes, and was therefore better informed than any Member State.\textsuperscript{170}

91. Arnaud Danjean MEP gave us a different view and maintained that the EU’s attempt at implementing a comprehensive approach had failed because of the problems in merging cultures, information and procedures of officials between the Commission, the Council and national diplomacies. He attributed this to insufficient political will and competences which were too divided. Internal leadership was needed for the EEAS to implement decisions.\textsuperscript{171}

92. We applaud the objective of bringing together the different streams of the EU’s external work, whether in the EEAS or the person of the HR/VP, to form a comprehensive approach to the EU’s foreign policy. This is working well in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and the southern neighbourhood, where different instruments have been brought together. This should continue to be the approach for the future. The new Comprehensive Approach under consideration by the Commission,\textsuperscript{172} in conjunction with the EEAS, should be ambitious and the EEAS should play a leading role in its formulation and implementation. We see this as a major area of further added value.

\textit{Sanctions}

93. Hugo Shorter cited the imposition of sanctions by the EU as an example of an achievement by the EEAS. Sanctions involved trade, visas and financial services, and pooling these different elements in support of a foreign policy objective could add value to the efforts of individual Member States.\textsuperscript{173} He pointed out that it was “quite useful” to have a neutral body to help Member States make difficult decisions on subjects such as sanctions. Coordinating the views of 27 Member States on these measures was difficult, given their divergent economic and other interests. However, in 2012 the EU had repeatedly been able to agree to robust packages. This was an example of how diverse interests had, with the help of the EEAS and the HR/VP, been merged into a more coherent and consistent external approach, finding

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{167} Q 263
  \item \textsuperscript{168} Q 125
  \item \textsuperscript{169} Q 11
  \item \textsuperscript{170} Q 242
  \item \textsuperscript{171} Q 231
  \item \textsuperscript{172} The Commission now plans to set out the “comprehensive approach” more formally than hitherto.
  \item \textsuperscript{173} Q 18
\end{itemize}
common ground in a way that might be harder for an individual Member State diplomatic service.\textsuperscript{174}

\textit{Impact on political problems}

94. We asked what specifically the EEAS had achieved on the ground since its inception and were given examples where the EEAS had worked successfully with the HR/VP. One of the areas most often cited by witnesses was the E3+3 negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme.\textsuperscript{175} The Minister for Europe thought that it would have been difficult under the previous system to combine the negotiating role on Iran and the HR/VP role as chairman of the FAC in taking forward the sanctions package.\textsuperscript{176} The EEAS’s work on the Middle East Peace Process was another example.\textsuperscript{177} Dr Cornelius Adebahr, however, criticised the EEAS’s failure to communicate EU policies to counter the negative image of the West portrayed by the Iranians in the media, and the lack of a delegation in Tehran following closure of Member State embassies.\textsuperscript{178}

95. Witnesses praised the work of the EEAS on Serbia and Kosovo, where the EU had developed a dialogue designed to persuade the Serbs to accept Kosovan independence and had kept Serbia on track towards EU accession.\textsuperscript{179} Edward Burke added two examples where the EEAS had taken action which the Member States could not have taken. In Tunisia, following the Arab Spring, the HR/VP and EEAS Delegation Head had brought Members together to arrange a comprehensive package of assistance measures. In Yemen, the EEAS Head of Delegation had, he thought, done “a great job” bringing the Member States together to reach agreement.\textsuperscript{180} Professor Whitman pointed out that a number of individual Member State embassies had closed down in Damascus during the current fighting, including that of the UK, but the EU Delegation had remained open and had assisted Member States who were without representation.\textsuperscript{181}

96. Mats Persson agreed that the EEAS had worked successfully on Iran and Serbia/Kosovo, and that the EEAS Delegation in Syria had played a useful role, but otherwise he thought that the EEAS’s performance had been patchy. He was unclear whether there were any examples of action by the EEAS which could not simply have been taken by the 27 Member States taking a common position, perhaps through the rotating presidency. There had been many examples where it had been irrelevant, though he conceded that there had been few where he thought its existence had damaged the EU’s credibility.\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{174} QQ 13, 14, also Sir Graham Watson MEP Q 231
\textsuperscript{175} The High Representative/Vice-President leads the E3+3 negotiations with Iran in which the UK, France and Germany participate with the US, Russia and China (the UN Permanent 5 members, plus Germany). The negotiations are also referred to as the P5 + 1 negotiations.
\textsuperscript{176} Véronique de Keyser MEP Q 231
\textsuperscript{177} Q 266, also Shorter Q 6
\textsuperscript{178} Shorter QQ 2, 6 also Burke paragraph 4
\textsuperscript{179} Adebahr paragraphs 3, 5, 12
\textsuperscript{180} Burke Q 47, Avery Q 17, Shorter Q 6, Arnaud Danjean MEP Q 231, Whitman
\textsuperscript{181} Q 47
\textsuperscript{182} Q 49, also EPC paragraph 12
\textsuperscript{182} Q 55
Operational improvements

97. Pierre Vimont stressed the advantages of having one point of contact for third countries in the post of HR/VP, for example at Quartet meetings, whereas, under the previous system, there had been three representatives. Partners outside the EU were pleased as they now “know where to go.” David Spence added that the relations which the HR/VP had developed, for example with the former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, had constituted a major advantage for the EU. Ambassador Wlachovský also spoke of the advantage of the EU’s being able to speak with one voice and present a “face” to the world. The “Kissinger question” had been resolved. 183

98. Witnesses spoke of the added value of the continuity created by moving away from dependence on the six-monthly rotating presidency, which had sometimes caused problems when smaller countries were in the presidency. David Spence said that, under the system of rotating presidencies, knowledge of how to run the presidency had sometimes been lacking, and individual presidencies varied in the emphasis they placed on different issues. Alan Charlton told us that in Brasilia, it was helpful that the EEAS, rather than the rotating presidency, now coordinated meetings of EU Member State ambassadors. 189

99. Pedro Serrano highlighted the improvement in longer-term thinking brought about by the EEAS. Under the rotating presidency system, diplomats thought about the six months of their country’s presidency. With the EEAS, it was possible also to think 10 years ahead. This was a “game-changer.” He pointed out that the EU was developing “greater clarity of objectives in the big issues that are challenging the European Union foreign policy,” for example for the Sahel and the Horn of Africa and Somalia. Relations with the Asian continent had become more sophisticated and the EU was engaging with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in a more political and targeted way than previously, “in great part … because we have the EEAS.” 190

100. The EEAS, in support of the HR/VP, has made a noticeable impact in a number of foreign policy areas. These include policy towards Iran, the EU’s reaction to the Arab Spring and the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, where the EU’s ability to speak with one voice has been enhanced. We hope that, once the EEAS is fully established, the time of the HR/VP will be freed to give greater focus to these and other key areas.

183 Q 159
184 Q 59 and Spence, also Sir Graham Watson MEP Q 231
185 The question, attributed to Henry Kissinger, formerly US Secretary of State, was that he did not know who to call if he wanted to contact Europe. In a comment to the BBC Today programme on 25 January 2013, he said he did now know who to call. See also Spence Q 59
186 Q 99
187 Minister for Europe Q 261
188 Q 56
189 Q 154
190 Q 207
Challenges

Reconciling policy differences

101. The EU’s CFSP was established in 1993 as an intergovernmental process under the Maastricht Treaty. The Policy was updated in the Lisbon Treaty, under which the EU is to “define and pursue common policies and actions” and “work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations … ”\(^\text{191}\) The EU is to “ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies.”\(^\text{192}\) The European Council is tasked with identifying the Union’s strategic interests, determining the objectives of the CFSP and defining its general guidelines;\(^\text{193}\) Member States are to “coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences” and to uphold the Union’s positions in such forums.” The HR/VP is to organise this coordination, put forward proposals and put into effect the CFSP.\(^\text{194}\)

102. We asked our witnesses to what extent the EEAS was able to bring Member States together to produce a common position, as there had been notable differences of opinion on some key issues, such as the military action in Libya (when one Member State had abstained in the UN Security Council vote, while the other Member States had supported the resolution\(^\text{195}\)); and the 2012 UN General Assembly (UNGA) vote on the status of Palestine at the UN\(^\text{196}\) (in which 14 Member States voted in favour of recognising Palestine, one voted against, and 12 abstained).\(^\text{197}\) Gary Quince acknowledged that the EU was at its weakest when unanimity was absent.\(^\text{198}\) Pierre Vimont believed that there was greater unity in foreign policy than was immediately apparent. Shortly after the UN Security Council vote on Libya, the Foreign Affairs Council had unanimously agreed on the way ahead for relations with the transitional council in Benghazi. In the same way, following the three-way split in the EU vote at UNGA on Palestine, the 27 Member States had reaffirmed their position on the Middle East Peace process.\(^\text{199}\) Nicola Bellomo (Political Officer, EEAS Delegation to the AU, Addis Ababa) told us that, for cases like Libya, the EEAS tried to identify and coordinate the views of Member States in advance to discover if there were any diverging views which needed to be considered by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels.\(^\text{200}\)

103. Dr Adebahr thought that the EEAS ought to be able to coordinate and lead on the development of a joint foreign policy, but that in this respect it had yet to meet the initial ambitions for the Service.\(^\text{201}\) Mats Persson thought that the EEAS could do more to build alliances within the EU on Russia, and build a

\(^{191}\) TEU Title V, Chapter 1, Articles 21.2 and 23
\(^{192}\) ibid. Article 21.3 and 23
\(^{193}\) ibid. Article 26.1
\(^{194}\) ibid. Articles 26.3, 27 and 34.1
\(^{195}\) UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011). The country which abstained was Germany.
\(^{196}\) UNGA Resolution 67/19 (2012)
\(^{197}\) See also Sir Robert Atkins MEP Q 231
\(^{198}\) QQ 133, 135, 139, see also Whitman
\(^{199}\) Q 165, also Serrano QQ 208–210
\(^{200}\) Q 133, also Spence Q 71
\(^{201}\) Adebahr paragraph 2, also Mats Persson Q 72
common position both on individual issues and on strategic thinking. Dr Bicchi told us that, despite the pressure on Member States to converge on a common position, this did not always happen. On certain issues there was “an agreement to disagree”; the use of force and the recognition of new political actors tended to be the most divisive issues. The Minister for Europe cited the absence of coherence on EU-Russia relations stemming from the differing approaches of Member States; Germany, for example, had a different perspective from the UK or Poland. This did not therefore permit effective EU-level activity to take place.

Hugo Shorter also thought that the added value of the EEAS lay in helping to create unified positions on individual foreign policy issues. Once a unified position had been reached (if possible) the advantage lay in presenting a unified EU position to the outside world. Individual Member States’ diplomatic services could not offer this. David Spence told us that, when the EU issued joint statements on foreign policy issues, political weight was often added as a further 11 states frequently aligned themselves with the 27 Member States. This constituted the combined view of 20% of UN members. Such statements also simplified the EU’s message for third parties. Graham Avery thought that the EEAS had made the EU’s external action more consistent and effective; on Syria, the EU had spoken with one voice and on Burma the collective efforts to improve the situation had been an example of what the EEAS could do. Mats Persson noted that the EU could only act when all 27 members were in agreement, and he believed that the jury was out on the value which the EEAS added.

Dr Bicchi thought that the EEAS had strengthened the framework which gave Member States the opportunity to take into account each other’s national positions while formulating their own. David Spence told us that one of the advantages with the EEAS was that mechanisms had been set up to ensure that officials negotiating with third countries on behalf of Member States were well informed about the full range of policies with proper briefing.

In written evidence, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) suggested that EU Member States needed encouragement to support joint EU action, which could include providing them with “timely and high quality strategy and policy ideas,” and “relevant analysis and strategy development which takes into account contemporary thinking ...” We note that the Future of Europe Group report, published in September

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202 Q 72
203 Bicchi paragraph 1.2
204 Q 265
205 QQ 6, 10
206 Croatia (acceding state), former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland and Serbia (candidate countries), Albania (in the stabilisation and association process), Liechtenstein and Norway (EFTA and EEA countries) and the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Georgia.
207 Q 55, also Serrano Q 217
208 QQ 6, 15
209 Q 55
210 Bicchi paragraphs 1.1, 1.2
211 Q 72
212 EPLO
2012, 213 recommended improvements in the way the FAC works and suggested that there should be more frequent meetings in the Gymnich format214 and better interaction with the European Council, with one meeting a year focussing on external relations policy with the participation of foreign affairs ministers. They also advocated introducing more majority decisions under the CFSP, or at least preventing one Member State from being able to obstruct initiatives, developing the concept of “constructive abstention.”

107. **The EEAS can only act under the Common Foreign and Security Policy if the EU’s Member States agree.** The Member States are able to find a common position on many subjects, including on difficult issues of sanctions on third countries. However, differing policies, based on different national interests, inevitably persist, including on key issues. The EEAS should make every effort to find and build on common ground to enable Member States to agree united positions.

108. **We welcome the fact that the EEAS regularly brings together a further 11 non-Member States as a part of common positions at the United Nations and more broadly.** We encourage the EEAS to continue and extend this aspect of its work.

**Determining priorities and focus**

109. We asked our witnesses how the EEAS established its priorities, given the wide-ranging interests of different Member States. Arnaud Danjean MEP argued that the greatest problem faced by the Member States, as well as for the EEAS, was a lack of clearly identified priorities. “We go from one issue to another. Lady Ashton, more specifically, goes from one point to another, one hotspot to another one, one crisis to another, with no sense of priority.” The consequences could be an impression of confusion, lack of efficiency and of uselessness. 215 The Minister for Europe thought that the EEAS needed to define its key priorities with greater clarity; “focusing on priorities is an important continuing task.” In his view, the EEAS’s role in dealing with strategic global partners had not taken off in the way that the UK and Member States had expected. 216

110. Professor Whitman thought that the first priority for the EEAS should be the neighbourhood policy, as the neighbourhood “mattered more than anything else”. The second should be the wider neighbourhood, defined as areas such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Caucasus, and the third should be the strategic partnerships where the emphasis should not necessarily be on big political issues, but on sectors such as energy, environment and trade. 217

111. Other witnesses laid stress on the value which the EEAS added in conveying the EU’s human rights principles and work. Alan Charlton thought this was one of the key elements in the EEAS Delegation’s work in Brasilia (see also

213 The Future of Europe Group’s report was published on 17 September 2012. It authors were the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain.

214 The Gymnich meetings consist of twice yearly informal meetings of foreign affairs ministers, chaired by the HR/VP.

215 Q 231

216 QQ 261, 263

217 Q 35
paragraph 44) The Minister for Europe told us that human rights had risen on the EU’s agenda in 2012 with the development of a welcome human rights strategy. Women’s rights had been reflected as a priority in the strategy and was in line with Government’s priorities.218

112. It is understandably difficult to reconcile the national priorities of 27 equal Member States, and reduce them to manageable proportions. Nonetheless, this should be done by the HR/VP in collaboration with the Member States, and should determine where the EEAS focuses its resources.

113. We consider that the EEAS should focus on areas of greatest security and economic importance to the Member States, and where it can make the most impact, in particular by deploying its civilian or mixed military/civilian missions and employing its new comprehensive approach. This will inevitably mean that there will be more concentration on issues which are geographically closer to the Member States, rather than distant ones. Relations with the emerging powers which have been chosen as the EU’s strategic partners should also be prioritised.

114. The EEAS can and should play a major part in furthering the EU’s human rights principles, which should continue to form part of all the EU’s relationships.

Institutional questions

115. We heard suggestions that there were problems with decision-making in Brussels. Elmar Brok MEP believed that the speed of decision-making and the implementation of policy was a weakness, which he attributed to the newness of the system and a lack of political will from Member States, especially on implementation.219 Arnaud Danjean MEP thought that difficulties in the decision-making process was due to a lack of leadership and reluctance by the HR/VP and the EEAS to put initiatives to Member States because they believed that they would be rebuffed (see also paragraph 18). Delays in implementation stemmed from problems with merging the cultures, information and procedures of staff from different backgrounds (the Commission, the Council and national diplomacies) and insufficient political will. He cited the example of the strategy for the Sahel which “was never really put in place”. Leadership in the EEAS and political will from the capitals were needed.220 Véronique de Keyser MEP thought that the HR/VP had tried to introduce flexibility in the structure, but it had created greater confusion between the hierarchical structure of the EEAS and the horizontal nature of the Task Forces.221 Mali had been an example of the problems within the structures which led to delayed reaction times.222

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218 Q 267
219 Q 229
220 Q 231
The Task Forces, under the leadership of the HR/VP have been used to handle the EU’s relationships with countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, following the Arab Spring.

222 Q 231
116. Dr Dijkstra told us that the EEAS should be more decentralised and less hierarchical: there were often four to five people between the HR/VP and the desk officer, which seemed to him to be too many for the foreign policy area, which required rapid response. He also thought that internal EEAS bureaucratic procedures, which had been adopted from the Commission, needed to be relaxed; a change in culture was also needed “in which people take responsibility and initiative, and do not have to discuss everything with everyone.” More broadly, he believed that structural integration of different services (foreign, development and security) should be considered.\(^{223}\)

Nicholas Westcott told us that the EEAS had been putting procedures and processes in place to enable it to work at the speed needed in diplomacy. Within the constraints of the need for agreement by the 27 Member States, procedures were getting faster, information networks were more efficient than previously and staff now knew how to get decisions agreed quickly by the Commissioner and the HR/VP. The EEAS response to the Mali crisis illustrated the ability to move swiftly when required.\(^{224}\)

117. **Despite the progress that has been made in setting up the institutions in the new service, problems remain in the lines of communication. The review should look at whether decision-making within the EEAS could be simplified so that implementation of actions can take place more speedily. The Member States also have a major role to play in this.**

**EEAS/Commission relations**

118. We explored the question of the relationship between the EEAS and the Commission. This is critical since responsibility for the various strands of the external policy is shared between these two different institutions. In evidence from the EU institutions, we were given the message that the relationship was improving. James Morrison (Chef de Cabinet to the HR/VP) thought it was “beginning to work” following the major change in the systems, though he pointed out that adaptation inevitably took time.\(^{225}\) He told us that the HR/VP held regular meetings with the commissioners dealing with external relations issues. The Commissioners with responsibility for the Neighbourhood and for Development did not have their own service to handle external relations issues, but used the EEAS and its desk officers. The coordination was in-built, which accorded with the principle that there should be no duplication of geographical desks between the EEAS and the Commission.\(^{226}\) Nicholas Westcott said that any remaining “chalk-line disputes” were being resolved.\(^{227}\) Pedro Serrano recounted that, as Deputy Head of the Cabinet of Javier Solana, he had experienced difficulties coordinating development work with the Commission. This had now changed and, during his time as Head of the EEAS Delegation in New York, he had felt that “we were all really in the same boat.” The EEAS was well connected to the Commission system; most of the President’s actions which were related to foreign relations were prepared with the assistance of the EEAS and the briefings were often shared with the President of the

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\(^{223}\) Dijkstra paragraph 20

\(^{224}\) QQ 245, 246

\(^{225}\) Q 171

\(^{226}\) Q 186

\(^{227}\) Q 257
Commission.\textsuperscript{228} He thought that the continuity and coherence created by the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty had increased effectiveness and efficiency.\textsuperscript{229}

119. A number of witnesses, however, spoke of remaining difficulties in the relationship.\textsuperscript{230} Professor Whitman considered that there were problems of overlap between the Commission and the EEAS and in the reporting lines within the EEAS.\textsuperscript{231} Edward Burke thought that the collegiate nature of the Commission could create delays and problems for the EEAS, while Commission officials suspected that the EEAS, and the potentially powerful role of the HR/VP, were undermining the community method\textsuperscript{232} and they were fighting back against the Lisbon Treaty, consequently undermining the EU’s external policy work.\textsuperscript{233} Professor Blockmans told us that the “RELEX group” of commissioners in charge of various aspects of external work had previously met every month but, more recently, had met only a “handful of times.” He thought the HR/VP should chair monthly meetings of the group.\textsuperscript{234}

120. The Minister for Europe told us that there was “a degree of institutional tension and turf warfare … ” at the level of High Representative and individual commissioners. Difficulties in the EEAS/Commission relationship also had cost implications; Heads of Delegation, who had primary responsibility for financial reporting, were only allowed to delegate budgetary tasks to others if they were not from the Commission. It was “lunatic” that a second officer had to be appointed to meet the financial reporting requirements because the other staff members in the delegations were all Commission employees.\textsuperscript{235} He hoped that a culture would be developed to overcome tensions in relations with the Commission.\textsuperscript{236} The Minister added that there was still work to be done on relations with the EU’s strategic partners, such as China, India, Brazil, and the United States, where the challenge was to achieve the right working culture and relationship between the EEAS and the Commission. More needed to be done to draw on all the instruments available to the EU and to coordinate action in the development and trade areas.\textsuperscript{237}

121. Our evidence suggested that, despite progress in coordination, there were still “turf wars” between the EEAS and the Commission in handling external relations in Brussels and in the delegations. It is simply not acceptable that already complex bureaucratic procedures result in a loss of efficiency and effectiveness for the EEAS. This

\begin{footnotes}

\item[228] QQ 207, 219, see also Avery QQ 2, 21
\item[229] Q 200, also Corbett Q 211
\item[230] Elmar Brok MEP Q 229, Arnaud Danjean MEP Q 231, EPC paragraph 2
\item[231] QQ 28, 32
\item[232] This is the EU’s usual method of decision-making, in which the Commission makes a proposal to the Council and Parliament who then debate it, propose amendments and eventually adopt it as EU law. In the process, they will often consult other bodies such as the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. This is in contrast to intergovernmental cooperation. http://europa.eu/abc/eurojargon/index_en.htm
\item[233] QQ 36, 27, 42 (also Korostelova)
\item[234] Blockmans paragraph 2, also Vimont Q 185, Burke QQ 27,42, Dijkstra paragraph 21
\item[235] QQ 273, 274
\item[236] Q 267
\item[237] Q 262
\end{footnotes}
problem must be overcome, and an excellent opportunity to do so will arise when the new Commission and the new High Representative/Vice-President take up their appointments in 2014. Solutions include ensuring that policy coordination meetings of external commissioners, in particular the Commissioners for development, neighbourhood policy and enlargement, and the HR/VP take place regularly during the year. As we have advocated above, the EEAS should work towards unified reporting structures, both in terms of personnel and finance, and the withdrawal of EEAS staff where the mission is purely technical.

Trade

122. We examined how trade work was handled in the EEAS, given that it is a Commission competence and that the Commission has primacy on trade. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the trade and development representations and offices constituted the EU presence around the world. Following the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, the role of the EEAS is to support the HR/VP in her responsibilities for ensuring the coherence of the EU’s external policies, including trade, while she is assisted directly on trade matters by the Commission.

123. We experienced difficulty in finding witnesses who were willing to comment on the EEAS’s role in trade matters, but were able to speak by videoconference to Arancha González (World Trade Organisation (WTO) Chief of Staff, Director General’s Office in Geneva) to ask about her experience of dealing with the EU since the creation of the EEAS. She told us that the impact of the EEAS on the WTO “is not perceptible to us, observing the EU as an actor on trade.” The nameplates had changed, as had the names on the business cards, but the EU Commission still represented the interests of the EU Member States in Geneva, and the interests of the EU had not fundamentally changed. For the WTO, it was critical that a qualified majority of Member States should support the position the Commission would like to take, whoever spoke for the EU.238 Ms González speculated that the presence of the EEAS might have the positive effect of bringing a geostrategic or geopolitical angle to trade discussions in meetings over which the Commission presided, especially in discussions about the accession to the WTO of countries in unstable parts of the world. The EEAS might also bring greater coherence to the discussions on trade policy. She thought that the EEAS served a purpose in Geneva and in all countries where the EU was represented; it had “a huge advocacy role on trade,” and therefore added value.239

124. In Brasilia, Alan Charlton told us that trade work was still largely run by the Commission and the establishment of the EEAS Delegation had not made a great difference so far, though it was work in progress. As far as the UK was concerned, the Commission could add value to the Embassy’s work if there was, for example, a market access problem where its expertise was useful. The Presidents of the European Council and the Commission visited Brazil for EU business meetings, accompanied by groups of business people, and discussed issues which could improve trade, but they did not provide services

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238 QQ 113, 114, 116, 117, 120
239 Q 120
to individual companies in a way that the UK would. He thought that the EEAS ambassador did have a role in promoting “a bit more coherence”; the UK was looking for the EEAS to develop more coherence in the programmes that it ran with the Commission, to ensure that EEAS work successfully complemented that of the Commission. He did not see the role of the EEAS as becoming involved in trade promotion per se, as Member States did.240

125. Richard Corbett (Cabinet of the President of the European Council, in charge of Inter-Institutional Affairs) told us that trade and development were now conducted in a context that had a greater regard for foreign policy objectives.241 A contrary view was, however, provided by the EPLO, which argued that the Trade Directorate General “operates largely independent of the rest of EU external action and is hesitant to serve wider EU objectives.” This was despite the EU’s role as the largest regional trading block with considerable leverage which it could use to support the EU’s foreign policy objectives. Trade could undermine other policy objectives and should, therefore, be subject to assessment by the relevant EEAS services.242

126. Edward Burke stressed that the role of the EEAS in the EU’s trade activity was to contribute a political context, as an understanding of the domestic politics of a country was necessary to implement an effective trade policy.243 Mats Persson believed that trade matters in the EU were already heavily politicised, and should not be politicised further. He saw no real difference in the EU’s trade work since the formation of the EEAS.244

127. It is important to distinguish between trade promotion and trade policy. It is clear that the main forum for promoting the trade of individual companies will remain national missions and embassies.

128. Trade policy is a competence of the European Union, on which the Commission leads. Our evidence indicates that, thus far, the EEAS has had no significant effect on the way in which the EU handles trade policy. We consider that, while duplication should be avoided, the EEAS could play a useful role in providing a diplomatic perspective on trade policy, and the EEAS delegations should be proficient at providing a strong local political context for trade negotiations. The review should consider how to ensure that the EEAS starts to play this constructive role in assisting trade policy.

Development

129. We sought evidence from a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working on the ground delivering the EU’s development programmes, but had limited success, which was disappointing, and we are therefore particularly grateful to those NGOs who did contribute. We heard divergent views from NGOs and the Government about whether the EU’s development work had become more effective and coherent following the creation of the EEAS. Nicholas Westcott told us that the EEAS had enhanced the EU’s ability to deliver development programmes effectively as

240 QQ 144–147
241 Q 216, also Serrano Q 218
242 EPLO
243 Q 30, also Spence Q 58
244 QQ 75, 58
it was now more closely linked to the EU’s political contacts. Planning the spend for the 11th Development Fund was done jointly by the EEAS and the Development Commissioner and his team, which ensured strategic coherence, though the process had taken a while to get right.245 Gary Quince said that, on areas which only concerned development cooperation, the reporting channels were from the delegations to the Commission.246

130. In London, the Department for International Development (DfID) thought that the formation of the EEAS had created greater opportunities for coherence in development policy and aid but, by adding another actor in the field, it had also introduced a challenge. The DfID believed that, as structures had settled down, areas of ambiguity had been resolved. They told us that a dedicated unit, the Development Cooperation Coordination, had been formed within the EEAS to coordinate work with the EU’s Development Directorate General (DEVCO) and ensure that links were made across the range of thematic issues. It was fully operational and had improved channels of communication. DfID officials were in regular contact with this unit.247

131. The DfID cited an example of improved coherence; the Commission and EEAS had used joint negotiating teams in proposing the new External Financial Instruments for 2014–2020, to produce a coherent position across development policy, foreign policy and the implementation of financial assistance during negotiations.248 Alan Charlton told us that the EU had earmarked €61 million for development aid to Brazil in a multi-year programme, which predated the establishment of the EEAS. In his view, the involvement of the EEAS had not made a great deal of difference.249 The Minister for Europe thought that the question of conditionality had not been taken forward with sufficient rigour or energy.250 Mats Persson believed that, in the past, EU aid had been politicised, largely deliberately, and linked to different objectives. It was too early to tell whether the EEAS had had an effect on the EU’s development policy, including on conditionality.251

132. The NGOs were considerably more critical. Paul Asquith (Africa Foundation for Development (AFFORD)) told us he had been struck by the paucity of information on the subjects we wished to investigate. The question of budget responsibility in-country was opaque, as were the structures or opportunities for NGOs to feed into the EEAS policy formulation process.252 There was a lack of clear, accurate and reliable information about what programmes were being funded and about lines of responsibility, specifically in relation to the impact of the EEAS or NGOs on the ground.253 He also expressed concern about the lack of expertise and capacity in delegations in certain African states, although the feedback he had received from AFFORD’s European
partner had been limited. He thought that the EU’s development policy was incoherent and that there were “turf wars” between the EEAS diplomats and the civil servants at the Commission.

133. Paul Asquith told us that African countries were now less interested in deals with the European Union and preferred projects which were more regionally based, and aid which was not linked to the kind of conditionality the EU imposed. He recommended that the EU should move its development effort away from aid to trade to suit the new situation. Developing countries also looked increasingly towards China and the BRICS. He thought that the EEAS should also play a pivotal role in developing the replacement for the Millennium Development Goals and it potentially had a role in Policy Coherence for Development (PCD).

134. The development NGO, Bond, and Paul Asquith, considered that the EEAS had focused on other areas, such as security and anti-terrorism and trade, to the detriment of long-term development. Bond also thought that, on development policy, the EEAS had been detrimental to poverty reduction objectives. The formation of the EEAS had in practice diluted the commitment to development and to the best interests of partner countries. They perceived a growing gap between the realities of development and poverty in the field and decisions taken in Brussels, with competition between the EEAS and the Commission. Bond believed that the EEAS had done little to prioritise PCD in its programmes. The European Centre for Development Policy and Management (ECDPM) also thought that PCD had not been a priority for the EEAS, but more of a long-term ambition for EU external action. Their research had shown that EEAS staff considered PCD to be the responsibility of the Commission. In their view, the HR/VP and EEAS had not shown leadership or organisational commitment to the issue.

135. Hugo Shorter told us that the complexity of the inter-related Commission/EEAS roles had surfaced in development working groups, which had caused delays in reaching agreement, though this had not had a serious impact on implementation. Anti Slavery International (ASI) also thought that coordination and decision-making in Brussels had not improved, nor had the creation of the EEAS led to a more politically informed development policy linking the Human Rights Strategic Framework to geographical policy. However, they considered that the Delegations had delivered better “coordination in country,” with useful statements, and the EEAS had drafted human rights strategies and involved

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254 QQ 87, 91
255 Q 85
256 Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, a group of countries with large fast-growing economies.
257 PCD is a policy by which the EU “seeks to take into account development cooperation objectives in non-development policies,” European Commission website.
258 QQ 82, 93 also Charlton QQ 150, 152, Avery Q 21
259 Bond paragraph 7, and Asquith Q 84
260 Bond paragraph 13
261 Bond paragraph 8
262 Bond paragraph 11
263 ECDPM, also Burke paragraphs 5, 7
264 Shorter
Member States. ASI’s experience when working in Uzbekistan had been that engaging with the EEAS was “frustrating, resulting in negligible impact on the delivery of development assistance.”

136. The Commission should continue to lead on development, which is where development expertise lies within the EU. However, the review should consider in detail how the EEAS can better contribute to the development of policy and ensure that all programmes are set in a political context.

137. In disbursing aid, the EEAS needs to focus on enforcing mutual accountability, which should continue to be an important part of the EU’s message in its aid work. A special remit could be given to the Court of Auditors to ensure that these conditions are effective.

138. We were concerned by the difficulty in obtaining evidence from development non-governmental organisations on how the EU’s development work has changed since the establishment of the EEAS. We conclude that the EEAS is either difficult to access or believed to be irrelevant. The review should consider whether these views are justified, and in what ways the EEAS could improve its relationships with these stakeholders.

139. There may be a number of instances where EEAS offices deal only with the operational aspects of implementing EU development policy. In these cases we believe that the EU should consider withdrawing EEAS status and staff and leave the offices under the control of the Commission.

140. We agree that EU’s humanitarian (ECHO) aid offices should remain independent of the EEAS.

Crisis management

141. The EEAS has answered the need to strengthen its crisis response capacity by creating a new position of Managing Director with overall responsibility for the area. A Crisis Management Board has also been formed to coordinate the different EU actors involved in responding to crises, and the EEAS holds regular meetings of the Crisis Platform to respond to crisis situations in third countries. These involve expertise across the EEAS and the Commission. Pierre Vimont said that the Crisis Platform Group had been used to form the EU’s mission in Mali; the new system had enabled the EU to bring together in the Group all those involved, from the military staff, including the Chair of the Military Committee, the different units in the field, the Crisis Management Planning Department (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Africa Director, with a contribution from the EEAS Delegation in the capital, Bamako, the Commission’s humanitarian and development assistance and those involved in counter-terrorism work. He hoped that efficiency would improve.

142. Gary Quince told us that the creation of the EEAS and the comprehensive approach had improved the EU’s crisis-management capabilities in the areas

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265 Anti-Slavery International
266 EEAS
267 QQ 158, 159
with which he dealt—in addition to the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, his Delegation had brought a range of policy and financial instruments to bear on crises in Guinea-Bissau, the Congo, eastern Congo and the Central African Republic, using political, development, humanitarian, military and security responses. The Minister for Europe also thought that “the greatest success has been over conflict prevention and crisis management … If the comprehensive approach to crisis management can become fully embedded in the way that the EU works, we will have a swifter, smoother and better-quality EU response to such crises.”

143. Professor Whitman, however, was critical of the crisis-management system. He believed that this was one of the issues that needed to be addressed in the review. The system of Brussels-based institutions was too complicated, and the EU needed to prioritise the areas where it should be investing resources in time, energy and effort and, in the longer term, in conflict mediation and mitigation work, as it could not “do global.” The review was an opportunity for the UK Government to state unambiguously what the tasks of the Service should be. Edward Burke also saw problems with the EU’s crisis-management, despite good work by the HR/VP in recognising that better integration of the relevant tools was needed. She had done well in establishing a new Crisis Management Board and in introducing the concept of a crisis platform to respond to specific conflicts or natural disasters, but he thought that the EU’s ability to respond rapidly to crises should be looked at in the review.

144. The EPLO believed that the EEAS had improved the EU’s conflict prevention and peace-building capacity, but the policy approach and coordination needed improvement in order to tackle the “entire conflict cycle,” including the root causes of conflict, which was an area where the EEAS had a comparative advantage over the Member States. The EEAS was best placed to revive and update the EU’s crisis management functions and should do so, with the close and informed involvement of Member States. Bond thought that the EU’s policies on crisis response had been positive as they demonstrated an intention to tackle drivers of conflicts “upstream,” but the practical implementing processes needed to be put in place. The GGI told us that, in their view, the crisis management systems were still not fully integrated and clarification was needed on responsibilities and the chains of command.

145. Evidence from our witnesses suggested that crisis management was an area that had as yet been given insufficient attention by the EEAS, although it is a core activity with potential for much added value. This is despite the fact that new structures have been created which are intended to streamline the EU’s ability to manage crises. As this is a vital and growing area of EU external activity, the review should ensure that the different parts of its crisis-management structure are well integrated and work smoothly.

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268 Q 125
269 Q 267
270 Q 51
271 Q 51, Burke paragraph 2
272 EPLO
273 Bond paragraph 16
274 Global Governance Institute
CHAPTER 4: DIFFERING APPROACHES TO THE EEAS

The UK

146. We sought the views of the Minister for Europe, and officials at the FCO and the DfID, about the EEAS. The Minister for Europe’s view was that the EEAS “should complement and support, not replace, the diplomatic services of other Member States.” He saw no area where the UK might be prepared to hand over some tasks to the EEAS, as the UK had a global diplomatic network at its disposal. The EEAS should be more effective, and should focus on practical, achievable improvements without going into further debate about institutions. The review should set clear priorities and target resources where EU action could add most value, strengthen policy coherence and embed the comprehensive approach to crisis management, and improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of working practices. Hugo Shorter cited the relations that the EEAS was developing with strategic partners and its peace building work, especially in Africa, as examples of where the EEAS complemented the UK’s efforts. The Service should only operate where it was authorised to do so, and within its budget, and should not replace the work of the FCO. The UK Government would continue to exert influence on the action and priorities of the service so that it contributed to British security, prosperity and values.

147. The EEAS told us that UK nationals were strongly represented in the EEAS at all levels, as diplomats and permanent officials. Overall, including all categories of staff, there were 150 British nationals working in the EEAS. 20 British diplomats had been recruited to the EEAS as Temporary Agents, in addition to 49 permanent officials at AD level; 15 were in management positions in Headquarters, 11 were Heads of Delegation and two were deputy Heads. Mr Shorter said that the UK identified posts in the EEAS which they would aim to fill, but they did not necessarily attempt to place diplomats in countries where the UK was not represented.

148. Hugo Shorter told us that the UK believed that the Service had “navigated a pretty pragmatic and sensible path through the competing demands of EU partners.” Not surprisingly, he told us that, in his view, the EEAS had been most effective when it had “worked with the grain of our own interests and objectives” and had helped to advance those interests. He said that the UK would like to see the EEAS focus on developing more strategic relations with emerging economies and established powers and use the full range of its tools, policies and capabilities to influence them in line with agreed Council purpose and direction. Relations with Brazil and India were going well: in the

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275 Q 261
276 QQ 261, 271
277 The EU has designated the US, Canada, Russia, China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Japan and South Africa as strategic partners.
278 QQ 2, 3
279 Figures dated December 2012
280 EEAS
281 Q 15
282 Q 16
283 Q 18
latter the EU should focus on trade, climate change and security, where it could best add value. With China, the EU value could be added by prioritising and coordinating EU positions on economic and political issues, leveraging its strength as one of China’s largest markets.\footnote{Q 20}

149. We also heard that difficulties had arisen for the UK during the establishment of the EEAS. Hugo Shorter told us that there had been a process of “refining our understanding” of precisely where competences lay under the Lisbon Treaty, involving a difficult negotiating process, and disagreements about the EU’s relationship with the UN. The problem had now been resolved “to our satisfaction”.\footnote{QQ 2, 4. The question of the EU’s role in the UN revolved around the extent to which the EU could represent the Member States in international organisations. The EU is an observer within the UN, and has no vote, but it is party to more than 50 UN multilateral agreements and conventions as the only non-State participant. It has obtained a special “full participant” status in a number of important UN conferences. http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/articleslist_s88_en.htm} The Minister for Europe explained that the EU Member States had unanimously agreed arrangements for the EU Delegation to the UN to represent Member States in negotiations on budgetary matters in the UN Fifth Committee, where there was Member State competence. On speaking and observer rights at the UN General Assembly, it had been agreed to continue with the EU’s observer status. The EU Delegation had the same rights as had been previously exercised by the Member State in the rotating presidency. He said that the approach had avoided a shift of competence, while in practical terms trying to make it possible for the EU to speak on a position which had been agreed collectively.\footnote{Q 261} Graham Avery said that the UK had been among the strongest of the Member States in refusing to permit the role of the EEAS to be upgraded; this problem had sometimes been referred to by others as “the UK issue.”\footnote{Q 4, also Burke Q 39, Whitman Q 38}

150. Dr Bicchi thought that it was in the UK’s interests to work with the EEAS; the new emphasis on political reporting in the EEAS meant that there was a significant difference in the way Member States participated in EU foreign policy-making, with some states relying on the EEAS for information. This created the opportunity for countries with a global reach, such as the UK, to work closely with EU delegations to contribute significantly to the direction and content of EU foreign policy. She believed that, in this way, the UK could contribute and multiply the UK’s political leadership in the world and make the UK a more attractive partner for the US.\footnote{Bicchi paragraph 2.3, see also Dijkstra paragraph 9} The Brussels and Europe Liberal Democrats commented that the UK Government should take a more positive attitude towards the EEAS, and that this included helping the EU carry more weight in its own right in the UN system.\footnote{Brussels and Europe Liberal Democrats paragraph 8} Graham Avery also pointed out that the EEAS offered the UK opportunities to promote its interests through designing European foreign policies which coincided with its own, as France had done in agriculture with the Common Agricultural Policy.\footnote{QQ 6, 24}
151. Professor Whitman did not think that the UK was making the most of the EEAS; its approach was piecemeal, connected to the ambition of individuals, rather than targeted. In his view the UK had difficulties in general in placing diplomats in EU institutions. He suggested that the UK should invite EEAS staff for secondments to London, “so that they get a better sense of us, what we want and the way that we operate.”

152. We believe that there are benefits for both the EEAS and the UK in high quality British diplomats working in the EEAS, in particular in areas where the UK has both experience and interests. We agree this offers the UK an opportunity to take a lead in developing European policy.

153. The Government should ensure that, when UK diplomats return to their national careers at the end of their secondment, their careers should not be disadvantaged. This will benefit the UK’s diplomatic service.

154. The UK public sector, including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, is under strong budgetary pressures. Given the existence of the EEAS, the Government should look anew, and constructively, at ways in which the presence of the EEAS could be used to the UK’s advantage in terms of saving costs, or increasing influence at no additional cost. This should not be the exclusive preserve of smaller Member States.

Other Member States

155. We asked how Member States viewed the EEAS, and found that views differed considerably, depending in large part on the size of the country and, consequently, of its diplomatic service. The EEAS believed that the creation of the EEAS had strengthened relations with the diplomatic services of Member States at headquarters and delegation level. They attributed this to the new role of the HR/VP in chairing different formations of the Council, which was mirrored in the PSC and Council working groups in Brussels, as well as in the work of EU delegations. The growing presence of national diplomats in the EEAS also helped relations with Member States. On the other hand, there were issues concerning the role and competence of the EU Delegations to some multilateral organisations, such as the UN and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where there was “work in progress.” Pierre Vimont told us that the twice-yearly meetings with Permanent Secretaries of the 27 Member States took place to discuss the relationship between the EEAS and the national diplomatic services. At the next meeting the 27 would give an assessment of the first two years of the EEAS. His counterparts in Member States were happy with the way the EEAS delegations were working, apart from a few possible personality problems. Heads of Delegation had been asked to maintain direct contacts on the ground with the embassies of Member States to

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291 QQ 38, 50
292 EEAS
293 Q 187
294 Q 167
exchange information. However, some Delegation Heads had complained that this was a one-way street.295

156. David Spence also thought that relations between the EEAS and Member States’ embassies were good and that the embassies liked the continuity which the Delegations brought. He said that some foreign affairs ministries, such as the Dutch and the Swedes, were looking at the nature of their own ministries to see how the EEAS could benefit them.296 Professor Whitman believed that a fairly small number of Member States saw the EEAS as a direct challenge to their diplomatic services. The predominant view was that it existed and they would like to see it thrive so that they could derive some national advantage, particularly in terms of spending less.297

157. We asked the ambassadors of three smaller Member States, represented in London, for their views of the EEAS: Ambassador Asta Skaisgiryté Liauškiené of Lithuania, Ambassador Miroslav Wlchovsky of the Slovak Republic, and Ambassador Iztok Jarc of the Republic of Slovenia. These ambassadors expressed strong support for the EEAS and outlined its advantages for smaller states. Ambassador Wlchovsky told us that the difference between larger and smaller states was one of capacity; Slovakian embassies did not cover the world and information provided by the EEAS therefore helped to shape Slovakia’s foreign policy. One of the benefits of “the club” was that it was represented around the world.298

158. This view was echoed by Ambassador Skaisgiryté Liauškiené for Lithuania, and Ambassador Jarc for Slovenia. Ambassador Skaisgiryté Liauškiené told us that Lithuania only had 40 bilateral embassies, of which 26 were in other EU Member States, and the presence of EU delegations in all the countries where it had no representation was “absolutely crucial.” Information sharing on, for example, Burma and Guatemala, was very important: before that, “we did not have a clue what was going on.”299 Ambassador Skaisgiryté Liauškiené gave a positive overall view of the EEAS which had achieved greater visibility, although not always unity. She thought its strengths lay in its single structure, planning and the network of delegations. She believed the new system for representation was an improvement on the rotating presidency system. Its weakness was that it did not have the ability to achieve united positions on all subjects.300

159. We heard a contrary view from Tarja Cronberg MEP. In her opinion small countries, including her native Finland, had declined in influence since the establishment of the EEAS. When they had formed part of the six monthly rotating chairmanship “everybody was dynamic, thinking about new ideas and trying to do something. Now, it has decreased into a more bureaucratic mess.”301

160. Turning to the larger Member States, Graham Avery thought that the French government, like the UK Government, had initially been sceptical
about the EEAS, but used the EU as “a means of projecting national interest and national power,” and believed that the EEAS had been successful. In his view, the Germans hoped that some radical ideas would emerge from the 2013 review, perhaps with a shift of competences from the Commission to the EEAS. In his view, the Germans considered themselves as one of the strongest supporters of the Service and they “want German foreign policy to be European foreign policy,” for example in wanting the EU to adopt friendlier policies towards Russia. Edward Burke thought that the French would like the EEAS to play a strong political role and act with greater boldness on military operations overseas. He told us that both Germany and Sweden thought that the EEAS lacked the powers envisaged under the Lisbon Treaty and they were frustrated with the bloc building by others.\(^{302}\)

161. Mats Persson thought that the EEAS had nothing new to offer to larger Member States, but that the strategic assessment was different for smaller Member States.\(^{303}\) David Spence thought, however, that the EEAS also offered benefits for the larger Member States, as all ministries were under financial pressure.\(^{304}\) In the view of Dr Federica Bicchi, there was a “win-win” situation for both small and large Member States. The larger states retained a *de facto* veto power and had the option of cooperating more closely with the EEAS to influence the direction of EU foreign policy. The small Member States had started to rely on the EEAS for the provision of crucial services and saw it as an opportunity for voicing their national concerns, for acting in crisis situations, (for which they did not have the means), and for receiving information on subjects about which they knew little.\(^{305}\)

162. **The importance of the EEAS for smaller EU Member States, which lack a global reach, is great as it extends their sources of information and, in some cases, informs their foreign policy.** For the larger Member States, which do have a global reach, the EEAS offers the opportunity to influence the CFSP and the EU’s external relations, and to make savings in their own ministries and diplomatic services.

163. **Prior to the review, Member States should jointly discuss and must clarify for the HR/VP what they want the EEAS to do as it moves forward.** Their views can then form part of that review and lead to the essential prioritisation of tasks and resources. The differing interests of both smaller and larger Member States should be taken fully into account.

164. **It is already clear from the practice of Member States sharing embassies or buildings with common services, (for example, the “Schengen House” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and from the wish of the smaller states for the EEAS to provide consular activities, that in the long term there is much to be gained by better use of Europe’s diplomatic resources across the globe, whether based around collections of Member States or the EEAS.**

165. **In conclusion, we believe that the EEAS has made a good start in its first two years. There is more to do, but it should now focus on swiftly**

\(^{302}\) QQ 15, 16, 45, 46

\(^{303}\) Q 59

\(^{304}\) QQ 58, 59, 63

\(^{305}\) Bicchi paragraphs 2.1, 2.2
correcting the remaining organisational problems so that its systems run smoothly, and delivering more in the areas where it has been successful. Both the review and the process of appointments in 2014 of a new Commission, including its President, of a new High Representative/Vice-President and of a new Chair of the European Council present real opportunities to address some of the shortcomings and weaknesses that have emerged during the early years of the EEAS’s existence. They must not be missed. The review should focus on the ability of the Service to add value to the effectiveness of EU external policies through the addition of diplomacy to traditional Commission tasks. This will include improved collection, use and dissemination of political intelligence, better coordination of the use of the EU’s different instruments within a particular region, and using the combined leverage of the EU to the advantage of all 27 Member States.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 2: The New Organisation

166. We recognise that the EEAS is still a young Service. In its first two years the EEAS had to create a new service and structure in order to become fully operational, but it should now put that period behind it and focus on delivering results. This is extremely important, since it is essential that the EEAS delivers added value to the EU’s external action. There were differences of view amongst our witnesses on the extent to which the EEAS had done so up until now. (Paragraph 13)

167. The EEAS should not, however, seek to project its own foreign policy. The Common and Foreign Security Policy should remain under the control of the Member States. (Paragraph 14)

168. We agree that the triple-hatted High Representative/Vice-President position brings many advantages for the coherence of the EU’s external relations. However, it does also bring a number of problems which make it difficult for the incumbent to undertake the role effectively. (Paragraph 19)

169. The triple-hatted HR/VP role has led to overload, especially given the inevitable amount of travel involved. We believe that serious consideration should be given to a whole range of possible solutions to this problem during the two year review of the EEAS and when appointments are made to the new Commission and the High Representative post in 2014. (Paragraph 23)

170. The Commission Vice-Presidency role of the High Representative should be used more rigorously to ensure that there is greater liaison between the policies managed by the Commission and those offered by the EEAS, and thereby enhance coherence in the EU’s external relations. (Paragraph 24)

171. We recognise the problem of setting up a new service and the additional investment that has been required, and that efforts have been made to restrain the budget and abide by the injunction to achieve budget neutrality. However, budget neutrality has not been achieved. We recommend that, while the EU Member States have to observe budgetary restraints, there should be zero real growth in the EEAS budget. (Paragraph 33)

172. We fully agree with the intention of the EEAS to continue cooperation with Member States to identify where resources can be shared to achieve savings in national budgets. The aim should be to provide benefits for all Member States. Achievement in this area should become a key indicator of performance by the EEAS. (Paragraph 34)

173. We have heard evidence that salaries are overgenerous in comparison with Member State diplomatic norms. It is very difficult to substantiate this because of the difficulties of establishing comparable grades, but we recommend that the general principle should be that salaries are broadly comparable with those of the larger Member States for officials in equivalent diplomatic service positions. This is especially important while many Member States face particularly severe budgetary constraints. (Paragraph 35)

174. We recognise that EEAS salaries are based on Commission staff regulations and that, if they are reduced, this may lead to the loss of good staff to other EU institutions, However, the appropriate way to resolve this would be to reduce the higher-level salaries within the institutions across the board, or to
recruit a larger proportion of staff from national diplomatic services. (Paragraph 36)

175. The EU, and hence also the EEAS, have a very wide range of potential interests spread across the entire globe. The prioritisation of aims and objectives must be a core part of the review of the EEAS, but it must also take account of the need to adapt to unforeseen circumstances and situations. (Paragraph 37)

176. In the vast majority of cases delegations have been inherited from the previous system of Commission representations. The location of delegations should not be driven by history but be subject to regular and rigorous review to assess their current usefulness for the EU’s overall priorities, leading, if necessary, to closures. (Paragraph 53)

177. Member States differ in their preferences for delegations, but they should take responsibility for the collective decision on their location. Where a delegation closure is decided, a lead Member State with an Embassy or High Commission in the third country should provide a focus for EU work, if necessary with supplementary personnel and funding resources from the EU. Clearly, this should be at a significantly lower cost. (Paragraph 54)

178. We consider that Commission business such as trade and development can benefit from being set in a political context, which can be provided by the EEAS. However, in cases where a delegation’s work is limited to these issues, we do not believe that there is a need to establish or continue a resident EEAS presence. Trade or development offices should be used instead, and political reporting should be handled by a mix of visiting EEAS political officers, connected to the relevant desk in Brussels, and a lead Member State in the area. (Paragraph 55)

179. There are already instances where Member States share diplomatic premises in third countries with each other or with the EEAS. The HR/VP should look in the review at how this practice could be taken further for mutual benefit. Where two EEAS delegations exist, they should be amalgamated as soon as is feasible. (Paragraph 56)

180. In countries where there are no EEAS delegations, the coordination role they perform for information exchange and crisis management should continue to be undertaken by the Member State holding the rotating presidency or, in their absence, by a nominated Member State appropriate to that location. This would place an additional resource burden on larger Member States, for which they should receive financial compensation from the EEAS. (Paragraph 57)

181. Reporting lines from the delegations are complex, with Commission staff working in the delegations reporting both to the Commission and to the Head of the EEAS Delegation. Appraisals for Commission staff in delegations are currently written in Brussels. The Head of Delegation must have responsibility for appraising Commission staff within the mission and reporting lines should be clear. (Paragraph 58)

182. The budget arrangements in delegations are complicated, as separate accounts are prepared for EEAS and Commission expenditure. There should be one set of budgets and accounts for delegations, with the potential for saving on accounting and administrative expenditure. The Heads of Delegation should have complete authority, including management and
accounting responsibilities, over all internal and external expenditure, with one set of accounts reported to the EEAS. (Paragraph 59)

183. Our evidence shows that many smaller Member States would find a consular role for EEAS delegations particularly useful. This has a number of implications, not least cost, as there is currently no such expertise in the delegations. The review should seriously consider the possibility of the EEAS operating in this area for States which wish to delegate some consular functions to the EEAS. However, those Member States which wish to be assisted in this way should meet the costs individually or collectively of setting up and operating the service. (Paragraph 63)

184. There is still work to be done in uniting the three staff components from the Council Secretariat, Commission and Member State diplomatic services. Heads of Delegation need to pay continued attention to the development of a corporate spirit in their delegations. (Paragraph 71)

185. We recommend that greater attention should be given to the planning and delivery of training for EEAS staff, including in the operations of the EU for staff from national diplomatic services, in political work for those coming from the Commission, and in languages where relevant. In particular, the EEAS needs more Arabic speakers if it is to capitalise on the consequences of the Arab Spring. A larger training budget will probably be required, which should be financed from savings elsewhere within the EEAS. (Paragraph 72)

186. We strongly agree with the idea of seconding EEAS staff into Member State ministries. A two-way flow would be healthy and help to achieve the cohesion in the EEAS. (Paragraph 73)

187. The EU’s Special Representatives in general fulfil a productive and effective role. They play a particularly important part where the issues involved are cross-border, regional or thematic. They should, however, be more fully integrated into the EEAS structure and their salaries rigorously reviewed (see our earlier recommendation). (Paragraph 76)

188. The relationship between the EU Special Representatives and the Heads of Delegation should be clarified, as should the chain of command of the Special Representatives. (Paragraph 77)

189. The HR/VP submits an annual report to the European Parliament on the EEAS staffing and budget. Given the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, she should also submit it formally to national parliaments. (Paragraph 83)

190. The EEAS should be required to respond to national parliaments if they raise matters following submission of the report. As it is clearly impractical for the HR/VP to attend each Member State parliament or chamber, a suitable cost and resource effective method needs to be found to achieve this. (Paragraph 84)

191. This re-balancing is particularly important as currently the European Parliament has far more influence over the HR/VP and the EEAS due to its ability to control budgets, scrutinise activity directly, and call them to account. The scrutiny role of the European Parliament should not go beyond its current level, as foreign policy is primarily inter-governmental and scrutiny should therefore be performed at the national parliamentary level. (Paragraph 85)
Chapter 3: Achievements and Challenges

192. We applaud the objective of bringing together the different streams of the EU’s external work, whether in the EEAS or the person of the HR/VP, to form a comprehensive approach to the EU’s foreign policy. This is working well in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and the southern neighbourhood, where different instruments have been brought together. This should continue to be the approach for the future. The new Comprehensive Approach under consideration by the Commission, in conjunction with the EEAS, should be ambitious and the EEAS should play a leading role in its formulation and implementation. We see this as a major area of further added value. (Paragraph 92)

193. The EEAS, in support of the HR/VP, has made a noticeable impact in a number of foreign policy areas. These include policy towards Iran, the EU’s reaction to the Arab Spring and the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, where the EU’s ability to speak with one voice has been enhanced. We hope that, once the EEAS is fully established, the time of the HR/VP will be freed to give greater focus to these and other key areas. (Paragraph 100)

194. The EEAS can only act under the Common Foreign and Security Policy if the EU’s Member States agree. The Member States are able to find a common position on many subjects, including on difficult issues of sanctions on third countries. However, differing policies, based on different national interests, inevitably persist, including on key issues. The EEAS should make every effort to find and build on common ground to enable Member States to agree united positions. (Paragraph 107)

195. We welcome the fact that the EEAS regularly brings together a further 11 non-Member States as a part of common positions at the United Nations and more broadly. We encourage the EEAS to continue and extend this aspect of its work. (Paragraph 108)

196. It is understandably difficult to reconcile the national priorities of 27 equal Member States, and reduce them to manageable proportions. Nonetheless, this should be done by the HR/VP in collaboration with the Member States, and should determine where the EEAS focuses its resources. (Paragraph 112)

197. We consider that the EEAS should focus on areas of greatest security and economic importance to the Member States, and where it can make the most impact, in particular by deploying its civilian or mixed military/civilian missions and employing its new comprehensive approach. This will inevitably mean that there will be more concentration on issues which are geographically closer to the Member States, rather than distant ones. Relations with the emerging powers which have been chosen as the EU’s strategic partners should also be prioritised. (Paragraph 113)

198. The EEAS can and should play a major part in furthering the EU’s human rights principles, which should continue to form part of all the EU’s relationships. (Paragraph 114)

199. Despite the progress that has been made in setting up the institutions in the new service, problems remain in the lines of communication. The review should look at whether decision-making within the EEAS could be simplified.

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306 The Commission now plans to set out the “comprehensive approach” more formally than hitherto.
so that implementation of actions can take place more speedily. The Member States also have a major role to play in this. (Paragraph 117)

200. Our evidence suggested that, despite progress in coordination, there were still “turf wars” between the EEAS and the Commission in handling external relations in Brussels and in the delegations. It is simply not acceptable that already complex bureaucratic procedures result in a loss of efficiency and effectiveness for the EEAS. This problem must be overcome, and an excellent opportunity to do so will arise when the new Commission and the new High Representative/Vice-President take up their appointments in 2014. Solutions include ensuring that policy coordination meetings of external commissioners, in particular the Commissioners for development, neighbourhood policy and enlargement, and the HR/VP take place regularly during the year. As we have advocated above, the EEAS should work towards unified reporting structures, both in terms of personnel and finance, and the withdrawal of EEAS staff where the mission is purely technical. (Paragraph 121)

201. It is important to distinguish between trade promotion and trade policy. It is clear that the main forum for promoting the trade of individual companies will remain national missions and embassies. (Paragraph 127)

202. Trade policy is a competence of the European Union, on which the Commission leads. Our evidence indicates that, thus far, the EEAS has had no significant effect on the way in which the EU handles trade policy. We consider that, while duplication should be avoided, the EEAS could play a useful role in providing a diplomatic perspective on trade policy, and the EEAS delegations should be proficient at providing a strong local political context for trade negotiations. The review should consider how to ensure that the EEAS starts to play this constructive role in assisting trade policy. (Paragraph 128)

203. The Commission should continue to lead on development, which is where development expertise lies within the EU. However, the review should consider in detail how the EEAS can better contribute to the development of policy and ensure that all programmes are set in a political context. (Paragraph 136)

204. In disbursing aid, the EEAS needs to focus on enforcing mutual accountability, which should continue to be an important part of the EU’s message in its aid work. A special remit could be given to the Court of Auditors to ensure that these conditions are effective. (Paragraph 137)

205. We were concerned by the difficulty in obtaining evidence from development non-governmental organisations on how the EU’s development work has changed since the establishment of the EEAS. We conclude that the EEAS is either difficult to access or believed to be irrelevant. The review should consider whether these views are justified, and in what ways the EEAS could improve its relationships with these stakeholders. (Paragraph 138)

206. There may be a number of instances where EEAS offices deal only with the operational aspects of implementing EU development policy. In these cases we believe that the EU should consider withdrawing EEAS status and staff and leave the offices under the control of the Commission. (Paragraph 139)

207. We agree that EU’s humanitarian (ECHO) aid offices should remain independent of the EEAS. (Paragraph 140)
208. Evidence from our witnesses suggested that crisis management was an area that had as yet been given insufficient attention by the EEAS, although it is a core activity with potential for much added value. This is despite the fact that new structures have been created which are intended to streamline the EU’s ability to manage crises. As this is a vital and growing area of EU external activity, the review should ensure that the different parts of its crisis-management structure are well integrated and work smoothly. (Paragraph 145)

Chapter 4: Differing Approaches to the EEAS

209. We believe that there are benefits for both the EEAS and the UK in high quality British diplomats working in the EEAS, in particular in areas where the UK has both experience and interests. We agree this offers the UK an opportunity to take a lead in developing European policy. (Paragraph 152)

210. The Government should ensure that, when UK diplomats return to their national careers at the end of their secondment, their careers should not be disadvantaged. This will benefit the UK’s diplomatic service. (Paragraph 153)

211. The UK public sector, including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, is under strong budgetary pressures. Given the existence of the EEAS, the Government should look anew, and constructively, at ways in which the presence of the EEAS could be used to the UK’s advantage in terms of saving costs, or increasing influence at no additional cost. This should not be the exclusive preserve of smaller Member States. (Paragraph 154)

212. The importance of the EEAS for smaller EU Member States, which lack a global reach, is great as it extends their sources of information and, in some cases, informs their foreign policy. For the larger Member States, which do have a global reach, the EEAS offers the opportunity to influence the CFSP and the EU’s external relations, and to make savings in their own ministries and diplomatic services. (Paragraph 162)

213. Prior to the review, Member States should jointly discuss and must clarify for the HR/VP what they want the EEAS to do as it moves forward. Their views can then form part of that review and lead to the essential prioritisation of tasks and resources. The differing interests of both smaller and larger Member States should be taken fully into account. (Paragraph 163)

214. It is already clear from the practice of Member States sharing embassies or buildings with common services, (for example, the “Schengen House” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and from the wish of the smaller states for the EEAS to provide consular activities, that in the long term there is much to be gained by better use of Europe’s diplomatic resources across the globe, whether based around collections of Member States or the EEAS. (Paragraph 164)

215. In conclusion, we believe that the EEAS has made a good start in its first two years. There is more to do, but it should now focus on swiftly correcting the remaining organisational problems so that its systems run smoothly, and delivering more in the areas where it has been successful. Both the review and the process of appointments in 2014 of a new Commission, including its President, of a new High Representative/Vice-President and of a new Chair of the European Council present real opportunities to address some of the shortcomings and weaknesses that have emerged during the early years of the
EEAS’s existence. They must not be missed. The review should focus on the ability of the Service to add value to the effectiveness of EU external policies through the addition of diplomacy to traditional Commission tasks. This will include improved collection, use and dissemination of political intelligence, better coordination of the use of the EU’s different instruments within a particular region, and using the combined leverage of the EU to the advantage of all 27 Member States. (Paragraph 165)
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF MEMBERS AND DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST

The Members of the Sub-Committee which conducted this Inquiry were:

Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury
Baroness Eccles of Moulton DL
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
Baroness Henig
Lord Inge
Lord Jay of Ewelme
Lord Jopling
Lord Lamont of Lerwick
Lord Radice
Lord Teverson (Chairman)
Lord Trimble
Lord Williams of Elvel
Baroness Young of Hornsey

Declarations of Interests

Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury
   No relevant interests
Baroness Eccles of Moulton DL
   No relevant interests
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
   No relevant interests
Baroness Henig
   No relevant interests
Lord Inge
   No relevant interests
Lord Jay of Ewelme
   Chairman, Merlin, International medical NGO
   Vice Chair, Business for New Europe
   Non-executive Director, Associated British Foods (ABF)
   Non-executive Director, Candover Investments plc
   Non-executive Director, Valéo SA (car components)
   Non-executive Director, Electricité de France (EDF)
Lord Jopling
   Receives funds from the Common Agricultural Policy
   Member of the UK Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
   Chairman, Committee on the Civilian Dimension of Security
Lord Lamont of Lerwick
   No relevant interests
Lord Radice
   Board member, Policy Network
Lord Teverson (Chairman)
   No relevant interests
Lord Trimble
   Trustee, Henry Jackson Society
Lord Williams of Elvel
No relevant interests

Baroness Young of Hornsey
Worked with VSO in Tanzania
Ambassador for Cotton Made in Africa, an NGO supporting cotton farmers in African countries
Patron of Anti-Slavery International

The following Members of the European Union Select Committee attended the meeting at which the report was approved:

Lord Boswell of Aynho
Lord Carter of Coles
Lord Dear
Baroness Eccles of Moulton DL
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
Lord Hannay of Chiswick
Lord Harrison
Lord Maclennan of Rogart
Lord Marlesford DL
Baroness O’Cathain
Lord Richard
The Earl of Sandwich
Baroness Scott of Needham Market
Lord Teverson
Lord Trimble
Baroness Young of Hornsey

A full list of registered interests of Members of the House of Lords can be found at http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-interests/register-of-lords-interests/
APPENDIX 2: LIST OF WITNESSES

Evidence is published online at www.parliament.uk/hleuc and available for inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (020 7219 5314)

Evidence received by the Committee is listed below in chronological order of oral evidence session and in alphabetical order. Those witnesses marked * gave both oral and written evidence. Those marked with ** gave oral evidence and did not submit any written evidence. All other witnesses submitted written evidence only.

Oral evidence in chronological order

* QQ 1–26 Foreign and Commonwealth Office

** Graham Avery, Senior Member, St. Antony’s College, Oxford University and Senior Adviser, European Policy Centre, Brussels

* QQ 27–53 Edward Burke, University of St Andrews and Associate Researcher, Fundación para las Relaciones Internaciones y el Diálogo Exterior

* Professor Richard G Whitman, Professor of Politics and International Relations and Chair, University Association for Contemporary European Studies, Rutherford College, University of Kent

** QQ 54–78 Open Europe

* David Spence, London School of Economics and Political Science

** QQ 79–97 African Foundation for Development

** QQ 98–110 HE Mrs Asta Skaisgirytė Liauškienė, Lithuanian Ambassador to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

** HE Mr Miroslav Wlachovský, Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

** HE Mr Iztok Jarc, Ambassador of the Republic of Slovenia to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

** QQ 111–123 World Trade Organization

** QQ 124–141 Gary Quince, EU Special Representative to the African Union and EEAS Head of Delegation to the African Union

Sandy Wade, Military Adviser, EEAS Delegation to the African Union

Nicola Bellomo, Political Officer, EEAS Delegation to the African Union

Jean-Francois Hasperue, Political Officer, EEAS Delegation to the African Union

** QQ 142–157 HE Alan Charlton, British Ambassador to Brazil
QQ 158–197  Pierre Vimont, Executive Secretary General, EEAS  
James Morrison, Chef de Cabinet to the High Representative, EEAS  
Patrick Child, Managing Director for Finance and Administration, EEAS

QQ 198–228  Richard Corbett, Cabinet Member in Charge of Inter-Institutional Affairs, Cabinet of President Van Rompuy, European Council  
Pedro Serrano, Principal Adviser on Foreign Affairs, Cabinet of President Van Rompuy, European Council

QQ 229–232  Elmar Brok MEP, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET), European Parliament  
Roberto Gualtieri MEP, AFET, European Parliament  
Arnaud Danjean MEP, Chairman, Security and Defence Sub-Committee (SEDE), AFET, European Parliament  
Véronique De Keyser MEP, AFET, European Parliament  
Tarja Cronberg MEP, AFET, European Parliament  
Sir Graham Watson MEP, AFET, European Parliament  
Dr Charles Tannock MEP, AFET, European Parliament  
Sir Robert Atkins MEP, AFET, European Parliament

QQ 233–260  Nicholas Westcott, Managing Director, Africa, EEAS

QQ 261–278  Rt Hon David Lidington MP, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

** Alphabetical list of all witnesses

Dr Cornelius Adebahr, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik

** African Foundation for Development

Anti-Slavery International

** Graham Avery, Senior Member, St. Antony’s College, Oxford University and Senior Adviser, European Policy Centre, Brussels  
Dr Rosa Balfour, European Policy Centre, Brussels  
Dr Federica Bicchi, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science  
Professor Steven Blockmans, Senior Research Fellow and Head of the EU Foreign Policy Unit, Centre for European Policy Studies and Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance, University of Amsterdam  
Bond  
Brussels & Europe Liberal Democrats

* Edward Burke, University of St. Andrews and Associate Researcher, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior

** HE Alan Charlton, British Ambassador to Brazil  
Department for International Development
Dr Hylke Dijkstra, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford
Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration
The European Centre for Development Policy Management
European Commission
** European Council Secretariat
* European External Action Service
** Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
* Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Global Governance Institute
Professor Elena Korosteleva, Professor of International Politics, School of Politics and International Relations, Rutherford College, University of Kent
** HE Mrs Asta Skaisgirytė Liauškienė, Lithuanian Ambassador to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
** Open Europe
Dr Kristi Raik, Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki
** HE Mr Miroslav Wlachovský, Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
** HE Mr Iztok Jarc, Ambassador of the Republic of Slovenia to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
** Security and Defence Sub-Committee, European Parliament
* David Spence, London School and Economics and Political Science
UK Independence Party
* Professor Richard G Whitman, Professor of Politics and International Relations and Chair, University Association for Contemporary European Studies, Rutherford College, University of Kent
** World Trade Organization
APPENDIX 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE

The EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs of the House of Lords, chaired by Lord Teverson, is conducting an inquiry into the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Sub-Committee seeks evidence from anyone with an interest.

Written evidence is sought by 12 December 2012. Public hearings will be held over the period November 2012–February 2013. The Committee aims to report to the House, with recommendations, in April 2013. The report will receive a response from the Government and may be debated in the House.

The European External Action Service (EEAS), formally launched on 1 January 2011, is one of the most important institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. The launch marked the culmination of a year-long negotiation between the EU institutions following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The function of the EEAS is to assist the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HRVP), currently Baroness Ashton, in performing her duties which include representing the Union for matters relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), conducting political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and expressing the Union’s position in international organisations and international conferences.

In 2013 the High Representative will review the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. This inquiry aims to influence the debate on the EEAS.

The Sub-Committee seeks evidence on any aspect of this topic, and particularly on the following questions:

1. What are the main achievements of the EEAS since its establishment? Where has it been less successful?
2. How well does the EEAS meet the objectives set out for it in the Lisbon Treaty and the Council Decision? Has the High Representative/Vice President fulfilled her mandate and the Council Decision for setting up the EEAS? What remains to be done?
3. How effective has the EEAS been in communicating and promoting the EU’s policies and values? Has it implemented Council CSFP and CSDP Decisions effectively?
4. Has the creation of the EEAS led to a more coherent and integrated EU foreign policy?
5. Has the EEAS been effective in its response to crises?
6. How does the balance of responsibilities between the EEAS and the Commission work out in the development area? Has the creation of the EEAS improved the implementation of the EU’s development policy?
7. How well does the relationship between the EEAS and the Commission work in the trade area? Does the EEAS have a role to play in EU trade policy and its implementation?
8. How well does the EEAS work as an institution?
9. How well has the objective of a geographically and gender balanced staff been met? How well has the objective been met of one third of staff from the diplomatic services of the Member States by mid 2013, a third from the Council Secretariat and a third from the Commission? Have staff
been adequately trained to perform the diplomatic role? If not, what are the omissions?

(10) Is the EEAS budget sufficient to meet its objectives? Are there any areas where the EEAS could make savings?

(11) In what ways has the financial and economic crisis within Member States affected organisation and activity of the EEAS?

(12) Has the EU created the right number and distribution of Delegations around the world?

(13) How well do the relationships with the Foreign Ministries of the EU Member States work and how well do EU Delegations cooperate with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States?

(14) Has the Foreign and Commonwealth Office responded effectively to the establishment of the EEAS? Has the UK been able to second high level candidates to important positions within the EEAS? Has it also seconded a representative number to more junior positions?

(15) Have the Foreign Services of other Member States all responded with their best candidates for EEAS posts?

(16) What should the EEAS need to do over the next three years and what should it prioritise? How can it maximise the influence of Member States and the EU in the future? On which areas should the 2013 review focus?
## APPENDIX 4: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Administrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFET</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFFORD</td>
<td>African Foundation for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASI</td>
<td>Anti Slavery International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELD</td>
<td>Brussels and Europe Liberal Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management Planning Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives in Brussels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>Development Directorate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGAP</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDPM</td>
<td>European Centre for Development Policy Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLO</td>
<td>European Peacebuilding Liaison Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRIDE</td>
<td>Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative/Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSE</td>
<td>London School of Economics and Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCD</td>
<td>Policy Coherence for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDE</td>
<td>Security and Defence Sub-Committee of the Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNE</td>
<td>Seconded National Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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## Appendix 5: EEAS Monthly Salary Table (Including the EU's External Action Service)

### Dependent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Sickness</th>
<th>Accident</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Contributions</th>
<th>Pensions</th>
<th>Social Security</th>
<th>Invalidity</th>
<th>Maternity</th>
<th>Childcare</th>
<th>Car</th>
<th>Life</th>
<th>Travel</th>
<th>Subsidy</th>
<th>Dependents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>213.10</td>
<td>97.60</td>
<td>151.20</td>
<td>123.10</td>
<td>264.04</td>
<td>69.66</td>
<td>124.06</td>
<td>124.06</td>
<td>125.20</td>
<td>125.20</td>
<td>127.13</td>
<td>127.13</td>
<td>127.13</td>
<td>127.13</td>
<td>127.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>203.53</td>
<td>96.22</td>
<td>147.31</td>
<td>123.10</td>
<td>264.04</td>
<td>69.66</td>
<td>124.06</td>
<td>124.06</td>
<td>125.20</td>
<td>125.20</td>
<td>127.13</td>
<td>127.13</td>
<td>127.13</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sickness and Accident Benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent</th>
<th>Sickness</th>
<th>Accident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>310.40</td>
<td>43.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>307.00</td>
<td>43.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>301.99</td>
<td>43.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>295.20</td>
<td>43.04</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Allowances and Deductions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Allowances</th>
<th>Deductions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>127.50</td>
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</tr>
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Source: The Foreign and Commonwealth Office submitted the table as supplementary written evidence. It was provided to them by the European External Action Service.