House of Lords - The EU's External Action Service

The EU's External Action Service - European Union Committee Contents

Chapter 2: The new organisation

Setting up the EEAS

10. The EEAS was established outside the normal EU institutions. In Treaty terms, it does not have the same formal status as an EU institution such as the Commission, the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament.[10] However, it does have a clear and well established legal basis, as it is referred to in a provision introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, further amplified by a Council Decision.[11] It is treated in every respect as if it were an institution. According to Patrick Child (Managing Director for Finance and Administration, EEAS), this meant that its staff were governed by the same principles and loyalties as any other EU officials working for any of the other institutions.[12] Professor Richard Whitman (University of Kent) thought that the free-floating position within the EU institutional architecture gave the EEAS a distinctive voice on foreign policy issues, though it presented a challenge by reopening dividing lines between those running different areas of the EU's external policy.[13] He commented that the timing of the Arab Spring had been unlucky for the EEAS, as it had faced a new political test while it was still a young institution.[14]

11. We heard from witnesses that problems had arisen because of the lack of clarity in the Lisbon Treaty's provisions for the EEAS, compounded by the absence of a clear view among the EU's Member States about what they wanted the Service to do.[15] Professor Whitman likened the "formidable task" given to Baroness Ashton of setting up the EEAS to constructing a piece of self-assembly furniture without knowing what was to be constructed and without instructions.[16] Elmar Brok MEP (Chairman of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, AFET) told us that the EEAS, and the post of HR/VP, had been aimed at achieving synergy and saving money, but that Member States themselves needed to develop greater political will so that decision-making and implementation of decisions could be expedited.[17]

12. A number of witnesses emphasised that the EEAS was still a young institution[18] and, in its first two years, attention had inevitably focussed on establishing its structure and institutions.[19] Hugo Shorter (Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Head of Europe Directorate-External) believed that, while the EEAS was not perfect, it had been established effectively to undertake the tasks it had been set and was now focussing on key foreign policy issues, rather than managerial matters.[20] David Spence (London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE) thought that the setting up of the EEAS had been a slow process, but that matters were now improving.[21] The EEAS told us that the Service was still a work in progress, and that the creation of a corporate culture took time. More time was also needed for the EEAS "to reach full cruising speed" and for cooperation with Member States and other EU institutions to be consolidated. The EEAS had set up coordination arrangements and structures but also depended on the "political commitment and consensus between Member States and other institutional stakeholders." The EEAS had worked on communicating the EU's policies and values through communiqus and meetings and through the work of its Strategic Communications Division.[22]

13. We recognise that the EEAS is still a young Service. In its first two years the EEAS had to create a new service and structure in order to become fully operational, but it should now put that period behind it and focus on delivering results. This is extremely important, since it is essential that the EEAS delivers added value to the EU's external action. There were differences of view amongst our witnesses on the extent to which the EEAS had done so up until now.

14. The EEAS should not, however, seek to project its own foreign policy. The Common and Foreign Security Policy should remain under the control of the Member States.

The High Representative role

15. We heard that there were advantages to combining the three roles of High Representative, Commission Vice-President, and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council in one person. There was now a single interlocutor for third countries, who in the past had not always been sure which of the posts was responsible for what.[23] Edward Burke (University of St Andrews and the Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, FRIDE) thought that it created opportunities for integrating the institutions.[24] For David Spence, the new post meant that the HR/VP was closer to the basis of EU financial power through her relations with Member States. In her role as Vice-President of the Commission, she had Commission staff who reported directly to her and she was in a position to be well informed on a wide range of subjects, such as climate change and development and humanitarian aid. Professional expertise through the various departments was available in a way that had not been possible for her predecessor.[25]

16. Edward Burke believed that, in some areas of the EU's external relations, the HR/VP had less power than that enjoyed by the former Commissioner for external relations; some assets had been retained by the Commission, for example the international climate negotiation unit. Currently, the influence of the HR/VP and the EEAS on the Commission on foreign policy matters was based more on collegial cooperation than executive authority. He suggested that the Commission Vice-President side of the HR/VP post should be strengthened to increase the post holder's ability to handle subjects in the Commission area of the portfolio and avoid delays in the implementation in foreign policy. The problem was compounded by the fact that meetings of the group of external relations commissioners had been less frequent since the establishment of the EEAS.[26] Elmar Brok MEP also believed that the HR/VP should "draw more upon her role as Vice-President of the Commission."[27]

17. We heard praise from witnesses for the way in which Baroness Ashton had fulfilled the post. The Minister for Europe, the Rt Hon David Lidington MP, thought that "a fair amount of credit from a British perspective is due for the way in which Baroness Ashton has conducted herself in the office." She had seen her role as being "the public voice and central coordinator of unanimously agreed foreign policy positions."[28] Hugo Shorter thought that she had, on the whole, "navigated a sensible path through the competing interests of 27 Member States and different EU institutions".[29] For Graham Avery (St. Antony's College, Oxford University), the existence of three leading roles—the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the HR/VP—created the potential for friction, which had thus far been avoided because of the personalities involved.[30] Mats Persson (Open Europe) thought that Baroness Ashton had managed to balance her role carefully between doing too much (and becoming an EU Foreign Minister) and too little (reducing her role to that of her predecessor) and that the role now had a higher profile than that of the former Council High Representative.[31]

18. We also heard some criticism of the way in which the role had been performed. Ambassador Aska Skaisgiryt Liauskien (Lithuanian Ambassador to the UK) looked for a stronger lead from the HR/VP in setting priorities, giving strategic direction, streamlining the political dialogue with international partners and building a record of policy success.[32] Arnaud Danjean MEP (Chairman of the European Parliament's Sub-Committee on Security and Defence, SEDE) also thought that the HR/VP, as well as the Member States, could play a greater leadership role, taking ownership of some initiatives. He maintained that Javier Solana had had fewer powers, prerogatives and staff and less money but had taken initiatives, regardless of what the Member States thought. Véronique de Keyser MEP agreed that Javier Solana had had a greater political profile than Baroness Ashton, who, in her view, had been a good diplomat, rather than a politician.[33] Dr Hylke Dijkstra (Oxford University) described the performance of the HR/VP as "underwhelming," and believed that she should "try to get ahead of the Member States by taking initiatives and by showing leadership."[34]

19. We agree that the triple-hatted High Representative/Vice-President position brings many advantages for the coherence of the EU's external relations. However, it does also bring a number of problems which make it difficult for the incumbent to undertake the role effectively.

THE DEPUTIES QUESTION

20. A number of witnesses commented that the HR/VP was overloaded, especially in view of the travel involved, and raised the question of deputies. David Spence said that there had been no proper study of the requirements of the job.[35] Ambassador Miroslav Wlachovsky (Slovakian Ambassador to the UK) told us that his government believed that it would be an advantage for the HR/VP to have a deputy as she "cannot be in two or three places at once."[36] Graham Avery thought that deputies were needed as the work of chairing of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) in particular, detracted from the HR/VP's ability to take CFSP initiatives.[37]

21. We asked who currently substituted for the HR/VP when, for example, diary commitments prevented her from attending a meeting. Pierre Vimont (Executive Secretary General, EEAS) told us that the Lisbon Treaty and Council Decision had made no provision for a deputy and no agreement had been reached between the Member States during the original negotiations, and it had been left aside. He reported that when the HR/VP was unable to accept an invitation to speak to the European Parliament she asked a minister from the rotating presidency or a commissioner to replace her. However, appointing a commissioner formally as a deputy would raise sensitivities about status for Member States. The HR/VP could not be substituted by a civil servant, such as himself or another member of the Corporate Board—the Deputy Secretary General/Political Director, Deputy Secretary General, or Chief Operating Officer.[38] Pedro Serrano (Principal Adviser on Foreign Affairs, Cabinet of the President of the European Council) told us that, at high-level bilateral international meetings, the EEAS could sometimes be represented by the EEAS Executive Secretary General, but his ability to intervene would be restricted as the meetings were political.[39] Ambassador Skaisgiryté Liauškiené thought that a deputy at the political level should be considered, although she was clear that the creation of two-tier commissioners, or junior commissioners, should be avoided; the question was "very sensitive" for Lithuania. The status of the deputy should be "very carefully considered." If ministers from Member States were called on to deputise, this should not be at the last minute, as had happened in the case of a Lithuanian minister.[40]

22. Elmar Brok MEP thought that using foreign ministers from the country of the rotating presidency to act as deputies was useful for the political aspects of the HR/VP's work, including speaking to the European Parliament following an FAC. He thought that EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) could also be used (see paragraphs 74-77).[41] Dr Charles Tannock MEP cited the example of a recent European Parliament meeting in Strasbourg when the Irish Minister for Europe had spoken in the foreign affairs debate on Mali, Syria and Iraq. In his view, using the ministers of Member States, or the relevant commissioner, was a model that worked.[42] The Minister for Europe expressed himself as "pretty dubious" about the proposal for deputies: provisions already existed for the HR/VP to appoint deputies to cover meetings if needed.[43]

23. The triple-hatted HR/VP role has led to overload, especially given the inevitable amount of travel involved. We believe that serious consideration should be given to a whole range of possible solutions to this problem during the two year review of the EEAS and when appointments are made to the new Commission and the High Representative post in 2014.

24. The Commission Vice-Presidency role of the High Representative should be used more rigorously to ensure that there is greater liaison between the policies managed by the Commission and those offered by the EEAS, and thereby enhance coherence in the EU's external relations.

The budget

25. The overall aim for the EEAS is that it should be "guided by the principle of cost-efficiency aiming towards budget neutrality."[44]However, in its first two years the EEAS has requested and received an increase in its budget, (see Box 1). The HR/VP has argued that "insufficient provision has been made for the needs of the EEAS as an autonomous body in financial and administrative terms … the Service is struggling to meet even minimum standards in terms of activity based management and financial programming, personnel policy, security and IT." The lack of adequate budgetary provisions was a "structural deficit that will need to be addressed over time."[45]In written evidence the EEAS argued that the baseline budget of 2011 failed to reflect accurately the true operating costs of the EEAS which, in addition, had faced unavoidable start-up costs, including the need to provide sufficient posts for the recruitment of national diplomats to meet the one third target requested by Member States. At the same time new priorities and new delegations had been needed to respond to the Arab Spring.[46] Pierre Vimont explained that, when the EEAS was set up, staff were transferred from the Council and the Commission, but the necessary financial resources had not always been transferred with them. Consequently, even without increasing staff levels, the EEAS had not from the outset had the resources due to it. That had been "one of our main problems."[47]

BOX 1

EEAS Institutional Budget

Council Decision 2010/427 established the EEAS as a sui generis service. Financial Regulation 2010/1081 sets out that the EEAS is to be treated as an institution for the purposes of financial regulation.[48] It has its own budgetary authority and can implement its own administrative spend. The EEAS is to be guided by the "principle of cost efficiency aiming towards budget neutrality."

The Commission has legal primacy over setting the EEAS's institutional budget and management of operational expenditures including operational appropriations implemented by the Heads of Delegations. The HR/VP is the authorising officer for the EEAS budget. The EEAS's institutional funding comes out of the administrative tranche of the EU budget.

Within EU delegations, operational budgets remain the responsibility of the Commission. The Commission is authorised to sub-delegate its powers of budget implementation of operational expenditure to Heads of Delegations. Heads of Delegations are nominated as authorising officers able to sign-off the operational budget. Heads of Delegation are responsible to the Commission for the management of the operational budget but remain responsible to the EEAS for the administrative expenditures. In accordance with the Financial Regulation, Heads of Delegation have to submit an annual activity report as authorising officers of the EEAS budget and, in parallel, an annual report as authorising officers of the funds of the Commission.

The EEAS budget is set annually as part of the general EU budgetary procedure. In setting its budget, the EEAS draws up estimates of its revenue and expenditure, after consulting the relevant Commission departments, and submits it to the Commission before 1 July every year. The Commission draws up the draft budget for the EEAS which may contain different figures to those provided by the EEAS, and also drafts a working document of administrative and operational expenditures and a breakdown of staff posts. This is presented to the budgetary authority (the European Parliament and the Council) for approval.

The budget for the EEAS in 2011 was 464m divided between €184m in headquarters and €280m in delegations. This budget was transferred over from the administrative budgets of the Commission and the Council Secretariat. The Commission's budget was increased by €9.4m in 2010 specifically to pay for 100 extra EEAS posts.[49] For 2012, the EEAS requested, and received, a 5.3% (€27m) increase bringing the budget up to €489m split between €190m for headquarters and €299m for delegations.

For 2013, the budget has been set at €509m, of which €313m will be spent on the delegations and €196 within headquarters.[50]Appropriations for missions and representations, which had been cut in 2012 by 10% and 5% respectively, have been frozen.[51] The EEAS budget represents 0.6% of the total EU administrative budget and 0.4% of the total EU budget.[52]

26. Pierre Vimont explained that financial processes and procedures were complicated. One legal problem for the Commission was that the EEAS was an administration, and not a fully fledged institution of the Union, and therefore did not have the legal status required to deal with the operational and financial resources that it managed. In addition, each service inside the Commission had retained a direct link with its representatives around the world.[53]

27. We enquired where savings could be made to reach the objective of budget neutrality[54] and heard that the EEAS has already made savings of 10% in travel budgets and 5% in representation costs.[55] In written evidence the EEAS told us that the difficult budgetary environment for national diplomatic services had been a stimulus for thinking on cooperation and pooling of resources with Member States, in particular where national authorities were forced to reduce their diplomatic network. This had included sharing of political reporting, mutual support in organising high-level visits and co-location of EU delegations and national embassies. The EEAS was "very open to closer cooperation with Member States, in particular where concentrating resources at EU level can produce considerable net savings in national budgets."[56]

28. We heard that the Lisbon Treaty had charged the EEAS with managing the Council machinery in Brussels and for taking over the tasks of the rotating presidencies in third countries, which had previously been provided and resourced by Member States, whose tasks had consequently been reduced. Two reviews had identified resources for the additional work which could be taken from areas of lower priority or duplication, and a "significant number of posts" had been identified for transfer from headquarters services to work in delegations. A senior management structure corresponding to the needs of the organisation, which was now more autonomous and independent of the Commission and the Council secretariat, had led to an increase of fewer than 10 senior positions.[57] David Spence told us that, in his view, the HR/VP, in refusing to request more money, had "accepted a self-denying ordinance."[58]

29. The UK position has from the outset been that the EEAS should be "budget neutral", as outlined in the Regulation and Council Decision. The Minister for Europe told us that economy and value for money needed to be addressed more energetically, even though the EEAS budget was small in relative terms. It was impossible to justify increases in the EEAS budget when the FCO was cutting back. He particularly criticised the EEAS's increased spending on buildings and associated costs at delegations, in security at the Brussels headquarters and on contract staff.[59] Hugo Shorter added that the UK Government believed that the EEAS's approach to budgetary issues went "beyond the Council Decision wording that it should commit to cost efficiency, aiming towards budget neutrality." The UK had opposed the large budget increases the EEAS had requested for 2012 and thought it should and could achieve its objectives without the increase. The UK had had to accept an increase in the EEAS budget, which had been decided by a qualified majority vote, but the increase had formed part of an overall cut in the EU's administrative spending. The UK had also opposed the 5.7% budget increase which had been requested for 2013.[60]

30. We asked about the level of EEAS salaries and how they compared with equivalent salaries in Member States. Patrick Child told us that the level of salaries was framed by staff regulations, which applied to all EU institutions and which were decided by the Council of Ministers based on proposals from the Commission. Comparison with national services was difficult as salary levels varied between Member States: some former ambassadors from Member States had been disappointed to discover the level of remuneration at the EEAS senior level, compared with their previous packages. He believed that, if the financial and accommodation packages of the average EEAS Head of Delegation or diplomat were compared with the UK system or that of another large Member State, there would not be a significant difference.[61]

31. The Minister for Europe told us that, in general, the staff of EU institutions were "considerably better paid and pay much less tax than their UK civil service equivalents." The 11 EU Special Representatives were funded from the CFSP budget at AD 16 level on the salary scale, but the UK believed that AD 14 would be sufficient.[62] He explained that the EEAS had chosen the high level of remuneration in order to attract influential figures for these positions, though, in reality, most EUSRs were civil servants from the Member States or EU institutions, and only three of the 11 were former ministers. EU staff paid a "Community Tax" and a "Special Levy" on their salaries on a progressive scale. The top rate for the former was 45%, "but the vast majority of staff pay considerably less than this and the lowest grades pay nothing." The Special Levy (up till January 2013, now under renegotiation) was an amount up to 5.5% and was applied on a progressive scale. He said that, in reality "only the top earners paid the full amount, with the average payment nearer to 1.9%."[63] The EEAS took the benchmark for overseas accommodation allowances from those used for staff from international organisations, such as the World Bank, whereas those of Member States were more appropriate.[64] Hugo Shorter told us that the UK was seeking a review of the salaries of EUSRs, which were "extraordinarily high"—many were higher than the UN Secretary-General's salary—but there was no unanimity among Member States on reducing them.[65]

32. Mats Persson opposed any increase in the EEAS budget and thought it should prioritise better, moving resources from back to front office and from expenditure on running costs to achievement on the ground. Some EEAS staff were paid "a ridiculous amount of money" which could be reduced.[66] Dr Charles Tannock MEP also told us that "there is plenty of fat that can be cut."[67] On the other hand, some witnesses felt that the EEAS was being asked to do more than was possible with its allocated budget. Edward Burke said that, if the Service was to remain budget-neutral, its tasks should be reduced.[68] Ambassador Wlachovsk thought the EEAS needed sufficient budgetary support, but care needed to be taken on how that budget was organised, in view of the current austerity conditions.[69]

33. We recognise the problem of setting up a new service and the additional investment that has been required, and that efforts have been made to restrain the budget and abide by the injunction to achieve budget neutrality. However, budget neutrality has not been achieved. We recommend that, while the EU Member States have to observe budgetary restraints, there should be zero real growth in the EEAS budget.

34. We fully agree with the intention of the EEAS to continue cooperation with Member States to identify where resources can be shared to achieve savings in national budgets. The aim should be to provide benefits for all Member States. Achievement in this area should become a key indicator of performance by the EEAS.

35. We have heard evidence that salaries are overgenerous in comparison with Member State diplomatic norms. It is very difficult to substantiate this because of the difficulties of establishing comparable grades, but we recommend that the general principle should be that salaries are broadly comparable with those of the larger Member States for officials in equivalent diplomatic service positions. This is especially important while many Member States face particularly severe budgetary constraints.

36. We recognise that EEAS salaries are based on Commission staff regulations and that, if they are reduced, this may lead to the loss of good staff to other EU institutions, However, the appropriate way to resolve this would be to reduce the higher-level salaries within the institutions across the board, or to recruit a larger proportion of staff from national diplomatic services.

37. The EU, and hence also the EEAS, have a very wide range of potential interests spread across the entire globe. The prioritisation of aims and objectives must be a core part of the review of the EEAS, but it must also take account of the need to adapt to unforeseen circumstances and situations.

The new delegations

LOCATION

38. The EEAS currently has 141 delegations around the world. In some places, such as Geneva and Addis Ababa, where international organisations are located, it has two. The Service employs some 1,922 staff in the Delegations.[70] Other EU offices also exist, such as trade promotion offices in Asia, which are not institutionally part of the administration of the EEAS, but are part of the EU presence and are supervised by the EEAS delegation. A network of assistance offices under the EU's humanitarian wing, ECHO (the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection), cooperate closely with the EEAS delegations but also have direct links with the headquarters Commission services responsible for humanitarian assistance. It was argued that this separation is necessary in order for the EU's humanitarian work to maintain sufficient independence from the EU's political action.[71]

39. The EEAS told us that the broad geographic coverage of the network of delegations reflected the global footprint of the EU and had "strong support from Member States", in particular from those whose national diplomatic resources were more limited.[72] This point was confirmed by the Ambassadors to the UK of Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia[73] (see paragraphs 157 and 158). Pierre Vimont told us that the network was regularly reviewed to take account of the reality of the international scene. Two Delegations had been closed (Suriname and New Caledonia) as new ones had been established. In Libya, a Delegation had been opened in Benghazi, and in Burma the EEAS presence had been upgraded to a full Delegation.[74] In January 2013, the HR/VP also announced the opening of a Delegation in the United Arab Emirates.[75]

40. Professor Whitman thought that the EEAS would not necessarily have chosen to place delegations where they were currently located if it had started with a blank sheet of paper; the system was not wasteful, but duplication existed between the diplomatic infrastructure of Member States and the EU. He wondered whether regional hubs with antennae could be useful.[76] Graham Avery regarded the delegations as the most important part of the EEAS. He believed that the EU's representation was working well, and that the suspicion of some Member States that the delegations would try to usurp the functions of Member States had not materialised.[77]

41. Roberto Gualtieri MEP thought that the delegations were "starting to prove their added value" and to be "the real places where we have a single place for the Union."[78] Mats Persson advocated greater focus on where the EEAS could add value and thought that it should close delegations where it could not. He cited Peru as a post which, in his view, added little value. By contrast the EU had the most leverage in its own neighbourhood, for example in the Balkans, and in countries where democratisation was underway, such as in Burma.[79] The Minister for Europe did not necessarily see the political need for large-scale EU-level representation in the Caribbean and South Pacific.[80] Nigel Farage MEP (UK Independence Party) thought that the size and cost of the delegations was unjustified and that their number constituted "outrageous profligacy" at a time when the UK Government had needed to curtail its diplomatic staff.[81]

OPERATION AND ROLES

42. As case studies, the Committee considered two of the 141 delegations in detail. Due to time constraints, we were not able to visit delegations on the ground, and therefore sought evidence via video-conference.

43. First, we spoke to Gary Quince (Head of the EEAS Delegation to the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa (see Box 2) and EU Special Representative to the AU). He said that the working relationship between the Delegation and the AU, which he visited several times a week, was close. The Delegation had an input into the early stages of the AU's thinking on the development of policies and operations, including assisting the AU with military, political input and financial support as they developed their campaign against the Lord's Resistance Army.[82] His Delegation also offered support to individual Member States who were not represented to the AU on the ground in Addis Ababa. He had also assisted the Ambassador of Croatia (a candidate state) on logistics and by arranging appointments for his recent visit.[83]

Box 2

EU Delegation to the African Union, Addis Ababa

The EU Delegation to the African Union is one of two EEAS Delegations in Addis Ababa; the other is the Delegation to Ethiopia. The Delegation to the AU was set up in January 2008, pre-dating the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the EEAS, and following the Africa/EU summit in December 2007, which set up the EU/Africa Partnership and the joint EU/Africa Strategy.[84] Following the Lisbon Treaty the Delegation became part of the EEAS. The AU is one of only eight non-state entities to which the EEAS sends a permanent Delegation. Along with the United States, the EU is the only body with a specific Delegation to the African Union.

Gary Quince is the current Head of Delegation and combines the role with that of European Union Special Representative to the AU. He is also accredited to the UN Economic Commission for Africa.[85] The Delegation currently has 43 staff,[86] divided between the EEAS (16 staff), EUSR (13) and the Commission (15). This includes support staff recruited locally. The administrative budget is €1.3 million and the EUSR budget is €680,000.[87]

The purpose of the Delegation is to support the EU's efforts to build a peaceful, democratic and prosperous Africa. This involves promoting peace and security; human rights and governance; sustainable growth, regional integration and trade; and investment in education, health and food security. The Commission staff manage the Delegation's development cooperation and the financial support given to the AU.[88]

44. Second, we spoke to the UK Ambassador to Brazil, Alan Charlton, to seek his views on how the EEAS Delegation in that country handled relations with Brazil, one of the EU's strategic partners.[89] He told us that the establishment of the EEAS had increased the level of interaction between Brazil and the EU. The EEAS organised annual summits with the Brazilians. The 2013 summit would be attended by the Brazilian President and the Presidents of the European Council and of the Commission, which illustrated how seriously Brazil took its relationship with the EU. The HR/VP had visited Brazil, as had other commissioners dealing with key areas, such as human rights, energy and climate change. The Brazilians had recently appointed a senior ambassador to the EU, which was a further sign of strengthening relations.[90] The Ambassador said that the EEAS might wish to be more active in ensuring that the Brazilians understood action which the EU was taking on key political issues, such as Iran. It also played a role in ensuring that correct information was communicated on the eurozone crisis. At a personal level, he did not, however, currently "see [the EEAS] as being central to my daily life."[91]

45. The Ambassador thought it was too early to say for certain whether the EEAS would make a significant difference to the coherence of the EU's policy in Brazil, but so far it had not. Locating the trade and political officers together in the Delegation had helped, but officials dealing with trade work still reported to the Commission, as this was a Commission competence, rather than to the EEAS. The EEAS needed to ensure that it focussed on the right things, and the review was the opportunity to ensure this. He hoped that improved coherence would lead to greater effectiveness and efficiency over time.[92]

Box 3

EEAS Delegation to Brazil

Brazil has been one of the EU's strategic partners since 2007, with the adoption of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership.

The Delegation, which is based in Brasilia, organises annual EU-Brazil summits to discuss a range of issues, and in recent years over 20 bilateral dialogues have been initiated, in areas as varied as climate change, financial services, science and technology, human rights and education. The 5th EU-Brazil Summit in October 2011 agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation and dialogues, establishing a new common plan of action for the next three years.[93] The latest summit took place in Brasilia in January 2013.

The current Head of Delegation is Ana Paula Zacarias. There are currently 47 members of staff within the Delegation, of whom 17 are EEAS officials and 30 are Commission staff.

The Delegation's mandate includes promoting political and economic relations between the EU and Brazil; monitoring the implementation of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership; keeping the Brazilian public informed about the EU and defending specific EU polices; and participating in the implementation of the EU's assistance programmes.

46. The EEAS delegations have taken over from the rotating presidencies the coordination of the activities of Member States in third countries, and the chairmanship of the meetings of national representatives in those countries. Pierre Vimont said that the EEAS Delegation in Washington had become the natural focal point for coordination for the 27 different missions; the American administration preferred to give one briefing for all 27 rather than separate briefings for each. For Member States, the EEAS delegations facilitated and gave more weight to their joint démarches.[94] Gary Quince also stressed the importance of his Delegation's coordination and chairmanship roles. He sent reports compiled by his Delegation to all of the EEAS delegations in Africa, and copied the relevant ones to the Member State embassies in Addis Ababa.[95]

COST SAVINGS AND CO-LOCATION

47. We asked about the opportunities for saving costs by joint working with Member State embassies. Pierre Vimont said that, in the face of the financial and budgetary crisis, most Member States were interested in working together to reduce costs. He cited the situation in Japan where the Member States' embassies had accepted the EEAS Delegation's proposal to produce only one daily press review for all 27 to save costs. Other joint working was under consideration, for example on translation, hotels and accommodation.[96]

48. We asked about other opportunities for savings by co-locating EEAS delegations with those of Member States, or sharing work. Nicholas Westcott (Managing Director, Africa, EEAS) told us that co-location took place in a number of places in Africa, for example in Juba, South Sudan and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where it had been a success. Efforts were being made to extend this practice, in Ghana and in Abuja, Nigeria, where the EEAS shared a compound with two Member States, enabling them to share basic facilities and large conference rooms.[97] Gary Quince said that the two Delegations in Addis Ababa—to Ethiopia and to the AU—were examining the possibilities for co-locating in order to share and thus reduce common costs and staffing. Currently only IT and staff for informatics services and security were shared because of the physical distance between the two Delegations.[98]

49. The Minister for Europe also favoured co-location and cited two examples. The Spanish had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the EEAS to establish an embassy inside the EU Delegation in Yemen, for which the EEAS would charge Spain. A Luxembourg mission was to be allowed within the EU Delegation to Ethiopia. A system already existed whereby the nationals of unrepresented Member States could obtain help from the mission of another Member State present in the country.[99] David Spence described the model of the Belgian-run Schengen House in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Schengen visas were jointly processed for the EU countries (and four non-Member States) participating in the Schengen border scheme.[100]

MANAGEMENT AND BUDGETS

50. We were told that line management and budget-handling in the delegations were shared between EEAS and Commission, and that this caused difficulties about who managed the budgets and who should send instructions to whom.[101] Patrick Child explained that in the EEAS delegations there were "dual financial circuits." Heads of Delegation were responsible in two ways for expenditure in the delegation. They were responsible for the administrative budget of their delegations, for which they were accountable to the HR/VP. Where they were sub-delegated as authorising officers, they also had specific responsibilities for the management and supervision of external assistance programmes, for which they were accountable to the Commission, which remained ultimately responsible for that spending.[102]

51. Under the staff regulations and financial regulation, the Head of Delegation has authority over administrative and operational expenditure (provided he or she has sub-delegated budgetary authority), and to instruct Commission staff in delegations and to convene meetings, (though the Commission has legal responsibility for the funds).[103] Pierre Vimont told us that, as was the case for bilateral ambassadors, the Heads of Delegation struggled to control the group of people in the delegation who retained a direct link with different services inside the Commission.[104] Performance appraisals of Commission officials are signed off by the Commission in Brussels, although the information in the reports comes from the Head of Delegation.[105] Gary Quince told us that he was the line manager for everyone who worked in his Delegation; they all operated under his responsibility, whether they were EEAS, Commission or EUSR officials. However, he was not the reporting officer for the Commission staff.[106] Professor Steven Blockmans (Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and University of Amsterdam) thought that the split between the EEAS and Commission staff in the delegations should be overcome by strengthening the authority of the Heads of Delegation, and allowing them to delegate more responsibilities, simplifying reporting lines and ending the "separation of financial circuits."[107]

52. Professor Elena Korosteleva (University of Kent) has studied Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, three of the Eastern Partnership[108] countries. She had observed that the EEAS could be beneficial both as a global force and for overcoming divisions in government and institutions, but thought that a number of management problems needed to be addressed to achieve coherence and continuity in competences at the lower levels of the EEAS, especially in delegations. She also advocated a clearer delineation of roles and responsibilities in relation to Member States and efforts to engage with host countries. Structural reform was needed to replace divided structures, loyalties and competences by "collective service to the common good."[109]

53. In the vast majority of cases delegations have been inherited from the previous system of Commission representations. The location of delegations should not be driven by history but be subject to regular and rigorous review to assess their current usefulness for the EU's overall priorities, leading, if necessary, to closures.

54. Member States differ in their preferences for delegations, but they should take responsibility for the collective decision on their location. Where a delegation closure is decided, a lead Member State with an Embassy or High Commission in the third country should provide a focus for EU work, if necessary with supplementary personnel and funding resources from the EU. Clearly, this should be at a significantly lower cost.

55. We consider that Commission business such as trade and development can benefit from being set in a political context, which can be provided by the EEAS. However, in cases where a delegation's work is limited to these issues, we do not believe that there is a need to establish or continue a resident EEAS presence. Trade or development offices should be used instead, and political reporting should be handled by a mix of visiting EEAS political officers, connected to the relevant desk in Brussels, and a lead Member State in the area.

56. There are already instances where Member States share diplomatic premises in third countries with each other or with the EEAS. The HR/VP should look in the review at how this practice could be taken further for mutual benefit. Where two EEAS delegations exist, they should be amalgamated as soon as is feasible.

57. In countries where there are no EEAS delegations, the coordination role they perform for information exchange and crisis management should continue to be undertaken by the Member State holding the rotating presidency or, in their absence, by a nominated Member State appropriate to that location. This would place an additional resource burden on larger Member States, for which they should receive financial compensation from the EEAS.

58. Reporting lines from the delegations are complex, with Commission staff working in the delegations reporting both to the Commission and to the Head of the EEAS Delegation. Appraisals for Commission staff in delegations are currently written in Brussels. The Head of Delegation must have responsibility for appraising Commission staff within the mission and reporting lines should be clear.

59. The budget arrangements in delegations are complicated, as separate accounts are prepared for EEAS and Commission expenditure. There should be one set of budgets and accounts for delegations, with the potential for saving on accounting and administrative expenditure. The Heads of Delegation should have complete authority, including management and accounting responsibilities, over all internal and external expenditure, with one set of accounts reported to the EEAS.

CONSULAR SERVICES

60. We found that one of the areas of greatest difference between Member States concerned the role of the EEAS in consular assistance in third countries. Since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, an EU citizen has been entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, with the service being undertaken by another Member State embassy if the Member State has no local representation.[110] The EEAS does not currently provide consular services to EU citizens, although the Council Decision[111] allows the EEAS to support the Member States in providing consular "protection". Ambassador Iztok Jarc (Slovenian Ambassador to the UK) told us that Slovenia would like EEAS delegations to have a consular role because, for citizens, consular work was visible and important.[112] The Ambassadors of Lithuania and Slovakia agreed that this should be an EU function.[113] Ambassador Skaisgiryté Liauškiené explained that, under the current system, countries without representation on the ground asked another country to represent them, as a favour. If the role was undertaken by the EU, it was no longer a favour: "we are all contributing … We provide the EEAS with our diplomats and our budgets—so please give something back."[114]

61. Hugo Shorter told us that the UK opposed the proposal; apart from giving consular assistance in crises, the EU did not have the relevant expertise.[115] The Minister for Europe was also clear that the role of the EEAS was to supplement and coordinate the activity of Member States; the HR/VP had said that it would be difficult to achieve on a resource-neutral basis; and logistically, it would be difficult to act for some Member States and not others.[116] David Spence suggested, as a possible solution, that consular assistance could take the form of an agency, from which the larger states could also benefit if they so wished.[117]

62. Pierre Vimont told us that the EEAS was approaching the issue of consular services cautiously: the EEAS had no expertise on the issues and no competence to undertake the legal acts involved. If Member States asked for the service, the possible consequences could be studied; the EEAS would need the necessary financial and human resources, and agreement from all 27 Member States, before any action could be taken. In his view, assistance would need to be limited to individual citizens from unrepresented countries, and to crisis management, where coordination and a focal point were needed. This had happened naturally, for example, after the tsunami in Japan where the EEAS Delegation had calmed the situation by organising meetings and coordinating the action of European embassies.[118]

63. Our evidence shows that many smaller Member States would find a consular role for EEAS delegations particularly useful. This has a number of implications, not least cost, as there is currently no such expertise in the delegations. The review should seriously consider the possibility of the EEAS operating in this area for States which wish to delegate some consular functions to the EEAS. However, those Member States which wish to be assisted in this way should meet the costs individually or collectively of setting up and operating the service.

Staffing

64. A number of witnesses told us about early problems involved in bringing together the three new staffing components prescribed in the Council Decision: Commission staff, Council personnel and diplomats on secondment from Member States, in particular relations between Commission and EEAS staff.[119] In February 2013, the EEAS had 3,400 staff, divided into Brussels staff (1,478) and delegation staff (1,922, including 1,100 local agents). The delegations also comprise Commission personnel (3,514) in addition to the 1,922 EEAS staff, making 5,436 staff in the delegations altogether. Some 28% of the EEAS come from national diplomatic services (around 26% in headquarters and 40% in the delegations).[120] Graham Avery said that Commission officials who had entered the EEAS suffered from confusion, lack of prospects and low morale, which had been a handicap to the development of a collective identity in the new organisation. He attributed this, however, to teething problems.[121]David Spence also maintained that no-one had planned how to ensure that officials from different backgrounds worked together to produce an esprit de corps.[122]

65. We asked about the impact of bringing Member State diplomats into the Service, in particular to those delegations where the main work was handled by the Commission. Gary Quince told us that in Addis Ababa the integration of Member States' diplomats had been seamless and had enriched and added value to the Delegation.[123] Graham Avery pointed out, however, that the Commission officials in the new Service were not diplomats and that some of them had been disappointed that senior posts were going to diplomats from Member States, and had therefore left the Service.[124]

66. We asked about the quality of staffing. Hugo Shorter told us that competition for posts in the EEAS was stiff as it was seen as an interesting organisation to join. UK candidates were sometimes in competition with more senior candidates from other Member State diplomatic services. The selection process was rigorous and based on merit and those chosen were "up to expectation".[125] Alan Charlton said that, in his view, officials working on trade in the Delegation in Brasilia were "pretty impressive", though this had not changed since the establishment of the EEAS.[126] Ambassador Skaisgiryté Liauškiené told us that the Lithuanians had some 20 officials working in the EEAS, which was satisfactory, though the number of seconded diplomats was fewer, the majority of them being in the divisions dealing with the eastern neighbourhood where they could add value to policy development.[127] Dr Simon Duke (European Institute of Public Administration) commented that all the Member States except Cyprus were now represented at Head or Deputy Head of Delegation level.[128] The Minister for Europe suggested that greater flexibility would benefit the EEAS, by moving people, abolishing posts, making poor performers redundant and recruiting outsiders mid-career.[129]

67. A number of witnesses suggested that more training of EEAS officials was needed. Pedro Serrano pointed out that diplomats from Member States had to learn about the EU, and that working for the EU was different from representing one's own national government. Personnel with Commission backgrounds, on the other hand, needed a better understanding of diplomacy and the intergovernmental aspect of the EU's CFSP. Both were needed.[130] Edward Burke believed that the individual institutions which had been brought together in the EEAS had not changed their mindsets or skills. Commission personnel had been "re-hatted" without the appropriate training, for example in languages.[131]

68. The need for training was echoed by Professor Whitman. He said that the EEAS had no training strategy and training tended to focus on the AD (administrative) staff, but that locally employed agents, who constituted a third of the staff in delegations, also needed training, though in different areas. Their jobs had also changed fundamentally. He identified languages and regional competences as "crucial issues" in training.[132] Dr Duke told us that some training was already offered, but the budget was small and had been reduced. He suggested that E-learning and blended learning could be used for distant delegations.[133]

69. We investigated whether Member States were prepared to release their best candidates and whether they facilitated their diplomats' return to their service of origin. Edward Burke questioned whether Member States would be willing to spare their more specialised diplomats, for example Mandarin or Arabic speakers.[134] Pierre Vimont told us that it was too early to see how the return of diplomats to their national diplomatic services was working, but that most of the secretaries general of Member States had told him that the EEAS had some of their best diplomats and wished them to return because of the experience gained.[135] Ambassador Jarc acknowledged that diplomats returning to Slovenia would contribute their broader knowledge and experience to the national service.[136] Ambassador Wlachovsky´ raised the problem of the possible brain drain from the national diplomatic services if the initial four-year secondment was renewed for an additional four years.[137] Conversely, GGI commented that Member States seconded high quality staff to AD posts, but the EU lost the institutional memory when they returned to national diplomatic services.[138]

70. Alan Charlton told us that it was important for the EEAS to recruit "the right kind of people and to ensure good succession planning." In Brasilia there had been a gap on human rights work in the EEAS Delegation: the EEAS should ensure that it was "getting the right people and not suffering from gaps in key positions." The human resource side was important to ensure that the EEAS functioned successfully in future.[139] Edward Burke believed that a long-term diplomatic capability should be developed, rather than reliance on secondments from foreign ministries whose budgets were being cut and who might be unwilling to give up resources to the EEAS.[140] By contrast, Dr Duke suggested that the use of Seconded National Experts (SNE) should be considered, as these were paid for by Member States and were cost-free to the EEAS. In written evidence, the European Policy Centre suggested that members of the EEAS might be rotated to Member State foreign ministries, and not just vice versa.[141]

71. There is still work to be done in uniting the three staff components from the Council Secretariat, Commission and Member State diplomatic services. Heads of Delegation need to pay continued attention to the development of a corporate spirit in their delegations.

72. We recommend that greater attention should be given to the planning and delivery of training for EEAS staff, including in the operations of the EU for staff from national diplomatic services, in political work for those coming from the Commission, and in languages where relevant. In particular, the EEAS needs more Arabic speakers if it is to capitalise on the consequences of the Arab Spring. A larger training budget will probably be required, which should be financed from savings elsewhere within the EEAS.

73. We strongly agree with the idea of seconding EEAS staff into Member State ministries. A two-way flow would be healthy and help to achieve the cohesion in the EEAS.

Special Representatives

74. The HR/VP recommends the names of EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) for approval by the Council. The EUSRs report directly to her but are outside the EEAS institutional structure. Their appointments are approved directly by the Council. There are currently 10 EUSRs, for Afghanistan, the African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, Kosovo, the Middle East Peace Process, the South Caucasus and Georgia, the Southern Mediterranean Region and Sudan. Four EUSRs are double-hatted as Heads of Delegation: to the AU, in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.[142] The Committee is familiar with the work of the EUSRs from its scrutiny of their appointments and mandates.

75. Gary Quince, double-hatted as EUSR for the AU and Head of EEAS Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa, told us that more weight was given by the AU to his role as EUSR than to the Head of Delegation role and it was important that he was seen to be appointed by the Council as well as by the EEAS. His responsibilities covered peace and security, human rights and governance, sustainable growth, regional integration and trade and investment in people, and he also worked with other African multilateral institutions.[143] Dr Cornelius Adebahr (Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Ausw?rtige Politik, DGAP) considered that the EUSRs constituted "an established and successful instrument of European foreign policy". However, he argued that they needed to be better integrated into the new structures.[144] Edward Burke argued that the fact that the EUSRs reported to the High Representative, but did not fall within the EEAS, had led to parallel lines of reporting and confusion about who was in charge.[145]

76. The EU's Special Representatives in general fulfil a productive and effective role. They play a particularly important part where the issues involved are cross-border, regional or thematic. They should, however, be more fully integrated into the EEAS structure and their salaries rigorously reviewed (see our earlier recommendation).

77. The relationship between the EU Special Representatives and the Heads of Delegation should be clarified, as should the chain of command of the Special Representatives.

Accountability and relations with Parliaments

78. Heads of Delegation appointed by the HR/VP are expected to appear at the European Parliament to make statements and answer questions on their work.[146] In addition, the HR/VP is required to submit an annual report on EEAS staff and a working document on the budget to the European Parliament. In 2011 she also had to submit a report on other areas.[147] Graham Avery told us that, in some ways. this went further than the oversight that the UK Parliament had of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He believed that it was important that Baroness Ashton had ensured that the EEAS had good relations with the EP.[148] Dr Charles Tannock MEP pointed out that the EP's AFET Committee had also acquired superior powers to almost all Member State parliaments because "confirmation hearings"[149] were required for all EUSRs, and most of the Head of Delegation diplomatic appointments.[150] Elmar Brok MEP pointed out that the EP did not want to run foreign policy, which was an executive responsibility, but it did want the right of parliamentary control, which included "the final weapon, the budget weapon" and ratification of the EU's international agreements.[151] Edward Burke thought that it was to their credit that the HR/VP and senior EEAS officials had spent "a considerable amount of time" briefing Member State parliamentarians, as envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty, though the meetings tended to be formulaic.[152]

79. Mats Persson told us that the best way to ensure accountability was the presence in the EEAS of diplomats seconded from Member States. He also thought that the Service should have links to Member States' parliaments and specifically their foreign affairs committees. Member States had the responsibility to ensure that they engaged at a parliamentary level with EEAS officials. He did not think that the European Parliament was the most effective democratic scrutiniser of the EEAS.[153] Mr Persson did not believe that the EEAS had ever exceeded its mandate in taking a unilateral initiative, although the Commission had done so. He saw the EEAS as a counter-force to "constant attempts" by the Commission to increase its power. If the Member States were divided on an issue, "the EEAS is pushed aside", as had happened over Libya and Syria.[154] Edward Burke suggested that a greater number of EEAS reports should be made available to national parliaments, as a systematic exchange of information was desirable and feasible. The EEAS could more routinely send unclassified versions of mission and delegation reports to the responsible parliamentary committee in each Member State.[155]

80. Dr Federica Bicchi (London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE) listed four forms of accountability: first, to the European Parliament and national parliaments, where there had been an improvement over the previous pre-Lisbon Treaty situation. This varied according to the different degrees of national parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, and their parliamentary procedures. Second, to its equivalent foreign affairs ministries in the 27 Member States, which monitored the EEAS, and where relations had also improved. Third, accountability to experts (whose attention had, however, been diverted by the euro area crisis) and lastly, to the general public.[156]

81. David Spence pointed to a further form of accountability: the "usual channels" remained, through which Member States could express their views in formulating policy—the Committee of Permanent Representatives in Brussels (COREPER); the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the working groups. Mr Spence was clear that the EEAS "cannot and should not make policy." He was not aware of any example of EEAS or Commission officials exceeding their mandates.[157] He thought that making the EEAS accountable to national legislatures would be "a recipe for permanent paralysis." The European Parliament and its committees supervised the EEAS's budget, although he considered that this could be done better. If national parliaments wished to be involved, it would be better done via contacts with the European Parliament.[158]

82. We asked whether the Heads of Delegations would be expected to report to the Council. Pierre Vimont told us that the ambassadors on the Political and Security Committee could ask a Head of Delegation to report to them orally. The European Parliament was also eager to hear visiting Delegation Heads. EEAS delegations would pass written reports to the EEAS headquarters, which would then forward them to Member States.[159]

83. The HR/VP submits an annual report to the European Parliament on the EEAS staffing and budget. Given the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, she should also submit it formally to national parliaments.

84. The EEAS should be required to respond to national parliaments if they raise matters following submission of the report. As it is clearly impractical for the HR/VP to attend each Member State parliament or chamber, a suitable cost and resource effective method needs to be found to achieve this.

85. This re-balancing is particularly important as currently the European Parliament has far more influence over the HR/VP and the EEAS due to its ability to control budgets, scrutinise activity directly, and call them to account. The scrutiny role of the European Parliament should not go beyond its current level, as foreign policy is primarily inter-governmental and scrutiny should therefore be performed at the national parliamentary level.

10 Article 13, TEU, Council Decision 2010/427, preamble 1, Financial Regulation 2010/1081, preamble 2. Back

11 Article 27, TEU; and Council Decision 2010/427, respectively. Back

12 Q 176 Back

13 Q 27 Back

14 Q 29 Back

15 Professor Whitman Q 32 and written evidence, also Graham Avery, LSE Q 2, Dr Hylke Dijkstra, Oxford University paragraphs 6, 8, EPC paragraph 1 Back

16 Q 29 Back

17 Q 229 Back

18 Arnaud Danjean MEP Q 231, Sir Graham Watson MEP Q 231, Dr Charles Tannock MEP Q 231, Sir Robert Atkins MEP Q 231, Dr Cornelius Adebahr DGAP paragraph 4.8, Brussels and Europe Liberal Democrats (BELD) Back

19 See written evidence by Dr Hylke Dijkstra, paragraphs 1-10, for background to the formation of the EEAS. Back

20 Q 2 Back

21 Q 66 Back